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Abstract   
 
After the Nazi Holocaust, the international community vowed to prevent genocide from 
occurring in the future. Yet, genocide has continued to occur. Accordingly, this study 
seeks to better understand why and how genocide takes place. I ask two key questions: 1) 
What are the causes of genocide at societal, state, and international levels? and 2) What 
accounts for temporal and regional variation in violence within genocides?  
 
To assess what leads to genocide, I conduct an event history analysis of the preconditions 
of genocide in all countries over the last 50 years. This quantitative analysis examines 
factors associated with the onset of genocide at the societal level (such as ethnolinguistic 
diversity), state level (such as type of government), and the international level (such as 
trade), finding that factors at each level must be considered in order to understand why 
genocides take place and that civil wars are the strongest predictors of genocide.  
 
While the event history analysis treats genocide as a single event, viewing genocide as an 
undifferentiated event misses opportunities to better understand the violence. Thus, the 
second part of this dissertation draws upon three case studies to analyze regional and 
temporal variation in genocidal violence in Rwanda, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Sudan. I 
rely upon quantitative models to test how numerous factors drawn from genocide studies, 
the study of political and ethnic violence, and criminology—such as ethnic diversity, 
resource scarcity, unemployment levels, education levels, or the presence of certain 
armies—influence the onset and magnitude of certain forms of violence at meso levels. I 
also conducted fieldwork and 113 interviews with survivors, scholars, and other 
witnesses.  
 
Overall, I find that the factors associated with regional and temporal differences in 
violence vary based on who the perpetrators are and how they are organized. In Rwanda, 
members of the community who were not part of previously organized formal groups 
participated in the violence. As such, criminology’s social disorganization theory—which 
argues that community cohesion influences crime rates—helps explain variation in this 
violence. In Bosnia-Herzegovina and Darfur, however, previously organized armies and 
militias generally committed the violence. Accordingly, strategic concerns dictated 
patterns.  
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Preface: Stories and Numbers 
 
 
The cab driver dropped me and my research assistant off at the edge of a dirt path leading 
to a large apartment complex. The buildings were short compared to many I had seen in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, though they still managed to invoke the drab Soviet high-rises 
found throughout much of the country. Adis peered at the apartments, attempting to 
differentiate between them. Finally, he pointed to the one whose inhabitants were 
expecting us.  
As we neared the dilapidated building, stray dogs lying on the pavement rose to 
investigate. I followed Adis up a narrow stairway to a door marked with a small number 
12. “This should be their apartment,” he noted as he quietly knocked. A woman in her 
mid-30s promptly opened it. She smiled nervously and hustled us inside, where two sets 
of house slippers had been set out by the door.  
After we slid the slippers over our socks, the woman showed us to the living 
room, hazy with cigarette smoke. Speaking in Bosnian, Adis introduced me to the family 
seated there. Each rose to greet us, and, while many sat on the floor, they indicated that 
the open chair was for me. Eight apprehensive faces, spanning three generations, peered 
at me as the eldest son in the family spoke with Adis. He explained, “I know you were 
only expecting to speak with Velna and myself, but our families live here too. And, they 
also wanted to be here for this.” I nodded as Velna’s daughter brought me a paper plate 
filled with cookies and told Adis that Turkish coffee was being prepared.  
Surveying the room, I wondered how so many people lived in such a small 
apartment. Despite its overcrowding, it was a bit sparse. The war and genocide had taken 
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place almost twenty years ago, but it was clear that the family had yet to recover many of 
the personal belongings they had lost, including their home.  
Velna’s daughter reappeared with coffee, and we began our conversation. Velna 
spoke softly about how four of her children were killed near Srebrenica. She remembered 
how her daughters screamed and how Serb soldiers had called her youngest child a 
“puppy” before they ripped him from her arms. Tears welling in her eyes, Velna repeated 
how she had been unable to save her children.  
As she finished her story, her eldest son held up a family tree he had been 
clutching. One by one, he showed me pictures of their family members, explaining when 
and how they had been killed. “Two of my uncles are still missing,” he noted, pointing at 
two faces. Many Muslim men in Bosnia-Herzegovina are still “missing,” including 
Adis’s own father. Yet, despite the uncertain terminology, we all knew what had 
happened to these men. They had been murdered during the genocide. Their remains had 
been tossed into as-yet undiscovered mass graves.  
I heard multiple other stories that afternoon, and I remain grateful to the family 
for sharing their experiences, tragedy, and wisdom with me. Velna, her relatives, and 
every other person with whom I spoke during the course of this project trusted me with 
the darkest moments of their lives, stories that they struggled to understand for 
themselves. Each of these stories is distinctive and told from a unique perspective. Still, 
these stories and events are also part of broader patterns—patterns that took place over 
and over again in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda, Sudan, and many other countries around 
the world. Velna’s family members are among the millions of people who have been 
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victims of genocide in recent history. She and her surviving family members join 
countless others who remain deeply affected by these genocides to this day.  
In this dissertation, I seek to better understand why genocides happen and how 
they unfold. Throughout the course of this research, I heard many personal stories about 
the genocides. Each person deserves to have her or his story documented, and you will 
read pieces of these stories woven throughout the forthcoming chapters. Yet, the aim of 
this project is not to tell stories but to document and illustrate the broader patterns they 
produce. The aggregate of stories, situations, and events comprise genocide; and I 
attempt to analyze why and how these genocides occurred.  
As such, while I draw upon stories, I base my analysis in statistics. These 
aggregate numbers are necessary for me to share the broader stories of the genocides, 
analyze the patterns of violence, and better understand why and how genocide occurs. 
Such numbers are powerful, though they are reductive. For example, to understand what 
factors influence how many people are killed in each community, individual deaths are 
combined into single quantities collapsed over many units of space and time. Numbers 
like these certainly do not privilege the individual’s story, though they in no way mean to 
diminish it. Instead, I believe these statistics show a different side of the story—how an 
individual’s experience can be contextualized in broader patterns. 
It may be difficult to remember people and their stories amidst what are often 
mind-numbing statistics and (sometimes boring) quantitative models in the following 
pages. But, keep in mind that each number represents life stories and series of events that 
radically altered individuals, families, and societies. As I test and rely on these numbers, 
my broader goal is to use social scientific tools as a response to gross horrors. It is my 
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hope that, through social science, we can assess why genocides occur and better 
understand how to respond to and even prevent them.  
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Chapter 1: The Crime of Crimes 
 
 
“Winston Churchill had called the offense, ‘a crime without a name.’ 
Raphael Lemkin called it ‘genocide.’” 
– James T. Fussell, Prevent Genocide International 
 
 
On December 9, 1948, the United Nations adopted the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Still reeling in the aftermath of the Holocaust, the 
countries of the world declared that genocide was a crime of international law and vowed 
to prevent it. The next day, the United Nations approved the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR), proclaiming that, “Disregard and contempt for human rights 
have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind” (UDHR 
1948). Clearly referencing Nazi Germany’s campaign to eliminate the Jewish people, the 
UDHR reaffirmed that genocide was a scourge.  
These documents defined genocide as a crime for the first time in history, 
marking a precedent in international law. Yet, genocide was hardly new. According to 
historians, the annihilation of communities in Canaan, Homer’s narration of the Trojan 
War, and Roman massacres at Carthage are evidence that genocide has been occurring at 
least as long as history has been recorded (Weitz 2003). Genocide was often part and 
parcel of modern conquest, and many empires eradicated indigenous peoples as they 
expanded their boundaries into “unchartered” territories. Even as the 20th century 
dawned, German colonizers intentionally killed the majority of the Herero, Ovambo, and 
Nama peoples in South-West Africa through starvation and harsh working conditions 
(Hull 2005; Steinmetz 2008), while the Ottoman government systematically exterminated 
between 300,000 and 600,000 Armenians (Akçam 2006).  
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The Genocide Convention and the UDHR were hopeful but unsuccessful. Today, 
pictures of piles of bodies, endless rows of faces behind barbed wire, and starving 
children in refugee camps fill news media around the world and remind us that genocides 
continue to occur with alarming frequency. In fact, since the Holocaust, genocide has 
taken place in over 15 percent of the world’s countries, shown in Figure 1.11  
 
Figure 1.1: Genocides 1955-2005 
 
Some of these genocides captured international attention and are commonly recognized 
as genocides by scholars and activists. These include the slaughter of over one million 
people in Rwanda and the Khmer Rouge’s murder of well over 1.5 million people in 
present-day Cambodia. Other genocides, such as the genocide of Iranian Bahá’ís, are less 
widely known.  
Scholars differ on whether these modern genocides represent a more intense (e.g., 
Bauman 2000; Weitz 2003; Powell 2011) or less dramatic pattern (e.g., Pinker 2011) than 
violence in previous centuries. Some argue that global violence is on a long decline, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 I explain the data I used to create this figure, including the definition of genocide, each 
case included, and the precise time period depicted, in Chapter 2.  
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others suggest that modernity has ushered in more intense genocides.2 Regardless of 
divergent historical perspectives, genocides have affected the lives of millions of people 
throughout the last century. More people were killed by their own governments in the 
20th century than on the battlefields of World War I, World War II, and all other 
international wars of the century combined (Rummel 1995). Further, more people died as 
a result of genocide than as a result of all homicides, manslaughters, and related crimes 
over the century (Brannigan and Hardwick 2003; Savelsberg 2010). As staggering as 
these numbers are, they do not begin to capture the full impact of genocide. The numbers 
of people who flee a country during or after genocide often surpasses the number killed. 
Rape, torture, the destruction of homes, and many other forms of genocidal violence—
including the destruction of cultures and the attempt to erase certain peoples from 
histories—increase victimization tolls beyond measure.  
 Such horrific violence motivates many questions, and I seek to understand why 
and how genocide occurred in the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century. To do so, I 
examine the macro-level risk factors that have influenced the onset of genocide since the 
Holocaust, analyzing whether these genocides were random events or if certain patterns 
can be found in countries where genocide occurred. Then, I focus on three of the most 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Scholars like Weitz, Bauman, and Powell suggest that the modern advent of 
bureaucracy, as well as the relatively modern meanings attached to race and nation, have 
resulted in more intense, systematic genocides. Pinker, on the other hand, argues that 
genocide, as well as many other forms of violence, have been declining over time, falling 
in line with research on the “civilizing process” (Elias 2000) and analyses of long-term 
declines in violent crime (Eisner 2003). Overall, I do not seek to compare the current 
historical period to previous ones and thus do not speak to the debate regarding the 
frequency and intensity of modern violence compared to past violence. Nevertheless, 
much more research over centuries of genocide is needed to validate either argument, and 
both may prove true. Indeed, intensity and frequency are categorically different and may 
illustrate diverse patterns. Today’s genocides may be simultaneously less frequent and 
more intense. 	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recent genocides—those in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda, and Sudan (Darfur)—to better 
understand the dynamics of genocide once it begins. For each case, I consider the 
determinants of the onset and magnitude of genocidal violence at the community level, 
providing a view of the causes and processes of genocide at meso levels as well as a 
glimpse at what drives the violence once it is set in motion.  
 In the following pages, I begin by defining genocide. I then explain how 
sociologists, criminologists, and other social scientists have studied the violence and 
argue that sociological and criminological inquiry should encompass the study of 
genocide. Next, I outline the three main theoretical interventions I make in this project 
and give a brief description of my case selection and methodological strategy. Finally, I 
preview the contents of this dissertation, highlighting each chapter and some of its main 
findings, which I more fully detail in the conclusion.  
Defining the Crime of Crimes 
During the violence in South West Africa, in Armenia, and even during the Holocaust, 
the word “genocide” did not exist. This changed in the early 1940s when a Polish-Jewish 
lawyer named Rafael Lemkin coined the term to describe the events taking place in 
Germany and Poland, drawing a connection with what had taken place in Armenia. He 
combined the Greek word genos, which means people or nation, and the Latin suffix  
–cide, which means murder. Specifically, Lemkin defined genocide as “a coordinated 
plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of 
national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves” (Power 2003:43).  
After coining the term, Lemkin successfully lobbied the General Assembly of the 
United Nations to draft a document on genocide (Power 2003). In 1946, the General 
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Assembly passed Resolution 96(I), affirming genocide as an international crime. This 
resolution was modified and became part of binding international law in the form of the 
1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (otherwise 
known as the Genocide Convention). According to this treaty, genocide is:  
Any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: killing members of the group; 
causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately 
inflicting on the group conditions of life, calculated to bring about its physical 
destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births 
within the group; [and] forcibly transferring children of the group to another 
group (1948).  
 
Subsequent documents, such as the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and 
the criminal tribunals for both the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, have reaffirmed this 
definition. It remains the legal definition of genocide to this day.  
 Legal scholars are quick to point out that intent is a key element of this definition, 
as intent to destroy distinguishes genocide from the many other civilian casualties that 
may occur during wartime (Schabas 2001/2007). For example, the bombs that the United 
States dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War II constitute mass killing, 
but they do not constitute genocide unless intent to destroy the Japanese people could be 
proven.  
Social scientists often concur,3 though most scholars find fault with the 
international legal definition of genocide, casting it as both too broad and too narrow. For 
example, some scholars question what destroying a group “in part” entails, and these 
words have opened up a range of debates about numerical thresholds that will be 
discussed further in Chapter 4 (Weitz 2003). Others argue that the restriction of victim 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Chapter 4 includes a more detailed discussion of the importance of intent as well as the 
different forms of genocidal violence. 	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groups is problematic. While the definition cites members of national, racial, ethnic, or 
religious groups as potential victims of genocide, multiple scholars have urged the 
inclusion of other groups, such as political groups (Kuper 1981; Fein 1993b; Chirot and 
McCauley 2006). According to Kuper (1981) and many others, it is virtually impossible 
to separate the racial, ethnic, national, or religious from the political. Further, political 
groups were included in earlier drafts of the Genocide Convention but eventually 
excluded—in part so that major powers could reserve the ability to act against political 
enemies (Kuper 1994; Orentlicher 1999; Hajjar 2001).  
Clearly, a legal definition created through a political process should not constrain 
sociological inquiry. To this end, many scholars are more inclusive in their studies of 
victims of genocide. Chalk and Jonassohn (1990:23), for example, prefer to leave the 
question of which groups should fall within the limits of the definition to the particular 
situation, “… as that group and membership in it are defined by the perpetrators.” 
Similarly, Helen Fein (1993b:24, emphasis added) has proposed that genocide is 
“sustained purposeful action by a perpetrator to physically destroy a collectivity directly 
or indirectly, through interdiction of the biological and social reproduction of group 
members, sustained regardless of the surrender or lack of threat offered by the victim.”  
 Beyond proposing definitions of genocide that do not restrict group membership, 
scholars have suggested definitions that diverge on the actions that constitute genocide, 
who can be considered a perpetrator, and numerous other factors.4 Indeed, genocide runs 
the risk of becoming an over-defined concept, with each scholar working with a slightly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Many scholars have also created typologies of genocide, often attempting  to 
differentiate between forms of genocide. For example, Fein (1993b) differentiates 
between ideological, despotic, retributive, and developmental genocides, while Kuper 
(1985) differentiates between domestic and international genocides. 	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different definition. Yet, despite some differences, the myriad definitions of genocide 
have much in common. Rather than adding yet another definition to a long list, I follow 
the convergence of scholars’ various demarcations, defining genocide as actions with the 
intent to destroy a social group.  
A Sociology and Criminology of Genocide 
Despite the magnitude of the crime of genocide, sociologists and criminologists have 
been disproportionately quiet in discussions of the causes, constituent elements, and 
resolution of genocide. Indeed, as Hagan and Rymond-Richmond (2009:35) note, “The 
criminology of genocide is only in its infancy.” This is, in many ways, surprising. Both 
sociology and criminology emerged as disciplines in response to intense social change 
and perceived social problems. Indeed, sociology was founded after political and social 
revolutions in 19th century Europe and the United States, and as such, its founders were 
particularly concerned with societal cohesion. Criminologists have likewise been 
concerned with actions that transgress societal norms, focusing even more specifically on 
why people commit crimes. 
 Yet, a confluence of factors has likely kept sociologists and criminologists largely 
on the sidelines of genocide studies. First, genocide is an extremely complex social 
phenomenon, and data to study it are not readily available. “Genocide” has also become 
an increasingly politicized term, appropriated by many victims groups who seek to gain 
recognition of atrocities committed against them and despised by government leaders 
who resent the label when applied to their actions. Along these lines, Hagan and 
Rymond-Richmond (2009) aptly point out that a lack of will to come to terms with 
genocide in the United States’ past has likely also influenced disinterest in genocide.  
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These factors have not deterred other disciplines, however. That points to 
additional reasons for silence. For example, both sociology and criminology within the 
United States have largely kept their attention focused inward on perceived social 
problems inside the country’s borders. Over time, scholarship on the United States has 
simply become more highly valued, which may have deterred international research on 
any topic, including genocide. In addition, genocide has generally remained within the 
purview of the disciplines of history and political science, perhaps creating a path 
dependency of knowledge that is difficult to break (Savelsberg 2010). 
 At the same time, a number of sociologists and criminologists have begun to 
demonstrate what their disciplines can bring to the study of genocide (see, for example, 
the work of Alexander Alvarez, Augustine Brannigran, Bradley Campbell, Daniel Chirot, 
Helen Fein, John Hagan, Susanne Karstedt, Leo Kuper, Eric Markusen, Michael Mann, 
Nicole Rafter, Christopher Powell, Wenona Rymond-Richmond, Joachim Savelsberg, 
and Martin Shaw, among others). These scholars have analyzed why and how some 
genocides have taken place, testing theories generated by scholars in other disciplines and 
creating new ones. They are at the forefront of what I believe will become a large body of 
scholarship bringing sociological and criminological analysis to bear upon genocide. 
Genocide is a structural, systematic, multifaceted, social phenomenon. It is driven 
by ideologies of race, nation, and exclusion; social relationships; and structural forces 
within and between societies. Genocide is also a state crime, and many actions 
perpetrated during genocide—such as killing, enforced disappearance, and rape—are 
crimes by practically any criminal code. For these and many other reasons, sociological 
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and criminological insights into the nature of groups, race, nationalism, ideologies, 
violence, ritual, crime, states, and myriad other social phenomena have much to add. 
Accordingly, I apply sociological and criminological insights to better understand 
why and how genocides occur. To be clear, I do not attempt to uncover a single cause of 
genocide; genocide is far too complex a process to boil down to a straightforward claim 
of causation (or one would hope that cause would have been found by now). Rather, I 
seek to test how theories from within my areas of study can help explain this pressing 
social problem. As such, this dissertation makes three key theoretical interventions, or 
contributions, to scholarly literature.  
Intervention 1: Genocide, Criminology, and Political and Ethnic Violence  
While genocide studies has become an established area of inquiry, it is also 
uniquely positioned to gain from its interdisciplinarity. In fact, cross-concept and cross-
discipline applications are often the most fruitful ways to shed new light on a social 
problem. Applying theories from other disciplines also allows for a test of the scope 
conditions of existing theories. Thus, it is mutually beneficial to explore if and how well-
tested theories in one field might explain other social phenomena—a necessary step 
before building new theories to explain what existing theories cannot.  
In this project, I draw upon established theories from genocide studies. 
Sociologists developed some of these theories, but not all. Rather than ignore the wealth 
of knowledge in history, political science, or other relevant advances in genocide studies, 
I consider and integrate theories from these disciplines as well.   
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 As I also aim to test existing sociological theories, I draw upon two other bodies 
of sociological research5—the study of political and ethnic violence and criminology—to 
better understand genocide and its similarities with and differences from other forms of 
violence. The sociological study of political and ethnic violence, which is itself the 
merging of two previously nonintersecting literatures (Brubaker and Laitin 1998), 
analyzes a wide range of forms of violence, such as civil wars, human rights violations, 
and state repression. Though genocide is a distinct form of violence, it can certainly be 
considered a type of political and/or ethnic violence and may, accordingly, benefit from 
applications of relevant theory (Shaw 2003; Goldstone et al. 2010; Verdeja 2012). For 
example, while civil wars differ from genocide in that they are explicitly two-sided and 
there is no intent to destroy an entire group—regardless of combatant status—they share 
many similarities with genocide and may inform our understanding of it. Similarly, 
genocide is a human rights abuse and has much in common with other forms of state 
repression that violate physical integrity rights. As such, genocide may also be informed 
by findings from the study of human rights violations.  
Just as genocide is a form of political and/or ethnic violence, it can also be 
conceptualized as crime. As noted above, criminologists have largely neglected genocide 
until recently (Alvarez 2001; Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008; Rothe 2009; 
Savelsberg 2010). Genocide is a violation of international law (Rome Statute 2002), and 
much violence perpetrated during genocide, such as murder and rape, violates criminal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  I do not mean to suggest that these are the only bodies of research that apply or that they 
are even the most relevant, as many other theories and areas of inquiry hold insights for 
the study of genocide. For example, genocide is gendered, both in terms of the violence 
committed and who commits it. I do not consider literature relevant to these claims and 
others where they do not inform my study,	  though there is much to be done in terms of 
future research.	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law on an incident basis in most of the world. As genocide is often a state crime, it may 
have properties similar to other forms of state or organized crime. It also involves the 
intent to destroy a social group, bearing a similarity to hate crimes motivated by the intent 
to harm a social group. In addition, genocide is perpetrated through co-offending, much 
like gang-related homicide and white-collar crime. 
Thus, in this dissertation, I draw upon genocide studies, the study of political and 
ethnic violence, and criminology to better understand the onset, process, and meso-level 
dynamics of genocide. By allowing me to better understand how genocide is similar to 
and different from other forms of violence, this approach informs both the study of 
violence more broadly as well as specific knowledge about genocide.  
Intervention 2: Levels of Analysis 
Theories that help explain genocide—as well as crime, war, and other forms of 
violence—emphasize factors at different levels of analysis, such as the individual or the 
state level. In line with this, studies of the causes of genocide often emphasize a 
particular level, privileging depth over breadth. While they are not mutually exclusive, I 
suggest that levels can be grouped within five main approaches, including individual-
centered, group-centered, society-centered, state-centered, and international-centered 
approaches.  
Individual-centered approaches often focus on the perpetrators of genocide. 
Dating back to early studies of German Nazis (see, for example, Adorno, Levinson, and 
Sanford 1950 and Arendt 1963), much of this research finds its roots in psychological 
assessments of genocidaires (those who commit genocide). Yet, while some, like Chalk 
and Jonassohn (1990:28), assume that genocide “requires the recruitment of pathological 
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individuals and criminals,” most scholars disagree. Rather, the majority of research in 
this vein aligns best with the work of psychologists Stanley Milgram (1974) and Philip 
Zimbardo (2007), whose experiments illustrated that psychologically average people 
could commit seemingly unthinkable acts in certain situations. That is to say, most 
research shows that perpetrators of genocide are not, on the whole, psychologically 
unstable; they are, in many ways, ordinary citizens—a paradox that remains the hallmark 
of research on the perpetrators of genocide (Arendt 1963; Browning 1998; Mann 2000; 
Waller 2007).6  
While individual-centered approaches are often applied to the “foot soldiers” of 
genocide, they also may help explain the behavior of those most responsible for 
orchestrating the violence. Valentino (2004), for example, argues that genocide occurs 
because extremist leaders face crisis and must continually adopt more radical policies in 
response. In line with this, Midlarsky (2005) posits that genocide occurs when leaders 
make rational choices in response to a threat, emphasizing how planning and 
orchestrating genocide can be seen as rational rather than pathological.  
An associated approach takes note that genocide has, to date, been perpetrated by 
groups. For example, Fujii (2011) analyzed how ties between perpetrators influenced 
their participation in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Likewise, many scholars who focus 
on perpetrators as individuals also analyze how group pressure and social learning 
influenced their actions (e.g., Browning 1998), often examining the battalions, 
paramilitaries, and other formal organizations that commit genocide (Fletcher 2007; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Though some scholars have argued that perpetrators of genocide are motivated by 
extraordinary hatred (see, for example, the work of Daniel Goldhagen), the notion of 
“ordinary perpetrators” remains a cornerstone of genocide studies. 	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Mueller 2007; Savelsberg 2010). Still others, like Melvern (2006) and numerous scholars 
of the Holocaust, analyze the organizations (such as groups of powerful politicians and 
leaders) that plan, fund, and benefit from genocide.  
 Closely related, society-centered approaches look to the characteristics of the 
society in which the genocide takes place. Studies that take this approach often analyze 
societal diversity with a specific focus on intergroup dynamics and ethnic conflict (e.g., 
Kuper 1981; Campbell 2009). Others focus on the local dynamics of genocide (e.g., 
Straus 2006; Weidmann 2011; Verpoorten 2012). This is a comparatively newer field of 
inquiry, beginning to disaggregate the violence in genocides below the country-year in an 
attempt to understand the importance of local situations and actors in how genocide 
unfolded in a particular region or period. Often, this work draws upon group-centered 
research as well, though it is typically distinguished by a focus on the meso level rather 
than a more micro focus on individuals or specific groups.  
While the Genocide Convention does not specify who can perpetrate genocide, 
state-centered approaches often argue that states have been key forces in the planning 
and execution of modern genocides. In fact, some scholars restrict definitions of genocide 
to instances in which the state is the perpetrator (e.g., Horowitz 1976; Harff 2003; 
Davenport 2007). For them, genocides cannot happen without the will and power of the 
modern state, and aspects of the state are seen as key to understanding why genocide 
takes place. These aspects may include the type of government, though many other state-
level factors, such as the Gross Domestic Product or nation-building processes, have been 
tested. Examples of this approach abound, and they are considered in more detail in 
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Chapter 2. Note also that while I utilize the general term “state,” this approach includes 
the nation state,7 as will be seen in more detail below.  
Lastly, the international system may also influence genocide. The vast majority 
of studies in line with this approach analyze the response to—and, in most cases, the 
failure to respond to—genocide (see, for example, Cushman and Mestrovic 1996; Rohde 
1998; Kuperman 2001; Barnett 2002; Power 2003; and Totten 2013). Apart from this, 
some scholars have considered the link between colonialism and genocide, suggesting 
that colonialism contributes to the formation of in and out groups within societies 
(Mamdani 2001; Levene 2005; Moses and Stone 2013). As the forthcoming chapters 
illustrate, however, a number of other international factors may also influence genocidal 
violence.  
 Taken as a whole, none of these five approaches is sufficient to understanding 
when, why, and how genocide occurs. For example, state-centered approaches often fail 
to explain how the violence unfolded in a particular community, while society-centered 
approaches often fail to explain the onset of violence within a country. Instead, scholars 
must consider some levels in tandem.8  
In this dissertation, I am concerned with broader, structural factors that influence 
why and how genocides occur. For this reason, and because individual-centered 
approaches are often less sociological, I do not rely upon individual-centered approaches. 
Likewise, while group-centered approaches are instrumental to better understanding the 
violence, I place more emphasis on the structural factors that influence patterns in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  This is distinguished from a society-centered approach, which examines features of the 
people rather than features of the nation state or country as a whole.	  	  8	  Clearly, one study cannot consider each level in depth. Integrating factors across levels, 
even with foci at certain levels, will yield many insights. 	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genocidal violence throughout a country. Thus, I pay particular attention to the societal, 
state, and international levels, corresponding with meso and macro factors, though I 
incorporate factors at other levels intermittently.  
Intervention 3: Genocide as a Process  
 Thus far, I have discussed how this dissertation integrates theories from genocide 
studies, criminology, and the study of political and ethnic violence to analyze how factors 
at different conceptual levels influence genocide. But genocide does not happen in a 
single moment. Rather, genocide consists of a collection of actions that ebb and flow over 
time; treating genocide as a single event misses the opportunity to understand what drives 
the violence. Genocide is a process, and studies of genocide must consider temporal 
levels.  
 To be clear, historical work on genocide has long viewed genocidal violence as a 
series of events. Quantitative work has also, in some ways, viewed genocide as a process 
by attempting to narrate and quantify the events that lead to genocide. Many of these 
studies have only utilized one clock—the world historical one—rather than thinking of 
processes at different levels of analysis. In other words, genocide is not only a process; it 
is also a process at individual, group, societal, state, international, and other levels.  
I include several temporal elements in this dissertation. In particular, I examine 
how societal, state, and international factors influence the onset of genocide at the state-
level over time—both generally for all genocides that have occurred since the Holocaust 
and in depth for the recent genocides in Rwanda, Bosnia-Herzegovina (hereafter 
“Bosnia”), and Sudan. In addition, I analyze how community-level factors influence 
genocide with a specific focus on how these and international factors impact the onset 
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and magnitude of violence within communities. Indeed, as a recent annual review noted, 
the most promising avenue for future research on genocide is the microanalysis of sub-
national units, both within and across countries (Owens, Su, and Snow 2013). In line with 
its second theoretical intervention, this dissertation delves into those sub-national units, 
striving to integrate temporal elements when possible.  
To do so, I rely on recent research on the meso- and micro-level dynamics of civil 
wars. As Kalyvas (2008) explains, this research paradigm emerged in response to several 
issues with state-level econometric analyses of war that aggregated the occurrence of war 
into a single number. Inspired by quantitative (e.g., Tong 1991), qualitative (e.g., Brass 
1997; Wood 2003), and mixed-methods studies (Tilly 1978; Tarrow 1998; Varshney 
2003) of contentious politics and violence, research within this new paradigm analyzes 
sub-national contexts to comprehend the micro-level dynamics and mechanisms that 
influence how violent episodes of civil wars unfold. For example, some studies 
(discussed in more detail in Chapters 3-5) assess the process of violence in a particular 
region or why violence started in one town rather than another. This allows for an 
analysis of violence at different levels and time horizons, recognizing that violence is a 
collection of actions and, thus, inherently a process-oriented undertaking. As I explain in 
more detail in Chapter 3, criminologists have long been analyzing violence in much the 
same way.  
This approach remedies some of the pitfalls of macro-level analyses, though it 
excludes macro-historical factors. Taking this more meso, process-oriented approach in 
combination with a focus on different levels, including the state and international levels, 
allows me to analyze both macro- and meso-level dynamics. Thus, drawing upon 
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literature from genocide studies, political and ethnic violence, and criminology, I explore 
the societal, state, and international factors that influence the onset of genocide from a 
macro perspective. Then, I turn to an analysis of the meso-level factors that influenced 
the magnitude and onset of violence at local levels in Rwanda, Bosnia, and Sudan. 
Throughout, I explore different levels of analysis and incorporate temporal dimensions, 
ending, in Chapter 6, with the extension of an emergent theory of genocide that integrates 
separate levels of analysis across time (Hagan and Rymond-Richmond’s 2008/2009 
Collective Action Theory of Genocide).  
Methodological Strategy 
To analyze the factors that influence the onset of genocide as well as regional and 
temporal variation within genocidal violence, I draw upon several methods. As noted 
above, these include a quantitative analysis of the risk factors that influenced the onset of 
genocidal violence in all countries over 50 years as well as mixed-methods case studies 
of violence in Rwanda, Bosnia, and Sudan that draw upon quantitative analysis9 and 113 
interviews. Overall, diverse methodologies allow me to analyze the different conceptual 
levels at play and the processes at some of these levels. Furthermore, they allow me to 
triangulate findings and provide analytic leverage, to which I return in the final chapter.  
To better understand the situations in which genocide occurs, I begin by 
conducting an event history analysis of the risk factors of genocide globally between 
1955 and 2005. This quantitative analysis tests the influence of societal, state, and 
international factors, such as societal diversity, type of government, and membership in 
international organizations, at the country-year level. Its main goal is to test a number of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Quantitative analytic techniques are explained in more detail as they are applied. 	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theories about why genocide occurs and to identify the factors that have been associated 
with its onset in the late 20th and 21st centuries.  
  As the event history analysis examines the influence of different factors 
separately, other methods are necessary in order to understand the preconditions of 
genocide holistically and to explore the process of genocide once it begins. For this, I 
turn to case studies. Comparative genocide studies have long been undervalued, as some 
argue that comparing genocides diminishes their significance (a complaint that may stem 
from a reluctance to compare the Holocaust to other genocides). Nevertheless, 
understanding the general conditions and courses of genocide requires comparison. 
Specifically, to examine different conceptual levels and processes, I analyze the 
cases of Rwanda, Bosnia, and Sudan, three major genocides that occurred during the past 
several decades. In 1994, Rwanda saw more than one million Tutsis and moderate Hutus 
killed in less than four months. At the same time, Bosnia was in the middle of a war and a 
genocide that spanned from 1992 to 1995. This violence took the lives of roughly 
100,000 people and saw the return of concentration camps to Europe. More recently, in 
2003 the Darfur region of Sudan erupted into an unparalleled wave of violence targeting 
the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa peoples. Violence in Darfur continues to this day.  
I chose these cases for theoretical and pragmatic reasons. Each is a modern 
genocide that occurred during the same world historical period. As noted, while 
genocides have been occurring for centuries, some genocide scholars differentiate 
genocides that occurred before the 20th century due to relatively recent developments 
concerning race, nation, and the bureaucratic state (Arendt 1951, 1964; Horowitz 1976; 
Weitz 2003). I control for these potential differences through case selection. Additionally, 
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each case occurred after the Cold War and thus was influenced by similar historical 
factors. 
 Partially as a result of their similar timing in history, each of the three cases 
experienced interventions. These interventions, including the presence of peacekeepers 
and determination of safe areas, may have influenced genocidal violence; and I test their 
impact on the process and meso-level dynamics of violence. In addition, each situation 
has been brought to international tribunals. The genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia have 
been tried at the ICTR and ICTY, respectively, while the case of Sudan is currently at the 
International Criminal Court (ICC). This is important because each of these tribunals has 
proven genocidal intent,10 upholding an important aspect of numerous definitions of 
genocide and finding support in scholarly communities that have widely accepted these 
events as genocides (though not without debate).  
 Additionally, from a methodological perspective, an analysis of meso-level 
genocidal violence necessitates data at sub-national levels. The recency of these three 
cases made it feasible to obtain or construct data on the types and intensity of 
victimization. Unfortunately, this is not the case for many genocides that occurred earlier 
in the 20th century.  
 In each case, I begin by outlining the factors that led to genocide. Given the 
flexibility and historical sensitivity of the comparative case method, I can pay attention to 
particular features of the genocides in Rwanda, Bosnia, and Sudan. Specifically, I use 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  The ICTR amassed much evidence that actions throughout Rwanda were genocidal, 
while the ICTY deemed actions in Srebrenica genocide, something I consider further in 
Chapter 4.	  In the case of Sudan, the Office of the Prosecutor has issued warrants, though 
the cases have yet to begin in May 2014. Nevertheless, the pre-trial phases uncovered 
enough evidence for the Prosecutor to confidently issue a warrant for the crime of 
genocide for the President of Sudan, Omar al-Bashir.	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process-tracing (George and Bennett 2004) to observe mechanisms prior to the 
genocides, focusing on turning points (Abbott 2001) and temporal dimensions of social 
life (Aminzade 1992).11 I also utilize history to understand the structural factors under 
which actors were operating and to identify legacies and memories that continue to shape 
the present. Among other things, this provides an opportunity to analyze how the factors 
identified in the event history analysis operated in concrete situations and how 
relationships between these factors influenced the occurrence of genocide.  
 Next, I turn to an analysis of prominent forms of genocidal violence by region and 
over time. In Rwanda, killing was a main form of violence, and detailed information on 
other forms of victimization is unavailable.12 Thus, I analyze the factors that influenced 
meso-level variation in the magnitude and onset of killing. For Bosnia, however, forced 
internment was a key aspect of victimization. So, in addition to analyzing regional and 
temporal variation in killings, I analyze data on the location of concentration camps. And 
in Darfur, mass attacks on villages have been common. Thus, for Sudan, I operationalize 
air strikes as violence and analyze the damage and destruction of villages.13 For the most 
part, I obtained these data in my travels to the respective countries, and I detail the 
specific sources, as well as discuss why forms of violence are likely to have differed, in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Please note that while I do not detail these methodological strategies further, I intend to 
spend much time explaining them when I turn part of this dissertation project into a book.	  	  12	  In my prospectus, I detailed a plan to analyze the number of perpetrators by region 
using the gacaca data. This is not quite possible; while I was able to gain access to these 
data, they are not yet matched to the current administrative boundaries. Thus, this must 
be a future supplement to this project. 	  13	  Again, there are many forms of violence during genocide, and this study does not 
imply that one is more important. Rather, I chose the form of violence to analyze based 
on the relative frequency of that violence and the availability of data. In addition, it is 
difficult to obtain completely accurate data on deaths and other forms of violence during 
mass conflict. I do not strive to obtain exact numbers of victimization but rather seek to 
understand general patterns in variation over time and space. 	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more detail in each chapter.  
  In the course of these studies, I spent two months living in Rwanda and two 
months living in Bosnia. In each, I traveled the country, learning about how the violence 
unfolded, visiting memorials and the sites of main massacres or concentration camps, and 
engaging in interviews and hundreds of informal conversations. As the violence in Darfur 
is ongoing, I was not able to obtain permits to enter Sudan, let alone the Darfur region. 
Thus, for the third case, I interviewed Darfuri refugees in Uganda.14  
 In total, I conducted 113 interviews, including 30 interviews in Rwanda, 40 in 
Bosnia, and 43 interviews for the case of Darfur. I spoke with government officials, 
genocide scholars, employees of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), survivors, and 
other witnesses of the violence in Rwanda and Bosnia and exclusively with victims and 
witnesses for the case of Darfur.15 The data are not meant to be representative. Rather, 
these informational interviews supplemented other data collection efforts by informing 
the analyses of the risk factors of genocide, influencing hypotheses and interpretations of 
findings, and providing additional information that cannot be captured quantitatively, 
such as the role of particular leaders. These interviews also allowed me to assess the 
validity of the patterns found in my quantitative data and cultural differences in the 
quantitative measures I employ, such as unemployment or divorce.  
 In general, I asked respondents about perceived causes of violence, the temporal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Darfuri refugees have fled to several countries, including Chad, South Sudan, and 
Uganda. I have worked with an organization—I-Activism—for more than a year to 
facilitate travel to the refugee camps in Chad. My trip has been cancelled three times. As 
it is not possible to visit these camps without humanitarian organization affiliation, data 
from Chad will come in a future trip to supplement and extend this project.	  	  15	  Again, as the violence is still taking place, it is not possible to live in Darfur and 
conduct interviews with scholars, leaders, and key NGO workers as I did in Rwanda and 
Bosnia.	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and regional variation in the violence, how the violence unfolded in their communities, 
and their perceived impacts of interventions. In addition, I interviewed many people who 
witnessed the violence personally in an attempt to hear narratives from multiple sectors 
of society. Interviews lasted between 30 minutes and 4 hours.16 For each interview, I 
employed a semi-structured technique that allowed for standardized questions and 
flexibility in answers and elaborations (Lofland et al. 2006). In addition, I underwent 
training and spoke with several psychologists about how to ensure I did not induce 
trauma during an interview.  
 In total, 88 of the respondents were men, and 25 were women. This discrepancy is 
largely due to the fact that only five percent of the refugee community in Uganda is 
female17 (thus, just three interviews with Darfuri refugees were with women). In addition, 
most NGO workers and scholars in Rwanda and in Bosnia were men. Beyond this, ages 
ranged from mid-20s to mid-70s. I also attempted to speak with people from different 
ethnic groups, though for each case, the majority of respondents identified with the 
victim group. 
 I conducted each interview in the language chosen by the respondent. If the 
participant preferred English, I conducted the interview alone. If the participant preferred 
the official language of the country (Kinyarwanda, Bosnian, or the Darfuri dialect of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 I asked respondents several other questions for future papers. As with most interview 
projects, only some of the data are represented in this dissertation, though I intend to use 
this interview data in several future papers and projects, including what will hopefully 
become a book. 	  17	  There are two key reasons for this imbalance. First, the trek from Darfur to Uganda is 
long and difficult. Secondly and more prominently, it is culturally rare for women to 
travel without men in Darfur. As many of the refugees in Uganda fled Darfur when they 
were younger and not married, the women refugees in Uganda are typically married to 
men with whom they had fled the violence.  
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Arabic), I worked with a translator. Choosing an appropriate translator was not taken 
lightly. For example, I chose a translator who is fluent in English, Kinyarwanda, and 
Swahili for my interviews in Rwanda. He had lived in Rwanda his entire life, so 
participants recognized his dialect. Additionally, he had collected testimonies for other 
projects and had previous experience as a translator for sensitive interviews. Finally, my 
translator was young, had a caring demeanor, and was a member of the victim group 
himself; thus, it was my hope that he was not threatening to respondents. In general, my 
translators for the other case studies had similar characteristics and qualifications.  
 Overall, these methods allow me to triangulate sources and better understand the 
causes and processes of genocide at multiple levels. Yet, they are not without 
weaknesses. First, it is not easy to draw spatial and temporal boundaries around an 
episode of genocide; genocides have spillover effects into other regions, as Rwanda and 
the Congo illustrate. Furthermore, it is often difficult to pinpoint the precise day that a 
genocide begins or ends, and there are often many ideas about what the beginning or 
ending of a genocide truly means.  
 Second, each level of analysis comes with its own data constraints. At the 
international level, as is explained in Chapter 2, solid, reliable international data do not 
generally exist before the creation of the United Nations during the 1940s. Thus, I am not 
able to include the earlier half of the 20th century in the analysis. Third, data on killings 
and other forms of victimization during genocide are difficult to obtain, particularly at the 
community level. I needed to travel to both Rwanda and Bosnia to physically obtain the 
data, and even then, I only have partial access to these data, as will further be described in 
the methods sections of respective chapters. Nevertheless, data scarcity or data 
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imperfection is no reason to abandon a study. Data are not, and never will be, perfect 
when we are dealing with the social world. Rather, such imperfections must be kept in 
mind when interpreting results.  
 Turning to the project: this dissertation proceeds as follows. In Chapter 2, I employ 
an event history analysis to analyze the factors that influenced the occurrence of genocide 
in 153 countries between 1955 and 2005. I consider risk factors of genocide at societal, 
state, and international levels, finding that factors at each level influence genocidal onset 
but that civil war and other forms of upheaval are the strongest predictors of genocide. I 
also test how these factors influence the presence of an exclusionary ideology and show 
that many factors proposed to explain genocide better explain exclusionary ideologies.  
 Chapter 3 turns the focus to Rwanda. After providing a history of the factors that 
led to the 1994 genocide and providing an overview of the patterns of genocidal violence, 
I analyze what influenced community-level variation in the rate of killing. I focus on 
targeted violence and ideologies that motivated violence; the community’s ability to 
organize against crime; population pressures; organized actors; and broader spatial and 
temporal factors (such as proximity to a border or distance from the capital). These data 
generally show that the factors that influenced the onset of genocide are not sufficient to 
explain how it unfolded. Instead, as the perpetrators of the violence were largely 
members of communities who were not part of previously organized formal groups, I find 
that criminological theories pertaining to community rates of crime help inform the rate 
of genocidal killing in Rwanda. I also find that population pressures, widely heralded as a 
key factor in driving violence, did not influence community-level rates of killings and 
that the Rwandan institution of education had a dark side. The second part of this chapter 
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assesses whether the factors that influenced the rate of killings in communities also 
influenced the onset of violence in each community, generally finding that they did not.  
 Chapter 4 considers the genocide in Bosnia. Again, I begin with a historical 
narrative of the factors that led to the genocide. Then, after briefly considering the 
patterns in the violence, I provide a more detailed discussion of why violence in Bosnia 
constituted genocide. While Rwanda is a clear example of genocide, the violence in 
Bosnia is often analyzed as a civil war rather than as a civil war and genocide, 
necessitating a discussion about the differences between these forms of violence. The 
first part of the analysis considers municipality-level variation in the number of killings 
of soldiers, killings of civilians, and concentration camps, applying the theories tested in 
Chapter 3 when relevant. Due in part to the structure of participation in the violence, I 
find that the factors that influenced municipality levels of killings and concentration 
camps more closely reflect organizational strategy (such as the goal for a “Greater 
Serbia” influencing more violence in regions closer to Serbia) than characteristics of the 
community, as found in Rwanda. Then, in the second portion of the chapter, I again test 
how these factors influence the onset and magnitude of violence over time, generally 
finding that the same factors that influenced the magnitude of violence also influenced 
variation in onset in Bosnian municipalities—again confirming the more top-down nature 
of genocidal violence.  
 In Chapter 5, I extend the analysis to an ongoing episode of genocide—the 
genocide in the Darfur region of Sudan. As the genocide is currently unfolding, the 
analysis necessarily takes a different form. Like in Chapters 3 and 4, I begin by detailing 
the road to genocide and explaining the patterns of violence and its perpetrators. I then 
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rely upon descriptive techniques to analyze the factors that influenced the bombing of 
villages as well as damaged and destroyed villages. I analyze analogous factors to those 
tested in Chapters 3 and 4, finding that the violence targeted certain groups and that other 
factors related to the unfolding of civil wars, such as elevation and location near a border, 
are associated with violence in this case.  
 In Chapter 6, I conclude by exploring the preconditions of genocide, analyzing 
how the case studies support conclusions from Chapter 2 and assessing whether anything 
else can be gleaned from studying the preconditions of genocide in Rwanda, Bosnia, and 
Sudan. Generally, I find further support for the argument that strain and threat to the 
government influence genocide and highlight the importance of ideology as well as of 
ethnic-based political organization and previous targeted violence, two factors that I was 
unable to test in Chapter 2.  
Then, I analyze the factors that influenced regional and temporal variation in each 
of the three cases. I assess patterns across the cases, finding that some factors, such as the 
ethnic population and the presence of armed actors, influenced the patterns of violence in 
each of the three cases. Yet, I also find that who the perpetrators are and how they are 
organized influences patterns in violence, with community characteristics (theorized 
through criminology) mattering more when the perpetrators are “ordinary” members of 
communities who perpetrate violence more spontaneously, and factors related to strategy 
and civil war (drawn from literature on political and ethnic violence) having more 
explanatory power when the violence is enacted mainly by previously organized 
militaries and militias.  
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To capitalize on the ability to examine both the macro-level factors that 
influenced the onset of genocide and the meso-level factors that influenced the process of 
genocide, I then briefly compare findings from Chapter 2 with findings from the case 
studies, again illustrating that the factors that influence onset are not sufficient to explain 
regional and temporal variation within genocidal violence. Finally, I draw on all of the 
chapters to inform a recent theory of genocide proposed by Hagan and Rymond-
Richmond (2008, 2009)—the Collective Action Theory of Genocide. I integrate my 
findings, analyze the process of genocide across analytic levels, and inform a promising 
new theory. I close by considering future directions for genocide studies within 
sociology.  
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Chapter 2: Assessing Risk Factors of Modern Genocide18 
 
“‘Never Again’ is in fact ‘Again and Again.’” 
-Samantha Power, Scholar and Diplomat 
 
After millions were killed during the Holocaust, the international community vowed to 
prevent genocide in the future. The phrase “Never Again” echoed throughout the world, 
and the United Nations initiated work on the Genocide Convention. Today we are faced 
with the reality that it has happened again. In fact, genocide has claimed more lives than 
were lost in international wars during the 20th century. It has displaced millions and left 
indelible marks on peoples and cultures around the world.  
 In this chapter, I begin with a macro approach to genocide. While popular thought 
long considered genocide inexplicable, recent research is beginning to better understand 
the conditions under which it is more likely occur. This chapter contributes to this 
research by exploring what influenced the occurrence and duration of genocide between 
1955 and 2005. Using event history analysis techniques, I argue that societal, state, and 
international factors must be considered if we are to comprehend the situations in which 
genocide occurs.  
  Overall, this chapter makes three primary contributions that are directly in line 
with the three interventions discussed in Chapter 1. First, it integrates previous findings 
with new insights from genocide studies and from the study of political and ethnic 
violence and criminology—areas of inquiry that can inform the study of genocide and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 This chapter is a modified version of a paper that has been resubmitted for 
consideration at the American Journal of Sociology. Some parts of Chapter 1, such as 
interventions 1 and 2, are included in the journal article format of this chapter, which 
explains the relatively short literature review in this format.  
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help differentiate it from other forms of violence. Second, the chapter considers potential 
risk factors of genocide at societal, state, and international levels and tests how they 
explain both occurrence of genocide as well as the presence of an exclusionary ideology. 
Lastly, it capitalizes on the importance of time, absent in previous research, by analyzing 
when and for how long genocidal violence occurred.  
 To accomplish these goals, I first outline hypotheses regarding the occurrence of 
genocide, drawing upon hypotheses at the societal, state, and international levels. Then, I 
use event history analysis to test these hypotheses, highlighting the importance of civil 
war and other forms of strain and upheaval. Finally, I analyze the duration of genocide 
and perform several tests of robustness and mechanisms, including restricting the analysis 
to countries that experienced civil war and analyzing the determinants of an exclusionary 
ideology. 
Risk Factors of Genocide19 
Sociologist Irving Louis Horowitz (1976) was one of the first scholars to argue that 
genocide is not a random event. Genocide does not just happen, nor is it ever an 
inevitable outcome of a situation. Rather, certain social situations influence the 
occurrence of genocide in particular times and places. Consequently, a body of literature 
on the factors that contribute to genocide has begun to emerge. I test findings from this 
literature, though I also consider prominent explanations for similar forms of violence, 
such as civil wars, human rights violations, and violent crime. As I focus on the structural 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  There are only a handful of studies that make general causal claims about genocide. 
Causation is difficult to prove, especially in the case of such a multifaceted phenomenon. 
I focus on factors that increase or decrease the odds of genocide. While these could be 
termed probabilistic causes, I use the term “risk factor” so as not to misrepresent the 
claims of other authors.  
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factors that influence the onset of genocide, my hypotheses are informed by society-, 
state-, and international-centered approaches.  
Society-Centered Approaches: Intergroup Dynamics  
The society in which genocide occurs may hold clues about its onset. For 
example, several scholars have argued that ethnic and linguistic heterogeneity20 increases 
the odds of genocide (e.g., Kuper 1981) or, at a minimum, that some degree of cultural 
distance must exist for genocide to occur (e.g., Campbell 2009). Several studies of civil 
wars confirm that ethnic diversity increases the likelihood of war (Vanhanen 1999; 
Sambanis 2001), and analyses of other crimes, ranging from studies of homicide (e.g., 
Sampson and Groves 1989) to hate crime (e.g., Lyons 2008), come to similar 
conclusions.21  
 However, recent studies of political violence have gone beyond the notion that 
population heterogeneity is associated with higher odds of violence, turning instead to 
examine how ethnic diversity is reflected within societal power relations. Fearon and 
Laitin (2003) and Wimmer, Cederman, and Min (2009) found that societal diversity was 
not associated with higher odds of civil war; instead, violence is more likely to plague 
states that exclude segments of the population from political power, especially along 
ethnic lines. Indeed, Harff (2003) found that countries where the ethnicity of elite rulers 
was a source of recurring conflict, especially when it differed from that of the broader 
population, had higher odds of genocide. In line with these theories, I expect that ethnic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  I use the term “ethnicity” for this variable (as well as the variable on elite ethnicity 
described on this page) because this is the term that those who created the data utilize. In 
the next chapter, I further detail how I conceptualize ethnicity as well as race.  21	  These theories have largely been created and tested to explain community- and 
neighborhood-level variation in violence. Yet, they may also be applied at the country-
level.	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heterogeneity is not associated with higher odds of genocide. More specifically, I expect 
that the odds of genocide will be higher when the ethnicity of elite rulers within a society 
is a recurring source of conflict. 
Beyond ethnic and linguistic diversity of both members of society and their rulers, 
the age structure of a society may influence violence. Several studies have found that 
higher percentages of youth are associated with political violence, as youth bulges may 
increase both the opportunities and motives for participation (Goldstone 1991; Urdal 
2006). It is also well established that higher proportions of youth participate in most 
forms of crime (Hirschi and Gottfredson 1983). Accordingly, I include a measure of 
youth bulges, and I hypothesize that youth bulges are associated with higher odds of 
genocide. 
Lastly, societal ideologies that turn dehumanizing and exclusionary may fuel 
genocide (Kuper 1981; Chalk and Jonassohn 1990; Fein 1993b; Harff 2003; Chirot and 
McCauley 2006; Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008). These ideologies result in the 
exclusion of individuals from the universe of obligation, a notion drawn from 
Durkheim’s theory of the collective conscience (Fein 1993b). The isolation, in turn, 
influences criminal behavior that is not seen by perpetrators or broader society as 
criminally or morally wrong. Thus, I expect that the presence of exclusionary ideologies 
will increase the odds of genocide.22  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Note, however, that existing data measure the ideology of state actors, which is 
assumed to strongly influence societal-level ideologies (Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 
2008). In addition, I would ideally be able to examine both exclusionary and 
dehumanizing ideologies, but data on dehumanizing ideologies for all countries over 
these years do not exist. It is noteworthy, however, that while many forms of ideologies 
can be exclusionary (such as nationalism), exclusionary ideologies in this context are 
narrower. As explained in this chapter, exclusionary ideologies in this context include an 
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State-Centered Approaches: National Politics and Economy 
As the state has been involved in every recent genocide, state-centered approaches 
examine characteristics of the state to assess how they may influence the occurrence of 
genocide. Specifically, the form of government is related to the likelihood of civil war, 
human rights abuses, and many forms of crime, with democracies having much lower 
odds of violence in each case (Rummel 1991; Poe and Tate 1994; Cooney 1997; Fearon 
and Laitin 2003; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009). Genocide scholars have also 
argued that democracies have lower odds of genocide (Kuper 1981; Fein 1993a; Harff 
2003) because they retain checks and balances through a system of popular participation 
that prevents leaders from organizing and committing acts of violence.  
 While many of these theories pertain to established democracies, transitions to 
democracy may have a very different effect. Mann (2005) argues that countries 
undergoing democratic transition are more likely to engage in murderous cleansing and 
posits that the democratic rule of the majority can have pernicious consequences. For 
Mann, “we the people” often defines “people” by ethnicity, creating a basis for excluding 
others during transitions. In line with this, some scholars have argued that partial 
democracies are more unstable and dangerous than full democracies or even full 
autocracies (Tilly 1978; Goldstone et al. 2004). Accordingly, I predict that established 
democracies have comparatively lower odds of genocide but that countries undergoing a 
democratic transition have higher odds of genocide.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
overriding principle or purpose that excludes some segments of people and are used to 
restrict or persecute categories of people who are defined as antithetical to that purpose.  	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Broader state capacity may also influence the odds of genocide. While long-
independent countries have been establishing economies and legal structures for years, 
countries that formed amid the cries for self-determination after World War II may rest 
on different foundations (Rotberg 2004; Hironaka 2005). These comparatively newer 
states, like Rwanda or Sudan, have seen overambitious attempts to impose state control, 
which have been linked to the presence of political and ethnic violence (Hironaka 2005). 
Further, new states often try to impose a strong sense of national identity, which may 
have exclusionary elements (Levene 2005; Verdeja 2010). Thus, I expect that long-
standing states have lower odds of genocide. 
Similarly, although the Holocaust was perpetrated by a developed nation with 
many resources at the perpetrators’ disposal, the majority of modern genocides have 
occurred in developing countries. Multiple studies have found that conflict, as well as 
human rights violations and many forms of societal and state crime, are more likely in 
countries with low economic development (Davenport 1995; Poe et al. 1999; Goldstone 
2002; Totten and Parsons 2008; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009).23 Accordingly, I 
hypothesize that economic development, measured by GDP, is negatively associated with 
genocide.24 
Related, studies of civil war have linked the onset of violence to conditions that 
foster insurgency (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Beyond poor economic development, rough 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  As multiple studies of international crime have found crime to be associated with 
inequality (e.g., Gartner 1990; Messner and Rosenfeld 1997), I would ideally include a 
measure of income inequality. However, these measures (such as the Gini Coefficient) 
are not available for most countries until 1970, so they are not included.	  	  24	  Note that I also test urban growth as an alternate measure of development, which is 
associated with significantly lower odds of genocide. It is excluded from analysis 
however, because data are missing the earlier years of the study.  
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terrain may facilitate insurgency and violence due to its distance from state power and 
control. To test this, I include a measure of elevation and hypothesize that elevation is 
associated with higher odds of genocide. Yet, as the state often perpetrates genocide, I 
recognize that the effect of rough terrain may be insignificant or may even run in the 
reverse direction.  
The context in which a regime operates is also crucial and informs a number of 
hypotheses. Many genocides, such as those in Cambodia and the former Yugoslavia, 
occurred during periods of crisis and change. Consequently, the criminological concepts 
of strain and anomie may help explain risk factors of genocide. Building on Durkheim 
(1893), Merton (1938), and—more recently—Agnew (1985), scholars have advanced an 
idea that strain may motivate crime. Although strain, or pressure, is often seen as a micro-
level factor, it has more recently been seen as a macro-level factor as well, suggesting 
that communities and, in this case, perhaps even governments, adopt to strain in various 
ways. In this context, structural conditions produce strain and, thus, crime and violence 
(Maier-Katkin et al. 2009). Indeed, both Fein (1993b) and Harff (2003) found that 
upheaval was associated with genocide. While these studies do not disaggregate types of 
upheaval, different perceived crises—such as civil wars, revolutions, coups, population 
pressure, and resource scarcity—may have diverse impacts on the odds of genocide.  
Specifically, Poe and Tate (and, in 1999, Linda Camp Keith) found that civil war 
increased human rights abuses within states due to perceptions of threat (1994). Based on 
this finding and research that links genocide and civil war (e.g., Straus 2006), I expect 
civil wars increase the odds of genocide. Similarly, abrupt regime change has been 
theorized as a risk factor of genocide (Fein 1993a; Krain 1997; Weitz 2003). Beyond 
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influencing anomie and strain linked with rapid sociopolitical change at the macro level 
(Zhao and Cao 2010), regime change may permit repressive leaders to come to power 
(Melson 1992; Fein 1993b). Consequently, I predict that states that have had recent 
regime transitions will have higher odds of genocide and that, in particular, coups and 
revolutions are associated with higher odds of genocide.  
Population pressures may also influence genocide. Several scholars have argued 
that the strain caused by population change is associated with increased repression due to 
uncertainty regarding resources and security (Henderson 1993; Raleigh and Urdal 2007; 
Agnew 2012). Large populations have also been linked to the presence of civil war 
(Fearon and Laitin 2003; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009). For some genocides, like 
that in Rwanda, multiple scholars have cited high population density as a risk factor of 
violence (Prunier 1995; Des Forges 1999). Although studies of civil war, crime, and 
human rights violations have found divergent results on this front, some have found 
support for this relationship (e.g., Homer-Dixon 1999). Accordingly, I include measures 
of population, population growth, and population density, and I expect that each will 
increase the odds of genocide.  
Much in line with this, resource scarcity has been theorized as a contributing 
factor to genocide (Diamond 2005; Tubiana 2007; Verpoorten 2012). While there are 
multiple theories about the mechanisms of scarcity-induced conflict (see Olzak 1990, 
1992; Homer-Dixon 1994), the link between the environment and violent conflict is of 
growing interest, especially considering recent genocides in Africa. Consistent with these 
theories, I expect that resource scarcity, measured through agricultural area, is 
associated with higher odds of genocide. Yet, as resource abundance has also been linked 
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to conflict (Collier and Hoffler 2004; Ross 2006), I test measures of oil production and 
diamond deposits.  
International Approaches and Dimensions 
Finally, the international context may impact the occurrence of genocide. Just as 
war within a country may influence the odds of genocide, international war may 
contribute to a regime’s perception of threat; elevated fear and uncertainty during times 
of conflict often influence repression (Erikson 1966; Skocpol 1979; Rummel 1995; 
Levene 2005; Chirot and McCauley 2006; Davenport 2007). I therefore expect that 
international war is associated with higher odds of genocide. In addition, I include a 
measure for war in a bordering country, which I hypothesize is associated with increased 
odds of genocide. 
As noted in Chapter 1, many scholars have also considered a link between 
genocide and colonial history,25 pointing to the colonizers’ creation of boundaries as a 
precipitating factor to violence (Mamdani 2001; Levene 2005). In addition, studies of 
determinants of human rights violations have found that, in some cases, colonial history 
is associated with human rights violations (Poe and Tate 1994). Thus, I expect that a 
history of colonialism is associated with higher odds of genocide.  
   While most other international-centered studies have examined how international 
actors failed to respond to genocide (e.g., Power 2003), scholars have begun to consider 
several other international influences. In particular, economic interdependency has been 
cited as a factor that could decrease the odds of genocide (Harff 2003). Defenders of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  This paper does not deny that genocide occurred during colonialism; however, due to 
the time period studied, it focuses on colonialism’s legacy—the idea that the view of the 
colonized as “others” remains long after colonial rule. 	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globalization claim increased trade leads to better human rights practices because 
economic interdependency, manifested through trade openness, promotes engagement in 
the international system. A high degree of trade openness also implies that a country has 
more resources, which may help in averting or managing crises (Goldstone et al. 2002). 
Accordingly, I expect that trade openness is associated with lower odds of genocide.26  
States are also connected through membership in international governmental and 
nongovernmental organizations, and these relationships may serve as an international 
system of checks and balances (Fein 1993a; Harff 2003). International nongovernmental 
organizations (INGOs) are important actors in the field of human rights, and their 
presence has been linked to respect for human rights within a country (Tsutsui and 
Wotipka 2004; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005). Therefore, I expect that membership in 
international governmental and nongovernmental organizations are each associated with 
lower odds of genocide. 
 From a more top-down perspective, world polity scholars argue that states attempt 
to comply with desirable global scripts and norms (Meyer et al. 1997; Boli and Thomas 
1999). One way to do this is by ratifying international human rights treaties, which in 
turn encourage compliance through treaty monitoring mechanisms, conferences, and 
other measures. While the effects of human rights treaties vary (e.g., Cole 2012), I expect 
states that have ratified the Genocide Convention have lower odds of genocide.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  On the other hand, some scholars believe that involvement with capitalism and foreign 
investors increases human rights violations. For example, Chomsky and Herman (1979) 
find that human rights abuses increase in developing countries that receive aid and 
investment from the U.S. However, the World Bank Development Indicator data on this 
measure had too many missing values for the years covered by this study. Bivariate 
regression with foreign direct investment net inflows (as a percent of GDP) showed that 
foreign investment is associated with lower odds of genocide, however. 	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 Together, I expect that societal, state, and international factors all influence the 
odds of genocide. Importantly, I do not view these as rigid categories or as deterministic 
causes of genocide but rather as general risk factors of genocide in the time period 
studied. The factors discussed are summarized in Figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1: Risk Factors of Genocide 
 
Data, Measures, and Methods 
To assess the risk factors of modern genocide, I analyze data for 153 countries between 
1955 and 2005. The 1950s represented a new era in international law with the adoption of 
the Genocide Convention and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. I 
chose to stop the analysis at 2005 so that time will have passed to ascertain whether 
genocides occurred, and I include as many countries as possible in the dataset. Those 
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excluded are small countries that lacked data on many variables; thus, the dataset 
contains 153 countries and 5,458 country-years.  
 Data are obtained from a variety of sources, including the Political Instability 
Task Force, Genocide and Politicide Project, Ethnic Armed Conflict Dataset, Ethnic 
Power Relations Dataset, Major Episodes of Political Violence Dataset, Penn World 
Table, Polity IV Annual Time Series Dataset, World Development Indicators, Yearbook 
of International Organizations, UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, Diamond Dataset, 
Food and Agricultural Organization, Ross, and Fearon and Laitin.27 I utilize listwise 
deletion for missing data, which lessens the likelihood of inferential errors (Allison 
2001). I use linear interpolation when appropriate.28 
Dependent Variable: Genocide 
 As noted above, genocide scholars criticize the legal definition of genocide as 
being both too broad and too narrow, and many scholars have proposed alternatives. As 
such, there is not consensus about which events between 1955 and 2005 should be 
considered genocide. Yet, several case sets have been proposed, and I employ two of 
them.  
First, I use the definition and designation of cases of genocide created by the State 
Failure Project (also known as the Political Instability Task Force, or PITF). The PITF 
included scholars who spent several years creating datasets on international conflict 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Citations include Fearon and Laitin 2003; Ross 2006; Gilmore et al. 2007; Harff 2008; 
Cederman et al. 2008, 2009; Marshall 2009; Heston et al. 2010; Marshall and Jaggers 
2010; Political Instability Task Force 2009; World Bank 2010; FAO 2012. 
28 All bivariate models were run with and without interpolated data. The effects remained 
constant.  
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(Harff and Gurr 1998). Their coding of genocides and politicides involved four key 
criteria: 
1) States or authorities must commit the killings or demonstrate complicity;  
2) Evidence must show intent on the part of the authorities to isolate group members 
for mistreatment;  
3) The victims must be members of an identifiable group; and 
4) Actions committed pose a threat to the survival of members of one of these 
groups.  
 
The events that meet these four criteria are presented in Appendix A (Harff 2003; PITF 
2009).29 Notably, since Harff (2003) published the results of her study using these cases, 
the PITF has added two additional cases of genocide—Nigeria in 1967 and Zimbabwe in 
1983. They are included in this study. It is also noteworthy that the PITF’s coding 
restricted the definition of genocide to events where the state or authorities were 
perpetrators of or complicit in the violence. This restriction is a point of contention 
among scholars, as other actors could feasibly perpetrate genocide. Yet, the state or its 
authorities have been involved—actively or tacitly—in all modern genocides.  
Further, as discussed in Chapter 1, the legal definition cites members of national, 
racial, ethnic, or religious groups as potential victims of genocide, but this study includes 
political groups. Multiple scholars have urged this inclusion (Kuper 1981; Fein 1993b; 
Chirot and McCauley 2006), as it is virtually impossible to separate the racial, ethnic, 
national, or religious from the political.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Harff’s previous classifications of genocide have been criticized for focusing on the 
state as a case rather than particular victim groups in an attempt to create a general 
classification (Fein 1993a). While I understand this criticism, the reality of international 
quantitative data as well and the involvement of the state in modern genocides validate 
the use of state-level data. 	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Countries are censored after the year they experience their first genocide during 
the time period analyzed.30 Several countries have experienced a second genocide based 
on the coding of the PITF, and both Fein (1993a) and Harff (2003) cite previous genocide 
as a predictor of genocide. However, since these effects may be difficult to disentangle 
and the determinants of a first genocide may be different from those that precede the 
second, this paper focuses on the former. I did, however, test repeated cases to ensure 
there were no key differences in findings. 
Lastly, I also test the robustness of the results with a restricted set of cases based 
on Helen Fein’s (1993a) coding. Fein analyzed cases that included sustained, purposeful 
action by a perpetrator (not necessarily the state) to physically destroy a collectivity, 
directly or indirectly. Her list is drawn from a compilation of other studies, and I use the 
11 cases and associated years from Fein’s study. In addition, I include Guatemala (Fein 
did not include Latin America in her cases) and recent cases of genocide beyond the date 
of her study that fit her classification scheme, including the genocides in the former 
Yugoslavia and Sudan. Cases included are starred in Appendix A, and Fein’s onset years 
are noted in parentheses.31  
Independent Variables  
 Countries enter the risk set in 1955 or the year they gained independence (if 
independence took place after 1955). Ideally, countries would be included before 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Clearly, while the paper refers to the “first genocide,” some countries (like Germany) 
experienced a genocide before the period of study. However, to my knowledge, none of 
the countries that experienced genocide in the time period studied experienced genocide 
in the time period immediately preceding 1955. 	  
31 Bivariate analyses were also run with the restricted cases, and the significance, 
direction, and magnitudes of results were very similar to those presented in Table 3. Mid-
level democracy variable was excluded, as it was “0” for all restricted cases that had 
experienced genocide. 
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independence, as genocides could be linked to independence struggles, but pre-
independence international data are virtually nonexistent. Thus, time is measured as the 
years since a country enters the risk set and is logged to best fit the data, though other 
measurements of time were tested, as explained below. Table 2.1 includes descriptive 
statistics and operationalization of all variables.  
 
 
Table 2.1 Dependent and Independent Variables for Chapter 2 
 
Dependent Variable Description No Genocide Genocide Range 
Genocide 0 = No genocide 
occurred                   
1 = Genocide 
occurred  
123 countries 
(5,428 years) 
30 countries 
(30 years) 
0.00 to 1.00 
     
Independent Variables Mean          
(No Genocide) 
Mean      
(Genocide) 
Range 
Societal     
Ethnolinguistic 
Diversity 
Probability that 
two randomly 
drawn individuals 
from a country 
are from different 
linguistic groups 
0.39 0.49 0.00 to 0.93 
Ruling Elite 
Ethnicity 
0 = Elite ethnicity 
is not a recurring 
source of conflict                                       
1 = Elite ethnicity 
is a recurring 
source of conflict 
0.36 0.84 0.00 to 1.00 
Youth Bulge Percent 15-24 
year-olds relative 
to adult 
population (15 
and older) 
29.25 31.92 12.01 to 41.05 
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Exclusionary 
Ideology 
0 = Ruling elite 
do not retain an 
exclusionary 
ideology                                                
1 = Ruling elite 
retain an 
exclusionary 
ideology 
(See Appendix B) 
0.22  0.58 0.00 to 1.00 
State       
Democracy -10 (full 
autocracy) to 10 
(full democracy) 
0.17 -4.32 -10 to 10 
Mid-level 
Democracy 
0 = -10 to 0 and 6 
to 10 on 
democracy scale 
1 =  1 to 5 on 
democracy scale 
0.08  0.06 0.00 to 1.00 
Democratization Democracyyear - 
Democracyyear-1 
0.08 -1.14 -18 to 16 
Colonial Past Proportion of 
years that state 
was under 
imperial rule 
(between 1816 
and the respective 
year)32 
0.48  0.53 0.00 to 1.00 
Regime Durability Number of years 
regime has 
existed since 
1800 or since last 
regime change 
21.54  5.26 0 to 157 
GDP per capita GDP divided by 
midyear 
population; data 
are measured in 
thousands of 
constant 2000 
U.S. dollars 
(logged) 
1.30 0.43 -3.09 to 4.49 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  Quantiative data for this measure do not exist before 1816; thus, this is the cut-off 
point for this analysis.	  The same is true of the measure of regime durability, which begins 
in 1800.	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Civil War 0 = No civil war 
taking place 
1 = Civil war 
(1000 battle 
deaths) taking 
place 
0.07 0.71 0.00 to 1.00 
Coup 0 = Coup not 
taking place 
1 = Coup taking 
place                   
 
0.07 0.35 0.00 to 1.00 
Revolution 0 = Revolution 
not taking place 
1 = Revolution 
taking place    
0.05 0.45 0.00 to 1.00 
Population Coded in 
thousands and 
logged 
8.86 9.61 5.22 to 13.90 
Population Change Populationyear - 
Populationyear-
1/populationyear-133 
2.01 2.31 -95.89 to 56.86 
Population Density Midyear 
population 
divided by land 
area (km squared) 
(logged) 
3.66 3.68 0.49 to 8.73 
Agricultural Area Area of land 
(1000 Ha) that is 
arable, a 
permanent crop, 
or a permanent 
pasture (logged) 
0.80 0.99 0.00 to 4.08 
Oil Production Oil production in 
hundreds of 
thousands of 
metric tons 
(logged) 
1.77 1.91 0.00 to 8.73 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  I also tried population change with the logged value, which did not produce 
qualitatively different results. 	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Diamond Deposits Total number of 
lootable and 
nonlootable 
diamond deposits 
in country 
8.66 4.32 0.00 to 239.00 
 Mountainous 
Terrain 
Percent of 
country that is 
mountainous 
16.50 27.24 0.00 to 74.50 
International  
 
   
Trade Openness Exports + 
imports/ GDP 
60.06 42.08 1.09 to 442.47 
INGOs Number of 
international 
nongovernmental 
organizations to 
which any citizen 
in a country 
belongs (logged) 
5.61 4.82 0.00 to 8.34 
IGOs Number of 
international 
governmental 
organizations to 
which a country 
belongs (logged) 
3.63 3.19 0.00 to 4.65 
Ratification 0 = Has not 
ratified Genocide 
Convention                           
1 = Has ratified 
Genocide 
Convention 
0.60 0.58 0.00 to 1.00 
International War Magnitude score 
of episode(s) of 
international 
warfare involving 
that state in that 
year scale: 1 
(lowest) to 10 
(highest); 
magnitude scores 
for multiple are 
summed; 0 
denotes no 
episodes  
0.06 0.35 0.00 to 9.00 
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Bordering War 0 = War did not 
take place in any 
bordering country 
in previous five 
years 
1 = War took 
place in at least 
one bordering 
country in 
previous five 
years              
 
0.55 0.79 0.00 to 1.00 
Time Years a country is 
at risk of 
genocide; starting 
point is 1955 or 
year of 
independence for 
countries that 
gained 
independence 
after 1955 
(logged)  
2.82 2.38 0.00 to 3.93 
 
Analysis 
 
To assess the risk factors of genocide, I utilize a discrete-time hazard model, 
which draws upon the concept of the hazard, or the instantaneous propensity that an event 
will occur. Unlike many models, hazard models analyze the influence of time and allow 
for time-varying predictors and censoring of data. Specifically, I utilize a discrete-time 
logistic regression model34 (Allison 1984):  
log[Pit/(1- Pit)] = αt + β1Xit1 + … + βkXitk.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  The discrete-time hazard model invokes several assumptions. First, linear additivity, 
which means that a predictor’s effect does not depend on the values of other predictors in 
the model or the position of the unit difference along its scale. Second, it invokes the 
proportionality assumption, that each predictor has an identical effect in every time 
period under study. Finally, the discrete-time hazard model assumes that there is no 
unobserved heterogeneity. Essentially, the population hazard depends only on predictor 
values (Singer and Willett 2003).  
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In this model, Pit represents the probability that country i experiences a genocide in time t 
(or t-1 if lagged). β signifies the effect of the independent variables; X1, X2 . . . Xk denote k 
time-varying explanatory variables; and α represents a set of constants corresponding to 
each discrete-time unit of one country-year. I cluster by country identifier to adjust for 
correlated errors within countries over time.  
Results are presented in odds ratios; coefficients larger than one are associated 
with increased odds of genocide, while coefficients smaller than one are associated with 
decreased odds of genocide. Logistic regression estimates are affected by omitted 
variables and, consequently, change across models should not be directly interpreted 
(Mood 2010). Since odds ratios also reflect the degree of unobserved heterogeneity in the 
model, I estimated the models standardizing on y* and found that all effects remain 
similar across models. The small number of cases of genocide also means that results 
must be interpreted with caution. As such, I ran rare events logit models (Tomz, King, 
and Zeng 1999), and the significance and direction of all results presented below 
remained. While genocide is rare, this paper tests the entire universe of cases considered 
genocide in the time period studied rather than attempting to generalize from a sample. In 
light of this, even correlations are of interest, and results are considered statistically 
significant if their p values are .1 or lower.35 
After presenting results regarding the onset of genocide, I analyze the duration of 
genocide. As factors influencing the duration of genocide have yet to be tested or 
theorized, I test if and how each factor reviewed above also influenced the duration of the 
violence. I use a Weibull model, which specifies a monotonically increasing or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  This is the case throughout this dissertation; populations rather than samples are 
analyzed in every chapter.	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decreasing hazard rate. To test a nonparametric model, I also ran Cox Proportional 
Hazard models. All results remained similar, and as the assumption of proportionality 
was not met, I present the results of the Weibull model, interpreting them cautiously due 
to the even smaller number of cases included.  
Assessing the Onset and Duration of Genocide  
Figure 2.2 illustrates the hazard of genocide over time. Again, countries are at risk when 
they enter the dataset, either in 1955 or in the year they became independent or gained 
recognition. As the figure illustrates, the hazard of genocide continually increases for the 
first 20 years a given country was at risk of genocide. At this point, it declines steadily. 
However, the low hazard 40 years after a country enters the risk set must be interpreted in 
light of the fact that multiple country genocides are not included in this analysis.  
 At first glance, it may appear that countries that gained independence after 1955 
are driving the hazard curve, as it is quite plausible that initial regime instability is 
associated with higher odds of genocide. However, further exploration of the hazard 
(Appendix C) reveals that while these countries did see higher odds of genocide after 
entering the risk set, it is actually countries that were independent or created before 1955 
that experienced an increase in the risk of genocide in the first 20 years of analysis. For 
these countries, the years 1975-1980 were particularly volatile, and multiple global 
factors could account for this particular time trend. For example, this coincides with the 
beginning of the third wave of democracy. It also coincides with the 1973 Oil Crisis and 
the subsequent global economic downturn, suggesting that time and international context 
are important considerations in this analysis.  
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Figure 2.2: Hazard of First Genocide 
 
 
To assess other factors that influenced the hazard of genocide, I begin by 
examining each independent variable separately. Table 2.2 presents the results from 26 
separate discrete-time logit models of a country’s first genocide.36 These models do not 
include control variables other than time. The first column treats time at risk as a linear 
variable, while the second takes the log of time at risk and the third includes years and 
years at risk squared (note that five-year and ten-year periods, as well as cubic splines, 
were examined but are not shown).37 BIC tests revealed that the log of years at risk is the 
best fit. It is used in the subsequent analyses. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 I also ran models with measures of world-level IGOs and world-level INGOs, though 
neither was significantly associated with the odds of genocide.  37	  Due to collinearity, “years” was centered around its mean before squaring. 	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Table 2.2 Predictors of First Genocide, 1955-2005 
Discrete Time Hazard Models with Different Measures of Time 
Results in Odds Ratios 
 
Predictor Model Years at Risk 
Years at Risk     
(Log) Year Squared 
     
Societal          
Ethnolinguistic Diversity 1 2.606 2.638 3.152* 
  (1.630) (1.642) (1.996) 
Ruling Elite Ethnicity 2 8.200*** 8.256*** 7.467*** 
  (4.032) (4.064) (3.416) 
Youth Bulge 3 1.069** 1.072** 1.067** 
  (0.035) (0.034) (0.035) 
Exclusionary Ideology 4 5.708*** 5.918*** 5.211*** 
  (2.403) (2.454) (2.061) 
State        
Democracy 5 0.936*** 0.929*** 0.940*** 
  (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Mid-level Democracy 6 0.665 0.647 0.678 
  (0.498) (0.488) (0.504) 
Democratization 7 0.589*** 0.599*** 0.589*** 
  (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) 
Colonial Past 8 1.377 1.459 1.393 
  (0.814) (0.859) (0.844) 
Regime Durability 9 0.915** 0.917** 0.912** 
  (0.041) (0.039) (0.042) 
GDP per capita (log) 10 0.558*** 0.556*** 0.557*** 
  (0.080) (0.079) (0.081) 
Civil War 11 28.393*** 29.934*** 27.923*** 
  (12.045) (12.429) (11.597) 
Coup 12 6.788*** 7.343*** 6.531*** 
  (2.640) (2.853) (2.535) 
Revolution 13 16.397*** 16.581*** 16.457*** 
  (6.880) (6.863) (6.968) 
Population (log) 14 1.465*** 1.444*** 1.465*** 
  (0.168) (0.162) (0.168) 
Population Change 15 1.012 1.018 1.001 
  (0.031) (0.035) (0.029) 
Population Density (log) 16 1.083 1.073 1.081 
  (.119) (0.116) (.119) 
Agricultural Area (log) 17 1.327 1.372 1.316 
  (0.233) (0.245) (0.229) 
Oil Production (log) 18 1.061 1.051 1.067 
  (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) 
Diamond Deposits 19 0.992 0.992 0.992 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Mountainous Terrain 20 1.019*** 1.018*** 1.019*** 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
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International        
Trade Openness 21 0.976*** 0.975*** 0.956*** 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
INGOs (log) 22 0.820** 0.813** 0.823** 
  (0.082) (0.073) (0.085) 
IGOs (log) 23 0.737* 0.742** 0.730** 
  (0.116) (0.111) (0.117) 
Ratification 24 0.946 0.942 0.946 
  (0.320) (0.321) (0.326) 
International War 25 1.416** 1.441** 1.411** 
  (0.240) (0.243) (0.236) 
Bordering War 26 3.150*** 3.177*** 3.093*** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
To briefly summarize Table 2.2, societal ethnolinguistic diversity is not associated 
with higher odds of genocide. Youth bulges are significantly associated with higher odds 
of genocide, though the two strongest risk factors of genocide at the societal level are 
contention regarding the ethnicity of elites and an exclusionary ideology. These factors, 
though reflective of society, also point to the importance of the state in the onset of 
genocide.  
Indeed, turning to state-level factors, democracies have significantly lower odds 
of genocide. Yet, countries undergoing democratic transitions also have lower odds of 
genocide, and mid-level democracies have lower odds of genocide yet are not 
significantly different from other countries. Comparatively higher GDP per capita has a 
negative effect.  
Against expectation, the percentage of years under colonial rule does not 
significantly impact the odds of genocide. To probe this effect, I tested a dummy variable 
indicating whether a country was ever a colony, as well as a series of dummy variables 
testing whether a country was a colony of Great Britain, France, etc. and indirect/direct 
rule. The lack of significance of these variables is puzzling, as the vast majority of 
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countries that saw genocide were once colonies. However, most countries in the model 
were colonized. In addition, as many scholars have convincingly argued that the creation 
of boundaries and subsequent political identities by colonizers contribute to conflict (e.g., 
see Mamdani 2001 for the case of Rwanda), it is possible that the effects of colonialism 
are manifested in other variables, such as exclusionary ideology, which is further 
explored below. 
Broadening to the context in which the regime operates, long-standing, stable 
regimes have lower odds of genocide. In line with this, societal upheaval influences the 
odds of genocide. Disaggregating the form of upheaval shows that the effect of civil war 
is particularly strong, followed by the effects of revolutions and coups, respectively. Yet, 
support is not found for concerns regarding strain induced by population growth, 
population density, and resource scarcity. To probe this, I also tested arable land, food 
supply, change in food supply, change in agricultural area, and whether a natural disaster 
had recently occurred. I then analyzed whether these variables interact with an 
exclusionary ideology (in other words, whether resource scarcity or pressure influences 
the presence of an exclusionary ideology). None of these tests significantly impacted the 
odds of genocide, which implies that resource scarcity and population pressure, as 
measured, do not influence the onset of genocide. Resource abundance, in terms of oil 
production and diamond deposits, is not significantly associated with genocide either.  
Turning to international factors, international war is associated with higher odds 
of genocide, likely due to the destabilizing and potentially restructuring effects of war. 
Civil war in a neighboring country is also associated with higher odds of genocide, 
suggesting that the effect of violence may extend beyond national borders. In addition, 
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countries that are connected to other countries through INGO membership, IGO 
membership, and trade have lower odds of genocide, pointing toward the importance of 
an international system of checks and balances. Ratification of the Genocide Convention 
does not appear to influence the odds of genocide, however. In fact, 18 of the countries 
where genocide occurred had already ratified the Genocide Convention. This finding 
supports world polity research that has found that repressive states are likely to sign low-
cost human rights treaties as a way to display legitimating commitments to world norms 
(Cole 2005; Hafner-Burton, Tsutsui and Meyer 2008). Known as decoupling or gap 
studies (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005; see also Klug 2005), this gap between speech 
and action is common with global scripts like human rights.  
Multivariate Analysis 
Next I analyze how the relationships reviewed fare in multivariate models. I 
exclude variables that were not significant and variables that did not significantly 
improve the fit of the models, including measures of resource scarcity, population 
change, population density, oil production, diamond deposits, percentage of years 
colonized, mid-level democracies, violence in a neighboring country, and mountainous 
terrain. Membership in IGOs and GDP per capita are also excluded due to 
multicollinearity, and regime durability is excluded because its effect is captured in the 
measure of time at risk.  
 Building on the aforementioned theories about the risk factors of genocide and the 
analyses above, Table 2.3 illustrates four discrete-time logistic regression models that 
assess the risk factors of genocide, presented in odds ratios. Model 1 includes variables 
associated with intergroup relations. Model 2 introduces measures of national politics and 
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economy. Model 3 adds variables associated with international dimensions, and Model 4 
adds measures of upheaval. These measures are added last due to the particularly strong 
effect of war on the odds of genocide and because many other variables tested also 
influence the occurrence of civil war. Note, in addition, that elite ethnicity and 
exclusionary ideology are lagged, and their effects are much stronger and significant at 
the .001 level when non-lagged versions are included. Overall, the comparative 
likelihood ratios are each statistically significant, which provides strong support that each 
additional model is a significant improvement. Model 4 is the most complete model, as it 
explains 40 percent of the variance in the occurrence of genocide.38  
Intergroup Dimensions 
 
As seen in Table 2.3, an exclusionary ideology is an important risk factor of 
genocide. This is consistent with theories that link exclusionary or dehumanizing 
ideologies with the occurrence of genocide (Harff 2003; Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 
2008). Indeed, many genocidal regimes of the 20th century drew upon concepts of human 
progress and desirability to deem some categories of the population, such as ethnic 
minorities in Cambodia or Bosnian Muslims, drains on the well-being of the larger 
population (Weitz 2003).  
As found in bivariate analysis, ethnolinguistic diversity is not significantly 
associated with higher odds of genocide. This finding challenges ideas that diversity 
breeds genocidal conflict, a popular idea behind several partitions of the 20th century.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  Traditional R2 cannot be calculated with logistic regression. However, Stata users have 
created several pseudo R2s that approximate R2. Following Allison’s (2013) suggestion, 
I have chosen to rely upon the pseudo R2 called McFadden’s R2. See Allison 2013 for 
more details about this calculation. 	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Table 2.3 Discrete Time Hazard Model Predicting First Genocide, 1955-2005 
Results in Odds Ratios 
 
  Model Model Model Model 
Predictors 1 2 3 4 
     
Years at Risk (log) 0.534*** 0.501*** 0.626**    0.461*** 
 (0.397 - 0.718) (0.364 - 0.691) (0.427 - 0.920) (0.281 - 0.755) 
Society     
Exclusionary Ideology 
(lagged) 3.395*** 2.860** 2.845**  2.595* 
 (1.476 - 7.807) (1.185 - 6.900) (1.162 - 6.968) (0.990 - 6.803) 
Elite Ethnicity 
(lagged) 2.743** 3.172***   3.143***   2.904** 
 (1.185 - 6.349) (1.404 - 7.167) (1.341 - 7.365) (1.153 - 7.315) 
Youth Bulge 1.090** 1.106*        1.082          1.054 
 (1.008 - 1.178) (0.999 - 1.224) (0.958 - 1.222) (0.919 - 1.208) 
State      
Democracy  0.933**        0.959 0.949 
  (0.872 - 0.999) (0.892 - 1.031) (0.866 - 1.041) 
Democratization  0.589***   0.596***        0.598*** 
  (0.443 - 0.783) (0.443 - 0.802) (0.428 - 0.836) 
Population (log)  1.629***   1.690***   1.135 
  (1.277 - 2.078) (1.235 - 2.311) (0.841 - 1.533) 
International      
Trade Openness          0.990 0.986* 
   (0.973 - 1.007) (0.972 - 1.001) 
INGOs (log)   0.691** 0.912 
   (0.515 - 0.928) (0.583 - 1.425) 
Upheaval     
Civil War         22.787*** 
    (8.645 - 60.064) 
Coup         4.013*** 
    (1.624 - 9.916) 
International War    1.327 
    (0.922 - 1.911) 
Constant 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000***    0.001** 
 (0.000 - 0.011) (0.000 - 0.001) (0.000 - 0.010) (0.000 - 0.364) 
     
Observations 5,458 5,458 5,458 5,458 
Events 30 30 30 30 
McFadden’s R2 0.101 0.169 0.191 0.402 
Robust confidence intervals in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Diversity is a social construction; minor differences can be made significant and major 
differences can be ignored or even constructed depending on the social context. Yet, data 
limitations prevent the examination of other forms of heterogeneity, such as the presence 
of several polarized ethnic groups like the Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs in Bosnia. I did, 
however, test mid-level ethnic heterogeneity and variables related to the size, 
polarization, and fractionalization of ethnic groups within society drawn from the Ethnic 
Power Relations Dataset (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009). None was significantly 
associated with the onset of genocide. 
 While ethnolinguistic diversity is not associated with higher odds of genocide, 
countries with salient elite ethnicities have 2.9 times higher odds of experiencing 
genocide than countries in which the ethnic or religious identity of prime ministers, 
presidents, or other high ranking officials was not a source of inter-ethnic disputes over 
access to political power.39 In Rwanda, for example, decades of exclusion of Hutus from 
government positions fueled violence, as is further detailed in Chapter 3. As high-ranking 
officials have planned the vast majority of modern genocides, this finding also suggests 
that contention over political power, rather than general diversity of the population, is 
important.  
National Politics and Economy 
 
Though democracies have lower odds of genocide in bivariate analyses, their 
effect is not significant in multivariate analysis. This effect was further probed by testing 
a threshold effect above “7” on the Polity scale (Davenport and Armstrong 2004), but it 
did not yield significant results. Rather, the effect of democracies is likely reflected in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 The effects of elite ethnicity and exclusionary ideology more than double and are 
significant at the .01 level when the variables are not lagged.  
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other variables. For example, democracies are generally more economically and 
politically interconnected and have lower odds of experiencing a civil war.  
As in bivariate analysis, a test of mid-level democracies does not provide support 
for theories that democratization influences genocide. In fact, democratizing countries 
have significantly lower odds of genocide, illustrating that not all forms of rapid change 
are linked to genocide. While Mann (2000) concedes that established democracies have 
lower odds of genocide than authoritarian regimes or democratizing regimes, he asserts 
that democracies can have a dark side at their early stages of development. The findings 
here suggest otherwise, indicating that genocide may not be a dark side of democracy. 
However, Mann’s focus on a key aspect of democratization—defining the people—points 
to nationalism or nation-building more generally. These are not unique to democracy but 
are, arguably, processes that all nation-states undergo in their effort to define, build, and, 
in essence, create boundaries (by definition exclusionary) around the nation. Indeed, 
Mann’s argument speaks to the long durée of history and may speak to the entire period 
studied.  
Broadening the scope to the context in which the regime operates yields the 
strongest risk factors of genocide. Specifically, civil wars have the largest effect on the 
onset of genocide (note the large odds ratio is consistent with Table 2.2 and that this 
effect remains significant with lagged and unlagged versions of the variable). This 
supports Maier-Katkin, Mears, and Bernard’s (2009) proposition that widespread and 
intense societal strain is a risk factor of crimes against humanity and, in this case, 
genocide. The genocide in Cambodia, for example, followed several years of civil war. 
Coups, too, are significantly associated with the odds of genocide, paling in magnitude 
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only to the effect of a civil war and suggesting both that the rise to power of certain 
leaders and the uncertainty and strain associated with certain forms of rapid change 
influence the occurrence of genocide. In line with this, I tested the effects of revolutions, 
which are excluded due to their high correlation with civil war but which increase the 
odds of genocide by a factor of 14 in a model without civil war.  
International Dimensions 
 
 International war is not significantly associated with genocide, though this 
measure was often significant throughout the model-building process.40 Like civil wars, 
participation in international war can lead to societal crisis, such as was the case in 
Pakistan during the early 1970s. In addition, both civil and international wars are 
associated with increased militarization. Yet, international war is not as strong a predictor 
of genocide as civil war. This is likely because war, while one time largely interstate in 
nature, has become increasingly intrastate since 1945. Furthermore, during international 
wars, states wage wars against other states. But, when the state is involved in a civil war, 
it wages war against a segment of its population. Thus, the state is an inwardly violent 
actor rather than a protector of its citizens against outward aggression; this may create a 
structure that facilitates genocide.  
Moving beyond international war, there is some evidence that engagement in the 
international system decreases the odds of genocide. An increase of 1 percent in trade 
openness is associated with a 1.4 percent decrease in the odds of genocide in Model 4. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 As noted above, the scale of international war and civil war are different. International 
war is operationalized by a 10-point scale of magnitude. However, as the corresponding 
scale for civil wars included genocide in the magnitude calculation, the civil war variable 
included is a dummy variable. To be able to analyze differences in the magnitude of the 
effects, I also ran models with dummy variables for international war.  
 63	  
This small effect of trade may reflect the presence of trade embargos, placed on some 
countries wherein strife and human rights violations are common. In addition, 
membership in INGOs is significantly associated with lower odds of genocide in Model 
3, though the effect is no longer significant when civil war and international war are 
included. Once war begins, INGOs might be less efficacious in curbing genocide, and 
countries at war may also fall outside of international normative pressure.  
 Nevertheless, trade openness and INGO membership may be capturing different 
sides of a similar phenomenon: engagement in the international system. World polity 
theorists propose that membership in INGOs influences the adoption of global norms and 
keeps a country within the confines of international normative pressure. Trade ties may 
achieve a similar effect through different avenues, reflected in several studies of human 
rights violations (Boyle and Kim 2009; Kim and Boyle 2012; Lim and Tsutsui 2012).  
 Taken together, these data affirm that genocide is not a random event and factors 
at societal, state, and international levels influence its occurrence. This extends previous 
studies of genocide (Fein 1993a; Harff 2003) by considering the effect of time, analyzing 
multiple new theories of genocide—such as the effects of democratization, colonialism, 
population pressures, resource scarcity/abundance, youth bulges, and disaggregated 
forms of upheaval, and conceptualizing risk factors by analytic level.41  Interaction 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  Fein (1993a) and Harff (2003) each find that key risk factors of genocide include prior 
genocide, authoritarian rule, political upheaval, and exclusion of certain segments of the 
population. Harff also adds trade openness and the ethnic identity of ruling elites. While 
their general agreement is important, these studies examined different subsets of 
cases/years with different methodologies. Fein’s methodology involved comparisons of 
descriptive statistics, which require more rigorous scrutiny. Harff’s study provides more 
rigorous scrutiny, but restricts its analysis to states undergoing state failure (it is plausible 
that only these countries are at risk of genocide, but we know from the Holocaust, which 
occurred in a context of state success, that state failure is not a necessary condition for 
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effects were also explored across levels and time periods, though they did not yield 
significant results and should be examined in more depth by future studies.  
As I test how factors associated with other forms of violence influence the odds of 
genocide, it is instructive to briefly consider differences in findings based on the type of 
violence. The majority of factors significantly associated with higher odds of genocide 
point to the regime, the context in which it is operating, and its international relations; 
without a doubt, the state has played an active or tacit role in modern genocides.42 
Notably, this contrasts with some factors associated with civil wars, where conditions that 
favor insurgency are predictive of violence. These include large populations, youth 
bulges, lower economic development, and mountainous terrain, which are significantly 
associated with the onset of violence in previous studies (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Urdal 
2006) as well as when the models presented above are run with civil war as the dependent 
variable (not shown). Violence in neighboring countries (e.g., Goldstone et al. 2002) and 
resource abundance (e.g., Ross 2006) have also been linked to state failure and civil war, 
though they do not significantly impact the odds of genocide.  
In addition, although they were not significantly associated with the onset of 
genocide, population, economic development, and the type of government (which has 
seen mixed results in studies of political and ethnic violence) have been linked to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
genocide). Two key variables—exclusionary ideology and salient elite ethnicities—in 
Harff’s model have also been updated substantially. In addition, neither study takes the 
issue of time seriously, nor does it include other risk factors of genocide that have been 
suggested. Finally, neither model differentiates the form of upheaval, instead combining 
the effects of civil war, coups, revolutions, and international war.  
42 I recognize that the coding of the dependent variable, especially with the inclusion of 
the state as an active or tacit perpetrator, may influence my findings. However, as the 
state has been involved in all modern genocides, I argue this is not an artifact of the 
coding of genocides but rather reflects the genocides that have taken place.  
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violations of personal integrity human rights (e.g., Poe and Tate 1994), and population 
structure and some forms of economic development have been linked to inter-country 
homicide rates (e.g, LaFree 1999). Like genocide, however, human rights violations and 
state repression are significantly impacted by civil war (Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, 
and Keith 1999), illustrating complex relationships among different forms of violence. 
Overall, these findings illustrate the importance of the state, the context of upheaval, and 
international relations in understanding the onset of genocide, contrasted in part with the 
importance of conditions that favor insurgency as well as other societal-level factors for 
understanding the onset of civil wars and related violence.  
Robustness Testing and Probing Mechanisms 
To probe and test the robustness of these results and consider potential mechanisms, I 
perform three additional analyses. First, to analyze if the definition of genocide 
influenced the findings, I examine a smaller subset of cases based on a more restricted 
definition. Then, as some may argue that not every country considered was truly at risk of 
genocide, I restrict the risk set to countries that experienced a civil war, the strongest 
predictor of genocide. Lastly, as some may suggest that an exclusionary ideology is part 
of the process of genocide, I treat it as a dependant variable and analyze how the factors 
considered thus far influence its presence.  
To start, it has been argued that the guidelines the PITF used to create their 
dataset were too broad (e.g., Mayersen 2010). While there will never be complete 
agreement regarding which cases constitute genocide, I address these concerns by 
restricting the 30 cases included above to a smaller sample of 15 cases, relying upon 
Fein’s (1993a) coding as explained above. Due to the small number of events, I again 
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start with simpler analyses of each individual predictor and time. All effects shown in 
Table 2.2 remain similar except the effect of trade openness, which is no longer 
significantly associated with lower odds of genocide. Multivariate analysis with rare 
events discrete time logit models (not shown)43 showed some evidence of instability in 
the predictors due to the small number of events, though results generally affirmed those 
reported in Table 2.3. Specifically, exclusionary ideologies, civil wars, coups, and 
autocratization remain associated with higher odds of genocide in these models, while 
trade openness and salient elite ethnicities are no longer significantly associated, though 
the direction and magnitude of the effects remain similar. International war is 
significantly associated with the odds of genocide in these models.  
As to the potential argument that some countries, such as Great Britain or Canada, 
were not truly at risk of genocide during the time period examined in this study, I restrict 
the sample to the 51 countries that experienced a civil war between 1955 and 2005 and 
set the time of risk to the first year a civil war took place. In other words, countries are 
not considered at risk of genocide unless a civil war had taken place. This results in a 
slightly smaller number of genocides (28), illustrating that civil war is not a necessary 
risk factor of genocide.  
Key findings remain in these models (not shown), as aspects of intergroup 
dynamics, national politics and economy, and international dimensions influence the odds 
of genocide. Ethnolinguistic diversity is not significantly associated with higher odds of 
genocide, though salient elite ethnicity and exclusionary ideologies are. Turning to the 
state, the key difference is that larger populations have higher odds of genocide, which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  Variables that were not significant are not included (such as youth bulge or democracy) 
due to the small N.  
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suggests that the effect of population is mediated by the effect of civil war in Table 2.3. 
Beyond this, the situation in which the regime operates significantly impacts the odds of 
genocide, with coups and revolutions each showing strong, positive effects. In terms of 
international dimensions, international war is significantly associated with higher odds of 
genocide, though the effects of trade openness and membership in INGOs are not 
significant, again suggesting that the influence of the international system may become 
less efficacious when a country plunges into civil war. Thus far, both tests of robustness 
confirm most findings but call the effect of trade openness into question. In light of this, 
and as this variable is only significant at the .1 level in the final model, future studies 
should analyze the mechanisms through which trade may impact the onset of genocide.  
Lastly, as the exclusion of a group is a key element of genocide, some may argue 
that an exclusionary ideology is part of the process of genocide and could be treated as a 
dependant variable. Indeed, both Mayersen (2010) and Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 
(2009) begin their process-oriented models of genocide with the establishment of an out-
group and an ideology that excludes that out-group. Further, as many genocides were 
planned prior to the year in which they took place, predicting an exclusionary ideology 
may be an important aspect of understanding genocide.  
Due to these considerations as well as potential issues of endogeneity, I examine 
how theories reviewed in this paper explain whether an exclusionary ideology existed in 
any of the 153 countries in the dataset over the time period analyzed. As outlined in 
Table 2.1 and further detailed in Appendix B, exclusionary ideologies are defined as 
“belief systems that are articulated by governing elite that identify some kind of 
overriding purpose or principle that is used to restrict, persecute, or eliminate categories 
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of people who are defined as antithetical to that purpose or principle.” More than one-
third of the countries examined had an exclusionary ideology at some point during the 
study, and many of the countries that experienced genocide had an exclusionary ideology 
present at some point prior to the violence. Independent variables can again be found in 
Table 2.1 and are analyzed under the assumption that theories that pertain to the 
occurrence of genocide also pertain to the presence of an exclusionary ideology. To test 
their influence, I utilize logistic regression with clustered standard errors, as an 
exclusionary ideology is not a singular event and could manifest multiple times over 
multiple years.44  
 Results are presented in Table 2.4, and it is immediately clear that many of the 
variables associated with the occurrence of genocide are also associated with 
exclusionary ideologies. In fact, more of the variables tested are significantly associated 
with the presence of an exclusionary ideology (Table 2.4) than with the occurrence of 
genocide (Table 2.3), suggesting that many theories about the onset of genocide may 
more accurately explain the presence of an exclusionary ideology.  
Looking at societal-level factors, more diverse societies have significantly lower 
odds of exclusionary ideologies. This provides support for the finding that ethnolinguistic 
diversity is not associated with higher odds of genocide and shows that more diverse 
societies actually have lower odds of exclusionary ideologies, perhaps due to intergroup 
contact (Allport 1954). In addition, as with genocide, societies in which the ethnicity of 
the ruling elite is a point of contention have significantly greater odds of an exclusionary 
ideology.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  Note that I am analyzing the best way to include timeperiod effects in the analysis but 
that models with time included did not see different results from those presented.	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Table 2.4 Logistic Regression of Exclusionary Ideology, 1955-2005 
Results in Odds Ratios 
 
  Model Model Model Model 
Predictors 1 2 3 4 
Society         
Elite Ethnicity 
(lagged) 4.426*** 3.352*** 2.854*** 2.792*** 
 (2.299 - 8.519) (1.647 - 6.822) (1.406 - 5.790) (1.363 - 5.719) 
Ethnolinguistic 
Diversity 0.164*** 0.109*** 0.098*** 0.095*** 
 (0.051 - 0.530) (0.032 - 0.375) (0.028 - 0.344) (0.027 - 0.336) 
State     
Democracy  0.857*** 0.860*** 0.854*** 
  (0.802 - 0.916) (0.810 - 0.914) (0.802 - 0.908) 
Population (log)        1.295*       1.210        1.092 
  (0.995 - 1.686) (0.851 - 1.720) (0.775 - 1.540) 
International     
Colonial Past         3.894**        3.909** 
   (1.094 - 13.855) (1.129 - 13.531) 
Trade Openness         0.991** 0.989*** 
   (0.983 - 0.999) (0.982 - 0.997) 
INGOs (log)            0.938          0.986 
   (0.692 - 1.271) (0.722 - 1.347) 
Upheaval      
Civil War              2.192* 
    (0.997 - 4.816) 
Coup           0.499*** 
    (0.332 - 0.749) 
International War              1.412** 
    (1.080 - 1.845) 
Constant      0.304***       0.030*** 0.078           0.149 
 (0.181 - 0.511) (0.002 - 0.373) (0.004 - 1.665) (0.007 - 3.032) 
     
Observations 6,310 6,310 6,310 6,310 
McFadden’s R2 
 
0.072 0.195 0.240 0.249 
Robust confidence intervals in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Turning to the type of state, democracies have much lower odds of exclusionary 
ideologies. State upheaval in the form of civil war is associated with higher odds of an 
exclusionary ideology, though the magnitude of this effect is much smaller than the effect 
of civil war on genocide. Revolutions (not shown due to their high correlation with civil 
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wars) are also significantly associated with higher odds of an exclusionary ideology, 
though a coup has a negative, significant effect (consistent with bivariate analyses). This 
may mean that regimes with exclusionary ideologies are more difficult to topple or that 
exclusionary ideologies seldom occur with a coup, perhaps because new leaders seek 
support from the population (both possibilities should be explored in future research). 
International war has a strong, positive effect.  
In terms of other international factors, each additional percent of time spent under 
imperial rule is associated with a four-fold increase in the odds of an exclusionary 
ideology. This underscores the finding that while colonialism is not directly associated 
with the onset of genocide, its effects manifest in other ways. By contract, trade openness 
is significantly associated with lower odds of exclusionary ideologies, providing support 
for the effect of certain forms of international interconnectedness. 
 Again, theories that pertain to the onset of genocide are also predictive of an 
exclusionary ideology and, in fact, better explain the latter. An exclusionary ideology is 
clearly linked to genocide, as genocide involves the intent to destroy a group of people. 
While this factor (as measured) was not present before every genocide, ideologies of 
exclusion and other forms of classification are often the first steps in process-oriented 
models of genocide (Stanton 1996; Mayersen 2010). Thus, while an exclusionary 
ideology is not a necessary or a sufficient condition, it is a mechanism for genocide. 
Future researchers’ models should examine the factors that lead to an exclusionary 
ideology and explore why some ideologies lead to genocide while others do not.  
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Duration of Genocide 
 Thus far, I have examined the factors associated with the onset of genocide and 
tested their robustness. Before concluding, I briefly turn to one other aspect of genocidal 
conflict: its duration. Comparative studies of genocide have yet to consider the factors 
that influence the duration of violence. While many of these factors are likely found at 
sub-national levels and potentially linked to the actions of external actors (such as armed 
interventions or economic sanctions), it is also plausible that more macro-level factors 
studied here influence the duration of genocidal violence. In fact, studies of the duration 
of civil war have found that, among factors related to the type of war (Fearon 2004), low 
economic development and moderate ethnic heterogeneity are associated with longer 
civil wars (Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom 2004).  
 To examine whether factors studied here also influence the duration of genocide, I 
draw upon a Weibull model, as described in the methods section. The dataset is restricted 
to episodes of genocide, resulting in 30 countries. The genocides lasted from 1 year (the 
lowest possible) to 20 years (see Appendix A for the duration the PITF assigned to each 
case), and all independent variables are, again, described in the data section and Table 
2.1. Note that I also ran analyses with Fein’s coding, and all effects presented remain 
similar.  
 Results, shown in Table 2.5, illustrate that factors that influence the onset of 
genocide do not generally influence its duration. Salient elite ethnicities provide one 
example. Yet, exclusionary ideologies, which are key factors related to the onset of 
genocide, are associated with significantly shorter genocides. This may suggest that  
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Table 2.5 Weibull Model of the Duration of Genocide, 1955 to 2005 
  Model Model Model Model 
Predictors 1 2 3 4 
Society     
Exclusionary 
Ideology -0.751* -0.976**    -0.946** -1.105** 
 (-1.575 - 0.073) (-1.870 - -0.081) (-1.839 - -0.053) (-2.069 - -0.141) 
Elite Ethnicity 0.116            0.338 0.437          0.959 
 (-0.917 - 1.148) (-1.052 - 1.728) (-1.020 - 1.895) (-0.734 - 2.653) 
Ethnolinguistic 
Diversity       -2.513***     -4.454***    -4.409***   -4.741*** 
 (-4.076 - -0.950) (-6.266 - -2.641) (-6.224 - -2.594) (-6.718 - -2.765) 
State     
Democratization  -0.104         -0.092         -0.104 
  (-0.592 - 0.384) (-0.574 - 0.390) (-0.614 - 0.407) 
GDP per capital 
(log)  -0.058         -0.018           0.142 
  (-0.774 - 0.658) (-0.760 - 0.723) (-0.647 - 0.931) 
Population (log)         1.042***      1.021***       1.068*** 
  (0.684 - 1.399) (0.656 - 1.386) (0.660 - 1.477) 
International and Upheaval    
Trade Openness            -0.004 -0.004 
   (-0.017 - 0.010) (-0.017 - 0.009) 
Civil War    -0.252 
    (-1.282 - 0.778) 
International 
War     0.194 
    (-0.161 - 0.549) 
Coup    -0.454 
    (-1.464 - 0.556) 
Constant     -2.559***     -12.112***      -11.937***      -12.510*** 
 (-3.970 - -1.148) (-16.333 - -7.890) (-16.220 - -7.655) (-17.089 - -7.930) 
     
Observations 174 174 174 174 
Events 30 30 30 30 
          
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
 
genocides where there was already in- and out-groups formed may see swifter violence.  
Ethnolinguistic diversity is also significantly associated with shorter episodes of 
genocide, which may mean that the presence of other groups helps bring the violence to a 
close. However, probing this effect by examining moderate levels of ethnolingustic 
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diversity (.4 to .6) shows that moderate levels are actually associated with longer 
genocides, paralleling findings related to the duration of civil war (Collier, Hoeffler, and 
Soderbom 2004).45  
Turning to national politics and economy, the type of government, 
democratization, and economic development are not associated with the duration of 
genocide. A country’s population is, however, and an increase in logged population 
increases the duration by a factor of 3.4. This finding may indicate that larger countries 
have longer genocides; it may also indicate that more potential victims increases the 
length of the conflict. In addition, the presence of civil war—the strongest predictor of 
genocide—is not significantly associated with the duration of genocidal violence. Other 
forms of upheaval, including coups and international war, are also insignificant.  
Overall, the interpretations of the effects presented here are largely speculative, 
and future studies should spend more time assessing the factors that influence genocidal 
duration and its impacts on measures like death tolls or regional stability.46 What is 
significant here is the finding that factors associated with the onset of genocide do not 
significantly impact its duration. Factors associated with the state and its context are most 
important for understanding the onset of genocide, though it may be factors at societal 
and international levels that influence the duration, calling for alternate theories as well as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  Moderate levels of ethnolinguistic diversity are not associated with the onset of 
genocide, however. 	  46	  Again, analyses were run with Fein’s restrictive case set of genocides, and effects 
remained. 
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analysis at sub-national levels, which I assess throughout this dissertation and to which I 
return in Chapter 6.  
Reviewing Factors that Influence the Onset (and Duration) of Genocide  
This chapter has drawn upon insights from the study of political and ethnic violence, 
genocide studies, and criminology to assess factors that influence the onset of genocidal 
violence at societal, state, and international levels. Testing numerous new theories about 
the occurrence of genocide, I find that exclusionary ideologies, salient elite ethnicities, 
autocratization, fewer years at risk, civil wars, coups, and lower levels of trade openness 
are associated with higher odds of genocide, indicating that the state and the context in 
which it operates is key to understanding the situation in which genocide occurs. 
Civil wars are the strongest predictors of genocide, as the state is already inwardly 
violent toward a segment of its own population. This also suggests that strain—
specifically in the form of civil wars and coups, which directly threaten a ruling regime—
is a particularly salient factor for understanding when and why genocide occurs. This 
supports individual-centered explanations that purport that genocide can be a strategic 
decision on the part of threatened ruling elite (Valentino 2004; Midlarksy 2005) and 
provides structural explanations to accompany them.  
Incorporating theories from several different areas of inquiry allows me to 
analyze whether factors that explain other forms of violence, such as a civil war, also 
influence the onset of genocide. While civil war is the strongest predictor of genocide, the 
factors associated with the onset of civil wars—including youth bulges, rough terrain, 
economic development, and large populations—are not associated with the onset of 
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genocide. This suggests that while factors that influence insurgency are strongly 
associated with civil wars, the onset of genocide is more influenced by the state.  
  I do not find support for several prominent theories regarding the causes of 
genocide. For example, I do not find that resource scarcity and population pressures 
influence the odds of genocide,47 which is in line with Agnew’s (2012) proposition that 
the effects of climate change may be more likely to lead to localized conflicts rather than 
larger, state-led atrocities. Nor do I find support for theories that democratization 
influences the onset of genocide. Rather, these theories (e.g., Mann 2000; Goldstone et al. 
2002) may be useful in understanding the effects of nation-building as well as the broader 
socio-historical context of the time period studied.  
Probing effects reveal that many of the factors I test significantly impact the 
presence of an exclusionary ideology. In fact, some factors—such as colonialism, type of 
government, and ethnolinguistic diversity—significantly influence the odds of an 
exclusionary ideology even though they do not influence the odds of genocide, with 
colonialism significantly predicting such ideologies and more diverse countries and 
democracies having negative effects. Notably, this further casts doubt on the “diversity 
breeds conflict” argument. It also shows that while colonialism does not directly 
influence genocide, it has a strong effect through the influence of exclusionary 
ideologies.  
This suggests that many theories developed to explain the causes of genocide 
focus instead on the exclusion of certain peoples, the element of the definition linked 
most closely to intent. However, only some exclusionary ideologies result in genocide, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  Yet, additional studies with fine-grained measures of resource scarcity are also needed 
to better understand its potential influence. 	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and future research should explore why exclusionary ideologies manifest themselves in 
numerous forms of violence, ranging from discriminatory laws to genocide. Exclusionary 
ideologies are often the first step in many process-based models (e.g., Hagan and 
Rymond-Richmond 2009), underscoring the importance of predicting an exclusionary 
ideology alongside genocide.  
While these results are robust, this analysis is not without limitations. First, as 
noted, scarce data before the 1950s and before countries gained independence prevent 
this study from including earlier genocides as well as years before a country became 
independent. It would be ideal to examine a discrete time unit smaller than one year, 
which is also impossible due to data limitations. Finally, the small number of cases 
should be kept in mind while interpreting results. While the genocides analyzed here 
could be considered a census, there is (fortunately) a relatively small number of 
genocides to analyze.  
 Beyond exploring exclusionary ideologies as a process both part of and separate 
from genocide, future research should turn its attention to the duration of genocidal 
violence. In my brief examination of duration, I find that the factors associated with the 
onset of genocide do not significantly impact its duration. Thus, while many of the 
factors associated with the onset of genocide are tightly linked to the state, factors 
associated with the duration of genocide may be more strongly influenced by micro-level 
factors pertaining to the society as well as circumstances pertaining to the international 
response to the violence. 
In sum, the findings presented thus far point to importance of multiple levels of 
analysis regarding modern genocide. Still, the significant factors relate to the regime, the 
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context in which it operates, and, to a lesser degree, its international relations. As modern 
genocides have been initiated by the state, it is clearly key to understanding genocidal 
onset. This contrasts with civil wars, in which conditions that favor societal insurgency 
are important factors in understanding why violence occurs.  
Genocide is never inevitable, and it is not random. Certain factors pertaining to 
intergroup dynamics, national politics and economy, and international dimensions 
influence its occurrence. While this chapter has assessed general preconditions of 
genocide globally, Chapters 3, 4, and 5 assess these factors in specific situations, further 
exploring the conditions under which genocide occurs.  
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Chapter 3: Genocide in Rwanda 
 
           
“If you must remember, remember this… The Nazis did not kill six million Jews… nor the 
Interahamwe kill a million Tutsis, they killed one and then another, and then another… 
Genocide is not a single act of murder, it is millions of acts of murder.” 
-Stephen D. Smith, Executive Director, Aegis Trust 
 
During several months in 1994, one million people were murdered in the small African 
country of Rwanda. An estimated 250,000 people were raped, countless individuals were 
tortured, and thousands of homes were destroyed. Many journalists and world leaders, 
even the United Nations, initially interpreted this violence as a civil war (Barnett and 
Finnemore 2004). Yet, in its aftermath, it became clear that the violence targeted 
Rwandan Tutsi and, as such, constituted genocide.  
The extreme number of individuals killed during a relatively short period of time 
has remained a defining aspect of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Several scholars have 
even attempted to quantify this intensity by noting there were 333.3 killings per hour, or 
5.5 killings per second, throughout the country (Gourevitch 1998; Barnett and Finnemore 
2004).48 Although these rates of killing are powerful numbers, they obscure the 
complexity of the violence. While it is conceivable that killing took place at a constant 
rate, it is highly unlikely. Further, it is dubious that levels of violence were the same 
throughout the country. In short, this statistic speaks to a broader tendency to treat 
genocide in Rwanda, as well as other episodes of genocide and mass violence, as an 
undifferentiated event, missing an opportunity to better understand the violence. 
Genocide is comprised of millions of events, and analyzing the meso and micro dynamics 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  These rates have been calculated on the assumption that 800,000 people were killed 
over 100 days.	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and process of these events is of critical importance to understanding the violence 
(Owens, Su, and Snow 2013). 
 Accordingly, this chapter analyzes determinants of regional and temporal 
variation in killings during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. After reviewing the events that 
led to the genocide and explaining how the violence unfolded, I discuss potential 
determinants of regional variation in killing and test these theories using fixed effects 
analyses in Part 1. In Part 2, I examine when genocide began throughout the country and 
analyze factors that influenced whether a community saw early, middle, or late onset of 
genocidal violence. Finally, I review the factors that influenced regional and temporal 
variation in genocidal violence.  
Among other things, I find that the population of Tutsis and the spread of 
propaganda—through radio and through the institution of education—influenced the rate 
of killings within communities. Multiple community-level factors, including marriage 
rates and employment in the formal sector, also influenced the rate of killing. These 
factors are particularly linked to who perpetrated genocide in Rwanda; nearly one million 
people participated in the violence, so variation in that violence was heavily influenced 
by community-level differences. This contrasts with the onset of violence at the macro 
level, as seen in Chapter 2, as well as at community levels in Rwanda, as further detailed 
below.   
The Road to Genocide 
 
Rwanda is a land-locked country in Central Africa that is roughly the size of Maryland. 
Like many countries in Africa, it first became a polity when several chiefships combined 
to form a kingdom (Mamdani 2001). Rwanda’s vibrant pre-colonial history is far too rich 
 80	  
to recount;49 nevertheless, in order to understand why and how genocide unfolded in 
1994, it is necessary to understand some of the factors at play in the decades prior.  
 
 
Figure 3.1: 1994 Rwanda  
 
Note: In 1994, Rwanda consisted of 11 prefectures (provinces), which were 
 comprised of 145 communes (municipalities). 
 
 While Chapter 2 found that colonialism is not probabilistically associated with 
genocide,50 colonialism is key to understanding the genocide in Rwanda. The Berlin 
Conference of 1884 assigned what is now present-day Rwanda, along with the territory 
that is present-day Burundi, to Germany. Throughout its rule from afar, Germany did not 
radically alter the political structure of Rwanda. Instead, it generally supported the King 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  For a detailed historical account of Rwanda, see Prunier 1995, Vansina 2004, or 
Mulinda 2010. 	  50	  Again, in Chapter 2, colonialism was not significantly associated with the onset of 
genocide. However, it was a strong predictor of an exclusionary ideology, suggesting its 
indirect effect on genocide, further illustrated in this chapter.	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(Prunier 1995; Des Forges 1999). As historian Alison Des Forges (1999) notes, Germany 
sought to rule Rwanda with the least cost and the most profit.  
 During World War I, Belgium took control of Rwanda and Burundi. Like 
Germany, Belgian officials sought to maximize profit in Rwanda, though it also 
implemented changes that directly affected Rwandans’ daily lives. Many of these 
changes were linked to emerging favoritism for one of the three ethnic groups in 
Rwanda—the Tutsi. For example, in 1920, a new law declared that all local colonial 
authorities were to be Tutsi.  
At the time, Rwanda was comprised of Hutus, Tutsis, and Twa. The precise 
origins of these groups are widely debated (e.g., Newbury 1988, Straus 2006), though 
scholars generally agree that the categories began to organize social life in the late 1800s 
(Cornell and Hartmann 2007). At this time, raising cattle was considered a high-status 
occupation; since more Tutsis raised cattle, they were accorded prestige. “Tutsi” became 
synonymous with “rich in cattle,” while “Hutu” came to mean “servant” or “employee.” 
These categories were fluid. Once a person acquired 10 cows, he or she became Tutsi 
(Gasanabo 2008).51   
  There is some evidence that the identities associated with “Hutu” and “Tutsi” 
were polarized even before colonialism (Joint Evaluation Report 1 1996; Des Forges 
1999; Mulinda 2010).52 Yet, Rwanda did not have a history of ethnic-based conflict. In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  While class is not a category protected by the Genocide Convention or even considered 
in most scholars’ definitions of genocide, this is not the only genocide in which class 
categories became politicized, suggesting that future research should examine the link 
between class and genocide. 	  
52 Several scholars point to the rule of the Tutsi King Rwabugiri (1860-1895) as a period 
in which the social categories of Hutu and Tutsi were created based on historical social 
positions (Joint Evaluation Report 1; Des Forges 1999). This period also saw the 
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fact, Hutus and Tutsis shared the same customs and language, and there are many verbal 
records of intermarriage (Gasanabo 2008). This began to change during Belgian 
colonialism. In the early 1930s, colonial officials reified ethnic identities by asking 
Rwandans to declare one on their identification cards.53 Officials also sought to document 
phenotypical characteristics associated with these identities, racializing ethnicities by 
asserting that Hutus were shorter with darker skin and broader noses while Tutsis were 
taller and lighter skinned—in some ways, more similar to Europeans. As the recent 
lineage of Rwandan Kings was also Tutsi, many Belgians subscribed to the notion of 
Tutsis as members the Hamitic race, a Eurocentric idea that Tutsis were from Northern 
Africa and consequently superior to Hutus, whose ancestors were thought to be from 
Sub-Saharan Africa (Newbury 1995).  
As Mamdani (2001) and Cornell and Hartmann (2004) argue, racializing 
ethnicities involved an attempt to biologicize differences. While both race and 
ethnicity are social constructs, race is typically construed by outsiders and does not 
tolerate multiple identities. As Cornell and Hartmann state (2004:28), “For race, the 
critical issue is who they are and how they are fundamentally different from us.”  In 
this case, Tutsis were seen as outsiders and settlers, based on perceived differences in 
biology and in homeland. Although existing ethnicities became racialized, Hutus and 
Tutsis also continued self-identifying with these groups. Thus, I use the term 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
amplification of feudal labor systems, such as uburetwa, which involved labor in return 
for access to land.  53	  The precise date that identity cards were introduced varies in historical records, 
ranging from 1931-1935. 	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“ethnicity” throughout this chapter,54 but I note that the raciliazition of these groups is 
key to understanding perceived differences and power relations between them.  
Soon, Belgian colonial officials began enacting policies that benefited the 
Tutsis.55 As noted above, Tutsis, the numeric minority, were appointed to fill all local 
government positions (Mamdani 2001; Melvern 2006). Catholicism was closely 
intertwined with the colonial project, too; once missionaries began to recruit native 
Rwandan clergy, they selected almost exclusively Tutsi (Longman 2011).56  
After World War II, Belgium continued to rule Rwanda, though it had become a 
United Nations Trust Territory. Belgium was mandated to oversee its eventual 
independence. Decolonization was sweeping across Africa, and it found much support 
from Rwanda’s King. Due in part to the Tutsi King’s excitement for independence, as 
well as growing discontent among Hutus and perhaps even a recognition of their long-
time favoritism toward Tutsis, Belgian colonists began to shift their support toward 
Rwandan Hutus (Joint Evaluation Report 1 1996). The Catholic Church even began 
increasing the numbers of Hutu clergy.  
As Hutus gained some power, their discontent regarding what they perceived as 
years of mistreatment and marginalization grew. In the mid-1950s, a Hutu emancipation 
movement emerged, led by Grégoire Kayibanda. A few years later, Kayibanda and other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  As I note in subsequent chapters, the same could be said of identities in the other two 
cases. This is something I discuss briefly in each chapter and plan to develop in more 
detail in the book.	  	  55Around this time, Belgian officials enacted two policies of forced labor (akazi and 
uburetwa). See Gasanabo 2008 for more.  56	  See the work of Timothy Longman for in-depth studies of the role of the Catholic 
Church in the genocide.  
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members of this movement published what has become known as the Hutu Manifesto.57 
This document alleged that the Tutsi minority held a monopoly on the power in Rwanda 
and called for political and ethnic solidarity between Rwandan Hutu, who deserved to 
rule as the numeric majority. Kayibanda formed the Party of the Movement for Hutu 
Emancipation (Parmehutu), the political party of the Hutu Emancipation Movement58 
(Straus 2006). As a Rwandan scholar explained of the name, “This literally means party 
of Hutu. It was meant to incite Hutus to join the party” (Rwanda, August 2012). Ethnicity 
had long been politicized; now it was official.  
In January 1959, Belgium announced its intention to grant independence to the 
Belgian Congo, increasing hope that Rwandan independence was near.59 Dissatisfaction 
with the monarchy grew alongside dreams of independence, and citizens began to form 
more political parties. These included the Association for the Social Promotion of the 
Masses (Aprosoma), the Rwandan National Union (NAR), and the Rwandan Democratic 
Assembly (RADER). Importantly, these parties were divided along ethnic (which, again, 
were also racial) lines and sometimes joined in pursuit of what they deemed ethnically 
based goals. In September 1959, for example, Parmehutu and Aprosoma met in Butare60 
and called for Hutu support. At the meeting, Kayibanda declared, “Our movement 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 This document, also known as the Bahutu Manifesto, was written in part as a reply to a 
government document entitled “Mise au Point” (To the Point), in which King Mutara 
Rudahigwa recognized inequalities in Rwanda but minimized issues between ethnic 
groups (Gasanabo 2008).  
58 This movement was previously called the Hutu Social Movement (Mouvement Social 
Muhutu). 	  59	  Several months later, King Mutara Rudahigwa, who had served since 1931, died 
suddenly, creating a political crisis (Straus 2006). Some Hutus began to call for the 
installation of a republic. The crisis was temporarily abated by the installation of 
Rudahigwa’s brother, also a Tutsi. 	  60	  Names of regions in Rwanda have changed several times since 1994; this chapter uses 
the 1994 administrative boundary names.	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concerns the Hutu—humiliated and despised, outraged by the Tutsi invader…” 
(Gasanabo 2008:200). Ominously, Tutsis were increasingly seen as outsiders.  
Tensions heightened, and, in November 1959, an influential Hutu was reportedly 
attacked by a group of Tutsis.61 Hutu leaders called for of the death of Tutsi leaders, and 
the first outbreak of mass violence began.62 Supporters of the monarchy were arrested 
and tortured, and crowds of Hutus attacked Tutsis and their property throughout the 
country. As Placide, a survivor, recalled, “Cows were killed, houses were burned… And 
so they created this movement of hate and of violence. So this, to me, is the beginning. 
From 1959… there was no peace in Rwanda” (Rwanda, September 2012).	  In total, an 
estimated five thousand homes were burnt, and refugees fled to neighboring Uganda and 
Burundi (Des Forges 1999). The exact number of Tutsis who left is unknown, though 
estimates range from tens to hundreds of thousands (Des Forges 1999; Joint Evaluation 
Report 1 1996).  
National elections were held for the first time the following year, and Rwanda 
became a republic (known as the First Republic) led by Grégoire Kayibanda. This 
culmination of the Hutu Emancipation Movement coincided with Rwandan independence 
in 1962. Hutus did not stop claiming they were marginalized, however, and Tutsi 
alliances strengthened. Ethnic boundaries were reinforced. Intra-group differences also 
became prominent, as the Parmehutu consolidation of state power drove a wedge 
between them and more moderate Hutu citizens.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  Several interviewees told me that this event was fabricated to mobilize Hutus against 
Tutsis. Either way, the end result (increased mobilization against Tutsi) was the same.	  	  
62 Many argue that this event itself was a genocide, though this point is widely debated. 
An in-depth examination of this time period was not performed; hence, this dissertation 
does not offer an analysis of the type of violence that took place during the 1950s.  
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Discrimination against Tutsis began; soon, Tutsis were excluded from high-
ranking jobs. As a survivor and government official explained, 
Simply just because they are Tutsi… Not in army, not in administration, very few 
people in teaching, in education, in medical… We had these IDs that said if you 
were Tutsi or Hutu, so you really couldn’t really have access to the basic things 
simply because you’re Tutsi. Discrimination, official discrimination… in the 
school, in the workplace, in the army (Rwanda, August 2012).  
  
Direct forms of violence continued, too. In 1963, some of the Tutsi who had fled 
attacked Rwanda across the Burundian border. The raids were used as an excuse for 
attacks on Tutsis within Rwanda. Even President Kayibanda stated, “Assuming that you 
[Tutsi] managed the impossible by taking the Kigali city, tell me in brief how you 
imagine the chaos that would follow in which you will be the first victims? ... It will be 
the complete and rapid termination of the Tutsi race” (Fieldnotes 2012; Kimonyo 2014). 
Violence continued. In 1968, Tutsis again tried to attack Rwanda through Burundi. The 
government responded by executing 20 prominent Tutsi, and Hutu civilians killed 
thousands of Tutsis (African Rights 1995). There was little to no international reaction, 
and those who killed Tutsi inyenzi (cockroaches) generally went unpunished.  
In 1972, Hutu in Burundi began organized attacks on Tutsi. The Burundian 
government responded with large-scale targeting and mass killing of Hutu, and the 
government of Rwanda seized the moment to incite fear of Tutsi violence against Hutu. 
Rwandans began to worry about reprisal attacks from Rwandan Tutsi.  
In the following year, General Juvénal Habyarimana, the most senior officer in 
the army, rose to power in a coup d’état.63 He established the Second Republic and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  While it will not be reviewed here,	  President Kayibanda’s repressive regime had 
received much criticism. For example, in 1962, he changed the Constitution to establish 
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promised to restore order to Rwanda. Two years later, he made Rwanda a single-party 
state under the National Revolutionary Movement for Development (MRND). 
Habyarimana sought to further organize Rwanda, whose administrative units were 
already centrally organized. He attracted foreign assistance during the 1970s and 1980s, 
which led to the development of roads, telephone services, and electric services (Des 
Forges 1999). Elites within Rwandan society enjoyed some prosperity, and killings 
decreased.  
However, discrimination against the Tutsi remained and arguably strengthened. 
Tutsis continued to be excluded from some jobs, and there were quotas for how many 
Tutsis could attend schools. Beyond this, all students learned that Tutsis were outsiders 
who had taken power away from the native Hutu. As President Habyarimana was a Hutu 
from the northern part of Rwanda, regional differences also began to surface. 
Habyarimana’s regime particularly favored northern Hutu marginalized southern Hutu 
alongside Tutsi.  
Prosperity in Rwanda grew shaky in the late 1980s, when the price of coffee, 
which accounted for 75 percent of Rwanda’s foreign trade, dropped sharply (Prunier 
1995). Habyarimana’s regime was under pressure from its donors to enact political 
reforms, such as returning to a multi-party system. While this pressure may have been 
tempered by donors’ fears of antagonizing what appeared to be a democratizing country 
(Des Forges 1999), they nevertheless placed pressure on the Habyarimana regime.  
Meanwhile, the Tutsi Diaspora, who had resettled in Burundi, Uganda, Tanzania, 
and other countries in the region, had still not been reintegrated into Rwanda. In fact, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
unlimited presidential terms. This and other repressive actions were met with increasing 
unrest among some factions of society. 	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Habyarimana’s regime denied reentry to many. In response, a group of Tutsi refugees in 
Uganda formed the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).64 After several years of training, the 
RPF invaded Rwanda on October 1, 1990, attempting to take power from Habyarimana.  
 This attack marked the beginning of a civil war and placed tremendous strain on 
the government. It also offered Habyarimana a way to rebuild his support by rallying 
Rwandans against the enemy: the RPF. Habyarimana’s government began to imprison 
and torture Tutsis for their alleged support of the RPF—arguably an attempt to draw Hutu 
together in opposition to a common enemy, a phenomenon that many sociologists have 
observed during times of crisis (e.g., Erikson 1966). Anti-Tutsi propaganda swept 
through the country through venues like Kangura, a newspaper founded shortly after the 
RPF invasion. Its content was notoriously sensationalist, though perhaps the most 
infamous piece was the Hutu 10 Commandments, published in December 1990. The 
“Commandments” included items declaring that Hutus married to Tutsi or befriending 
Tutsi were traitors, that the education sector must be comprised of a Hutu majority, and 
that all strategic positions within the country should be entrusted only to Hutu. Other 
media sources, such as Radio RTLM,65 were created to spread similar anti-Tutsi 
propaganda to those without access to newspapers or the ability to read.66  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 The RPF grew out of the Rwandan Alliance for National Unity (RANU). While Fred 
Rwigyea originally led the organization, it was led by Paul Kagame, the current President 
of Rwanda, throughout the civil war and the genocide (Mamdani 2001). See Mamdani for 
a detailed explanation of the RPF.  
65 Radio RTLM (Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines) was broadcast from July 8, 
1993 to July 31, 1994. Its leaders have been charged with genocide, incitement to 
genocide, and crimes against humanity at the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda. Though the government did not directly create the radio station or newspaper, it 
funded both.  
66 For detailed studies of the role of media in the genocide, see Thompson 2007.  
 89	  
Due in part to some of the pressure exerted on the regime, Habyarimana accepted 
a constitutional amendment that allowed other political parties in late 1991. Several 
months later, he agreed to allow some of these parties to join a coalition government—
much to the dismay of some Hutus, who wanted to hold onto power, not share it with 
Tutsis. Fears that a broader coalition government would form swept the already unstable 
country and influenced the creation of youth political party wings. The Interahamwe, for 
example, was comprised of youth from the MRND party who pledged to defend the 
country from threats. Political leaders and citizens formed many other self-defense 
groups. In general, these groups urged individuals to train to defend themselves against 
Tutsi attacks. As a memorial guide and witness noted: 
You see, they were called self-defense groups for a reason. This was a way to get 
the broader public to participate. Make them think they are in danger. Their 
families are in danger. That way, they slowly get ready to participate in the 
violence by thinking they are defending themselves (Rwanda, September 2012). 
 
Another survivor explained, “So what the regime did is to incite people and to show that 
there is now public danger, public threat to everyone regardless of his level, educational, 
well being… it’s now the end: if you don’t defend yourself, you’re done” (Rwanda, 
September 2012). Beyond mobilizing ordinary citizens, these committees also created 
identities for Rwandan citizens as defenders, illustrating that it is important to understand 
the group identities of the perpetrators as well.  
Meanwhile, the RPF and the Rwandan Government signed a ceasefire in July 
1992, and peace talks associated with a series of agreements known as the Arusha 
Accords began. Habyarimana often disavowed the Arusha Accords when speaking about 
them in Rwanda. Other politicians voiced disapproval of a peace process and advocated 
for the continuation of violence. While speaking at an MRND event in 1993, politician 
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Léon Mugesera scolded that Hutus must not let themselves be invaded and urged them to 
execute the “scum” (Gourevitch 1998).  
Yet, President Habyarimana continued to participate in the peace process and 
signed another protocol in January 1993. This established a plan for a broad based 
transitional government in which power would be shared until subsequent elections. 
Specifically, power was to be shared by the Habyarimana regime, the RPF, and a third 
faction comprised of other political parties. The tripartite proposition met much resistance 
among members of the incumbent government.67  
The RPF violated the ceasefire and invaded Rwanda on February 8, 1993, 
resulting in displacement within Rwanda and again placing pressure on the Habyarimana 
regime. After a few days of fighting, the parties agreed to another cease-fire, but support 
for self-defense groups and against the RPF grew. In August 1993, all three parties of the 
transitional government signed another agreement, and local-level leaders began to fear 
for their positions once—if—the Arusha Accords were implemented. The RPF, local 
youth militias, and self-defense committees grew (Des Forges 1999), while the 
government imported three-quarters of a million dollars worth of machetes (Melvern 
2006).  
 On October 21, 1993, Tutsi army officers assassinated the President of Burundi. 
Both Hutu and Tutsi were slaughtered in Burundi, sending streams of Burundian refugees 
to Rwanda. Hopes that Hutu and Tutsi could share power peacefully were deeply shaken 
by these events, and the Habyarimana regime capitalized on them to instill fear. As a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  67	  Violence also continued, and the United Nations initiated a Commission of Inquiry. 
The Commission found that both the Habyarimana regime and the RPF had committed 
human rights abuses, though this finding did not lead to prosecutions. 	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survivor explained, “So they [the Government]… said, ‘Don’t you know? The Tutsi are 
very bad. They killed even the president in Burundi. If you don’t pay attention, they’ll 
kill you’” (Rwanda, September 2012). 
The UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) was established to help keep 
peace, and troops were sent in December 1993. Yet, they lacked full numbers and basic 
supplies, as the budget was not formally approved for months. Even then, the general of 
the UNAMIR, Roméo Dallaire, heard warnings that government officials were planning 
genocide but was unable to obtain more assistance (Dallaire 2004).  
 Beyond the confidential information that Dallaire had received, many signs and 
preconditions analyzed in Chapter 2 were clearly present. In Chapter 6, I analyze these in 
more detail and in comparison to Bosnia and Sudan. For now, I review them briefly. 
 At the societal level, ethnic divisions were flexible categories that changed and 
took on new meanings over time. Such fluid understandings of ethnicity are difficult to 
model quantitatively—likely another reason why a simple measure of ethnolinguistic 
diversity is not a significant predictor of the onset of genocidal violence (Chapter 2). 
Rather, the politicization of ethnicity, especially through political parties but also through 
other intra-ethnic civil society organizations (Varshney 2003), is key. These polarized 
ethnic identities were also tied tightly to the ethnicity of those in power within the 
regime, and it is evident that there was much contention over the ethnicity of the ruling 
elite in Rwanda, lending credence to theories suggesting that such contention is a 
precondition of genocide and qualitatively supporting the quantitative results shown in 
Chapter 2. In addition, an exclusionary ideology, which in this case was led by the state 
and political parties and transmitted to broader society through media, was clearly 
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present, affirming many genocide scholars’ focus on ideologies (Weitz 2003; Hagan and 
Rymond-Richmond 2008).  
 At the state level, it again appears that the precise type of government may matter 
less than the perceived strain on that government, though a more detailed discussion of 
this will follow in Chapter 6. Indeed, the clearest precondition at this level was the civil 
war, including repeat attacks by the RPF, which placed pressure on the relatively new 
government and resulted in increased militarization (Straus 2006). As noted above, the 
civil war also provided the government with an opportunity to align all Tutsi with the 
RPF, cast all Tutsi as enemies and threats, and rally the public into self-defense 
committees. Paradoxically, the peace process caused additional strain and influenced 
fears of power loss.  
The strain caused by the civil war was compounded by other shocks to the 
regime, such as the coffee crisis of the late 1980s. The effect of colonialism—another 
international factor—is most evident in its impact on Rwandan ethnic identities. Violence 
in neighboring countries, particularly Burundi, also impacted Rwanda in the years 
leading to the genocide, both through an influx of refugees as well as by inducing fears 
within Rwanda.68  
 None of these preconditions is sufficient to cause genocide. Instead, these factors 
influenced a situation in which genocide was possible. The actions of those who planned 
the genocide (well documented in Melvern 2006), and the societal, state, and 
international context, set the stage for violence.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68	  As Mamdani (2001) notes, other regional influences also influenced the violence. In 
particular, the RPF learned how to become an army in Uganda. 	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Descent into Genocide  
On April 6, 1994, a plane carrying President Habyarimana and the President of Burundi 
was shot down as it prepared to land in the capital of Rwanda. There were no survivors. 
Only a few hours later, targeted killing of Tutsis and moderate Hutus began. As a scholar 
and survivor explained,   
 …Immediately the army, Habyarimana army… started accusing RPF for having 
destroyed the plane. And then they put barricades everywhere… in Kigali. They 
started in the night, and in the morning, everyone who went out was killed. So 
they started in Kigali… and then it was spread everywhere… (Rwanda, August 
2012).  
 
Accordingly, the plane crash69 is often cited as the cause of the genocide, yet, as the 
previous discussion illuminated, this is not accurate. Rather, the plane crash could be 
thought of as a proximate cause, or what genocide scholars typically call a “spark,” but 
genocide took place due to a combination of factors already in play well before the night 
of the 6th.  
Mass action with the intention to destroy Tutsis and their associates began swiftly 
after April 6, 1994. Members of the army and political figures first targeted political 
moderates in Kigali who might stand in their way. Within an hour, the Presidential Guard 
had blockaded the home of the Prime Minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana. Next in line for 
the presidency, she had arranged for UNAMIR soldiers to escort her to the radio station 
in the morning, where she planned tell the nation she was committed to the Arusha 
Accords. She never made it. Instead, Rwandan soldiers under the command of Colonel 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  It is quite possible that Habyarimana’s own regime orchestrated the crash. Many 
members of regime planned the violence and had been instrumental in creating self-
defense committees and warning citizens to be prepared to fight the Tutsi. In addition, 
roadblocks were set up and targeted killing began within hours, suggesting that the 
incident was expected. However, research on the crash’s cause has, to date, been 
inconclusive. 	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Theoneste Bagasora captured and killed her. Witnesses interviewed by Human Rights 
Watch explained that she had been left naked on her home terrace with a beer bottle 
shoved up her vagina (Des Forges 1999). Many moderate Hutus, like Uwilingiyimana, 
were systematically killed over the next few days, and trials at the ICTR have confirmed 
that perpetrators were working from pre-collected lists of names of influential leaders—
what scholars referring to other genocides have called elitocide (Gratz 2011).  
Elsewhere throughout the city, Interahamwe and Rwandan soldiers patrolled the 
streets, killing anyone who attempted to stop them (Des Forges 1999). Roadblocks, 
mainly set up by government soldiers and Interahamwe, stopped those who tried to flee. 
One survivor recalled, 
And here in the capital… they knew their neighbors. This wasn’t a big city to us; 
it was quite small. They know their neighbors, and even when you didn’t know, 
this is where the IDs now worked to their benefit. To pass a roadblock, they 
would say, “Bring your IDs.” And every ID had your name, your parent’s names, 
and whether you were Hutu or Tutsi. So this was very easy, even when their 
parents would really be doubted. They would use an ID (Rwanda, October 2012).  
 
As word of the plane crash spread, similar patterns of violence began in many 
cities throughout the country. In Nyarubuye, a commune in Eastern Rwanda, Tutsis and 
their families fled to a large Roman Catholic Church, thinking they would be safe. On 
April 15 and 16, however, local police and citizens attacked the church. The mayor of the 
commune led the attack, first asking Tutsis and Hutus hiding in the church to separate 
and then leading the killings, which targeted Tutsis as well as Hutus who stood in the 
way of the violence. In just two days, more than 20,000 people were killed. A survivor 
said: 
When there was violence in 1959 and other times, Tutsis sought refuge at these 
places…. And they were safe. Police, public buildings… and they were safe. And 
this time they thought maybe… this will pass. They thought this will pass; it is 
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just insecurity. We have seen this before; this will pass. And it didn’t; it became 
worse (Rwanda, September 2012). 
 
Privat, a child at the time, recalled his mother being torn away by several men 
who likely raped her before killing her. Their attackers had machetes, spears, and other 
common weapons, though they also used guns and grenades. Some people, including 
Privat, managed to flee, though after killing those hiding in the church, the perpetrators 
hunted down as many people as they could find in surrounding buildings, homes, and 
woods. Bodies were left where they fell (Rwanda, September 2012).  
At this point, systematic violence had yet to begin in Butare,70 a prefecture in 
southern Rwanda. Reasons for differences in onset are explored below, though one key 
reason is that Butare’s governor, a Tutsi, opposed the violence. He was ultimately 
unsuccessful: the interim President had him removed from office and killed after just a 
few weeks. Subsequently, residents sought shelter within their homes or in common areas 
within their communes. An estimated 65,000 people, for example, sought refuge in and 
around a local technical school. After days without much food or water, the mayor of the 
Mudasomwa commune, soldiers, and other townspeople attacked the school on April 21. 
The death toll has been estimated at 50,000.  
The violence was swift. Many scholars and writers note that the genocide took 
place within a matter of 100 days. Yet, as it is difficult to point to a day when the 
genocide began, it is also difficult to pinpoint an exact ending to the violence. Often, 
scholars cite the date the Rwandan Patriotic Front invaded Rwanda and took control of 
the capital on July 4, 1994. Others point to the installation of an interim government on 
July 19, 1994. However, almost every interviewee told me that killings and other forms 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	  The commune of Nyakizu provides one exception.	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of violence continued past these dates. Both the International Criminal Tribunal and the 
Rwandan Gacaca Courts recognize this, and their jurisdictions extend through December 
1994. Thus, while 100 days is in many ways a catch phrase for the genocide, it is not 
accurate. Rather, the ending of a genocide should be measured by when systematic 
actions with the intent to destroy a social group subside. Accordingly, this study focuses 
on the dates April 6, 1994 to December 1994, though the vast majority of violence 
occurred within the three-month period following April 6th. 
Patterns of Genocidal Victimization in Rwanda 
 Genocidal violence can take several forms, bound by the common defining 
element of actions with the intent to destroy a social group. As the brief summary of the 
events in Rwanda illustrated, one of the main forms of violence in Rwanda was killing. In 
general, political opposition leaders were the first targets (Des Forges 1999; Melvern 
2006), though all Tutsis, as well as Hutu moderates and Hutus associated with Tutsis, 
were targeted. In total, an estimated one million71 people were killed. 
Many other forms of victimization were prominent. For example, it is estimated 
that 250,000 women were raped (Prunier 1995; Des Forges 1999). Torture, property 
destruction, and kidnapping also took place. There were also many internally displaced 
persons (IDPs), though many who were initially displaced were killed, making 
displacement figures almost impossible to reconstruct. Furthermore, as the period of most 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71Popular estimates of those killed vary widely. The vast majority of the estimates fall 
between 500,000 and 1 million, though many estimates are acknowledged as rough 
guesses, at best (Davenport and Stam 2007). More recent studies have converged around 
one million. In addition, the two comprehensive studies taken by the Rwandan 
government cite 934,218 victims (Ministry of Local Administration 2004) and “over 
1,050,000 victims” (Gacaca Final Report 2012). This study uses the data from the 
Ministry of Local Administration.  
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intense violence took place during such a short amount of time and as many of those who 
were displaced were hiding at the houses of neighbors, there are no reliable estimates of 
IDPs.  
Most estimates place the number of refugees at around two million. A fraction of 
this number includes Tutsis who were able to flee Rwanda before the genocide began or 
as it unfolded. However, the majority of the refugees were actually Hutus. Many who 
participated in the killings, as well as those who feared reprisal killings, fled once the 
RPF took over the capital in July.  
The Perpetrators72  
While the intensity of the violence has remained a defining aspect of the 
genocide, the proportion of citizens who participated in the violence has remained 
another. To be clear, this genocide was planned and executed by leaders within the 
government and political parties, including army officials, governors, and mayors 
(Melvern 2006; ICTR 1998-2013). Many other participants were members of the army or 
self-defense committees and organized militias, like the Interahamwe, that had formed in 
the years leading to the genocide. Some of these groups, including the Rwandan armed 
forces, traveled around Rwanda, wreaking havoc on citizens in many different 
communities.73  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  72	  It is important to underscore that the categories of perpetrator, victim, and rescuer are 
often complex. For example, LeAnn Fujii (2011) explained that someone could save 
several people and kill several within the same week or even the same day. Likewise, 
those who are forced to kill others are, in some ways, simultaneously victims and 
perpetrators. 73	  This dissertation does not study the Interahamwe and other militias, although much 
research is needed to better understand how they were organized and how they operated. 
See Savelsberg (2010) for analyses regarding how criminological theories may inform 
the study of the formation, socialization, and group processes within these militias. 	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 Yet, the genocide could not have been executed to the extent it was without the 
participation of civilians. New data from the Rwandan National Gacaca Courts reveal an 
estimate of well over one million participants, and as co-authors and I demonstrate 
elsewhere, the majority of these participants were men between the ages of 18 and 45 
(Nyseth Brehm, Uggen, and Gasanabo unpublished).  
Records suggest that most civilian perpetrators were part of more loosely formed 
groups that remained within their community. In essence, they killed their neighbors (Des 
Forges 1999; Hatzfeld 2006; Fujii 2011). As a Rwandan scholar told me,  
Because we just talk about this militia or just talk about the Interahamwe… but I 
think what we can discuss was how the population was mobilized because it 
wasn’t the militia only, [it was] the neighbors. I mean, the one you call your 
friend could wake up one day and just pick up a machete (Rwanda, September 
2012).  
 
Several scholars have interviewed a small percentage of these perpetrators (Straus 
2006; Hatzfeld 2006; Fujii 2011), and their data show that, for some, participation in the 
genocide became like a job. Radio RTLM broadcast messages telling people to “work” 
during those months of 1994, and the interim President often congratulated citizens for 
their “work.” Interahamwe literally means “those who work together.” This created a 
definition favorable to crime (Sutherland 1947), which may help explain the mass public 
participation.74 Many other factors75 likely influenced the participation rates and 
subsequent victimization levels, and for this, I turn to an analysis of the rate of genocidal 
killing at the commune level.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74	  While the precise number of Interahamwe is not known, many suggest that the group 
started at 4,000 to 5,000 in April 1994 and grew to 20,000 or 30,000 during the course of 
the genocide (Mann 2005). 75	  Local networks and ties also influenced participation in the violence, as Fujii (2011) 
shows.	  As explained in more detail below, I do not analyze these, though I also do not 
discount their import.	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Part 1: Disaggregating the Violence 
 
While efforts to analyze meso- and micro-level dynamics of genocidal violence pale in 
comparison to analyses of state-level planning, several recent studies have begun to 
explore regional-level variation in killings during the genocide. Most of these have 
focused on specific prefectures or communes76 within Rwanda. For example, Verwimp 
(2004) conducted a quantitative analysis of death in the prefecture of Kibuye (a region in 
western Rwanda). He concluded that Tutsis who were not farmers and who did not flee to 
a large stadium had better odds of surviving the genocide. He also found that the 
probability of surviving the genocide in the prefecture increased with age up to the age of 
20 and then decreased again with older ages. Similarly, Verpoorten (2005) conducted a 
quantitative analysis of deaths in the Gikongoro province (in southwestern Rwanda) with 
the goal of obtaining the most accurate death toll. In a subsequent analysis, Verpoorten 
(2012) also examined the relationship between population pressure and meso-level 
violence, concluding that the death toll was significantly higher in regions with high 
population densities and fewer opportunities for young men to acquire land.77  
In a different vein, Mulinda (2010) analyzed local dynamics in two small 
communes, finding that local leaders are key to understanding how genocide unfolded 
differently across communes. In his study of perpetrators, Straus (2006) also focused on 
local dynamics, ultimately arguing that fear and chaos were important factors in the five 
communes he studied.78 These studies are novel, and more studies of the specific 
dynamics in each community are needed. This analysis, however, strives to fall between 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  76	  Again, at the time of the genocide, the country was divided into 11 prefectures (states) 
and 145 communes (municipalities), which were further subdivided into sectors and cells. 	  77	  Greenfield (2009) came to a similar conclusion in his unpublished thesis.	  	  
78	  Note that Straus also documented variation in violence between the 11 prefectures.	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aggregated, nation-level analyses and smaller, commune-specific analyses by examining 
all geographic regions within Rwanda. Thus, its goal is not to understand the local 
dynamics or actions of particular individuals or groups but to explore general patterns in 
regional variation throughout the entire country.  
Indeed, an analysis of the killings by commune (Figure 3.279) makes clear the 
municipality-level variation in the genocidal violence. Notably, there were more killings 
in the central and southern regions of Rwanda, especially in the capital and the prefecture 
Butare. By contrast, northern Rwanda saw comparatively lower rates of killing. Even 
communes that stood side by side saw markedly different violence. In fact, the number 
killed in a commune ranged from 700 to over 50,000. What could account for this?  
As the disaggregation of genocidal events is a new area of inquiry, there are no 
established theories regarding regional variation in violence. To date, most theories about 
genocide focus on its preconditions, such as the presence of civil war or other societal 
upheaval (Fein 1993; Chirot and McCauley 2006), the type of government (Rummel 
1995; Harff 2003; Mann 2005), the economic climate (Totten and Parsons 2008), 
dehumanizing ideologies (Weitz 2003; Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008), and many 
other factors reviewed in Chapter 2. While some of these circumstances may influence 
how genocides unfold over time, state-level factors do not completely explain why one 
region saw more violence than another. Instead, other factors at other conceptual levels 
may explain regional variation in violence.80  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  79	  Three communes in northwestern Rwanda are missing data and are included in the first 
category. Note also that, in a handful of communes, the rate of killing is above 1,000 per 
1,000, likely due to the movement of people during the genocide.	  	  80	  I do not argue that state-level factors cannot explain some of the more meso- and 
micro-level processes but rather that additional explanations are necessary. 	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Figure 3.2: Rate of Killing by Commune in Rwanda  
 
 
Thus, I turn to theories from several fields of research, including genocide studies, 
criminology, and the study of political and ethnic violence. These theories speak to 
targeted violence and ideologies that motivate it, the community’s ability to organize 
against crime, population pressures, organized actors, and broader spatial and temporal 
factors. 
Targeted Violence and Ideology 
Many studies focus on the factors that motivate genocide, assuming that such 
terrifying violence would not take place without motivation. It is difficult to capture 
intent and motivation quantitatively, but I can account for the targeted killing of certain 
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groups. Most directly, the percentage of Tutsi living in each commune likely influenced 
the rate of killings. During genocide, particular groups of people are targeted, and in 
Rwanda, there was a plan to exterminate all Tutsi. Thus, I hypothesize that the percent 
Tutsi is associated with higher rates of killing, which would also confirm the targeted 
nature of the genocide.81 However, I expect that other factors also influence whether the 
state-led goal of extermination is carried out at a regional level.  
An alternate aspect of identity—religion—may have influenced regional 
variation. Though there is not documentation of people being targeted based on religious 
identity, the Catholic Church was heavily intertwined with the colonial project and often 
favored certain groups, restricting leadership positions first to Tutsi and later to Hutu. As 
such, it may have contributed to the politicization of ethnic identities and the ideologies 
that accompanied them. In addition, several leaders of the Catholic Church were 
implicated as participating and, in some instances, reinforcing discriminatory ideologies 
and even orchestrating killings (Des Forges 1999; Longman 2011).82 Thus, I test whether 
the percentage of Catholics in a region influenced the rate of killings, and I hypothesize 
that the percentage Catholics in a region is associated with higher rates of killing.  
Ideologies that cast Tutsis as enemies and urged people to kill were also likely 
spread in other ways. It is well documented that Radio RTLM played much hate speech 
and propaganda throughout the genocide, and Yanagizawa-Drott (2011) and many other 
scholars have argued that propaganda incited Hutus against Tutsis (see the eight chapters 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  81	  If there were regions with a majority of Tusti, I would specify this variable in other 
ways and explore curvilinear relationships. However, there is no commune with more 
than 45% Tutsi.	  	  82	  It is also well documented that many priests attempted to stop the violence and save 
Tutsis.	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on this subject in Thompson 2007). These broadcasts brought dehumanizing messages to 
many areas of the country and often explicitly urged Hutus to participate in the killing. 
For example, one broadcast urged people to fight Tutsi by saying,  
Do not be lazy; let us fight for this Rwanda. Do not say that you are fleeing, until 
when will you flee? What do you flee? They are as young as you are. You are 
even stronger than they are. Learn the tricks to catch them. You may set a trap for 
them; you may dig a hole in which they can fall (Radio RTLM April 1994). 
 
Broadcasts like this played daily throughout the genocide. To test this influence of hate 
speech and propaganda at the regional level, the percentage of households that owned 
radios is included, and I hypothesize that radio ownership is associated with higher rates 
of killing.83  
In general, education is associated with political moderation and less political 
extremism (Krueger and Maleckova 2002), and a large pool of poorly educated men has 
been associated with armed conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 1998). Yet, some scholars have 
found that the education system can actually contribute to violence (Lange and Dawson 
2010; Lange 2011). Educated individuals may be more likely to participate in violence, 
as education creates a gap between expectations and lived reality and instills in people the 
confidence to feel they should address these gaps (Gurr 1970; Goldstone 2002). Beyond 
this general effect, education laden with discriminatory beliefs or ideologies is likely to 
influence violence. In Rwanda, post-independence curricula taught that Tutsis were 
outsiders who had taken the land from the native Hutu (Gasanabo 2004). Students were 
also socialized to believe that Tutsis were inferior. As a survivor shared,  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  83	  It could be suggested that radio access would bring competing discourses, such as 
radio broadcasts from other countries, to the people of Rwanda. However, the radio 
stations were completely controlled by the state.  
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In the morning, they would have people stand up. “Hutu stand up.” They stand 
up; others remain seated. Then after they say, “Tutsis stand up.” They stand up; 
others laugh… I think that was to humiliate the children indirectly because at that 
time some children didn’t know if they were Tutsi or Hutu (Rwanda, October 
2012).  
 
 In line with this, I include a measure of average education, and I hypothesize that 
communes with higher levels of education had higher rates of killings.  
Community Organization 
An ideology that motivated the destruction of Tutsis may not be enough to 
explain regional variation in genocidal killings. Criminologists have long examined how 
neighborhood, community, and regional-level characteristics influence levels of crime, 
and their most prominent theories regarding community-level variation in violence pay 
more attention to community-level controls. While these theories have never been applied 
to genocidal crime, it is feasible that community-level influences on homicide rates also 
influence rates of genocidal killing.  
In particular, social disorganization theory84 starts with the fact that crime is not 
randomly dispersed throughout cities or regions, but is concentrated in certain areas 
(Shaw and McKay 1942). These areas have structural factors in common that impede a 
community’s ability to prevent crime by affecting community trust, cohesion, and 
networks, all factors that may influence community-level violence during genocide. 
Theories of social disorganization have been revised by a number of criminologists (e.g., 
Kornhauser 1974; Bursik 1988; Sampson and Groves 1999), and today, the idea that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  84	  Although these theories have generally been applied at the neighborhood level, they 
have also been applied and found relevant at the supra-regional level (see, for example, 
Vuolo 2012). Furthermore, while these theories were originally called social 
disorganization theories, I use the more basic term “community organization” throughout 
this dissertation to signal that communities and other groups can feasibly be organized for 
or against crime. 	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community organization impacts its ability to achieve its goals—including lower crime 
rates—remains prominent and applies to many types of crime, such as homicide, crime 
committed by gangs, and burglary.85  
To test these theories, I rely on several specific indicators. Ethnic heterogeneity is 
always included in tests of social disorganization, as many studies have found that crime 
rates are higher in more heterogeneous areas. In the case of genocide, this measure takes 
on a new meaning. In addition, residential mobility has been seen as a key indicator of 
disorganization and has been linked to higher levels of crime (Shaw and McKay 1931; 
Sampson and Groves 1989). High levels of mobility may disrupt a community’s network 
of social relations and act as a barrier to friendship bonds, making crimes more likely. 
Yet, it is also feasible that lower levels of residential mobility facilitate killing because 
residents committing genocide know where their fellow residents reside: targeted 
destruction is easier. To examine this, I test the percent of people who have always 
lived86 in each commune, and, in line with theories of social disorganization, I 
hypothesize that communes where a higher percentage of people have always lived will 
have lower rates of killings. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  85	  Sampson and Groves proposed that many factors that influence crime are mediated by 
collective efficacy, defined as social cohesion among neighbors combined with their 
willingness to intervene on behalf of the common good. This is often measured by 
surveys of trust within a community, but there are no measures of trust or other 
comparable measures for communes in Rwanda before 1994. Yet, the idea that social 
cohesion among neighbors influenced neighborhood participation and, thus, the rate of 
violence has much face validity. 	  86	  Note that previous censuses do not give a good picture of the mobility over time, so I 
just use data from the 1991 census. In addition, demographic data on foreigners are 
missing from the census, so I am not able to include the percent of foreigners in this 
analysis. It was, however, reportedly very small and likely did not have an effect. 	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Sampson (1987) has also argued that marital disruption may decrease informal 
social controls at the community level, and Sampson and Groves (1989) found that 
marital disruption, measured by divorce, was associated with higher crimes rates. Both of 
these studies were concerned with juvenile delinquency and linked family disruption to a 
lack of parental supervision at a community level, but divorce may also result in less 
social controls within a community. Thus, I include a measure of divorce, and I 
hypothesize that communes with higher percentage of divorce have higher rates of 
killing. As formal divorce was not common in Rwanda, especially in rural areas, I also 
test marriage rates among people age 15 and older.  
Socioeconomic status, too, has been linked to community-level crime. Shaw and 
McKay (1942), as well as many others (Byrne and Sampson 1986; Sampson and Groves 
1989; Morenoff, Sampson, and Raudenbush 2001), have argued that communities of 
lower socioeconomic status suffer from weaker organization, which leads to more crime. 
This is much in line with theories of civil war, which have linked low economic 
development to both the onset of civil war (e.g., Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and 
Hoeffler 2004) and to meso- and micro-level studies of magnitude (e.g., Do and Iyer 
2007). In line with this, I rely upon measures of unemployment, and I hypothesize that 
higher levels of unemployment are associated with higher rates of killing.87 As 
unemployment levels are very low due to the agrarian nature of Rwandan society, I also 
construct and test a variable to capture employment in the formal employment sector. I 
created this variable using census data on the type of employment people claim; in 
particular, I assign those listing themselves as an employer or an employee as having 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  87	  At the individual level, unemployment could also influence strain. However, I focus on 
the community level and thus focus on community organization. 	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formal employment, while those listing themselves as self-employed, unemployed, or a 
family worker as not.88   
 In addition, Sutherland (1947) suggested that an area with a large population of 
adolescents and young adults would have more crime. Indeed, the age distribution of 
crime, which ascends during adolescence, peaks in early adulthood, and then declines, 
would suggest that areas with more youth would have higher rates of crime and, in this 
case, genocidal crime (Hirschi and Gottfredson 1983; Farrington 1986; Gottfredson and 
Hirschi 1990; Massoglia and Uggen 2010).89 This hypothesis also finds support in studies 
of ethnic and political violence, which have argued that higher percentages of young men 
translate to more potential perpetrators (Collier 2000; Goldstone 2002; Urdal 2006). 
Accordingly, I include the percent of young men, defined as the men ages 1690 to 30, and 
I hypothesize that higher percentages of young men are associated with higher rates of 
killing.  
 Lastly, interethnic marriage may influence rates of killing. It is often suggested 
that interethnic marriages may be associated with lowered violence during genocide, 
though few studies assess this relationship. Interethnic marriages provide more social 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  88	  I also just examined the percentage of employers within a commune, though the results 
did not vary from results presented below.  89	  Recent research specifically on Rwanda has shown that those who participated were 
actually older than traditional research on age and crime would suggest, with a median 
age of 30-34 (Nyseth Brehm, Uggen, and Gasanabo, unpublished). This research also 
found that 89% of participants in the genocide were men, echoing criminological studies 
of gender (Hirschi and Gottfredson 1983) as well as genocide studies literature on 
perpetrators (Browning 1993; Mann 2000). In line with this, I test a variety of other age 
groups, including middle-aged men, which are not significantly associated with the rate 
of killing once other variables, such as employment, are included in the model. Note also 
that I explore other reasons for the age of Rwandan perpetrators in another paper (Nyseth 
Brehm, Uggen, and Gasanbo unpublished). 	  90	  I set the minimum at 16 because this is the age at which people can enter the Rwandan 
army. 	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cohesion and indicate social integration (Alba and Golden 1986; Merton 1941), which 
might, in turn, positively impact the ability to organize. Thus, I include the percent of 
interethnic marriages in each commune, and I hypothesize that higher percentages of 
interethnic marriages are associated with lower rates of killing. 
Differential Social Organization and Defended Communities  
While social disorganization theories predict that socially organized communities 
would see lower rates of killing, each of the variables above may also have the opposite 
effect. For instance, it is typically assumed that a community’s goal would be to organize 
against crime, but Sutherland’s (1947) theory of differential social organization notes that 
communities can also be organized toward crime (Matsueda 2006). In other words, the 
structural characteristics that influence crime prevention may also positively motivate 
crime, depending on the goal of a community. A highly organized gang may organize 
around a goal of committing crime. In the case of genocide, an entire community may be 
organized around a goal of committing genocide.  
Many things may motivate this goal. For example, the defended communities 
perspective suggests that people go to great lengths to defend their community identities. 
In line with this, Lyons (2007) found that socially organized, affluent communities 
sometimes experience more hate crime, outlining a “dark” side of social organization. 
Similar processes may be at work in genocide. Thus, while I hypothesize that indicators 
of differential social organization influence genocidal killings in much the same way that 
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they influence homicide or other forms of crime, I recognize that they may have the 
opposite effect in the case of well-organized community.91 
Resource Competition 
Resource scarcity and population pressures may also influence regional variation 
in violence. Indeed, resource scarcity has been linked to conflict, often in aggregate 
nation-level analysis (Homer-Dixon 1994) (as discussed in Chapter 2) but also in meso-
level studies (Urdal 2008). In the case of Rwanda, Prunier (1995), Uvin (1998), Mamdani 
(2001), Verpoorten (2012), and others have hypothesized that resource scarcity 
contributed to violence because hunger and landlessness influenced feelings of 
hopelessness and because those who participated in the genocide often received rewards 
and the spoils from lootings. Generally, these hypotheses have been linked to the onset of 
violence, though Verpoorten (2012) tested them on a meso-level analysis and found that 
resource scarcity, measured with a proxy for landlessness, was associated with increased 
deaths during the genocide in Rwanda.  
Closely related, Henderson (1993) suggested population pressures may cause 
strain within a country, arguing that pressure associated with population change is 
associated with increased political repression due to uncertainty regarding resources and 
security. This falls in line with criminological theories that suggest that situations that 
bring pressure to bear on an individual can influence criminal behavior (Savelsberg 2010; 
Agnew 2011). Population pressure has been linked to repression and violence in studies 
of civil war and other violence (Raleigh and Urdal 2007; Ostby et al. 2011), and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  91	  Ideally, I would be able to test data on various community-level indicators of a 
community goal, such as the political party of the mayor. I have yet to find these data, 
however. If they exist, this must be a future paper. 	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population density is often discussed in the case of Rwanda—in 1994, it had the world’s 
highest population density, leading many to refer to it as a “ticking time bomb.” To test 
the influence of resource scarcity and population pressure, I include measures of the 
kilocalorie production per capita per day—a direct measure of agricultural productivity—
as well as population growth and population density. I hypothesize that regions with 
lower kilocalorie production, as well as regions with higher population density and 
higher rates of population growth, have higher rates of killings.  
Beyond general levels of population pressure and resource scarcity, resource 
competition theories would also predict that unemployment levels should be associated 
with higher rates of crime. Yet, rather than linking unemployment levels to lower levels 
of community social controls, resource competition theory suggests violence should vary 
with the degree of interethnic competition (Olzak 1990, 1992). Indeed, much research has 
found connections between economic recessions and racial and ethnic-based conflict, as 
measured by crimes like lynching (Olzak 1992; Soule 1992; Tolnay and Beck 1995). 
Similarly, relative deprivation theories (e.g., Gurr 1970) argue that poor, marginalized 
populations are more willing to join movements to topple forces seen as responsible for 
their marginalization. Though these forces are often the government, in the case of 
genocide, marginalized populations may be more willing to join movements against 
social groups seen as the cause of marginalization, much like the Tutsi were seen as the 
cause of Hutu marginalization. Thus, I also test Hutu and Tutsi employment. As 
unemployment numbers are small (less than 1 percent), I rely on Hutu Employment in the 
Formal Sector and Tutsi Employment in the Formal Sector, and I hypothesize that 
genocidal rates of killing are higher in communities with lower levels of Hutu 
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employment in the formal employment sector.  
Organized Actors 
Kalyvas (2008) has argued that research on the meso- and micro-level processes 
of violence is incomplete if it does not take into account territorial control or movement 
of armed actors. Despite this, none of the previous studies of regional variation in 
Rwanda include armed actors. A number of institutionalized organized actors may have 
influenced the rate of killing, often working as forces of criminal social organization 
(Vaughan 1999 Savelsberg 2010). The Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) clearly became a 
force of criminal social organization, participating in—and even leading—killings (Des 
Forges 1999; Melvern 2006). Thus, I hypothesize that the presence of the Rwandan 
Armed Forces (FAR) is associated with increased rates of killing.92  
 Other organized actors who were moving throughout the country also may have 
influenced regional variation in the rate of killing. The RPF re-invaded Rwanda as the 
genocide began, and it has been argued that their presence influenced fear and subsequent 
killings (Davenport and Stam 2009) or that they engaged in defensive killings themselves 
(Rusesabagina 2006). Alternatively, the presence of RPF soldiers may have deterred 
violence, as perpetrators may have fled regions in which the RPF gained control. Thus, I 
test the presence of RPF armed forces. Furthermore, as the RPF invaded Rwanda to fight 
the interim government, I analyze whether the frontline between the RPF and FAR 
influenced rates of killings.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  92	  Note that other organized groups, such as the Interahamwe, were also active 
throughout the violence, though data on their movements do not exist. 	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France sent troops in response to the genocide in late June under Chapter VII of 
the United Nations Charter,93 though many Rwandans charge that French troops did not 
assist Tutsis so much as provide safe passage for Hutu perpetrators fleeing Rwanda. 
Nevertheless, as these troops were sent to keep peace, I test whether the presence of 
French troops was associated with lower numbers of killing; and I hypothesize that 
French troop presence is associated with lower rates of violence.  
Broader Spatial and Temporal Factors 
Lastly, factors pertaining to physical surroundings may have influenced regional 
levels of violence. Conditions favorable to insurgency, measured by rough/mountainous 
terrain, have been found to be one of the strongest predictors of civil war at the macro 
(Fearon and Laitin 2003) and micro levels (Murshed and Gates 2005; Bohara, Mitchell, 
and Nepal 2006; Cederman, Buhaug, and Rod 2009). To test whether this holds for 
genocidal violence, I include a measure of elevation to capture rough terrain, and I 
hypothesize that rough terrain is associated with higher rates of killing.  
The capital, Kigali, and other urban areas, may have seen comparatively different 
rates of violence. As noted above, the genocide began by targeting political and cultural 
leaders (Des Forges 1999; Melvern 2006), and such leaders are concentrated in urban 
areas. This would also be in line with studies of crime, which have largely found that 
urban regions have higher crime rates. Yet, in his study of collective killings during the 
Cultural Revolution in China, Su (2011) found that killings were more likely in rural 
areas. It seems remoteness facilitated higher rates of killings, perhaps through distance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  93	  Chapter 7 authorizes the use of force for peace. UN troops were also stationed in 
Rwanda in small numbers. I have been unable to obtain conclusive information about the 
communes in which they were stationed. 	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from information flow or from the organizational control from the Party Center, which, in 
that revolution, had no central policy to endorse collective killings. In Rwanda, the 
opposite could be true, as there was a central government endorsing the killings. In other 
words, distance from those directly planning and inciting violence may result in lower 
rates of killings.94 Accordingly, I include dummy variables for the capital region as well 
as for all urban areas, defined as areas containing a prefecture capital city, and I 
hypothesize that the capital and urban areas have higher rates of killing. As a way to 
capture the ease of movement to and from these areas, specifically for armed actors, I 
also include measures of distances from roads and distances from cities, following 
studies of civil war (Kalyvas 2006; Raleigh and Hegre 2009).  
 Scholars and individuals in Rwanda suggested to me that leaders may have used 
violence in neighboring Burundi to incite fear and instability in Rwanda (Straus 2006). 
Further, many Hutu refugees fled violence in Burundi and settled across the border in 
Rwanda. Studies of political violence have found higher rates of violence near borders, 
perhaps due to the instability of these border regions (Hegre, Ostby, and Raleigh 2009). 
To test the effect, I include a measure of whether the commune bordered Burundi and 
hypothesize that communes that bordered Burundi had higher rates of violence. I also 
include a binary indicator as a test of any international border violence to test whether 
Burundi’s border differed from others.  
 Recall that Rwanda also saw much sporadic violence in the years leading to the 
genocide. Communes that experienced violence against Tutsis prior to the genocide may 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  94	  Those familiar with the Holocaust might find this surprising: killing in Nazi Germany 
took place in killing centers that were purposefully hidden. In Rwanda, there was little 
attempt to conceal what was happening; rather, perpetrators attempted to frame the 
violence as a civil war.	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have had a culture of impunity, which may have influenced levels of violence in 1994. To 
test this, I include a measure of past violence, specifically measuring whether communes 
had experienced widespread killings during the 1990s.95 Finally, the violence in 
surrounding communes may influence the killing in each commune. In other words, no 
commune is a self-contained region (Deane et al. 2008). Thus, I control for spatial 
autocorrelation.  
 
Figure 3.3: Tested Determinants of Commune Variation in Killing in Rwanda 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Ideally I would include violence that took place before 1990, though I have been unable 
to find reliable measures of such violence. Episodes of violence included in this measure 
include Kibilira in October 1990, March 1992, December 1992, and January 1993; in 
northwestern Rwandan communes, including Mukingo, Kinigi, Gaseke, Giciye, Karago, 
and Mutura, in January and February 1991; in the region known as Bugesera, commune 
Kanzenze, in March 1992; in several communes of Kibuye in August 1992; and again in 
the northwest in December 1992 and January 1993 (Des Forges 1999).  
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 In sum, many factors may have influenced regional variation in killings during the 
genocide in Rwanda, including factors pertaining to targeted violence and ideology, 
community ability to organize toward or against crime, population and environmental 
pressures, organized actors, and broader spatial and temporal factors. These theories are 
illustrated in Figure 3.3.  
Methods and Measures 
Dependent Variable 
To test the applicability of these theories in Rwanda, I draw upon a measure of killings 
per commune obtained from a survey conducted by the Rwandan Ministry of Local 
Administration and Community Development (2004). This survey sought to document 
the death of every person killed during the genocide in Rwanda between April and 
December 1994.96 It includes reported and confirmed deaths, checked against other 
reports as well as records of human remains. These measures are correlated at .99, and I 
use the measure of reported deaths. This number ranged from 71 to 54,700 deaths in a 
commune, with a mean of 7,287 deaths. I transform this number into a logged rate that 
standardizes on killings per 10,000 people in each commune. A log transformation of the 
rate increases the normality of the distribution. Further, the number of deaths is never 
negative, and this transformation ensures that predicted values of y are always positive 
numbers. Note that I utilize a rate per total population rather than per Tutsi population 
because many Hutus were targeted for their association with Tutsis. 
Killings were chosen as a dependent variable because they were a main form of 
victimization during the genocide and because numbers and patterns regarding those 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  96	  Again, the vast majority of killings took place within the three-month period beginning 
in April 1994.	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killed are more reliable than other forms of victimization, such as forced displacement or 
sexual violence. It is dubious that the survey captures every person who was killed in the 
genocide, but it provides the most reliable estimates of death to date. Also note that the 
lowest administrative level for which these data are currently available is the commune 
level. Communes, or municipalities, were small areas governed by bourgmestres, or 
mayors, who were handpicked by the President and wielded much local power (see 
Wagner 1998 for an example of the power of the bourgmestre in shaping the genocide). 
Their presence and policies within the commune are likely captured in many of the 
variables in this study and validates the study of the commune level.  
Data on the dependent variable are missing for three communes. As these 
communes were communes where the RPF was located throughout much of the violence, 
there were likely far fewer killings in these regions. Due to the missing data, though, they 
are excluded from the analysis.97 Thus, this analysis includes 142 communes.  
Independent Variables 
As seen in Table 3.1, the majority of the independent variables are obtained from 
the 1991 Rwandan Census through IPUMS International (2012). As Rwanda conducted 
both a de facto and de jure census—meaning they counted present residents, absent 
residents, and visitors—the data are restricted to present and absent residents to avoid 
double counting. Individual-level data are aggregated to commune means; for variables 
that only pertain to adults, such as employment, I exclude children from calculations.98  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  97	  It is not possible to analyze whether independent variables differed for these 
communes, as the census is missing data for them. The Minnesota Population Center is 
not aware of any systematic reason for these missing data. 	  98	  As an alternate measure, I ran models with median values. Results presented are 
qualitatively similar.	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Variables that were not obtained from the census are also detailed in Table 3.1. 
Those measuring the presence of RPF, French, and FAR troops were obtained from the 
Genodynamics Project (2010), which constructed its measures using testimony from the 
International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda and interviews with commanders. I 
constructed variables for the capital, urban location, elevation, distance from cities and 
roads, and whether a commune bordered Burundi or any other country based on maps of 
Rwanda using ArcGIS software. I created the variable on past violence based on Human 
Rights Watch reports (Des Forges 1999). Lastly, I constructed the variable on 
neighboring violence in GeoDa; this variable is essentially a spatial weight that takes 
account of the average violence in all communes that contiguously neighbor a commune.  
 
Table 3.1 Dependent and Independent Variables by Commune 
Variable Description Coding Source 
Commune 
Mean Range 
Dependent Variable     
Rate of Killing Rate of those 
killed per 
10,000 people 
in each 
commune, 
logged 
Logged Rate Ministry of  
Local Admin. 
6.63 4.26 to 10.91 
        
Targeted Violence and 
Ideology     
Tutsi Percentage of 
population that 
is Tutsi 
Percentage 1991 Census 9.15 0.00 to 44.46 
Catholic Percentage of 
population that 
is Catholic 
Percentage 1991 Census 62.12 27.44 to 92.64 
Radio 
Ownership 
Percentage of 
population that 
owns a radio  
Percentage 1991 Census 33.44 17.37 to 76.09 
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Education Number of 
years of 
education, 
beginning at 
first grade 
Years 1991 Census 2.88 1.73 to 4.18 
            
Community Organization     
Always Lived Percentage of 
residents who 
have always 
lived in a 
commune 
Percentage 1991 Census 70.51 23.32 to 83.85 
Divorce Percentage of 
the adult 
population who 
are divorced 
Percentage 1991 Census 3.07 1.05 to 6.07 
Marriage Percentage of 
the adult 
population who 
are married 
Percentage 1991 Census 57.66 44.88 to 72.64 
Unemployment Percentage of 
the population 
who are 
unemployed 
Percentage 1991 Census 0.30 0.00 to 6.76 
Formal 
Employment 
Percentage 
employed in 
formal sector 
(employer or 
employee) 
Percentage 1991 Census 11.08 2.52 to. 44.79 
Young Men Percentage of 
men age 16-30 
Percentage 1991 Census 12.70 10.39 to 15.49 
Intermarriage Percentage of 
mixed Hutu-
Tutsi marriages 
Percentage 1991 Census 5.06 0.00 to 23.01 
            
Resource Competition    
Population 
Density 
Population/km2 Thousands of 
inhabitants/k
m2 
ArcGIS 0.42 0.04 to 1.37 
Population 
Growth 
Average annual 
population 
growth between 
1978 and 1991 
Percentage Verpoorten 
2011 
2.81 0.03 to 7.63 
Kilocalorie 
Production 
Kilocalories 
produced per 
day per capita 
100s 1989 Ag. 
Census 
215.21 31.10 to 392.10 
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Hutu Formal 
Employment 
Percentage of 
Hutus in formal 
employment 
sector 
Percentage 1991 Census 10.56 1.72 to 40.50 
Tutsi Formal 
Employment 
Percentage of 
Tutsis in formal 
employment 
sector 
Percentage 1991 Census 18.63 0.00 to 100.0099 
            
Organized 
Actors      
RPF Troops RPF present (at 
any time) in 
commune 
0 = No RPF     
1 = RPF  
Genodynamics 0.83 0.00 to 1.00 
FAR Troops FAR present (at 
any time) in 
commune 
0 = No FAR        
1 = FAR  
Genodynamics 0.84 0.00 to 1.00 
French Troops French troops 
present (at any 
time) in 
commune 
0 = No 
French          
1 = French  
Genodynamics 0.10 0.00 to 1.00 
RPF/FAR 
Frontline 
Frontline 
between the 
RPF and the 
FAR present in 
the commune 
(at any time) 
0 = No 
Frontline          
1 = Frontline  
Genodynamics 0.70 0.00 to 1.00 
            
Broader Spatial and Temporal Factors    
Elevation Average 
distance from 
sea level 
Meters U.S. 
Geological 
Survey 
1765.82 1137.80 to 2634.19 
Capital Region Communes that 
contain Kigali  
0 = Not 
Capital          
1 = Capital 
1994 Map 0.02 0.00 to 1.00 
Urban Region Communes that 
contain a 
prefecture 
capital city  
0 = Not 
Urban            
1 = Urban 
1994 Map 0.12 0.00 to 1.00 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 While the range of this variable is surprising, it is correct. Several communes had zero 
percent Tutsi, thus zero percent of Tutsis working in the formal sector. A handful of 
communes also had high percentages of Tutsis working in the formal sector, since their 
population of Tutsis was very small.  
 120	  
Distance from 
Roads 
Distance 
between 
commune 
centroid and 
closest road 
(logged) 
Kilometers ArcGIS 0.94 -4.56 to 3.26 
Distance from 
Cities 
Distance 
between 
commune 
centroid and 
closest 
prefecture 
capital (logged) 
 Kilometers ArcGIS 2.57 0.24 to 3.81 
Borders 
Burundi 
Communes that 
border Burundi 
0 = No 
Border          
1 = Borders 
Burundi 
1994 Map 0.10 0.00 to 1.00 
International 
Border 
Communes that 
border any 
country 
0 = No 
Border           
1 = Int. 
Border 
1994 Map 0.32 0.00 to 1.00 
Past Violence Communes 
where targeted 
killing of Tutsis 
took place pre-
1994 
0 = No 
Violence          
1 = Past 
Violence 
Human Rights 
Watch Reports 
0.05 0.00 to 1.00 
Surrounding 
Violence 
Average 
violence in all 
border 
communes 
Average 
magnitude of 
violence per 
1000 people 
in border 
communes  
GeoDa 7.31 0.22 to 27.62 
 
 
Analytic Strategy 
To analyze regional variation in killings, I begin with bivariate analysis. As this 
study includes all but three communes, and as many of these relationships have never 
been tested, simple bivariate relationships are meaningful. In addition, it is theoretically 
worthwhile to assess why factors that are associated with other forms of violence, such as 
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civil war, might not be associated with genocide. This may shed light on differences 
between forms of violence.  
 I then turn to multivariate models with a prefecture-level fixed effect. Fixed 
effects models are preferred due to the nested nature of the data (communes are nested 
within prefectures), which violates the assumption of independence required for 
regression. A Hausman test confirms that fixed effects are preferable to random 
effects.100 They are also preferable to count models, such as Poisson regression, due to 
the high frequencies of killings. To address the violation of independence in bivariate 
analyses, I cluster standard errors by prefecture identifier. As explained below, I also use 
robust standard errors in the fixed effects models.  
Results: Determinants of Regional Rates of Death 
Table 3.2 includes 29 separate regression models of the rate of deaths per 10,000 people 
in each commune. Each model contains one independent variable, shown in the first 
column. The next main column, labeled “Tutsi (Control),” presents the same model with 
the inclusion of a control variable for the percent Tutsi. Again, I cluster standard errors in 
each model due to the nested format of the data.  
 Higher percentages of Tutsi are associated with higher rates of killing. Due to the 
nature of genocide, this is expected. It further confirms the targeting of Tutsis. Percent 
Tutsi was not the only determinant of regional variation in killing, however, and all 
subsequent effects reported held with a control for percent Tutsi. 
While percent Tutsi influenced variation in rates of killing, percent Catholic did 
not. Even though segments of the Catholic Church may have been involved in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  100	  I analyzed mixed models with prefecture-level means, though no meaningful results 
were found.	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genocide, regional differences in adherence to the Catholic faith are not associated with 
the rate of killing. This may mean that exclusionary ideologies were not spread 
throughout the Church, or that religious affiliation may not be an accurate representation 
of exposure to such ideologies.  
There is support for the notion that a genocidal ideology was spread through other 
media, as radio ownership is significantly associated with higher rates of killing. This 
variable is unable to capture the complete effects of radio broadcasting, since people 
often gathered at neighbors’ homes to hear broadcasts, but it suggests that variation in 
radio ownership, measuring exposure to hate speech and propaganda, may have impacted 
regional variation in violence. Note, however, that this variable is likely capturing wealth. 
Because of this, I am currently obtaining data on radio coverage, which will provide a 
more accurate measurement of exposure to hate speech and other propaganda on the 
radio.101  
Percent education is associated with significantly higher rates of killings. 
Gasanabo (2004) has shown that the curricula used in Rwandan classroom between 1962 
and 1994 reinforced, and even created, polarized ethnic identities. And as noted above, 
children were socialized to believe that Tutsis were inferior outsiders. In the case of 
genocide in Rwanda, then, there may have been a “dark side” of education, though 
multivariate analysis will further interrogate this finding. 
Criminological theories of differential social organization also inform regional 
variation in genocide; their effects are in line with theories that assume communities 
organize against crime. In the case of genocide in Rwanda, it seems communities with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 As of June 2014, I am waiting ot obtain the data. When I obtain these data, I will 
explore interactions between radio coverage and education levels.  
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lower levels of trust and cohesion had higher rates of killing. Specifically, regions with 
less population mobility saw significantly lower rates of killings, while regions with 
higher percentages of unemployed residents and higher percentages of divorce (and lower 
percentages of marriage) saw significantly higher rates of killings. These findings do not 
mean that the genocide was not organized; instead, they suggest that characteristics 
associated with a community’s ability to successfully organize against crime were 
associated with higher rates of killing in communes.  
The	  percentage of young men is significantly associated with higher rates of 
genocide. This is in line with differential social organization theories as well as several 
theories from the study of political and ethnic violence (Collier 2000; Goldstone 2002; 
Urdal 2006).	  Lastly, communes with higher rates of inter-ethnic marriage had 
significantly higher rates of killing in bivariate analysis; but, as the effect is no longer 
significant with the inclusion of percent Tutsi, the significant positive effect is likely 
driven by the fact that areas with higher percentages of intermarriage had higher 
percentages of Tutsi. The measure may also be capturing Hutus who were killed because 
they were married to Tutsis and children of interethnic marriages who were killed 
because their ethnicity was uncertain. 	  
Turning to resource competition, communes with greater population densities or 
higher rates of population growth did not have higher rates of killing, which contradicts 
some existing findings (Verpoorten 2012). The idea that resource scarcity, manifested as 
food scarcity, influenced regional variation in violence—as well as resource competition 
theories that would predict that Hutu or Tutsi employment rates would influence the rate 
of violence—was not supported. These results will be further probed in multivariate  
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Table 3.2: Bivariate Predictors of Logged Rate of Deaths  
per 10,000 people per Commune 
Independent Variables Model Bivariate SE 
Tutsi 
(Control) SE 
Targeted Violence and Ideology      
Tutsi 1 0.132*** 0.022 0.132*** 0.022 
Catholic 2 0.009 0.011 0.001 0.006 
Radio Ownership 3 0.065** 0.021 0.040*** 0.010 
Education 4 1.712*** 0.357 0.730*** 0.173 
      
Community Organization      
Always Lived  5 -0.049** 0.018 -0.249*** 0.003 
Divorce 6 0.622*** 0.175 0.277*** 0.060 
Marriage 7 -0.161*** 0.023 -0.082*** 0.014 
Unemployment 8 0.660*** 0.099 0.340*** 0.062 
Formal Employment 9 -0.001 0.005 -0.001 0.002 
Young Men 10 0.477*** 0.125 0.155** 0.066 
Intermarriage 11 0.218*** 0.055 0.063 0.049 
      
Resource Competition      
Population Density 12 -0.211 1.200 -0.594 0.725 
Population Growth 13 -0.321 0.204 0.081 0.087 
Kilocalorie Production 14 0.002 0.003 0.003** 0.001 
Hutu Formal Employment 15 0.043 0.028 -0.001 0.022 
Tutsi Formal Employment 16 -0.006 0.010 -0.001 0.006 
      
Organized Actors      
RPF Troops 17 -0.545 0.499 0.260 0.170 
FAR Troops 18 2.281*** 0.355 1.196*** 0.326 
French Troops 19 0.309 0.471 -0.262 0.276 
RPF/FAR Frontline 20 0.513 0.424 0.550 0.230 
      
Broader Spatial and Temporal 
Factors      
Elevation 21 -0.002*** 0.001 -0.001** 0.000 
Capital Region 22 3.092*** 0.394 1.730*** 0.149 
Urban Region 23 0.317 0.609 0.443 0.287 
Distance from Roads (log) 24 -0.154 0.114 -0.005 0.064 
Distance from Cities (log) 25 0.100 0.164 0.099 0.129 
Borders Burundi 26 0.603 0.463 0.454* 0.204 
International Border 27 -0.205 0.247 -0.228 0.161 
Past Violence 28 -0.587 0.439 -0.116 0.272 
Surrounding Violence 29 0.177*** 0.044 0.106*** 0.025 
Standard errors clustered by prefecture     
* p < .1, ** p <.05, ***p < .01    
Tutsi(control) includes the predictor as well as a control for the percent Tutsi in the commune. 
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 analysis, though it is noteworthy that the perception of such pressures may have 
influenced violence.102  
Turning briefly to organized actors, the presence of the RPF troops did not 
significantly decrease the rates of killing.103 Yet, the presence of FAR troops is associated 
with higher rates of killings, which suggests that the FAR’s involvement influenced  
variation in regional rates of violence.104 Notably, the French intervention, meant to 
respond to the violence, was not associated with lower rates of killings. French troops did 
not arrive in Rwanda until the end of June, and the majority of killing had already taken 
place by then. The timing of the intervention is likely responsible for its insignificant 
effect, though the data to test this do not exist. Notably, this does not suggest that such 
interventions should not be undertaken but that the timing of the intervention is crucial.105  
Lastly, broader spatial and temporal factors show mixed results. Communes with 
higher elevation levels had significantly lower rates of killing, contrary to my hypothesis. 
Studies of political violence may still inform this finding. In the case of genocide in 
Rwanda, rough terrain may have enabled successful resistance against the state, which 
was perpetrating genocide, and this may have, in turn, influenced lower rates of killing. 
Rough terrain may also have made some houses harder to reach, significantly decreasing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  102	  This is something I cannot test currently.	  	  103	  This cannot inform deaths directly caused by RPF members, which would not be 
genocide and are likely not included in this survey. In addition, this study is unable to test 
whether and how their movements over time influenced violence in neighboring 
communes. 	  104	  I tried several other variations of these variables, such as the number of days that an 
army or organization was present in a commune, whether it was present during a certain 
month, or the number of days it was present in a certain month. 	  
105 In addition, while there was not a quantitative effect on aggregate violence, this does 
not mean that the intervention did not save lives.  
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the rates of killings. Yet, it remains to be seen whether this effect remains in multivariate 
analysis.  
 Urban areas generally do not have significantly higher rates of death, but 
communes in the capital region do, as expected due to the centralized nature of the 
genocidal plan. Thus, outside the capital, there was not a large urban/rural dichotomy. 
Distance from roads and cities also did not significantly impact the rates of killings, 
perhaps because neighbors of the victims executed many of the killings.  
There is minimal evidence indicating that communes that bordered Burundi saw 
higher rates of violence, conceivably because, as previous work has suggested, 
communes that bordered Burundi were particularly militarized in the years before the 
genocide (Mulinda 2010). As noted earlier, this result may also be due to the presence of 
refugees from Burundi, which will be accounted for in multivariate models by including 
“always lived” in the same model. The effect does not apply to any international border, 
however. In addition, regions with past violence not only did not have significantly 
higher rates of killing, they saw significantly lower rates. It is difficult to know if this is 
because many of the Tutsi living in the area were already killed, because previous 
violence de-legitimated violence in 1994, or if some other factor is at play. Lastly, 
communes that were surrounded by violence had higher rates of violence, which 
illustrates the importance of controlling for spatial autocorrelation.  
Multivariate Analyses 
Table 3.3, which includes prefecture fixed effects models with a control for 
spatial autocorrelation, confirms many of these trends. These models excluded variables 
that were not significant in bivariate analysis and that did not significantly improve the fit 
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of the models. “Capital” is measured through the fixed effect for Kigali prefecture—a 
small prefecture in central Rwanda that comprises the capital—and is thus also excluded. 
I utilize robust standard errors, as regression diagnostics revealed slightly homoskedastic 
errors.  
 Model 1 is the simplest model, illustrating that percent Tutsi explains much of 
the variation in rates of killing within communes. Each increase in percent Tutsi is 
associated with a 7.1 percent increase in the rate of violence in a commune. Education 
also has a robust, large effect on the rate of killing. This variable captures average years 
of education, though I also tested a dummy variable measuring exposure to any 
education, similarly significantly associated with higher rates of killing.  
Models 2 and 3 include variables to measure each commune’s ability to organize 
against crime. As education status and marriage status are highly correlated (-.8), I 
operationalized dichotomous variables to capture the percentage of the commune 
population who were married and had any exposure to the education system and the 
percentage of the commune population who were not married and had any exposure to 
the education system (note that dummy variables for any exposure to the education 
system and a continuous years of education were each significantly associated with 
higher rates of killing). This is well in line with theories that suggest that a pool of 
educated men may be associated with more violence—perhaps due to the state-controlled 
curricula (Lange 2011), associations formed in school, or the creation of confidence to 
address disconnects between expectations and reality (Gurr 1970; Goldstone 2002)—and 
expands these theories to bring in criminological theories of social controls, which would 
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suggest that marriage would exert social control in a spouse’s life and a community 
(Sampson, Laub, and Wimmer 2006) and nullify the effect of education in this context.  
I created four variables to ascertain these effects. These included the percentage 
of people who were married and had exposure to the education system (25 percent), 
married with no education (26 percent), had education but were not married (34 percent), 
and were not married and had no education (15 percent). As seen in the table, higher 
percentages of people who had exposure to the education system and were not married 
were associated with significantly higher rates of killing, while higher percentages of 
people who had exposure to the education system but were married are associated with 
significantly lower rates of killing. Though it is not shown, the other two categories 
(married/no education and not married/no education) were each associated with lower 
rates of violence. This confirms previous findings about the education system, but also 
suggests that marriage may have provided community-level social controls hindering the 
perpetration of violence.106  
In addition, the percent of people who always lived in a commune is no longer 
significant, though it remains negative. Yet, the percent employment in the formal sector 
is associated with significantly lower rates of killing, suggesting that communities of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  106	  I also tested an interaction term between the percent Tutsi and intermarriage. Recall 
that I had hypothesized that intermarriage would result in lower rates of violence. Yet, 
higher percentages of Tutsi would theoretically be necessary for higher rates of 
intermarriage. As percent Tutsi is one of the strongest predictors of violence, 
intermarriage is associated with significantly higher rates of killing. Percent Tutsi and 
percent mixed marriage are centered for more accurate interpretation of the main effects, 
which remain positively associated with the rate of killings. The significant negative 
interaction effect illustrates that each increase in percent intermarriage is associated with 
a decrease in the effect of percent Tutsi on the rate of killings, signifying that 
intermarriage did function to decrease the targeted killing of Tutsis.	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lower socioeconomic status saw higher rates of killing and confirming theories of social 
disorganization. 
Model 4 tests ethnic-based formal employment measures as a test of resource 
competition theory. As seen in the table, the rate of killings was lower in communes 
where Hutus had higher rates of formal employment, while Tutsi formal employment did 
not influence the rate of killings. In line with resource competition theory, this suggests 
that strain on the Hutu population, in terms of employment, influenced the rate of 
violence. On the other hand, most variables measuring population pressure, such as 
kilocalorie production per day or population growth, did not significantly impact rates of 
violence. In fact, higher population density is actually associated with lower rates of 
violence in some models,107 though it does not significantly improve the models and is 
excluded from the table above.  
Turning to Model 5, the number of days the frontline between the RPF and the 
Rwandan Army was located within a commune is positively associated with the rate of 
killings. It is unclear whether this frontline represents strategic areas of interest, which 
are not well documented, or if represents where the Rwandan Armed Forces were present 
and threatened by the presence of the RPF, resulting in increased violence.108 As noted 
above, I also tested dummy variables measuring RPF presence, French presence, and 
Rwandan Armed Forces presence—both in general and by month—as well as variables 
capturing the number of days each troop faction was present. None of these significantly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  107	  This may seem surprising, but areas of higher population density may have been more 
integrated, which may have translated to lower rates of killing. These communities may 
also have provided anonymity to Tutsis who were hiding.	  	  108	  It is plausible that a small number of the killings resulted from fighting between the 
Rwandan Armed Forces and the RPF. Yet, based on estimated numbers of troops, this 
would be only a fraction of the total killed.	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impacted the rate of violence in multivariate analysis. Most surprising is the lack of 
significant effect for Rwandan army presence, though much of this effect is captured in 
the effect for the frontline. In addition, while accounts of the violence make clear that 
members of the Rwandan Armed Forces participated in the violence, many more citizens 
who were not members of armed forces also participated in killing. 
Each model includes a spatial weight for the violence in surrounding communes. 
While much of the spatial patterns are captured in fixed effects at the prefecture-level, the 
significant effect illustrates other spatial clustering. This could be due to the strength of 
various political parties or other contingent factors, such as specific actors, that I am  
unable to measure quantitatively. The other variables discussed thus far remain 
significant when controlling for spatial autocorrelation. In addition, this model illustrates 
that all communes but Kigali, the capital, had lower rates of violence than Butare. Kigali 
had significantly higher rates of violence, while two northern prefectures—Ruhengeri 
and Byumba—had significantly lower rates. Beyond much lower populations of Tutsis, 
each prefecture had seen violence decades before the genocide. Specifically, the 
government had attacked and deported Tutsis from the north in prior decades, which may 
also partially account for what appears to be less violence during the genocide.  
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Table 3.3 Fixed Effects Models of the Rate of Death in Communes 
 
  Model Model Model Model Model 
Predictors 1 2 3 4 5 
Targeted Violence and Ideology     
Tutsi 0.069*** 0.070*** 0.065*** 0.064*** 0.068*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
Education (years) 0.355**     
 (0.136)     
Community Organization      
Marriage   -0.045***    
  (0.017)    
Educated and Not Married   0.064*** 0.065*** 0.058*** 
   (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Educated and Married   -0.033* -0.032* -0.035** 
   (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) 
Always Lived   -0.009 -0.009 -0.008 
   (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Formal Employment   -0.027**  -0.031** 
   (0.013)  (0.014) 
Resource Competition      
Hutu Formal Employment    -0.027*  
    (0.015)  
Tutsi Formal Employment    -0.001  
    (0.006)  
Organized Actors      
Days in Frontline     0.008*** 
     (0.002) 
Surrounding Violence 0.036*** 0.034*** 0.023* 0.023* 0.029** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) 
Prefectures      
Byumba -1.724*** -1.478*** -1.658*** -1.647*** -1.554*** 
 (0.248) (0.268) (0.242) (0.245) (0.257) 
Cyangugu -0.413* -0.181 -0.177 -0.172 -0.051 
 (0.224) (0.241) (0.227) (0.226) (0.231) 
Gikongoro -0.014 0.124 0.048 0.056 0.078 
 (0.178) (0.181) (0.173) (0.173) (0.173) 
Gisenyi -0.565* -0.134 -0.337 -0.329 -0.286 
 (0.295) (0.374) (0.290) (0.289) (0.296) 
Gitarama -0.195 -0.026 -0.195 -0.196 -0.246* 
 (0.150) (0.128) (0.136) (0.138) (0.146) 
Kibungo -0.017 0.182 -0.040 -0.042 0.059 
 (0.167) (0.186) (0.202) (0.202) (0.201) 
Kibuye -0.252 0.003 -0.041 -0.031 0.035 
 (0.166) (0.189) (0.172) (0.172) (0.177) 
Kigali 0.910*** 1.144*** 1.426*** 1.422*** 1.415*** 
 (0.253) (0.217) (0.357) (0.356) (0.395) 
Kigali Rural -0.104 0.088 -0.237 -0.233 -0.370* 
 (0.160) (0.160) (0.176) (0.174) (0.201) 
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Ruhengeri -1.374*** -0.883** -1.118*** -1.101*** -1.276*** 
 (0.326) (0.395) (0.336) (0.343) (0.339) 
Constant 5.166*** 8.578*** 5.815*** 5.769*** 5.805*** 
 (0.417) -0.909 (0.882) (0.883) (0.814) 
      
Observations    142      142     142     142     142 
R-squared 0.840 0.845 0.855 0.855 0.870 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; Butare prefecture excluded  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
Note: As explained in the text, education is measured in years except for when I analyze whether 
someone had any education, which is a dummy variable. Note also as while R2 values using xtreg are 
incorrect, I estimated R2 using regress and a series of dummy variables.  
 
Toward an Integrated Conceptual Model of Regional Variation in 
Violence 
Overall, these findings suggest that genocide studies, criminology, and the study of 
political and ethnic violence can all shed light on regional variation in genocidal violence. 
As hypothesized, the percent Tutsi is associated with significantly higher rates of killing, 
confirming the targeted nature of the violence. This further suggests that, while state-
level analyses of genocide seldom find that ethnolinguistic diversity of the population 
influences the onset of violence, ethnicity (or other social groupings relevant to particular 
genocides) influences meso-level variation in the violence.  
Ideologies that cast Tutsis as cockroaches and otherwise dehumanized them were 
spread through the radio and reached other segments of the population through the 
education system, which taught through curricula and socialization that Tutsis were 
northern outsiders who had collaborated with the Belgian colonialists. Broadly, this 
suggests analyses of meso-level genocidal violence should incorporate the spread of 
propaganda, at least when the violence in perpetrated through popular participation. 
However, it is noteworthy that quantitative techniques do not allow me to disentangle 
whether the effect of education is due to the particular curricula and socialization or 
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simply due to higher (but unmet) expectations, as general theories of political and ethnic 
violence would suggest (Gurr 1970; Goldstone 2002).  
 The effect of education is dampened by a marriage effect. This effect is prominent 
throughout criminological literature, which finds that at both the individual level and the 
community level, marriage is associated with less crime. This is likely due to individual 
and community-level controls on peoples’ lives. Marriage is also associated with higher 
community organization, which theories of social disorganization cite as key to 
understanding regional variation in violent crime. Beyond marriage, employment in the 
formal sector is associated with lower rates of violence. This is also in line with social 
disorganization theory and contrary to a defended communities perspective, which would 
expect higher rates of killing in more organized communities. 
 The percent of young men was associated with significantly higher rates of 
killing in bivariate analysis, but this effect is no longer significant when other variables, 
such as marriage or employment, are included in the models, as is common in many 
studies of crime (e.g., Deane et al. 2008). Studies of civil war and other violence often 
find that the percentage of young men is significantly associated with violence, 
illustrating that these theories should perhaps pay closer attention to criminological 
theories of social controls.109  
Resource competition theory finds some support, as the rate of killings was lower 
in communes where Hutus had higher rates of formal employment. Yet, other theories 
from the study of political and ethnic violence—particularly those linked to Malthusian 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  109	  Age holds different meanings in different countries. As noted above, in a separate 
analysis, co-authors and I analyze the age of people who participated in the genocide in 
Rwanda and suggest other factors—such as age-graded memories—that may have 
influenced age trends. 	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concerns about population pressures—do not find support in this study. At the commune-
level, population growth, kilocalorie production per day, and population density are not 
associated with higher rates of violence, casting doubt on explanations that focus on 
resource scarcity and population pressure. The evidence does not support theories that 
deemed Rwanda a “ticking time bomb” of population pressure either at the state (as 
shown in Chapter 2) or the regional level. As noted above, this study is unable to capture 
perceptions of resource scarcity, which may differ from quantitative measures. In 
addition, the relationship between ideology and resource scarcity, especially at the 
individual level, cannot be studied here, though it may have been an important factor in 
the violence. I test whether these factors influenced violence in Bosnia and Sudan in 
Chapters 4 and 5 before further assessing the explanatory power of resource scarcity and 
competition theories.  
Taken together, many of these significant factors point toward the importance of 
community-level factors, such as meso-level marriage rates, employment rates, and 
education levels in understanding the magnitude of the violence. Indeed, as citizens of 
communities perpetrated the violence, characteristics of these individuals and these 
communities influenced the rate of violence—something previously unexplored within 
genocide studies. It remains to be seen whether this is the case for genocides with 
different groups and organizational levels of perpetrators. This is explored in Chapters 4 
and 5 and revisited within Chapter 6.  
While community-level factors are important in understanding the violence, 
institutionally organized actors also influenced the rate of killing. I am unable to capture 
the movements of all organized actors, but the length of time the frontline between the 
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Rwandan Army and the RPF was present in a commune influenced the rate of violence. 
This is likely because the Rwandan Army felt more threatened in these regions, though it 
may also capture some killings on the frontline. Either way, the result suggests a complex 
relationship between genocide and civil war; additional analyses should attempt to 
disentangle relationships between concurrent forms of violence.  
 Turning to broader spatial and temporal factors, the capital region had higher rates 
of violence, perhaps due to the centralized nature of the genocide as well as to the 
presence of political and cultural elites. Surrounding violence also impacted the rate of 
killing, but the distance from roads or cities and the presence along any border was not 
significantly associated with the rate of violence. Elevation is not significantly associated 
with the rate of violence, suggesting that multiple factors associated with meso-level 
variation in civil war were not associated with meso-level variation in genocide in 
Rwanda. Other theories—such as those pertaining to characteristics of the 
communities—must be taken into account.  
 While these results are robust, it is worth repeating that this study cannot account 
for the movement of people during the genocide, which occurred quickly and is not well 
documented. Similarly, the inability to analyze how these factors influenced the 
magnitude of violence over time means that some effects, like that of the French 
intervention, cannot be fully assessed.  
There are several other data limitations. I would ideally analyze these factors at 
micro levels (such as neighborhoods within the communes), though data on the 
independent and the dependent variables do not allow for it. Nor can I account for the 
strength of certain political parties, which have been found to be associated with violence 
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(see, for example, Dhattiwala and Biggs 2012) and were likely associated with violence 
in Rwanda. Still, the survey utilized here provides the best estimate of those killed during 
the genocide, even though an exact number of those killed will likely never be known.  
I also anticipate that some will question the applicability of theories created to 
explain crime in the United States to a very different form of crime in Rwanda. 
Criminologists have extended theories of social (dis)organization to other countries, such 
as the United Kingdom (Sampson and Groves 1989; Lowenkamp, Cullen, and Pratt 2003) 
and South Africa (Breetzke 2010), as well as to rural areas (e.g., Bouffard and Muftic 
2006). Scholars have more to do in terms of testing this theory internationally and in 
other contexts, but research to date has suggested that it helps explain crime across a 
diverse range of settings. I strove to create the most culturally appropriate variables, 
though some variables—like divorce—do not capture nearly the same amount of 
variation due to their lack of prevalence in Rwanda in the early 1990s. The 
generalizabiliy of these findings is probed in Chapters 4 and 5, which consider the 
genocides in Bosnia and Sudan, and implications for these theories is explored in Chapter 
6.  
Part 2: Temporal Variation and Determinants of Genocidal Onset by 
Region 
 
As the genocide in Rwanda took place within several months, there are not reliable 
records of when specific killings took place. Thus, it is virtually impossible to confidently 
examine variation in killings over time within communes, let alone in the country as a 
whole. Instead, I turn to a more reliable measure that captures a form of both temporal 
and regional variation—onset of genocidal violence. 
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Violence took place in every commune throughout Rwanda, but it did not start at 
the same time. As a Rwandan scholar and witness explained, “Violence started in Kigali, 
and it also started in many other places around the 6th of April. But it did not start in other 
places like Butare…until mid-April” (Rwanda, October 2012). Indeed, Figure 3.4 shows 
variation in early, middle, and late onset dates, explained in more detail below. 
Understanding what influenced these differences in onset date will shed additional light 
on what may have driven the violence— it may even inform targeted interventions in 
ongoing episodes of violence in the future.  
 
Figure 3.4: Commune Onset in Rwanda 
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As seen in Chapter 2, the vast majority of studies of genocidal onset have 
examined factors that influence the onset of genocide at the state-level. In fact, only one 
study has quantitatively examined determinants of onset of violence in Rwanda: Straus 
(2006) drew on bivariate regression to analyze the determinants of onset for the 11 
prefectures within Rwanda, finding that violence did not radiate from the center. In other 
words, distance from Kigali—the capital—did not influence onset at the prefecture-level. 
Straus also found that education, population size, population density, age distribution, 
and ethnic diversity did not impact onset dates. Instead, he found that genocidal violence 
began earlier in areas with lower unemployment rates. A binary variable that he created 
to measure support for the ruling party and population growth were also each 
significantly associated with earlier onset. Yet, 11 prefectures contain other 
administrative units that may be obscuring other trends, as there was variation within 
prefectures. Thus, an analysis of smaller geographic units—such as the commune—is 
needed. In addition, while bivariate analysis can be powerful, multivariate analysis allows 
for a more thorough investigation.  
To further analyze some of the factors that are associated with the onset of 
violence at the commune level, I test how the theories outlined in the previous section 
help explain the onset rather than the magnitude of violence. Indeed, many of the theories 
explained above are related to the presence of violence and may explain its onset. 
Furthermore, while factors that are associated with higher rates of violence may be 
associated with earlier onset, this has yet to be explored in scholarly literature. As the 
theories and variables I will test have already been reviewed, I explain my methods and 
present results, incorporating additional theoretical interpretations.  
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Data and Analysis 
I measure onset of genocidal violence as a nominal variable of early, middle, and late 
onset. This measure is obtained from two groups of scholars—Scott Straus (2006) and the 
Genodynamics Project (2013). Straus drew upon six key sources to determine the onset 
date for each commune. These include transcripts from the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and reports from a commission appointed by the Rwandan 
Ministry of Higher Education, Human Rights Watch, African Rights, Ibuka (a Rwandan 
NGO), and Straus’ interviews with 230 perpetrators of violence (Straus 2006:249). In his 
book, Straus provides each of the onset estimates given in the reports and a final onset 
estimate he created after weighing the potential credibility of each report. 
Christian Davenport and Allan Stam’s Genodynamics Project (2013) also sought 
to ascertain when violence started in each commune. They coded five sources—including 
the reports from the Ministry of Higher Education, Human Rights Watch, African Rights, 
and Ibuka—as well as a report from the Ministry of Youth, Culture, and Sport. Then, 
using Bayesian methodology, they analyzed these data to ascertain the best estimate for 
the onset date in each commune by allocating various amounts of credibility to the 
sources. They also assessed the validity of the dates by conducting interviews at the 
ICTR. 
I obtained access to both of these datasets. As the specific date of onset varied 
widely across sources and when comparing the two datasets, here I rely on a measure of 
early, middle, and late onset, sacrificing precision in favor of validity. I define early onset 
as April 6-8th. While this is a small range of time, almost a third of the communes saw 
violence within these days. Middle onset is defined as April 9-14th, while late onset is 
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defined as April 15th and later. This matches Straus’ assessment of early, middle, and late 
onset, and it breaks the communes into three relatively even groups.  
To assign the value of early, middle, or late to a commune, I followed three steps. 
First, if Straus’ estimate and Davenport and Stam’s fell within the same category (early, 
middle, or late onset), I assigned that category to the commune. Second, if one of the 
datasets was missing the onset date, the onset data from the other dataset was assigned, 
resulting in a total of 92 communes (onset agreement).110 Third, for the remaining 
communes, I analyzed the sources used by the two different research teams and drew a 
conclusion based on the agreement of the sources, was always in line with either Straus 
or Stam and Davenport (onset expanded). I use the more complete measure, onset 
expanded, for analysis, though I also restrict all analyses to the 92 communes (onset 
agreement) to ensure that the results remain similar across the two case sets (not shown). 
In addition, even with the more complete measure, reliable data on the onset of violence 
do not exist for 26 communes, and they are excluded. 
Table 3.4: Commune Onset Dates 
Data Source Early Middle Late Total 
Onset (agreement) 31 (33.7%) 27 (29.4%) 34 (37.0%)  92 (100%) 
Onset (expanded) 43 (36.1%) 40 (33.6%) 36 (30.3%) 119 (100%) 
 
These dependent variables are summarized in Table 3.4, while Table 3.5 includes 
descriptive statistics by onset date. All independent variables match those above with the 
exception of the spatial autocorrelation weight, which now is a measure of the onset in  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  110	  The nominal variable of onset in the two datasets is correlated at .72.	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Table 3.5 Mean Values of Independent Variables by Onset (Expanded)  
Independent Variables Early Middle Late 
Targeted Violence and Ideology    
Tutsi 9.99% 8.62% 13.51% 
Catholic 56.63% 63.83% 67.83% 
Radio Ownership 36.76% 32.28% 34.22% 
Education  2.84 2.86 3.2 
    
Community Organization    
Always Lived  67.08% 73.10% 69.16% 
Divorce 2.99% 2.96% 3.66% 
Marriage 59.77% 57.44% 52.41% 
Unemployment 0.22% 0.27% 0.15% 
Formal Employment 11.64% 10.75% 11.30% 
Young Men 12.22% 12.57% 13.50% 
Intermarriage 4.65% 4.59% 8.62% 
    
Resource Competition    
Population 56,854 47,937 43,960 
Population Density  399.04 455.81 411.68 
Population Growth 3.47% 2.66% 2.25% 
Kilocalorie Production  206.18 219.68 193.63 
Hutu Formal Employment 10.99% 10.38% 10.55% 
Tutsi Formal Employment 17.97% 18.56% 21.50% 
    
Organized Actors (April)    
RPF Troops 30.23% 25.00% 5.56% 
FAR Troops 88.37% 90.00% 94.44% 
RPF/FAR Frontline 46.51% 40.00% 2.78% 
    
Broader Spatial and Temporal Factors    
Elevation  1,768.85 1,778.09 1,668.99 
Capital Region 100% 0% 0% 
Urban Region 16.28% 15.00% 2.78% 
Distance from Roads  4.78 4.66 4.25 
Distance from Cities  17.80 15.03 14.69 
Borders Burundi 14.00% 5.00% 16.67% 
International Border 41.86% 20.00% 19.44% 
Past Violence 11.63% 2.50% 0% 
Distance from Kigali 65.22 59.57 56.14 
Surrounding Onset 1.50 1.80 2.64  
Note: While these values are transformed in the analyses and in the other descriptive tables, values 
presented here are in original units.  
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surrounding communes.111 In addition, troop location is restricted to troop presence in 
April, rather than throughout the entire episode of violence, since all onset dates were in 
April. Because of this, the presence of French troops is excluded. Population, which is 
included in the dependent variable (a rate) above, is now tested as an independent 
variable. Lastly, I include a measure of distance from Kigali to test the theory that 
violence radiated outward.  
Descriptive statistics were also analyzed for the 26 communes missing an onset 
date. These communes had significantly lower percentages of Tutsi (three percent 
compared to eight percent in the non-missing communes). In addition, they had much 
higher average elevation (averaging over 1880 km2) and much lower numbers of people 
killed (averaging 2,000 deaths per commune compared to the total average of over 7,000 
deaths per commune). The comparatively lower number of people killed likely explains 
why the onset date is unknown and, overall, illustrates that communes excluded are those 
with much lower levels of killing.112  
Analysis 
To analyze the factors associated with the onset of violence within a commune, I 
employ multinomial logistic regression, an appropriate model when the dependent 
variable is categorical and there are more than two outcomes. In this case, as discussed 
above, there are three outcomes (early, middle, or late), and early onset is excluded as the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 I created the onset variable manually, as GeoDa is unable to calculate onset when 
missing values are included. Thus, it is the average onset (1, 2, or 3, corresponding to 
early, middle, and late, respectively) of surrounding communes excluding those with 
missing values.  112	  Currently, there is no way to remedy this. However, on a future trip to Rwanda, I will 
conduct interviews to better understand the onset in these regions (specifically, before 
turning this dissertation into a book).	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comparison outcome. As with models of magnitude presented previously, I begin by 
building bivariate models, shown in Table 3.6. I review these briefly and then turn to 
multivariate models, illustrated in Table 3.7. Note that results are presented in odds ratio, 
so coefficients larger than one suggest that the variable is associated with higher odds of 
middle or late onset in comparison to early onset, while coefficients less than one suggest 
that the variable is associated with lower odds of middle or late onset in comparison to 
early onset. Note also that I cluster standard errors by prefecture due to the nested nature 
of the data.113  
Results: Determinants of Genocidal Onset 
As seen in Table 3.6,114 the factors associated with the magnitude of violence generally 
did not influence the onset of violence. Namely, the percent Tutsi, significantly 
associated with higher rates of killing, did not impact the onset rate. Percent Catholic did 
have a significant effect on onset, however, with higher percent Catholic associated with 
middle and late onset dates. Recall that in analyses of the rate of killing, this variable was 
included to test the potential spread of a genocidal ideology through the Church, and it 
was not significantly associated with the rate of killings. In the case of onset, the 
significant effect may reflect the efforts of clergy to stop the genocide, delaying onset but 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  113	  To my knowledge, Stata users are still creating a code for a multinomial logit fixed 
effects model, and any existing user-written commands are specific to time-series data. 
As fixed effects models produce results equal to including a series of dummy variables 
with one excluded, I also ran the models with a series of dummy variables, excluding 
Butare. Most of the results remained the same, but it was clear the inclusion of dummy 
variables resulted in unstable models with odds ratios far larger than normal. Thus, here I 
present models with clustered standard errors. 	  114	  I tried excluding the other two categories of onset, and the basic picture remained the 
same. I chose to present the results with early onset excluded because this is the category 
I am most interested in. Thus, the models compare the other two categories against early 
onset.  	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ultimately not preventing genocide in most cases. Indeed, while scholars have confirmed 
that many exclusionary ideologies were spread through the Church (Prunier 1995; 
Rittner, Roth, and Whitworth 2004; Longman 2011), there is also clear documentation 
that many clergy attempted to save people during the genocide (Des Forges 1999; Fox 
2012; author’s interviews.) 
 Variables capturing the spread of propaganda, such as the radio and education 
levels, also appear to have influenced the onset of violence, with increases in radio 
ownership associated with decreased odds of middle onset dates and increases in 
education associated with greater odds of later onset dates. These seemingly disparate 
results are further probed in multivariate analysis.  
Variables meant to measure social disorganization, many of which significantly 
impacted the magnitude of violence, are generally not significantly associated with the 
onset of violence. There are a few exceptions: areas of lower unemployment and lower 
mobility levels had a later onset when compared against early onset. In addition, areas 
with the latest onset had higher percentages of young men.  
Population and environmental pressures generally do not help explain the onset of 
violence, though it is noteworthy that violence began comparatively later in areas with 
less population growth. The presence and movement of armed actors also may have 
influenced the onset dates, with the frontline associated with significantly higher odds of 
earlier onset, again suggesting that the presence of both the RPF and the Rwandan Armed 
Forces influenced strain within a commune.  
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Table 3.6: Bivariate Analysis of Genocidal Onset in Rwanda 
Early Onset Excluded; Presented in Odds Ratios 
 Independent Variables 
 
Model Middle Onset Late Onset 
Targeted Violence and Ideology    
Tutsi 1 0.977 1.045 
  (0.906 - 1.055) (0.962 - 1.134) 
Catholic 2      1.026***   1.042* 
  (1.008 - 1.045) (0.995 - 1.091) 
Radio Ownership 3    0.951**  0.976 
  (0.913 - 0.990) (0.925 - 1.030) 
Education  4 1.091      6.004** 
  (0.351 - 3.388) (1.083 - 33.299) 
Community Organization    
Always Lived  5   1.084*  1.018 
  (0.999 - 1.175) (0.950 - 1.091) 
Divorce 6  0.973 1.76 
  (0.668 - 1.418) (0.855 - 3.622) 
Marriage 7  0.936        0.741** 
  (0.858 - 1.022) (0.569 - 0.964) 
Unemployment 8   0.434*  0.687 
  (0.179 - 1.051) (0.377 - 1.250) 
Formal Employment 9 0.976  0.992 
  (0.892 - 1.069) (0.907 - 1.085) 
Young Men 10 1.504        3.927*** 
  (0.788 - 2.871) (1.869 - 8.251) 
Intermarriage 11 0.995 1.21 
  (0.839 - 1.181) (0.950 - 1.542) 
Resource Competition    
Population (log) 12  0.161   0.046 
  (0.017 - 1.509) (0.001 - 1.973) 
Population Density  13  0.999  1.001 
  (0.995 - 1.003) (0.997 - 1.005) 
Population Growth 14        0.453***        0.243*** 
  (0.276 - 0.742) (0.093 - 0.632) 
Kilocalorie Production  15  0.994  0.997 
  (0.986 - 1.002) (0.987 - 1.008) 
Hutu Formal Employment 16  0.983  0.988 
  (0.892 - 1.082) (0.897 - 1.088) 
Tutsi Formal Employment 17   1.002  1.006 
  (0.963 - 1.044) (0.967 - 1.046) 
Organized Actors (April)    
RPF Troops 18  0.769      0.136** 
  (0.338 - 1.753) (0.024 - 0.768) 
FAR Troops 19  1.184  2.237 
  (0.391 - 3.587) (0.675 - 7.417) 
RPF/FAR Frontline 20  0.767        0.033*** 
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  (0.307 - 1.916) (0.003 - 0.376) 
Broader Spatial and Temporal 
Factors 
 
  
Elevation (log) 21  2.401 0.159 
  (0.058 - 99.259) (0.001 - 24.278) 
Capital Region 22        0.000***        0.000*** 
  (0.000 - 0.000) (0.000 - 0.000) 
Urban Region 23  0.908      0.147** 
  (0.227 - 3.635) (0.031 - 0.704) 
Distance from Roads (log) 24                    1.160 0.960 
  (0.832 - 1.617) (0.674 - 1.366) 
Distance from Cities (log) 25  0.566 0.620 
  (0.249 - 1.286) (0.274 - 1.406) 
Borders Burundi 26  0.325 1.233 
  (0.047 - 2.238) (0.224 - 6.782) 
International Border 27   0.347* 0.335 
  (0.114 - 1.059) (0.086 - 1.309) 
Past Violence 28   0.195*       0.000*** 
  (0.030 - 1.266) (0.000 - 0.000) 
Distance from Kigali (log) 29  -0.133 -0.085 
  (-1.003 – 0.737) (-1.584 – 1.414) 
Surrounding Onset 30       1.634***        5.118*** 
  (0.598 - 2.669) (3.544 – 6.692) 
       
Standard errors clustered by prefecture     
* p < .1, ** p <.05, ***p < .01  
 
 As interviewees suggested, genocidal violence began in urban regions, including 
the capital, before other regions of the country. It did not radiate from the capital, 
however, reaffirming Straus’ (2006) findings at a lower geographic level. The spatial 
weight is significant, indicating that communes in similar geographic proximities saw 
similar onset dates. Variables capturing the ease of movement, such as distance from 
roads, distance from cities, and elevation, did not significantly influence the onset of 
violence. Areas that had past violence had significantly earlier onset dates, suggesting 
that recent violence may have influenced genocidal violence, perhaps through an already 
existing structure that facilitated the violence or through the prior mobilization of self-
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defense groups. This effect, as well as others briefly discussed here, is further probed in 
multivariate analysis.  
Multivariate Analysis of Genocidal Onset 
 To further analyze these effects, Table 3.7 includes multinomial logit models of 
genocidal onset. Again, results are presented in odds ratios, and “early” onset is excluded 
as the comparison. Variables that were not significant or did not significantly improve 
each model are excluded. For the sake of space, some of the more parsimonious models 
are not shown.  
Model 1 includes measures that capture the presence of ideology as well as social 
disorganization, while Model 2 adds factors related to resource competition, armed 
actors, and broader spatial and temporal factors. Model 3 includes all of these variables 
but excludes communes located in Butare. Recall that Butare had a later onset date in part 
because the governor, who was the only Tutsi governor in Rwanda at the time, attempted 
to prevent genocide from occurring there. As a resident of Butare told me, “…the 
governor said, ‘Please, please, don’t kill your neighbor. Don’t kill your friends’” 
(Rwanda, September 2012).  
In fact, 19 communes in Butare had late onset dates, 1 had a middle onset date, 
and none saw early onset. This indicates that leaders at various administrative levels were 
key in implementing (and, in this case, preventing) the genocide, in line with the focus of 
other scholars (e.g., Mulinda 2010). This analysis seeks to understand if other 
community-level factors also inform why genocide began in some places before others. I 
cannot adequately control for the actions of all leaders. Yet, to ascertain how the actions 
of the governor may have influenced the onset dates in Butare, I run all models presented 
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below without communes in Butare included (Model 3). Note that I also ran a model 
controlling for Butare, and the results of this model (not shown) are almost identical to 
the results in Model 3.  
 In Table 3.7, the models illustrate that increases in percent Catholic were 
associated with higher odds of a middle onset date. In particular, each increase in percent 
Catholic is associated with about a five percent increase in the odds of having middle 
onset date relative to early onset dates. This suggests that the clergy’s efforts to prevent 
the genocide and keep people safe may have influenced delayed onset, although it is not 
possible to further analyze this effect to ascertain other potential explanations. Note that 
the effect of the percent Catholic is not significantly associated with late odds, again 
emphasizing that the governor’s actions and previous policies in Butare were the main 
driver behind the later onset dates.  
 Radio ownership is associated with comparatively earlier onset. It is likely that 
the news of the genocide spread most quickly through the radio and influenced earlier 
onsets in some communes. Notably, this effect holds when measures of economic status 
(education and formal employment) and the urban setting are included in the model. 
Nevertheless, data on radio coverage should also be examined as an additional test of this 
finding. In addition, the alternate measure of exposure to propaganda—education—is 
insignificant and thus not shown. While education had a large effect on magnitude of 
violence, it did not significantly impact its onset. This reaffirms that the significance of 
the radio is likely due to its role in spreading the news rather than any particular ideology 
behind the genocide.  
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Table 3.7 Multinomial Logit Models of Genocidal Onset 
"Early" Onset Excluded; Presented in Odds Ratios 
 
 All Communes All Communes 
  Middle Late Middle Late 
Predictors Onset Onset Onset Onset 
Catholic       1.047*** 1.034     1.047*** 1.050 
 (1.024 - 1.071) (0.973 - 1.098) (1.026 - 1.068) (0.983 - 1.122) 
Radio Ownership     0.919** 0.930    0.904** 0.909 
 (0.853 - 0.991) (0.846 - 1.022) (0.826 - 0.989) (0.792 - 1.043) 
Young Men       1.990***        3.837***    2.042**       3.436*** 
 (1.202 - 3.295) (2.062 - 7.140) (1.179 - 3.538) (1.775 - 6.649) 
Always Lived   1.053*  1.026 1.047 1.010 
 (0.999 - 1.110) (0.939 - 1.122) (0.987 - 1.111) (0.928 - 1.099) 
Tutsi Formal Employment  1.025      1.072** 
   (0.982 - 1.069) (1.015 - 1.132) 
Front (April)   0.932        0.088*** 
   (0.343 - 2.528) (0.033 - 0.233) 
Urban   0.907       0.056** 
   (0.255 - 3.226) (0.005 - 0.681) 
Surrounding Onset 2.285      65.656*** 2.175         45.360*** 
 (0.822 - 6.354) (12.716 - 339.007) (0.748 - 6.322) (14.107 - 145.853) 
Constant        0.000***        0.000***       0.000***         0.000*** 
 (0.000 - 0.000) (0.000 - 0.000) (0.000 - 0.001) (0.000 - 0.000) 
     
Observations 118 118 118 118 
McFadden’s R2 0.412 0.412 0.449 0.449 
Confidence intervals clustered by prefecture      
* p < .1, ** p <.05, ***p < .01   
 
   
Butare Excluded 
  Middle Late 
Predictors  Onset Onset 
Catholic     1.049*** 0.999 
 (1.028 - 1.070) (0.939 - 1.063) 
Radio Ownership    0.902** 1.025 
 (0.822 - 0.988) (0.857 - 1.225) 
Young Men    2.033**       4.421*** 
 (1.162 - 3.559) (2.195 - 8.904) 
Always Lived 1.043 1.104 
 (0.982 - 1.108) (0.923 - 1.321) 
Tutsi Formal 
Employment 1.023        1.077*** 
 (0.981 - 1.067) (1.042 - 1.112) 
Front (April) 0.935    0.122* 
 (0.346 - 2.529) (0.013 - 1.165) 
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Urban 1.003       0.000*** 
 (0.267 - 3.762) (0.000 - 0.000) 
Surrounding Onset 2.105    13.997** 
 (0.704 - 6.297) 
(1.073 - 
182.615) 
Constant         0.000***        0.000*** 
 (0.000 - 0.001) (0.000 - 0.000) 
   
Observations 98 98 
McFadden’s R2 0.367 0.367 
 
Turning to indicators of community organization, the percent of young men in 
each commune has a large effect on the onset of genocidal violence, both in and outside 
of Butare. Specifically, higher percentages of young men have a strong and consistent 
relationship with comparatively later onset dates.115 Thus, while young men did not 
influence the magnitude of killing, this indicates that areas with higher percentages of 
young men had much higher odds of later onset. Most theories link young men with 
greater violence due to their prevalence as perpetrators (Goldstone 1991; Urdal 2006). 
This finding provides more nuance and is, in some ways, counter to expectations derived 
from these theories. Perhaps young men, most often thought of as perpetrators, also had a 
role as protectors and resistors.  
 There is not strong evidence that areas with greater strain on the population had 
earlier (or, for that matter, later) onset dates. Closely related resource competition 
theories did yield interesting results. While Hutu formal employment was associated with 
a greater magnitude of deaths, Tutsi formal employment is associated with comparatively 
higher odds of later onset. In areas with more Tutsis employed in the public sectors, 
Tutsis and Hutus may have been more integrated in public life. This also might reflect a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 Minimal interview data support this, and I will probe this further in future trips to 
Rwanda.  
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lack of discriminatory policies and, thus point to more tolerant ideologies at the 
community level, which could delay genocidal onset.  
 As in bivariate analysis, the frontline is associated with lower odds of 
comparatively later onset, confirming that the presence of both the RPF and the FAR 
incited violence. These models confirm much earlier onsets in urban areas. As the 
violence was organized by the government and, in many ways, carried out by mayors, 
governors, and other political leaders, it is easy to understand why violence began in and 
near cities.  
 Areas that saw violence in the early 1990s had significantly lower odds of a later 
onset. In fact, none of these communes had a late onset date, so this is not included in the 
models above. It is impossible to ascertain whether other factors influenced the early 
onset in each of these cases, though it is possible that pre-existing structures facilitated 
earlier onset (e.g., it may have been particularly easy to mobilize the self-defense groups 
in these communes to begin killing due to previous mobilization). Nevertheless, much 
additional research is needed on the effects of these factors, as well as the effects of 
collective memory of recent violence, on violence during genocide. Lastly, surrounding 
onset is the strongest predictor of onset, suggesting that violence did spread in a way that 
is not captured by other factors. Most likely, this reflects individuals who moved 
throughout the country as well as other actions that cannot be measured quantitatively.  
Understanding the Onset of Genocide in Rwanda 
To briefly synthesize these results, models of onset suggest that factors that influence the 
magnitude of violence do not generally influence the onset of violence, and vice versa. 
Indeed, with the exception of the influence of the radio and the presence of the frontline, 
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different factors influence variation in magnitude and onset of genocidal violence at the 
commune level. Overall, it appears that theories suggested thus far have more 
explanatory power when used to assess magnitude than when used to assess onset, which 
may be context-specific and depend strongly on the actions of particular leaders or 
groups.  
Specifically, violence started earlier in urban areas and in places with higher 
percentages of radio ownership, suggesting the importance of the radio in spreading the 
message that violence had or should begin as well as the importance of those who 
planned the violence in orchestrating its onset. Indeed, leaders were particularly 
important, and it is likewise clear that the timing of the onset of violence in Butare was 
greatly influenced by the actions of the governor in seeking to prevent the genocide from 
taking place within his prefecture. Many other individual actions likely influenced the 
timing of violence in ways that may not have influenced the magnitude and in ways that 
cannot be measured quantitatively, as indicated by the measure of spatial autocorrelation, 
again suggesting that the onset may depend more on particular individuals than does 
magnitude.  
Several other community-level factors influenced the onset of violence. 
Communities with higher populations of young males saw later onsets of violence, an 
effect contrary to theory and worth exploring in more detail. Communities with higher 
percentages of Tutsis employed in the formal sector had later onset dates, suggesting that 
the integration of Tutsis in public life (in part through the fewer discriminatory policies 
keeping Tutsis out of jobs) kept genocidal violence at bay briefly. Few measures of social 
disorganization and population pressure influenced the onset of violence.  
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These findings differ from Straus (2006), who found that the prefecture-level 
onset was associated with population growth and unemployment. Each was significantly 
associated with comparatively earlier onset in my bivariate analysis of communes, and as 
Straus only utilized bivariate analysis, these results do not contradict his but rather add 
more fine-grained analyses. Indeed, these variables were ultimately insignificant in 
multivariate analysis, showing that other factors were at play.  
Note also that, as mentioned above, data on genocidal onset are valid, though data 
are missing for a number of communes. The violence took place quickly, and data on 
specific onset dates must be treated with some caution. In addition, there are no well-
established theories regarding the onset of genocidal violence at sub-national levels. This 
chapter makes a first pass at establishing some theories for the case of Rwanda, but much 
additional research is needed to understand the timing of violence within communities.  
Lastly, although I have considered them separately, it is instructive to briefly 
examine how the onset date may have influenced the magnitude of violence. Figure 3.5 
illustrates the average number of those killed in a commune by onset date. Clearly, 
communes with earlier onset dates as well as those with late onset dates had the highest 
level of deaths. This reflects the high number and rate of killing in Kigali and Butare. 
Nevertheless, including onset as a predictor in models of the rate of killing does not yield 
significant results (not shown), illustrating that the onset did not necessarily influence the 
magnitude of violence in Rwanda.  
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Figure 3.5: Average Number Killed in Commune by Onset Date 
 
 
Conclusion  
In just a few months in 1994, more than one million people were killed in Rwanda. While 
this violence is often discussed in the aggregate, few attempts have been made to 
understand variation in the violence across the country. In this chapter, I have taken some 
steps in analyzing the factors associated with the rate of killing and the onset of violence 
in Rwanda’s communes.  
 I began by assessing the preconditions of genocide, finding much support for 
factors identified in Chapter 2 and detailing how strain and threat to the government and 
the creation of us/them identities were key processes that influenced the road to genocide. 
I then provided an overview of the violence, focusing on the forms of victimization and 
the perpetrators. While the genocide was planned by key leaders and many of the 
perpetrators were previously mobilized in militias, the vast majority of perpetrators were 
citizens who joined the violence as it was unfolding. 
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 This is important for numerous reasons—chief among them is my argument that 
who the perpetrators were directly influenced the patterns of violence. As the perpetrators 
were largely members of communities who were not members of formally organized 
militaries, I find that criminological theories pertaining to community rates of crime 
apply to understanding the rate of killing in Rwanda. Specifically, marriage and 
employment in the formal sector were associated with lower rates of killing. Further, the 
spread of the ideology against Tustis—both through the radio and through the institution 
of education—and the rate of killing in surrounding communes influenced patterns in the 
violence. 
Population pressures, widely suggested as a key factor in Rwanda’s violence, did 
not influence community-level rates of killings. Micro-level trends or individual 
perceptions of scarcity and pressure may be at play and merit future analysis, however. 
The movement of armed actors did influence the rate of violence, with the frontline 
between the Rwandan Armed Forces and the RPF significantly associated with higher 
rates of killing.  
 Interestingly, only a few factors that influenced the magnitude of the violence also 
influenced its onset. Places with higher levels of radio ownership saw higher levels of 
violence, indicating that the broadcasts about the plane crash and the violence around the 
country likely influenced its onset in other communities, a different explanation than the 
typical link to propaganda. Similarly, the frontline effect supports the explanation that the 
frontline is also capturing the strain felt by the armed forces when the RPF was in their 
territory.  
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Beyond this, different factors were at play in the onset of and the degree of 
violence. Urban communities saw earlier violence, while communities with higher 
percentages of Catholics and higher levels of Tutsi employment saw slightly later onset. 
Although I focus on broader structural factors, interviews, too, revealed other factors that 
influenced the violence. For example, the presence of a Tutsi governor in Butare was a 
key reason given for that community’s later onset, but the rate of killing there was very 
high. 
Overall, these findings make clear that the factors that influenced the onset of 
genocide are not sufficient to explain the magnitude of violence or even the onset of 
violence at more meso levels. Instead, in Rwanda, factors associated with the 
organization of the community, the spread of propaganda, surrounding violence, and the 
movements of armed actors influenced patterns in the magnitude of violence. Onset was 
influenced by more localized factors, such as the movements of armed actors, radio 
broadcasts that spread the news of the violence, resistance efforts, and even the efforts 
and actions of particular leaders within communities. This makes sense, as these factors 
influenced the events of one day rather than the rate of violence over several months. Of 
course, as noted above, many other more localized factors also certainly influenced 
patterns, but this chapter has also identified structural factors that influenced patterns in 
the violence. In the next chapter, I analyze whether and how these factors influenced a 
concurrent episode of genocide, this time in “Europe’s Backyard.
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 Chapter 4: Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
 
 
“When you think of the sort of things that happen when a genocide happens, 
 it's again not people who are intrinsically evil.” 
-Desmond Tutu 
 
During the early 1990s, people around the world were shocked when pictures of 
concentration camps appeared in newspapers. Shirtless, emaciated men peered out from 
behind barbed wires. It looked like the Holocaust. These camps were located in a 
European country about the size of West Virginia—Bosnia and Herzegovina. Though 
different from Rwanda in many ways, Bosnia shared the experience of genocide. 
 Following the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, Bosnia 
erupted in violence. In the context of a fight for independence and regional territorial 
aspirations, more than 100,000 people were killed. Bosnian Muslims and many others 
were also forcefully displaced, detained in concentration camps, raped, and victimized in 
numerous other ways over the next three and a half years.  
This chapter seeks to understand regional and temporal variation in Bosnia’s 
violence. I begin with a brief summary of the preconditions that led to the onset of 
violence, highlighting similarities with the decades that preceded violence in Rwanda. I 
then consider the different types of victimization and discuss how genocide is 
differentiated from other forms of violence, building on and extending the discussion in 
Chapter 1, as the events in Bosnia are often considered a civil war rather than a civil war 
and genocide. Next, I analyze the factors that influenced regional variation in the killing 
 158	  
of civilians and soldiers as well as the location of concentration camps,116 drawing upon 
many of the theories outlined in Chapter 3. The chapter ends with an analysis of variation 
in the onset of violence and the magnitude of violence over time.  
Overall, I find that the ethnic composition of a region influenced both the 
magnitude and the onset of violence. Specifically, violence targeted Bosniaks, though 
polarized communities with two large ethnic groups also saw comparatively more 
violence and earlier onset. Factors related to community organization, which had much 
explanatory power for the case of Rwanda, did not significantly impact soldier deaths, 
civilian deaths, or the number of concentration camps, however. This is likely because 
previously formed armies and militias perpetrated much of the violence in Bosnia. 
Instead, violence was largely influenced by the presence of these armies and militias, 
proximity to Serbia, and other factors related to strategy. 
The Road to Genocide 
Located at a cultural crossroads between Western and Eastern Europe, Bosnia has long 
been at the intersection of regional conflicts (Nation 2003).117 After the 2nd century, the 
line dividing the Western and Eastern Roman Empire ran through the region, and clashes  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  116	  I am in the process of reconstructing data on forced migration patterns. I was able to 
obtain data from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and I am working 
to harmonize them with previous Bosnian boundaries.	  	  117	  Like Rwanda, Bosnia’s rich history is far too detailed to fully review in this 
dissertation chapter. Yet, while history is never a deterministic factor in the events of a 
genocide, Chapter 2 has shown that historical background can shed light on the events 
that take place during a genocide. Accordingly, while this brief history includes key 
historical events, it mainly focuses on recent preconditions leading to 1992, when Bosnia 
became an independent country. 
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Figure 4.1: The Former Yugoslavia  
 
between these empires—and many subsequent empires—were fought on its soil (NIOD 
Prologue 2002).  
Bosnia gradually evolved into a Kingdom that was relatively autonomous 
throughout the 12th to mid-14th centuries. Near the close of the 14th century, the Ottoman 
Empire attacked, ultimately taking control of the country in 1463. Serbia, Bosnia’s 
eastern neighbor that had ruled its own Kingdom of Serbs since the beginning of the 13th 
century, also fell to the Turks in two crucial battles that have long remained part of 
Serbian mythology. Ottoman occupation spread throughout the Balkans. Ottoman Turks 
engaged in numerous battles with Bosnia’s western neighbor, Croatia, and established a 
firm hold on the region.  
Ottoman rule was characterized by a high degree of religious tolerance that was 
well in line with a history of co-existence in the region (Cigar 1995; NIOD Prologue 
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2002).118  This tolerance was maintained in part by the millet system, which allowed 
religious organizations (such as courts) to govern peoples’ lives. The system defined 
people primarily by their religious identities, and it has been seen as an early example of 
religious pluralism (Sachedina 2001).  
Although the Ottomans tolerated different religious identities, approximately two-
fifths of the population of Bosnia converted from Christianity to Islam during Ottoman 
rule (Lampe 2000). This changing religious identity, as well as waves of migration to the 
region, meant that the population was roughly divided between Muslims, Orthodox 
Christians, and Catholics by the mid-19th century. Bosnia was the most ethnically diverse 
region in the Balkans (NIOD Prologue 2002). By contrast, most Serbs adhered to the 
Orthodox faith during Ottoman rule, while Croatians and their western neighbors 
remained loyal to the Roman Catholic Church.  
During this period, religious identities became increasingly intertwined with 
ethnic ones (Weitz 2003). “Orthodox” became synonymous with “Serb,” while 
“Catholic” became synonymous with “Croat,” the people who mainly occupied the 
region of present-day Croatia. Unlike Serbia and Croatia, Bosnia did not have a dominant 
ethnic group. Rather than “Bosnians,” there were Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, and 
Bosnian Muslims (later known as Bosniaks), though many argued that the latter group 
was comprised of descendants of either Serbs or Croats who had wrongfully adopted 
Islam. Bosnian Muslims embraced their identity, however, making it an ethnicity that, as 
in Rwanda, later became polarized and racialized.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  118	  Indeed, while popular accounts of violence in the region place emphasis on “long-
standing divisions” or “age-old conflicts,” Bosnia, like Rwanda, had seen relative peace 
among ethnic groups in the broader historical period prior to the genocide. 	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The economic system of the Ottoman Empire relied heavily upon agriculture. 
Landowners were predominantly Muslim, while the tenants were mainly Orthodox and 
Catholic (NIOD Part 1 2002), mirroring Tutsi’s predominant ownership of the land in 
Rwanda. Peasants were unhappy with this arrangement, and the 19th century saw 
numerous Serb peasant revolts against landowners’ impositions (Lampe 2000).  
Unhappiness regarding Ottoman rule also grew. Small battles between some 
countries in the Balkans and the Ottoman Empire continued throughout much of their 
occupation, culminating in great discontent throughout the 19th century. At this time, 
ideas about Serbian and Croatian independence began to proliferate, and Serbia began to 
build an administrative and military framework for its future as a nation-state. Each 
sought greater territorial control in the Balkan region, dreaming about expanding their 
land to form “Greater Serbia” and “Greater Croatia.”119  
Bosnia saw growing unrest, though much of it was between Bosnian Serbs and 
Bosnian Muslims. For example, a particularly violent Serb and Croat peasant revolt took 
place in 1875 in Herzegovina, a region in southern Bosnia. The peasants wanted greater 
representation and land, and Bosnian Muslims and Ottoman forces responded forcefully. 
By its end, an estimated 150,000 people (mainly Serbs) were dead or forcibly displaced 
(Lampe 2000).  
Shortly afterward, Bosnia was included in the 1878 Treaty of Berlin, through 
which the United Kingdom, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, and the 
Ottoman Empire reassigned control over areas of Eastern Europe. The Treaty placed 
Bosnia squarely under Austro-Hungarian control. Several hundred thousand Bosnian 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 For more on rising nationalism and territorial aspirations, see Lampe 2000.  
 162	  
Muslims fled to the Ottoman Empire, giving Serbs a plurality in Bosnia, while those who 
remained under Austro-Hungarian control were forced to consolidate their cultural and 
religious autonomy (Lampe 2000).  
Austro-Hungarian rule featured aggressive policies to enhance the industrial and 
agricultural development of Bosnia. While industrial production initially increased at a 
rate of 15 percent a year beginning in the 1890s, the agricultural project failed miserably. 
When Austria decided to formally annex Bosnia in 1908, the predominantly Serb 
peasantry comprised 42 percent of the rural population but made up 74 percent of the 
sharecropping landless (Lampe 2000:82). This fostered a growing sense of frustration and 
resentment amidst the Serb population. At the same time, Bosnian Muslims were 
increasingly concerned about maintaining their cultural autonomy within the 
predominantly Christian Austro-Hungarian Empire.  
Growing nationalist tensions and struggles for political power culminated in the 
First Balkan War (1912-1913), during which Serbia, Montenegro, Greece, and Bulgaria 
(the “Balkan League”) sought territory from the Ottoman Empire, which still laid claim 
to some of the region. The Balkan League was victorious and divided the majority of the 
Ottoman territories among themselves. Bulgaria was not satisfied with its territorial gain, 
however; several weeks later, in June 1913, it initiated the Second Balkan War by 
attacking some of its former allies. This war lasted several months. At its end, Serbia 
emerged with an increase in territory that almost doubled its claim from before the First 
Balkan War (Cigar 1995; NIOD Part 1 2002). This sparked a renewed commitment 
among Serbian politicians to the vision of Greater Serbia: now they aimed to create a 
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large southern Slav state to displace Habsburg rule. It also deepened anxieties between 
Muslims and Serbs in Bosnia.  
 Peace in the region was short lived, and Bosnia’s rule by numerous different 
political regimes continued. In 1914, Gavrilo Princip, a Bosnian Serb, assassinated the 
Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand—the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne—and his 
wife in Sarajevo. Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia shortly thereafter, triggering 
the beginning of World War I.120  
The Austro-Hungarian Empire collapsed during the war. In 1918, Balkan leaders 
created a new country—the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes—in which united 
Slovenes, Kosovars, Serbs, Albanians, and Muslims could build a common life. King 
Alexander I formally ruled the Kingdom, which encompassed present-day Serbia, 
Montenegro, Bosnia, Croatia, and several other areas within the region and later became 
known as the first Yugoslavia.  
During the first Yugoslavia’s early years, leaders attempted to integrate the 
diverse land, law, tax, and transport regimes of the constituent republics. Serbia was at 
the core of the Kingdom (Djokic 2007). Serbs comprised the numerical majority of the 
population (based on a pre-WWI census) and dominated the government and army 
leadership. Almost all of the 24 government ministers, as well as many army chiefs, were 
Serbian (NIOD Part 1 2002).  
Not all citizens of the new country were happy with Serb dominance, making the 
unification of the various southern Slavic states into a single Kingdom more fragmented 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  120	  During the war, Croats and Slovenes fought in the Hapsburg Army against Serbs, and 
Croats created concentration camps for Serbs and Bosnians. Overall, Bosnia remained 
relatively sheltered during the war, though Austrian rulers displaced an estimated 
100,000 Serbs from Eastern Bosnia (NIOD Part 1 2002). 	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than the name implied. There were constant struggles between Serb and Croat leaders 
over their different visions of a centralized or federalist state (Djokic 2007). Some Croats 
sought autonomy for Croatia, while Serb leaders generally championed the cause of a 
unitary Yugoslavian state. Meanwhile, Bosnian Muslims retained a degree of cultural and 
religious autonomy and sought to maintain ties to Turkey (Burg and Shoup 1999). Soon, 
new political parties formed to advance these different goals, and, as in Rwanda, they 
developed along ethnic lines (NIOD Part 1 2002).121  The parties politicized and 
polarized ethnicities to a degree previously unseen. 
Fearing growing political threat inside the kingdom and from other countries, 
King Alexander tightened his reins in 1928, suspending the constitution and installing a 
monarchic dictatorship. The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes officially became 
known as the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and Alexander undertook authoritarian measures 
to end the country’s disunity and created a more centralized Yugoslav identity (NIOD 
Prologue 2002; Djokic 2007). He encouraged citizens to think in terms of Yugoslav 
allegiance rather than ethnic-based nationalism, and he jump-started the economy with an 
industrialization program.  
Alexander’s rule was cut short when he was assassinated during a visit to 
Marseilles in 1934. The path to a more centralized Yugoslavia continued, and in some 
ways strengthened, under the leadership of Prince Regent Paul and Prime Minister Milan 
Stojadinovic and their new political party, whose slogan was “one state, one people, one 
king” (Lampe 2000:176-8; Djokic 2007:106-120). Competing nationalisms continued to 
emerge, however, and remained salient (Djokic 2007).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  121	  See Balkan Battlegrounds (CIA 2002:122) for detailed information on the ethnically-
based political parties. 	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Several years later, World War II broke out in Europe. Yugoslavia quickly 
declared its neutrality, but it was not an option for long, given Yugoslavia’s geographic 
position between Hitler’s Russian front, Germany, Italy, and the Adriatic passage to 
North Africa. In 1941, Yugoslavia joined the Tripartite Pact (with Germany, Italy, and 
Japan). The signing of the Pact was swiftly followed by a military coup led by a group of 
Serb officers who protested against Prince Paul’s decision to join the Axis powers. Hitler 
was furious and was determined to destroy the new regime (Lampe 2000).  
Germany bombed the Yugoslav city of Belgrade, forcing the country’s new 
leadership to capitulate. Nazi troops took control of many urban centers in Serbia, and 
Yugoslavia was partitioned into a Croatian state under Nazi rule. The Ustashe, a Croatian 
fascist and terrorist organization, led the state for the Nazis, and the rest of Yugoslavia 
was either occupied or annexed (Djokic 2007).  
Under Croatian Ustashe occupation, Bosnia experienced a rule of terror 
characterized by atrocities against Serbs and some Muslims. Hundreds of thousands of 
Serbs were killed in the early years of the war. Croats dominated the region, and Ustashe 
leaders took action to implement parts of the “Final Solution” of exterminating Jews and 
other “undesirables,” including Yugoslavian Serbs. Ustashe leaders forced well over 
140,000 people to migrate from Serbia to other regions, such as Bosnia and Croatia, and 
many others were interned in concentration camps (Lampe 2000). In response to the 
terror, Serb nationalists organized the Chetnik movement, which called for an end to the 
persecution of Serbs and a “Homogenous Serbia” (Cigar 1995). As a Bosnian activist 
shared with me, “Multiple atrocities were committed against Serbs. And they didn’t 
forget it. It became part of their identity as Serbian” (Bosnia, March 2013). Meanwhile, 
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Serbs and other Yugoslavs who were opposed to the Ustashe and Axis powers joined the 
Communist Party, helping to organize the Partisan resistance movement. The Partisans 
supported a unified, federal Yugoslavia and opposed the involvement of Italian and 
German powers.  
After the defeat of the Axis powers and the military victory of the Partisans, the 
Allied powers supported the Communists in reconstituting Yugoslavia (Burg and Shoup 
1999). The Communist Party quickly consolidated power and declared that all ethnic 
groups were welcome. Calls for  “Greater Serbia” and “Greater Croatia” were 
discredited, and Chetnik and Ustashe groups were banned. In the pursuit of a more 
unified country, the government also banned religious education and did not tolerate 
Islam.122  They prohibited Islamic courts and the wearing of the veil. These religious 
prohibitions were designed to grant all Yugoslavs equal opportunities for economic, 
social, and political advancement.  
The constitution renamed the country the Federal Peoples’ Republic of 
Yugoslavia, which consisted of six autonomous republics (the Socialist Republics of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia), an 
autonomous district, and an autonomous province. This reflected the pre-1914 regional 
territories, though Serbia had an advantage, as the capital was in Belgrade. Serbs also had 
a disproportionate share of the posts in the government, military, judicial system, 
Communist Party, and economic infrastructure (Cigar 1995).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 Earlier versions of the census contained categories such as “Muslim Serb” and 
“Muslim Croat,” but, by 1953, the category “Muslim” was absent from the census. 
Muslims were again recognized in the 1963 Bosnian census.  
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After having lead the Partisans to victory, Josip Broz Tito emerged as the chief 
architect of the new Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia. He became provisional 
leader of the country and was elected soon after. He began strengthening the country 
immediately. In 1948, Tito broke ties with Stalin’s Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
(USSR or Soviet Union), and, as a result, Yugoslavia enjoyed more autonomy than many 
other communist regimes. He drew upon Stalinist, fear-based tactics to rule the country, 
though Tito also emphasized Communism and Yugoslav identities over ethnic and 
religious identities. He implemented widespread economic and agricultural reforms, and 
during the 1960s, brought a period of widespread economic success to Yugoslavia. 
Within Bosnia, Tito was exceptionally popular. As a Bosnian lawyer recalled, “When 
Tito took over, he said now we will stop talking about what happened to the Serbs or the 
Bosnians or whoever. We will all be brothers and sisters… live in unity” (Bosnia, April 
2013).  
Bosnians have various opinions about whether this unity was really achieved. 
Some argue it covered a deeper simmering conflict, much like Habyarimana’s regime in 
Rwanda appeared more stable than its predecessors to outsiders. Others insist that Tito’s 
Yugoslavia was a glorious period with high levels of ethnic tolerance, prosperity, and 
urban cultural renaissances in centers like Sarajevo. A former political prisoner, now 
diplomat in Bosnia shared: 
In the Tito’s time, all criminals were in the prisons. Right now, most of the 
criminals are our ministers. In Tito’s time, you were free to leave your car 
unlocked. Right now, you need to take the chain and to take your car to the tree, 
because there is no security. Probably the most important is that passport we had 
in ex-Yugoslavia; we didn’t have visas. You could travel anywhere (Bosnia, May 
2013).  
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Either way, Tito helped maintain some peace within the region. Cold War politics 
helped maintain equilibrium, too: Yugoslavia was courted by both the Soviet Union and 
the United States, and it had continually better relations with the West.123 Yet, the 
country’s need to stand on its own between the two global powers also influenced a 
heavy reliance on internal trade. Of all the Eastern European Community countries, only 
Romania and Albania had a lower level of foreign trade per capita between 1950 and 
1965 (Woodward 1995).124 
After almost four decades of rule, Tito died in May 1980. Over the next few 
years, economic and political crisis emerged. Massive outmigration and movement away 
from rural peasant villages after WWII meant that some 9 million people had either 
moved within Yugoslavia or moved abroad. Many Serbs with education or skills left 
Bosnia in favor of Zagreb or Belgrade, generally more cosmopolitan cities, so the 
demographic plurality of Serbs was reversed in favor of Bosnian Muslims (Lampe 2000). 
After the international oil crisis in the 1970s and a host of other macroeconomic 
fluctuations, incomes had also begun to decline. Youth unemployment was increasing 
rapidly—by 1985, 38.7 percent of those under age 25 were unemployed (Woodward 
1995). Across Yugoslavia as a whole, one million people were registered as unemployed 
(ibid). 
These crises occurred in part under international watch. When Bosnia hosted the 
1984 Winter Olympics, international attention focused on the region. In this context, 
nationalism was also on the rise. Serbia, in particular, saw nationalism parallel the rise of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 See NIOD 2002 Prolouge for numerous examples of these relationships.  124	  In 1963, the country formally changed its name to the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, and Josip Broz Tito was named President for Life. 	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Slobodan Milošević, who ascended through the political ranks to become President of 
Serbia in 1989.  
Milošević was previously well known for his pro-Serb rhetoric (NIOD 2002; 
Ramet 2006). Shortly after he was elected President, he gave one of his most prominent 
speeches, coinciding with the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, a military defeat 
of the medieval Serbian kingdom by the Ottoman Empire. The speech emboldened Serb 
nationalists who expressed grievances against the Muslim “Turks”—a term that 
racialized the ethnic group by suggesting that they were outsiders and settler peoples 
rather than native peoples125—and suggested that violence might be necessary to secure 
Serb interests. It also furthered a populist movement that aimed to dismiss former 
Communist officials in favor of leaders who would ensure the protection of Serbs (Mann 
2005). Milošević put the interests of Serbia ahead of the interests of Yugoslavia as a 
whole, promising a compact form of federalism that would defend Serbs anywhere they 
lived. By the end of the decade, ethnic rhetoric was again in full swing.  
Partly as a result of Milošević’s increasingly polarizing politics and his growing 
control over the entire region, discrimination against Muslims also became more 
prominent throughout the late 1980s. Media attacks against Muslims in Bosnia as well as 
Albanian Muslims in Kosovo were prevalent, and public figures expressed their disdain 
at the minarets seen throughout Bosnia. More than 200 prominent academics from the 
Serbian Academy of Arts drafted the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences 
and Arts (1986) (Lampe 2000). Much like the Hutu 10 Commandments, this document 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  125	  As in the previous chapter, I utilize the term “ethnicity” because the groups celebrated 
and embraced a self-defined group membership. Yet, in the decades prior to the genocide, 
Serbs (and, to a lesser degree, Croats) increasingly constructed Bosniaks as outsiders and 
settler peoples, thus racializing the group.	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claimed that Muslims threatened Serbian existence and that Serbs were repressed. It also 
expressed support for the quest for a Greater Serbia, arguing that the Serbian people did 
not have their own state.126 Much in line with this, the Serbian Orthodox Church 
characterized Islam as alien, primitive, and aggressive. Inflammatory rhetoric about 
Muslims even appeared in official Church publications (Cigar 1995; Sells 1998).  
  As communist parties across Europe buckled and the Cold War came to an end, 
Yugoslavia’s political system effectively ceased to function. As Woodward put it, within 
Yugoslavia, “There was no longer any uncontested authority… this political opening and 
free-for-all also encouraged others to pursue ambitions of political power and avenge 
perceived wrongs. The more the system dissolved, the greater was the incentive to seize 
the moment” (1995:116).  
Representatives from the region gathered for the 14th Congress of the League of 
Communists of Yugoslavia in January 1990. The Serbian delegation, led by Milošević, 
attempted to secure power for Serbs by emphasizing greater control for the Federation. 
Conversely, the Slovenes sought reform that would result in greater power for the 
republics and less for the Federation. The Serbian delegation blocked Slovene proposals, 
and during debate, the Slovenian delegation literally stood up and left the Congress, 
followed by the Croatian delegation (Lampe 2000). They had been pushed to their 
breaking points.  
In 1990, both Slovenia and Croatia held elections and threatened secession. 
Croatia’s threats of secession and efforts to arm itself particularly pressured Serbia, 
whose leaders hoped to control all of Yugoslavia, and a series of conflicts unfolded 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 This document did not advocate violence as blatantly as the Hutu 10 Commandments.	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between Croatia and Serbia.127 Kosovo declared independence in July 1990, adding an 
additional threat to Serbia, whose hold on power seemed to be unraveling much like the 
Rwandan Hutu government’s power appeared to be unraveling during the Arusha Accord 
peace process.  
On June 21, 1991, Croatia declared independence with a three-month moratorium. 
Slovenia followed on June 25, 1991. Determined to maintain the territorial integrity of 
Yugoslavia, the Serbian-controlled Yugoslav National Army (JNA) invaded Slovenia and 
Croatia. The JNA soon abandoned fighting in Slovenia and focused on Croatia, butting 
heads with its President, Franco Tudjman.128 While the republics had territorial defense 
units,129 the JNA vastly outnumbered the Croatian forces. Many Croatians were killed, 
and the forced displacement that followed presaged some of what was to take place in 
Bosnia—some scholars have since called it a “dress rehearsal” for the events in Bosnia 
(Cigar 1995).130  Sporadic shelling of Bosnia from the Serbian side of the Drina River 
began, though the precise patterns and perpetrators are not well documented (Cigar 1995; 
NIOD 2002).  
As Yugoslavia was crumbling, the international community became involved in 
discussions and plans for the future of the region. A number of peace plans, such as the 
Vance Owen Plan and the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan, were proposed, but none was 
successful. The United Nations Security Council imposed an arms embargo on the entire 
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  See Balkan Battlegrounds (CIA 2002) for additional information on these conflicts. 	  128	  Again, as this chapter focuses on Bosnia, I will not be reviewing the events in Croatia 
in depth. Instead, I refer the reader to Balkan Battlegrounds (CIA 2002) and numerous 
works on the collapse of Yugoslavia. 	  129	  For a detailed analysis of the armed forces, see the work of Smail Cekic. 	  130	  Macedonia also declared independence in September 1991, though this was met with 
far less resistance.	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region in September 1991 (Resolution 713). However, the effects of this embargo were 
mostly felt by Bosnia, as Serbia had control of the Yugoslav National Army and Croatia 
had been smuggling weapons through its position on the coast (Cigar 1995; NIOD 2002). 
The United Nations also created the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in 
February, sending peacekeepers to Croatia to monitor a cease-fire.131   
Meanwhile, in Bosnia, public opinion about whether to follow other republics in 
secession was divided. Calls for change were common, as the situation within Bosnia was 
increasingly dire. Although Bosnian President Alija Izetbegović had declared the country 
was neutral in the conflict between the Serbs and the Croats, Bosnia was suffering. Its 
economy took as hit, as both Croatia and Serbia decreased exports to Bosnia (NIOD Part 
1 2002). In addition, Muslims were increasingly targets of physical attacks (Cigar 1995). 
During this period, Serb leaders in Serbia and in Bosnia amplified their calls for 
Serbs to protect themselves, declaring that they had been victims before and would not be 
again. Since the mid-1980s, Serbian popular culture had generated an obsessive 
sentiment that Serbs had been wronged throughout history—that they were the “Jews of 
the Balkans” (Ramet 2005:17). This sentiment was expressed in folk music, sporting 
events, and the media. In 1989, Serbian authorities even dug up mass graves from WWII 
to show their population how Serbs had been persecuted in the recent past (Ramet 2005). 
These sentiments only rose with anti-Serb rhetoric from Croatian President Tudjman.  
Between September and November 1991, Serbs declared five autonomous Serb 
regions within Bosnia. Serbs in those regions began to assemble paramilitaries, were 
mobilized, trained, and armed by the JNA. In many ways, this echoes the training of self-
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  In June 1992, this mandate was extended to aiding Bosnia.	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defense groups before the violence in Rwanda. These groups were designed to protect 
Serb citizens if Bosnia declared independence, at which point Serb leaders warned that 
Serbs might be at risk of attack. A former soldier explained, “They were like special units 
of the Yugoslav Army. But they called them paramilitaries, and why? Because they [the 
JNA] are not responsible” (Bosnia, April 2013). 
In late November, the newspaper Slobodna Bosna published a secret plan 
showing that the JNA was planning to work with the Bosnian Serb Army (also known as 
the Army of Republika Srpska) and the paramilitaries to blockade Sarajevo. One month 
later, the JNA started digging in artillery in the hills surrounding Sarajevo. 
Simultaneously, the General of the Bosnian Serb Army, Major General Ratko Mladić, 
began organizing volunteer formations, recruiting almost 70,000 men (NIOD Part 1 
2002) and setting up “crisis staffs” of army members and Serb police around Bosnia.132 
All too familiar to Rwanda, these crisis staffs were organized around the idea of 
preparing for impending threats to Serbs. On December 5th, the Bosnian Serb Army 
created the Serb Republic of Bosnia (also known as Republika Sprksa). The Serb 
Republic of Bosnia then declared independence on January 9, 1992 (Weitz 2003). It was 
not recognized internationally or by the government of Bosnia, but its mobilization 
continued. 
Many Bosniaks, as numerous respondents shared with me, still viewed their 
region as a place where people of different ethnicities married, worked together, and 
coexisted. They generally did not anticipate the violence. Some, however, fled the region 
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  Note that the crisis staffs were part of a larger written plan—the “Organization and 
Activity of the Organs of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina in Extraordinary 
Circumstances"—to take over municipalities in Bosnia. 
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in light of increasing instability.    
On January 15, 1992, the European Communities (forerunner of the European 
Union) recognized Slovenia and Croatia as independent states, and many countries 
recognized them shortly afterward.133  On February 29, 1992, President Izetbegović 
called for a referendum on Bosnian independence—strongly favored by Bosniaks and 
Bosnian Croats and strongly opposed by Bosnian Serbs (who boycotted the referendum). 
Bosnian leaders put a provisional coalition government in place. Serbia refused to 
recognize Bosnian independence, however, and claimed it owned much of the land in 
Bosnia. 
The next day, a Muslim reportedly shot a Serb during a Serb wedding in Sarajevo, 
Bosnia. Like the rumored attack of an influential Hutu by Tutsis in the late 1950s, 
Bosnian Serb leaders used this incident to illustrate the threat of Muslims (author 
interviews). Many Serbs feared attacks by their Bosniak or Croat neighbors, just as Hutus 
feared attack by the RPF. The next day, Serb paramilitaries were stationed around 
Sarajevo. Thousands of citizens took to the streets to protest the paramilitary presence, 
however, and no violence took place.  
Two weeks later, international peace talks began in Sarajevo. Serb, Muslim, and 
Croat leaders agreed on a framework for establishing ethnic cantons in Bosnia (called the 
Carrington-Cutileiro Plan). While all of the leaders signed, the agreement fell through 
only days later. Fighting broke out in parts of Bosnia, including the towns of Bosanski 
Brod in the north, Jajce and Mostar in the center, and Neum in the south. Almost exactly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 Due to several other issues, such as Greek opposition, Macedonia was not recognized 
until April 1993.  
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two years prior to Rwandan President Habyarimana’s plane crash, Bosnia teetered on the 
verge of war and genocide. 
Descent into Violence 
On April 5, 1992, the European Communities recognized Bosnia as an independent state.  
Previously, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić had suggested that if Bosnia were 
recognized, it would not survive, leading, instead, to the annihilation of Muslims (Berg 
and Shoup 2000:78). As soon as Bosnia was declared independent, the longest siege of a 
capital city in modern history began.134   
As noted, the Yugoslav Peoples’ Army (JNA) had already begun to dig artillery 
into the hills of Sarajevo, a capital city with roughly 525,000 inhabitants (1991 Yugoslav 
Census). In conjunction with the JNA, Bosnian Serb troops quickly surrounded the city 
on April 5th. The citizens of Sarajevo took to the streets, and while they protested 
peacefully as they had the previous month, troops shot several protestors, marking the 
first casualties of the siege. A protestor showed me a tattered photo from that day in 
which he was carrying a wounded man: 
This is photo, my photo from the 5th of April 1992… I attended peace  
demonstration, demonstration against war. And then the Yugoslavian People’s  
Army… started to shoot us demonstrators… So this guy [points at picture]… was 
so wounded I had to take him to help (Bosnia, March 2013).  
 
Protestors surrendered, and the First Corps Sarajevo, the Bosnian defense force, was 
unable to defend the city against the Bosnian Serb Army. In fact, during the early part of 
the Siege, Sarajevo relied upon gangs—as they had access to the existing weapons—to 
defend the city. Despite their defense, they too were far outnumbered, and Serb forces 
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  For an in-depth understanding of the daily events of the siege, see the Study of the 
Siege of Sarajevo (United Nations 1994).	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gradually took over the perimeter of Sarajevo.  
By May 2nd, the Bosnian Serb Amy had completely blockaded the city. They 
controlled all roads and the airport, and they cut off food supplies and medicine. They cut 
off the water and electricity.135  The Bosnian Serb Army instituted curfews for Muslims, 
dismissed Muslims from their jobs, and prohibited Muslims from sending their children 
to schools (Weitz 2003). Bosniak houses in some areas of the city were ransacked, and 
many men were forced to move into makeshift prison camps.136  
Beyond controlling access to basic needs, the Serb Army regularly bombarded 
Sarajevo with mortars, tanks, artillery, and guns. “Sniper Alley” became particularly well 
known for its danger; snipers targeted civilians from their perches in high-rise buildings. 
The citizens of Sarajevo were in constant fear: 
The siege was terrible. We were always afraid… always thinking that we were 
going to be killed. Walking outside was always danger, for three years…But, we 
also carried on. We put on plays for children indoors. We tried to find food. We, 
well, we did the best we could with the situation (Bosnia, April 2013).  
 
The bombardment of Sarajevo was strongest at the beginning of the conflict, and it 
resulted in many deaths. As Figure 4.2 shows, the deadliest month was June 1992, when 
1,706 people were killed. Bombardment continued throughout the siege, and in later 
months, several particularly deadly shells hit the market in Sarajevo. Overall, over 12,000 
civilians137 were killed (Cekić 2009; RDC 2013) and estimates suggest an additional 
56,000 were wounded (UN 1994).  
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  The UN Mission was able to bring some supplies by air. 	  
136 As explained in more detail below, Serbs set up the majority of concentration camps, 
though Bosniaks and Croats also set up makeshift camps. 137	  This number is from a slightly earlier version of the Bosnian Book of the Dead (used 
in the analysis presented in Table 4.8). The newest version is slightly updated, but the 
basic trends remain the same. 	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Many homes and apartments were also destroyed or severely damaged during the 
siege. Other buildings were systematically targeted, including television, radio, and 
newspaper stations, as well as the Holiday Inn, where foreign journalists resided. Some of 
the shelling was indiscriminate, but some homes were targeted. Further, Serb areas of the 
city were rarely, if ever, hit. Muslim areas were hit more regularly and with more force 
(UN 1994).  
 
Figure 4.2: Siege of Sarajevo Deaths  
 
Note: The data are described in the methodology section. 
  
Elsewhere in the country, violence took a similar pattern, though most cities 
toppled more quickly than Sarajevo, avoiding lengthy sieges. Many times, armed Serb 
paramilitaries worked with the Bosnian Serb Army to take the towns, doing the “dirty 
work” for the armies themselves (Hughes 1962). For example, Serb paramilitaries began 
erecting roadblocks in Prijedor, a region and city in northwestern Bosnia, on April 14, 
1992. UN Observers were withdrawn two weeks later; and two days after they were 
withdrawn, the Serb Prijedor Crisis Staff took over all government offices within the city. 
Many non-Serbs lost their jobs, and residents were required to carry identification papers. 
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The local radio stations, such as Radio Prijedor and Kozarski Vjesnik, began to slander 
non-Serbs, illustrating that while propaganda spread through radio was likely a more 
important factor in the violence in Rwanda, it played a role in the violence in Bosnia as 
well (UN Commission Report 1994).138  
As Bosnian Serb forces took over smaller towns within the municipality of 
Prijedor, non-Serbs were required to wear white armbands and hang white flags from the 
windows of their homes (reminiscent of the yellow stars Jews were forced to wear during 
the Holocaust). As in Sarajevo, forces ransacked many of the houses, sending many 
people to concentration camps. The camps at Trnopolje, Omarska, and Keraterm have 
become particularly notorious.139  Once places of industry, these camps were filled with 
thousands of people, starting in late May of 1992. Serb forces usually separated men and 
women, often raping women in front of their family members. Both men and women 
were sent to camps, though men were usually sent to more notorious death camps, such 
as Omarska.  
In the camps, living conditions were dire. People were crammed together, 
regularly deprived of food and water. Many died of starvation and malnutrition, while 
others were executed outright. Mirsad, a survivor of Omarska, told me the violence was 
not just physical. At night, the guards would walk outside and drag clubs, psychologically 
torturing those inside. They laid awake, knowing that, at any moment, they could be 
beaten or even killed (Fieldnotes, April 2013).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 I am unable to quantitatively test the role of the radio, as Rwanda had state-controlled 
radio stations, while Bosnia had local stations that were controlled by interim 
governments and other parties.  139	  Omarksa and Keraterm were known as death camps, while Trnopolje was a transit 
camp with higher percentages of women and elderly. Serb political prisoners were also 
kept in the camps. 	  
 179	  
 Mosques and other buildings that represented Muslim culture were destroyed, 
while “Muslim” named streets and cities were changed to Serb names in a concerted 
effort to eradicate Muslim culture. Though I do not analyze this form of victimization in 
great detail, the changing of names and the destruction of places of worship were meant 
to erase the very memory of a people.  
 The pattern in Prijedor was repeated throughout the country, though the most 
infamous violence occurred several years later in Srebrenica, a town and municipality 
located in the Drina River Valley in Northeastern Bosnia. It occupied a strategic position 
as a territorial area adjacent to Serbia. As Bosnian and Serb forces struggled for control 
of the area, the United Nations declared the city to be one of several Safe Areas in 1993 
(Resolution 819). Shortly afterward, UN Peacekeeping troops were stationed there, and 
approximately 25,000 displaced people sought refugee within its borders.   
Despite the Safe Area designation, Serb forces remained close and refused to 
withdraw their weapons. In March 1995, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić issued 
Directive 7, which instructed his soldiers to “…create an unbearable situation of total 
insecurity with no hope of further survival or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica” 
(ICTY Indictment, IT-04-80-I). After several months of sporadic violence, Serb forces 
began their offensive against Srebrenica and took the city in early July.  
While the 25,000 Bosniak civilians gathered in Srebrenica and in the neighboring 
village of Potočari expected protection from the UN soldiers, they did not receive it.140 
Hasan Nuhanović, the interpreter for the Dutch forces assigned to protect Srebrenica as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 For a detailed account of the violence in Srebrenica and Potočari, including why Dutch 
peacekeepers turned displaced peoples away, see Nuhanović 2007 and the ICTY 
proceedings.  
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Safe Area, explained that, after negotiating with Serb forces, the Dutch peacekeepers 
ordered the displaced peoples to leave (Bosnia, April 2013). Nuhanović had to translate 
this request, effectively giving thousands of men, including every member of his own 
immediate family, a death sentence.  
With nowhere left to turn, the displaced Bosniaks were at the mercy of the Serb 
forces. Serbs began gathering the displaced peoples and separating them by sex, 
victimizing women and generally sending them away on buses. Many of the men 
attempted to flee for nearby territory controlled by the Bosnian army. While some of 
these men were soldiers, the majority of them were not. Boys were loaded onto buses; 
and many men of military age were taken to a building known as the “White House,” 
where many were killed both in the building and in the surrounding forest (Fieldnotes 
April 2013). A column of men tried to flee, and they were hunted down by the Serb 
Army and massacred, resulting in the murder of approximately 8,000 Bosniak men and 
boys in just a few days.141   
Nuhanović also fled, realizing that the Dutch peacekeeping forces would not offer 
him protection. As he shared his story, he explained that killing continued after the main 
massacre: 
When we came to Tuzla after [the] Srebrenica massacre, it was actually still going 
on. It took the Serbs several weeks to kill these people, although most of these 
people were killed within 72 hours… But they continued the killing for weeks, 
hunting people in the woods... (Bosnia, April 2013).  
 
This massacre—known to the world by the name “Srebrenica”—was the largest 
that took place during the violence in Bosnia. It also marked the West’s most forceful 
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  The majority of those killed were from the column of men who had tried to escape. 
For a much more detailed depiction of the events of the massacre, see Nuhanović 2007. 	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intervention. Numerous previous interventions by the United Nations, NATO, the 
European Community, and individual states could not stop the violence. But, the 
massacre at Srebrenica and Potočari, as well as a deadly Serb mortar attack in Sarajevo in 
August 1995, led to major NATO air strikes against Serbia. The violence was largely 
ended, and a few months later, the Dayton Accords were signed, declaring a ceasefire.142  
Patterns of Violence in Bosnia 
Chapter 1 provided a brief overview of the definition of genocide. As the complex case of 
Bosnia is often considered a war, with some questioning the label of genocide, it is useful 
to revisit this definition. To do so, I consider the form of violence, the scale of the 
violence, and the type of victimization, all directly relevant for the forthcoming analysis 
of the number of soldiers killed, the number of civilians killed, an the number of 
concentration camps. While I suggested in Chapter 1 that sociologists need not be 
constrained by the legal definition of genocide, most scholars who argue that these events 
in Bosnia were not genocide draw upon this definition, so I use it to engage those 
arguments.  
 Although a comparatively small number of the killings that took place in Rwanda 
could be classified as a civil war—namely, when the RPF re-invaded Rwanda and fought 
the interim government—there is overwhelming consensus and evidence that the majority 
of the killings were a result of genocide. In Bosnia, the line becomes less clear. Some 
believe it was only a war, while others believe it was both a war and a genocide. In the 
abstract, differentiating between the two is feasible. Civil war can be defined as “armed 
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  Most interview respondents in Bosnia did not believe that the violence was over when 
the Dayton accords were signed, and many felt that violence was ongoing. This 
dissertation does not analyze ongoing violence.	  	  
 182	  
combat within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between parties subject to 
a common authority at the outset of the hostilities” (Kalyvas 2006:5), while international 
war takes place outside of the boundaries of a recognized sovereign. Genocide shares 
many similarities with war, though genocide is distinguished by the intent to destroy a 
social group. As discussed in Chapter 1, this could be an ethnic group, a religious group, 
or one of many other types of groups, though it is also generally a civilian group rather 
than a group of active soldiers engaged in two-sided combat. Even those killed during a 
civil war can be conceptualized as a social group, but the particular collective intent of 
soldiers is generally not to destroy their enemy but to win the war. Destruction through 
battle is a means to achieve victory, not a goal in itself.    
 Kalvyas’s (2006) typology of mass political violence (displayed in Table 4.1) is 
useful for further distinguishing between the production of violence and the aims of 
violence. Kalyvas distinguishes between whether the violence is unilateral or bilateral, as 
well as whether the political actor intends to govern the targeted population. According to 
him, genocide occurs in unilateral situations in which the political actor does not intend 
to govern the population targeted. To be clear, intent is also necessary for genocide —as 
genocide involves the intent to destroy a group. In addition, genocide is not necessarily 
unilateral but rather uneven.143 Nevertheless, this typology is useful for understanding 
differences between forms of violence. Specifically, the intention of future governance is 
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  No genocide, even the Holocaust, has gone without uprising among the victims. In 
Rwanda, people fought the genocidaires in Bisesero for weeks. In Bosnia, Bosnian 
paramilitaries and the Bosnian armed forces fought both Serb and Croat forces, and all 
sides engaged in war crimes (just as the RPF in Rwanda engaged in war crimes as they 
attempted to stop the genocide). This does not negate the actions of the perpetrators, 
however: it is their intended actions rather than responses to those actions that constitute 
genocide.	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important. During genocide, perpetrators seek to destroy the victim groups whether 
through killing, forced removal from land, or forced destruction of culture—in none of 
these cases does the actor intend to govern the population.  
 
Table 4.1: Kalyvas Typology of Mass Political Violence 
 Aims of Violence: Political Actor Intends to Govern  
the Population Targeted 
Production of Violence Yes No 
Unilateral State terror Genocide and mass 
deportation 
Bilateral Civil war violence Reciprocal extermination 
 
Differentiating between forms of violence becomes more difficult when genocide 
and civil war occur at the same time. Many unarmed Bosniak citizens were targeted due 
to group membership, though there was also a Bosniak army fighting on their behalf. On 
the side of the perpetrators, Serbs (and, to a lesser degree, Croats) were attempting to 
defeat armies while simultaneously terrorizing Bosniak citizens and, at times, fighting 
each other. Thus, genocide and war occurred concurrently, and genocide could even be 
considered a strategy of war (with additional aims). It becomes virtually impossible to 
completely distinguish which killing may have been genocidal in intent and which would 
be better classified as war. However, each killing does not need to be motivated by 
genocidal intent in order to constitute genocide. Rather, the actions of leaders, as well as 
the broader structural plan, constituted genocide and classify the violence as such.144  
Genocide, in other words, is a collection of actions that, together, constitute a distinct 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  144	  See the many documents at the ICTY for proof of intent.	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social phenomenon. 
As noted in Chapter 1, many scholars have debated the scale on which genocide 
occurs, and Bosnia has been central to many of these discussions. Recall that the legal 
definition of genocide includes “the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnical, racial, or religious group” (Genocide Convention 1948, emphasis added). Some 
question the meaning of “in part,” with international trials at the ICTY concluding that 
the destruction of 8,000 Bosniak men at Srebrenica constituted genocide in itself (ICTY). 
As social science does not need to follow or constrain itself to legal guidelines, scholarly 
definitions should also be unbound from any form of numeric threshold. Such intent to 
completely destroy a people, as in Rwanda or the Holocaust, is often envisioned as 
necessary, partially due to the influence of the Holocaust on the definition and 
conceptualization of genocide. However, actions taken with the aim of destroying a group 
of people, even if it is not the entire group of people, based on their social group qualifies 
as genocide. This took place between 1992 and 1995 in Bosnia.  
 The violence in Bosnia (and discussions of numeric thresholds) also brings into 
question the type of victimization that takes place during genocide. The legal definition 
of genocide includes killing as just one of five genocidal acts, though almost every 
scholarly definition focuses on killing. As noted in Chapter 1, some, like Horowitz 
(1976), believe killing should be a main aspect of the definition because it is irreversible. 
But, elimination of cultural ways of life and the psychological effects of rape and many 
other forms of sexualized violence are often irreversible as well. Others point to the fact 
that all of the genocides that have occurred during the 20th century involved killing, 
which is important yet should not constrain definitions.  
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 Genocides do involve killing, though the form of violence during genocide can 
vary, as any actions intended to destroy a social group can be genocidal. In the previous 
chapter, it became clear that killing was a dominant form of violence in Rwanda. In 
Bosnia, killing was also a key form of violence, aimed particularly at men.145 Throughout 
Bosnia, it followed a pattern not unlike what unfolded in Srebrenica. As an ICTY 
judgment noted, 
Most of the mass executions followed a well-established pattern. The men were 
first taken to empty schools or warehouses. After being detained there for some 
hours, they were loaded onto buses or trucks and taken to another site for 
execution. Usually, the execution fields were in isolated locations. The prisoners 
were unarmed and, in many cases, steps had been taken to minimize resistance, 
such as blindfolding them, binding their wrists behind their backs with ligatures 
or removing their shoes. Once at the killing fields, the men were taken off the 
trucks in small groups, lined up and shot. Those who survived the initial round of 
gunfire were individually shot with an extra round, though sometimes only after 
they had been left to suffer for a time. Immediately afterwards, and sometimes 
even during the executions, earth moving equipment arrived and the bodies were 
buried, either in the spot where they were killed or in another nearby location 
(ICTY Krstić Judgment 2001). 
 
As the brief example of Prijedor illustrated, forced displacement and internment 
were also prominent. Such violence has since become associated with the euphemism 
“ethnic cleansing,” undertaken to “cleanse” an area of unwanted people. To “ethnically 
cleanse” a city, Serbian paramilitary forces (sometimes with the assistance of the JNA 
and Serb armed forces) began by taking over the city. In many cases, Serbian residents 
were told to leave before violence began. Then, the homes of non-Serbs, particularly 
Bosniaks, were targeted for destruction (UN Commission Report 1994). As in Prijedor, 
cultural monuments and buildings, such as mosques, were often destroyed; and 
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  While I do not consider it until Chapter 6—and even then consider it only briefly— 
it is important to note that cultural notions attached to characteristics such as age, gender, 
sexuality, and other social groups likely also pattern forms of victimization.	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paramilitaries raped, humiliated, and killed Bosniaks and looted their possessions. 
Serbian authorities would then seize the area. Bosniaks, as well as some Croats, would 
often be transferred to concentration camps or makeshift detention centers, where 
sexualized victimization, mass killing, torture, and other forms of victimization were 
common (UN Commission Report 1994). As noted above, sometimes men and women 
were separated at this stage.  
There is much debate regarding whether such “ethnic cleansing” constitutes 
genocide, with some scholars and legal analysts differentiating between destruction as 
death and destruction as removal. The UN General Assembly has labeled ethnic 
cleansing genocide in a resolution (47/121). Yet, the European Court of Rights and others 
argue that ethnic cleansing is not genocide: the intent to destroy is different than the 
intent to remove. As there is no formal legal definition of ethnic cleansing, these scholars, 
as well as some political scientists, have classified it as a war crime or a crime against 
humanity.146   
Again, I have focused on the legal definition because those who argue that the 
violence was not a case of genocide almost exclusively cite the legal definition, 
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  In line with this, the Rome Statute (1998) provides the current international definition 
of crimes against humanity and war crimes, and scholars have generally accepted these 
definitions. Crimes against humanity (Article 7) are widespread and systematic attacks 
directed against any civilian population, including murder, extermination, enslavement, 
deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape and other forms of sexual violence, group-based 
persecution, enforced disappearance, apartheid, or other similar acts that cause great 
physical or mental suffering. War crimes (Article 8) include grave breaches of the 
Geneva Conventions that are part of a plan or large-scale commission and are 
differentiated from genocide and crimes against humanity because they occur in the 
context of armed conflict. Generally, ethnic cleansing is seen as a crime against 
humanity; however, the forced transfer of children is listed as a crime of genocide. Both 
war crimes and crimes against humanity are seen as distinct from the intent to destroy a 
social group.	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suggesting that since the violence largely targeted men, it was not intended to destroy the 
entire population, thus was not ethnically motivated, thus was not genocide. Others have 
relied upon the legal definition and come to the opposite conclusion: that the violence 
was genocide (Cigar 1995; Cushman and Mestrovic 1996). Still others have gone beyond 
the legal definition. For example, Sells (1998) returns to Lemkin’s definition of genocide, 
arguing that Lemkin never suggested that an entire community must be destroyed, but 
that genocide entails a plan to destroy a group’s foundations of life. Bennett (1995) 
argues that ethnic cleaning is simply a euphemism for genocide, and numerous other 
genocide scholars consider the case in their studies (e.g., Alvarez 2001; Weitz 2003).  
Indeed, as this dissertation is a sociological analysis of genocide, the legal 
definition takes a backseat to an analytic one. The actions reviewed here were intended to 
destroy a group, aligning with the scholarly definition of genocide I articulated in Chapter 
1. As noted above, while destruction in Bosnia involved killing, it also involved forced 
removal, the ruin of places of cultural importance (like mosques), and the removal of the 
traces of a people by changing town and street names. In line with Bennett (1995), I treat 
ethnic cleansing as a form of genocide. In the subsequent analysis, consequently, I 
analyze patterns in killings but also in the location and number of concentration camps.  
The Perpetrators147  
 Violence took many forms in Bosnia, and several different groups of perpetrators 
were responsible for this violence. First, it is clear that, as in Rwanda, key figures in 	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  As I focus on genocide in this dissertation, I focus on the actions of Serb forces and 
paramilitaries in particular. This is not to suggest that Croat and Bosniak forces and 
paramilitaries did not commit violence or even grave human rights abuses and crimes, as 
they surely did. Rather, I chose to focus on Serb actions in particular because those 
actions were genocidal, while Croat and Bosniak actions were not. This is not to diminish 
the latter group’s actions. 	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leadership positions within the government of both Bosnia (particularly Republika 
Srpska) and Serbia coordinated the violence. Second, as detailed above, the governments 
worked with a number of armed paramilitary groups. Third, as in Rwanda but to a much 
smaller degree, non-soldier citizens participated in the violence.  
 While there is not space (nor aim) to fully analyze the participation of key 
government officials and army leaders, it is clear that many leaders joined in planning the 
violence that unfolded in Bosnia. Many of these leaders were tried at the ICTY, though 
one of the key orchestrators of the violence—Slobodan Milošević—died before his trial 
was completed. Two of the other people most culpable for the violence, the President of 
Republika Srpska, Radovan Karadžić, and the chief of Staff of the Army of Republika 
Srpska, Ratko Mladić, are currently on trial at the ICTY.148     
 As in Rwanda, members of armies also participated in the violence. However, 
many of the armies also worked with paramilitaries, perhaps to allow the armies of states 
to distance themselves from culpability. Some of the paramilitaries were highly organized 
and moved around the country, while others were more loosely organized and operated in 
just one city. There were paramilitaries on every side of the conflict and all committed 
crimes, though Serb and Croat groups outnumbered Bosniak ones. Armies organized 
many of these unofficial militias, though political parties, local police, or community 
leaders organized others (UN 1994).  
 Some local people were recruited to join paramilitaries, while others assisted the 
military forces in other ways. A lawyer in Bosnia explained: 
…there were also people who were really neighbors of other people, you know, 	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  For more on the orchestrators of the violence, see the many judgments and documents 
publicly available on the ICTY website. 	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and used to live in, let’s say, harmony or at least, you know, some good 
neighborly relations… And so suddenly, war starts, they take on guns, and they 
attack their neighbors. So this was, I think, a complete shock to the people who 
survived. The person who helped you when your baby was born, or you were 
drinking coffee with them every day, and suddenly they take on guns… I don’t 
know about other conflicts, but it was quite specific for Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
that you really had neighbors that at one point overnight turned against you 
(Bosnia, April 2013).  
 
Numerous survivors of concentration camps attested that it was their neighbors who had 
brought them to the camp or who had tortured them; others recalled local police, 
firefighters, and other members of their communities joining paramilitaries or more 
loosely organized groups.  
Disaggregating the Violence 
As with Rwanda, violence in Bosnia is often discussed in the aggregate (with the 
exception of Srebrenica and a few other locations). Indeed, there have been few attempts 
to analyze regional and temporal variation in violence in Bosnia, which has received 
comparatively less scholarly attention than Rwanda. To date, variation in killings has 
been analyzed in three existing studies. Weidmann (2011) sought to understand whether 
killings in municipalities in Bosnia were initiated “from above” or “from below.”  In 
other words, he tested whether violence was linked to macro-political pursuits of territory 
(strategic importance) or to local ethnic conflicts (measured by local population of ethnic 
groups), concluding that both are important for understanding levels of killings within 
municipalities.149,150 In line with this, Beger (2012) argued that the distance from the 
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  Weidmann also controls for the impact of distance from borders, per capita income, 
road density, and urbanization, finding that none significantly impacted the rate of 
killing. 	  150	  While Weidmann’s argument shows that ethic composition and strategic importance 
must be considered, it is important to note that these are not mutually exclusive. In fact, 
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frontline must be included in discussions of the violence. Lastly, Costalli and Moro 
(2009, 2011, 2012) examined various indices of ethnic heterogeneity by municipality, 
including a temporal dimension and arguing that, over time, the frontline became a more 
important predictor of the level of violence than the ethnic composition of municipalities.  
 These three studies begin to paint a picture of the factors that influenced regional 
variation in killing, emphasizing ethnic heterogeneity, strategic importance, and the 
frontline. Yet, these studies have not analyzed camps or forced displacement, arguably 
the most prominent form of victimization during the conflict. Further, they conceptualize 
the violence as a civil war rather than a civil war and a genocide.  
 Thus, I analyze municipality-level variation in solider deaths, civilian deaths, and 
the number of concentration camps (and explain the data in more detail below). This is 
the first study of Bosnia that disaggregates solider and civilian deaths, beginning, 
however crudely, to differentiate between battle deaths and targeting killing of civilians. 
As an alternate measure of the targeting of civilians, I also test the number of 
concentration camps (again, this is also the first study to do so). Figure 4.3 shows the 
total number of killings in each municipality in Bosnia, while Figure 4.4 shows the 
location of concentration camps. As the figures illustrate, comparatively more killing 
took place in northern Bosnia and along the borders, and most concentration camps were 
located along borders.  
 To analyze what may have influenced this variation, I test a number of factors. 
These include factors that explain variation in violent crime and genocide, drawn from 
social disorganization theories as well as genocide studies. I analyze other micro-level 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Kalyvas (2006) argues that ethnic composition influences strategic importance, as armed 
groups often target villages with low or moderate zones of control.	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factors that have been found to influence variation in violence during civil war, such as 
population pressures and the movement of armed actors. Generally, I hypothesize that 
many factors influence the forms of violence in similar ways, and I focus on hypotheses 
linked to genocidal violence. However, analyzing soldier and civilian deaths separately, 
as well as a different form of genocidal violence, may lend insights to differences in 
determinants of distinct forms of violence. As many of these theories were reviewed in 
depth in Chapter 3, in this chapter, I limit the discussion to their potential applicability in 
the Bosnian case.  
 
Figure 4.3 Deaths in Bosnia 
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Figure 4.4 Concentration Camps in Bosnia 
 
 
Targeted Violence  
As genocide targets certain groups, it is first necessary to examine whether the 
ethnic composition of communities influenced levels of victimization. Notably, this will 
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also test whether Bosniaks were targeted. Most simply, the percent Bosniak in a 
municipality may be linked to comparatively more victimization, as was the case for 
percent Tutsi in Rwanda. In addition, racial threat theories would suggest that relatively 
large numbers of Bosniaks may have been perceived as a threat by other groups in the 
municipality (Blalock 1967). Yet, there may also have been a threshold effect, as areas 
with a certain majority of Bosniaks may not have suffered as much victimization due to 
their clear dominance (Olzak 1990; Jacobs, Carmichael and Kent 2005).151  
This idea also finds support in Tilly’s (1978) argument that areas with a clear lack 
of control would see comparatively higher levels of violence and Kalyvas’s (2006) idea 
that more violence takes place in zones of partial control. Yet, as Horowitz (1985) 
argued, conflict and violence may be most likely when an ethnic majority faces a large 
ethnic minority. As such, studies of political and ethnic violence have not only focused 
on the victim group but also on the relative composition of other ethnic groups within a 
region, pointing to the presence of two main groups as linked to violence. This is 
measured by polarization, which captures how far the distribution of the ethnic groups is 
from the (1/2, 0, ... 0, 1/2) distribution, a bipolar distribution that represents the highest 
level of polarization (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005; Weidmann 2011). In other 
words, a measure of polarization is highest when two ethnic groups within a community 
are close to the same size.  
To test these theories, I include a measure of ethnic heterogeneity (the probability 
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  Recall that threshold effects were not as likely in Rwanda (at the geographic level 
studied), as no communes had a majority of Tutsis.  
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that two randomly drawn people are from different ethnic groups),152 a well-accepted 
measure of population heterogeneity. I also test measures of percent Serb and percent 
Bosniak as well as a quadratic term for percent Bosniak to test whether there is a 
threshold effect in line with racial threat theory. In addition, I test a measure of ethnic 
polarization to capture the presence of two polarized ethnic groups. I hypothesize that 
ethnic fractionalization and percent Bosniak are associated with more killing and 
concentration campus within municipalities, though I also anticipate a threshold effect in 
line with racial threat theory. In addition, I hypothesize that more polarized regions have 
higher levels of victimization but that regions with more Serbs have lower levels of 
victimization.153  
Community Organization  
  As noted in Chapter 3, criminologists have long studied the relationship between 
crime and space. They have found that certain factors linked to trust and cohesion in a 
community influence crime rates by neighborhood or region. These factors influence a 
community’s ability to organize to prevent (or, feasibly, to commit) crime. While these 
theories have yet to be applied to the crime of genocide, Chapter 3 found that some 
factors associated with a community’s ability to organize to prevent crime—such as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 Note that religion and language each are highly correlated with ethnicity 
(approximately .95) and are not tested separately.  153	  As in Rwanda, an ideology that dictated that certain groups should be destroyed may 
have also influenced the level of victimization in different municipalities. There are few 
clear ways to measure the presence or spread of such ideologies for Bosnia, however. 
Namely, while the case of Prijedor illustrated that the radio did spread propaganda that 
discriminated against Bosniaks, this was municipality-specific and will not be explored. 
Furthermore, there is not evidence that discriminatory ideologies were spread through the 
curricula, as is further explored below. Thus, I test the presence of various ethnic groups, 
but do not have additional measures to explore for the presence or spread of ideologies 
that targeted those groups. 	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marriage and employment—are associated with lower rates of genocidal killing. 
Notably, measures of community organization were easily applied to Rwanda, as 
the vast majority of perpetrators were “ordinary” citizens. In Bosnia, the perpetrators 
were primarily members of organized armies and paramilitaries but included citizens who 
were not members of armed groups. As such, it is questionable whether the theories that 
help explain regional variation in genocidal violence in situations where the majority of 
perpetrators are community members who were typically not formally organized prior to 
the violence (as in Rwanda) also apply. Nevertheless, as “ordinary” citizens often 
participated in the violence within their communities, including joining local 
paramilitaries, these theories may hold potential for explaining regional variation in 
killings and camp locations in Bosnia.  
 Beyond ethnic heterogeneity, which has a different meaning in the context of 
genocide, criminologists have argued that marital disruption is associated with higher 
rates of crime, linking the effect of marriage to social controls within the community 
(Sampson 1987; Sampson and Groves 1989). This relationship has been found to hold for 
many forms of crime, such as homicide and burglary, and, in Chapter 3, genocide. Thus, I 
include a measure of divorce and hypothesize that municipalities with higher percentages 
of divorce have higher levels of victimization. Beyond this, I also test the percent of 
intermarriage between Serbs and Bosniaks. In line with theories that suggest that 
interethnic marriage positively influences social cohesion and social integration (Alba 
and Golden 1986; Merton 1941), I hypothesize that municipalities with higher 
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percentages of intermarriage have lower levels of victimization.154  
In addition, socioeconomic status has been linked to community-level crime. 
Shaw and McKay (1942), among many others (e.g., Byrne and Sampson 1986; Sampson 
and Groves 1989; Morenoff, Sampson, and Raudenbush 2001), have illustrated that 
communities of lower socioeconomic status suffer from weaker organization and thus 
more crime. This theory of social (dis)organization is also in line with theories of 
political and ethnic violence that have found that violence is more likely in resource-poor 
countries (e.g., Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004) and poorer regions 
within countries (e.g., Do and Iyer 2007). To measure this, I test the unemployment level 
and the average salary of the average economy worker, and I hypothesize that 
unemployment and lower incomes are each associated with higher levels of victimization.  
Residential mobility has also been seen as a key indicator of disorganization 
linked to higher levels of crime (Shaw and McKay 1931; Sampson and Groves 1989). 
High levels of mobility may disrupt a community’s network of social relations and act as 
a barrier to friendship bonds, which may make crimes more likely. To examine this, I test 
the percent of people who have recently moved in each municipality. In line with research 
in this vein, I hypothesize that municipalities where a higher percentage of people have 
moved within the last five years will have higher levels of victimization.  
 The percentage of youth and, in particular, young men may influence the rate of 
violence, as men may have been more likely to participate in the violence or to join 
paramilitaries within municipalities (Sutherland 1947; Hirschi and Gottfredson 1983; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 Again, while this measure is not typically included in studies of community 
(dis)organization, it would feasibly influence community trust and cohesion and thus is 
similar to these other measures in many ways.  
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Farrington 1986; Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990; Massoglia and Uggen 2010).155  Scholars 
of ethnic and political violence have also argued that higher percentages of young men 
translate to more potential perpetrators (Collier 2000; Goldstone 2002; Urdal 2006), 
though criminology notably brings insights into how to interpret the prevalence of young 
men participating in violent crime, often linked to age-graded social controls (Laub and 
Sampson 1993) or age-graded notions of adulthood (Massoglia and Uggen 2010). Yet, 
unlike some of the other measures of social disorganization, this theory did not hold in 
the case of Rwanda, where I suggested that other factors in the model (like marriage) 
account for the lack of significance and also suggest that young men may have served in 
protective roles, staving off the onset of genocidal violence. Nevertheless, I include the 
percent of young men, defined as the men ages 15156 to 29, and hypothesize that higher 
percentages of young men are associated with higher rates victimization.  
Resource Competition  
 Population pressure and resource scarcity have not been cited as factors that 
motivated violence in Bosnia and also did not receive support in Chapter 3; nevertheless,  
they are theorized to motivate many forms of political and ethnic violence (Olzak 1990, 
1992; Henderson 1993; Homer-Dixon 1994, 1999). In addition, strain induced by 
population pressure and resource scarcity has been linked to repression and increased 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  155	  As mentioned in Chapter 3, recent research on Rwanda has shown that those who 
participated were older than traditional research on age and crime would suggest, with a 
median age of 30-34 (Nyseth Brehm, Uggen, and Gasanabo, unpublished). This research 
also found that 89% of participants in the genocide were men, echoing criminological 
studies of gender (Hirschi and Gottfredson 1983) as well as genocide studies literature on 
perpetrators (Browning 1993; Mann 2000). In line with this, I test a variety of other age 
groups, including middle-aged men.	  156	  Military age was 15 in the former Yugoslavia; thus, this is chosen as the lower 
threshold. Data are available in 5-year periods; thus, 25-29 is the upper threshold.	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victimization in micro-level studies of civil war (Raleigh and Urdal 2007; Ostby et al. 
2011). Thus, I include a measure of arable land, and I hypothesize that municipalities 
with lower levels of arable land have higher levels of victimization. I also include 
population density, and I hypothesize that municipalities with higher population density 
have higher levels of victimization.157  
Chapter 3 also found that education levels in Rwanda were associated with 
increased rates in killing, likely due to discriminatory curricula and to the socialization of 
students. In Bosnia, the education system had become segregated and polarized after the 
war, but there is little existing evidence of similar discriminatory messages or 
socialization in Bosnian schools in the decades leading to the war. Still, some studies 
have found that general education levels are related to higher levels of ethnic violence 
within a country (Lange and Dawson 2010; Lange 2011). In line with this and as outlined 
in the previous chapter, scholars have argued that educated individuals may be more 
likely to participate in violence, disenchanted by the difference between expectations and 
lived reality and emboldened to feel they should address these gaps (Gurr 1970; 
Goldstone 2002; Berrebi 2003). In the case of genocide, “other” groups are blamed for 
these gaps, in line with resource competition theories. I test both literacy levels and the 
percent of people who have completed high school and college, and I hypothesize that 
education is linked to increased victimization.  
Organized Actors 
 As noted above, many groups committed violence in Bosnia. While some of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  157	  As I do not yet have access to the complete census, I am unable to test resource 
competition theories that would suggest that interethnic competition for employment 
would influence the levels of violence, as found in Chapter 3.	  Note that population is 
included as a control variable.	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factors discussed to this point may have influenced citizens’ decisions to participate in 
the violence or join paramilitaries, I must also account for the movements of key 
organized actors, including armies and paramilitaries. I hypothesize that these groups are 
key to understanding variation in the violence. Specifically, I test the presence of a 
number of armed forces, including the Yugoslav National Army (JNA), the Army of 
Republika Srpska, the Serb Republic of Krajina Army, the Croatian Defense Council, the 
Croatian Army, and the Bosnian Army.158 I hypothesize that the presence of each army is 
associated with increased victimization and, in particular, soldier deaths. I also test 
whether the frontline influences victimization in line with Beger (2012), and I 
hypothesize that the frontline is associated with higher levels of deaths but not the 
number of camps.  
 As paramilitaries were often key to taking over a city and terrorizing citizens, the 
presence of paramilitaries (active on all sides of the conflict) likely influenced 
victimization within municipalities. I include measures to capture the presence of Serb, 
Croat, and Muslim Paramilitaries, and I hypothesize that they are associated with higher 
victimization and that the effect of Serb Paramilitaries is stronger than that of Croat and 
Muslim paramilitaries.  
 Lastly, as noted above, the UN declared the municipalities of Srebrenica, 
Sarajevo, Zepa, Goražde, Tuzla, and Bihać as Safe Areas (UN Resolution 819 and 
Resolution 824). These areas were placed under the protection of the UN Peacekeeping 
Force, UNPROFOR, with hopes of decreasing victimization. While it is evident that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  158	  The Serb Republic of Krajina Army formed in March 1992 within the territory of 
Croatia, though it fought within Bosnia as well. Again, see Balkan Battlegrounds (2002) 
and the work of Smail Cekić for more details on these forces. 	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designation of a Safe Area did not prevent the massacre at Srebrenica, this designation 
and the presence of UNPROFOR troops may have lowered total levels of victimization in 
other municipalities. Thus, I include a binary variable measuring whether a municipality 
was declared to be a Safe Area and hypothesize that Safe Areas had lower levels of 
victimization. 
Broader Spatial and Temporal Factors 
 The historical and international context may have influenced regional variation in 
violence within Bosnia. As noted, territorial aims were part of a plan for Greater Serbia. 
In addition, municipalities bordering Serbia were easily accessed not only by Serb forces 
but also by JNA forces from Serbia. Thus, I include variables that measure whether a 
municipality bordered Serbia and hypothesize that municipalities that bordered Serbia 
had higher levels of each type of victimization.159  As alternate measures, I also explore 
distance from Serbia and distance from Croatia.160  
Some territories within Bosnia were already under Serb control—declared 
Serbian Autonomous Regions—when the violence started. Thus, it is possible that these 
municipalities may have had higher levels of victimization, since Serbs were already 
present, though they may have seen lower levels of victimization if they were already 
securely under Serb control. To test these ideas, I include a binary variable for whether a 
municipality was declared to be a Serbian Autonomous Region, and I hypothesize that 
these regions are associated with higher levels of victimization.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  159	  There were also plans for “Greater Croatia,” but the majority of municipalities 
bordered Croatia, so this cannot be tested well with a measure of contiguity with the 
border. However, the distance from Croatia may help test strategic importance to Croatia. 
In addition, I explored regions that bordered Serbian Krajina.  160	  Note that I also explored distance from Montenegro as well as from any international 
border.	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As noted above, Serbia had agreed to the proposed division of Bosnia during the 
peace talks of March 1992. While the plan was short-lived, it is feasible that Serbia 
became attached to these territories (or, alternatively, that their importance to Serbia is 
reflected in the plan). I include a dummy variable for whether a municipality was 
assigned to Serbia in the Carrington-Cutileiro Plan and hypothesize that these 
municipalities had higher levels of victimization.161   
 Beyond territorial claims, Serb memories of atrocities committed during World 
War II may also have influenced variation in violence and mobilized people to 
participate. As one respondent explained,  
…When within the family you have I don’t know how many members 
slaughtered and you haven’t found the bones… This sticks with you. However 
much you want to live in unity… you have at least this family memory of you 
know what happened. And you transfer that to your children and to the next 
generation and so far so long. So, I think that those narratives were used; they 
were, exaggerated to a certain extent… “The Muslims…were with the Utashe; 
now it’s time for us, for our revenge” (Bosnia, April 2013).  
 
Indeed, those who organized and led the violence capitalized on the collective memories 
of Serb marginalization and atrocities during World War II. Although it is difficult to 
measure such collective memories quantitatively, I include a dummy variable capturing 
whether a World War II Serb concentration camp existed in the municipality, and I 
hypothesize that regions with Serb concentration camps had higher levels of 
victimization.162   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 As Serbia had owned a larger share of land in the Balkans that was taken away when 
Yugoslavia was formed. If this territory had included part of Bosnia, I would have tested 
these municipalities as well. 	  
162 I am in the process of obtaining data on the presence of memorials to Serb victims of 
World War II, as these memorials may indicate and perpetuate a strong collective 
memory of the violence. I am also attempting to collect data on massacres of Serbs 
during World War II. 
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Regional variation in violence may be facilitated by several other factors. In 
particular, conditions favorable to insurgency have been found to be one of the strongest 
predictors of civil war at both macro (Fearon and Laitin 2003) and micro levels (Murshed 
and Gates 2005; Bohara, Mitchell, and Nepal 2006; Cederman, Buhaug, and Rod 2009). 
These conditions may have influenced regional variation in victimization, especially as 
there were paramilitaries moving throughout the country. To test this, I include a measure 
of elevation to proxy rough terrain—a standard measure used in the literature—and I 
hypothesize that rough terrain is associated with higher levels of violence.  
Distance from roads and cities may also limit violence due to the difficulty of 
reaching certain areas once insurgent or armed groups are formed (Kalyvas 2006). Thus, 
I also include a measure of the average distance from roads and hypothesize that it is 
associated with lower levels of violence. I also include a measure to capture the percent of 
the municipality considered urban. As discussed in Chapter 3, some theories (such as 
social disorganization theories) suggest that urban areas have high levels of violence, 
while others have found that urban areas have lower levels of violence during episodes of 
mass violence, due to the control of the central government in these areas (Su 2011). In 
Rwanda, urban areas did not have significantly higher levels of violence, but the capital 
did. Thus, I test percent urban and whether the municipality was part of the capital 
region.  
 Lastly, the victimization in surrounding municipalities may have an effect above 
and beyond the other factors discussed here. For example, in Rwanda, it was clear that 
spatial patterns were present; in other words, violence in surrounding communes 
contributed to broader patterns of violence within the region. As such, I include average 
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measures of each type of victimization for the surrounding municipalities. Variables 
tested are summarized in Figure 4.5. 
Figure 4.5: Theories of Regional Variation Tested 
 
 
Data and Analytic Strategy 
To assess the factors that influence regional variation in violence in Bosnia, I rely upon 
several dependent variables, including soldier deaths, civilian deaths, and the presence of 
concentration camps. I obtained the data on killings from the Research and 
Documentation Center (RDC) in Sarajevo. This is an NGO that formed in April 2004 as a 
successor to the State Commission for Gathering Facts on War Crimes. The RDC’s main 
mission was to document everyone who was killed and went missing during the war and 
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the genocide.163  To do so, the group collected as many primary sources as they could to 
document people who perished during the war. They visited gravesites, incorporated data 
from other NGOs, and collected thousands of primary sources. Once they had compiled 
their list, they launched the campaign “Has Anyone Been Forgotten,” during which they 
invited citizens to submit names and assess the database (Nettelfield 2007).  
After the campaign, three demographic experts assessed the database, suggesting 
that it provides an approximation of the minimum deaths from the violence. They noted 
that including new cases only brought a marginal improvement to the database. Overall, 
their assessment was quite positive (Ball, Tabeau, and Verwimp 2007). The RDC worked 
to respond to the assessment, and their final database was published in March 2013. I 
obtained partial access to the database while in Sarajevo; this is the first study that uses 
the completed data.164   
The vast majority of causalities in the database (approximately 98 percent) are 
direct deaths, including all persons who died, went missing, or are unaccounted for and 
whose death or disappearance was caused by direct violence, including deportation to and 
imprisonment in concentration camps. The database classifies deaths by combatant and 
noncombatant status. Importantly, this is not perfectly correlated with the cause of death. 
In other words, anyone who died and was a soldier (member of the military or police), 
regardless of whether the incident occurred on duty, is categorized as a combatant death. 
Nevertheless, I assume that the majority of the soldiers were killed during combat, while 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163 The vast majority of the violence took place between 1992 and 1995, though the RDC 
included 1991 and 1996 in the database as well.	  	  164	  After many meetings, hundreds of emails to the RDC and their funders, and phone 
calls over a two-year period, I was unable to obtain the person-level database to fully 
examine killings by region and over time. These data have not yet been released to 
anyone.	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civilians were targeted as civilians.  
I analyze all deaths (95,596), soldier deaths (57,584), and civilian deaths (38,012) 
as separate dependent variables. Sixty-five percent of all deaths were Bosniak, while 82 
percent of all civilians killed were Bosniak (42 percent of the population was Bosniak at 
the time).165 Thus, the analysis that restricts killing to civilian deaths is likely capturing 
civilians who were targeted based on group membership (genocide) and is most similar to 
the operationalization of genocidal violence in Chapter 3, while solider deaths more 
accurately represents civil war deaths. Clearly, this is an overgeneralization, yet these 
categorizations speak to general patterns and are the most fine-grained categorizations 
possible.  
I also analyze variation in concentration camp locations. I obtained these data by 
reading and coding UN Commission of Experts reports on the locations of concentration 
camps that existed in Bosnia between 1992 and mid-1994 (pursuant to UN Security 
Council Resolution 780). This is the most complete source of data on the locations of 
camps to my knowledge, though it unfortunately excludes 1995. Nevertheless, as most 
camps were created in the earlier months of the conflict, I am confident that the majority 
is represented in the report.  
When ascertaining whether a location constituted a concentration camp, the 
committee considered whether persons were alleged to have been held there against their 
will and whether the detention site appeared to have been established as a result of the 
armed conflict. To locate camps, the Commission drew upon myriad primary and 
secondary sources. Sometimes camps were well known and corroborated in multiple 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165 I do not have access to data that disaggregates death by ethnicity.  
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sources. Other times, their existence was asserted by one source and was uncorroborated. 
For this analysis, I test both a measure of corroborated camps as well as a measure of 
total camps, which includes both corroborated and uncorroborated reports. As they are 
correlated at .93, I display total camps.  
 The camps ranged in size from small centers that temporarily housed a few 
people to large camps such as Omarska in Prijedor. The vast majority of people in the 
camps were civilians rather than Prisoners of War, and the camps operated for anywhere 
from days to months. Notably, the Commission documented which “side” of the conflict 
ran the camps (in other words, whether they were run by Serb, Croat, or Bosniak forces 
or citizens). As this analysis is particularly interested in genocidal intent, Serb-run camps 
are employed as the dependent variable. Nevertheless, analyses of Bosniak and Croat 
camps are explored (though not shown). Note that number of camps does not necessarily 
correlate to the number of people interned in camps, as one large camp could feasibly 
hold many more people than 10 smaller ones. There are not reliable data on the sizes of 
these camps, so I cannot test this; however, I test a binary measure of whether camps 
existed as well as a measure of the number of camps.  
 These dependent variables are summarized in Table 4.2. This table also includes 
descriptive statistics for independent variables used to test the hypotheses outlined above. 
These variables come from a variety of sources. For measures related to the population, I 
draw upon 1991 census data. It was the last census conducted in the former Yugoslavia 
before the war; since it was conducted shortly before the violence began, it can be used to 
approximate the municipality characteristics in 1992. Notably, these census data are not 
available through IPUMS International. Instead, I contacted the government statistics 
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office in Bosnia and obtained PDF tables of the variables from the final published books 
of the Census. My translators in Bosnia assisted with the translation of these tables, and I 
copied the tables by hand. I am not able to analyze group-specific variables (such as 
Bosniak employment levels relative to Serb employment levels) at this time because of 
the existing format of these data.  
Variables related to paramilitary presence were coded from the UN Commission 
of Expert Reports, mandated by a UN Resolution to investigate crimes in Bosnia. The 
Commission created a report of all paramilitaries operating during the conflict in each 
municipality between 1992 and the end of 1994 (for full methodological information, 
please see the report).166 I read the report and created binary variables for whether Serb, 
Muslim, or Croat paramilitaries were ever present in a municipality. In addition, variables 
related to the presence of armed forces were coded from Balkan Battlegrounds, two 
volumes and 63 maps created by the United States Central Intelligence Agency to outline 
the conflict. These volumes and maps were coded to ascertain troop presence by month 
and by municipality. Lastly, I constructed spatial variables using ArcGIS and relevant 
historical documents, while several other variables were obtained from scholars. Spatially 
lagged variables were constructed in GeoDa and are not included in Table 4.2 but are 
included in the analysis.  
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  166	  Regretfully, this report does not include 1995. It is incomplete, but it is the best source 
of data on paramilitary presence that exists.	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            Table 4.2: Dependent and Independent Variables by Municipality 
Variable Description Coding Source 
Mun. 
Mean Range 
Dependent Variables     
Total Killed Number of 
people killed 
within the 
municipality 
Number Research and 
Documentation 
Center 
877 7 to 7243 
Civilians Killed Number of 
civilians killed 
within the 
municipality 
Number Research and 
Documentation 
Center 
348 0 to 5398 
Soldiers Killed Number of 
soldiers killed 
within the 
municipality 
Number Research and 
Documentation 
Center 
528 5 to 2054 
Number of Camps Number of 
Serb-run 
concentration 
camps existing 
within the 
municipality 
Number United Nations 3.16 0 to 36 
           
Targeted Violence     
Bosniak Percentage of 
population that 
is Bosniak 
Percentage 1991 Census 38.64 0.01 to 97.29 
Serbian Percentage of 
population that 
is Serbian 
Percentage 1991 Census 34.81 0.05 to 96.98 
Ethnic 
Fractionalization  
Probability that 
two randomly 
selected people 
belong to 
different ethnic 
groups167 
      0 to 1      Costalli and 
Moro 2012 
0.48 0.02 to 0.74 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  167	  In subsequent analyses, ethnic fractionalization and polarization are included as 
percentages instead of probabilities so that the effect size is comparable to the other 
measures in the models, which are generally percentages.	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Ethnic 
Polarization 
Extent to which 
the distribution 
of groups in 
municipality 
approximates a 
bimodal 
distribution  
      0 to 1 Weidmann 
2011 
0.42 0 to 0.81 
Community Organization     
Divorce Divorces per 
1000 marriages 
Rate 1991 Census 50.61   0 to 238.5 
Intermarriage Percentage of 
marriages 
between a Serb 
and a Bosniak 
Percentage 1991 Census 0.34 0 to 1.13 
Unemployment Percentage of 
municipality 
that is not 
employed168 
Percentage 1991 Census 59.85 52.30 to 71.20 
Average 
Economy Salary 
Average annual 
salary of 
economy 
worker169 
Income          
(in YUM) 
1991 Census 4603.05 3198 to 7913 
Recently Moved  Percentage of 
residents who 
moved within 
the last five 
years 
Percentage 1991 Census 5.69 2.14 to 16.29 
Young Men Percentage of 
population that 
are males age 
15170 to 29 
Percentage 1991 Census 12.98 9.84 to 16.50 
           
 
 
 
    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168 This measure is also a measure of agricultural work, as farmers were counted as 
unemployed in the census.    169	  Ideally, I would be able to test data on all salaries. Yet, the available census tables 
only include data on the salary of the economy worker. The census tables do not define 
this category, though interviewees suggested that an economy worker is someone who 
contributes directly to the economy through wage labor, most typically through work in 
industry.  170	  Youth were able to join the Yugoslav army at age 15.	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Resource Competition 
Population 
Density 
Population/km2 
(log) 
Thousands 
inhabitants
/km2 
ArcGIS 4.36 1.91 to 7.88 
Arable Land Area of 
farmable land 
in municipality 
(log) 
 
Area 
(km2) 
1991 Census 8.60 5.63 to 10.83 
Literacy Percent literate Percentage 1991 Census 11.32 2.20 to 27.70 
High School  Percent 
finished high 
school 
Percentage 1991 Census 30.76 17.10 to 15.20 
College  Percent 
finished college 
Percentage 1991 Census 2.86 0.90 to 19.30 
           
Organized Actors      
Frontline Main frontline 
present in 
municipality at 
any time 
0 = No 
Frontline           
1 = 
Frontline 
Maps of 
landmines and 
Balkan 
Battlegrounds  
0.55 0.00 to 1.00 
Serb Paramilitary Serb 
paramilitary 
present at any 
time during 
conflict 
0 = Not 
Present      
1 = Present 
United Nations 
Reports 
0.33 0.00 to 1.00 
Croat Paramilitary Croatian 
paramilitary is 
present at any 
time during 
conflict 
0 = Not 
Present              
1 = Present 
United Nations 
Reports 
0.13 0.00 to 1.00 
Bosniak 
Paramilitary 
Bosniak 
paramilitary is 
present at any 
time during 
conflict 
0 = Not 
Present      
1 = Present 
United Nations 
Reports 
0.12 0.00 to 1.00 
Yugoslav Army  Yugoslav 
Army present 
at any time 
during conflict 
0 = Not 
Present     
1 = Present 
Balkan 
Battlegrounds 
Books and 
Maps  
0.30       
(Mean 
months  
is 0.59) 
0.00 to 1.00 
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Republika Srpska 
Army 
RS Army is 
present at any 
time during 
conflict 
0 = Not 
Present          
1 = Present 
Balkan 
Battlegrounds 
Books and 
Maps  
0.82       
(Mean 
months  
is 8.56) 
0.00 to 1.00 
Serbian Army of 
Krajina 
Serb Army of 
Krajina is 
present at any 
time during 
conflict 
0 = Not 
Present         
1 = Present 
Balkan 
Battlegrounds 
Books and 
Maps  
0.29       
(Mean 
months  
is 0.90) 
0.00 to 1.00 
Croatian Defense 
Council Forces 
Croat Defense 
Council Forces  
present at any 
time during 
conflict 
0 = Not 
Present        
1 = Present 
Balkan 
Battlegrounds 
Books and 
Maps  
0.56       
(Mean 
months  
is 3.72) 
0.00 to 1.00 
Croatian Army Croat Army  
present at any 
time during 
conflict 
0 = Not 
Present         
1 = Present 
Balkan 
Battlegrounds 
Books and 
Maps  
0.47       
(Mean 
months  
is 1.83) 
0.00 to 1.00 
Bosnian Armed 
Forces 
Bosnian Army 
present at any 
time during 
conflict 
0 = Not 
Present         
1 = Present 
Balkan 
Battlegrounds 
Books and 
Maps  
0.72       
(Mean 
months  
is 7.74) 
0.00 to 1.00 
Safe Area UN designated 
place within 
municipality as 
a safe area  
0 = Not a 
Safe          
1 = Safe 
Area 
UN 
Resolutions 
0.08 0.00 to 1.00 
           
Broader Spatial and Temporal Factors    
Borders Serbia Municipalities 
that border 
Serbia 
  0 = No 
Border 
  1 = 
Borders  
 Serbia 
1992 Map 0.10 0.00 to 1.00 
Distance from 
Serbia 
Km between 
municipality 
centroid and 
closest point on 
Serbian border 
(logged) 
Kilometers ArcGIS 11.20 7.28 to 12.42 
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Distance from 
Croatia 
Km between 
municipality 
centroid and 
closest point on 
Croatian border 
(logged) 
Kilometers ArcGIS 10.50 8.26 to 11.83 
Serb Autonomous 
Region 
Declared a Serb 
Autonomous 
Region 
0 = Not 
Serb A  
1 = Serb A  
 
Maps of Serb 
Autonomous 
Regions 
0.45 0.00 to 1.00 
Carrington-
Cutileiro Plan  
Municipality 
was assigned to 
Serbia in CC 
Plan 
0 = Not 
Serbia's 
1 = 
Serbia's 
Carrington-
Cutileiro Plan 
0.34 0.00 to 1.00 
Past Violence Municipalities 
that had Serb 
concentration 
camps during 
World War II 
0 = No 
Violence 
1 = Past 
Violence 
Coded from 
numerous 
historical 
documents on 
camp location 
0.17 0.00 to 1.00 
Elevation Average 
distance from 
sea level 
(logged) 
Meters Digital Chart of 
the World 
6.29 4.42 to 7.16 
Average Roads Average road 
length per 
municipality 
(logged) 
Meters of 
road/km2 
ArcGIS 4.31 0 to 6.06 
Urban Percent urban 
area 
Percentage 1991 Census 32.11 5.28 to 99.78 
Capital Whether a 
municipality is 
in the capital 
region 
0 = Not 
Capital 
1 = Capital 
1991 Census 0.05 0.00 to 1.00 
 
 
Methods 
Death counts and numbers of concentration camps are always positive integers, which 
indicates that the standard linear normal model is inappropriate for this analysis. In the 
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previous chapter, I transformed the dependent variable into a rate. Yet, the counts of 
deaths are much lower in Bosnia, indicating that they can be conceptualized as counts 
and that count models, such as Poisson or negative binomial regression models, are 
appropriate. As Table 4.2 illustrates, the mean total deaths per municipality is 877 (with a 
mean of 349 for civilians and 528 for soldiers), while the standard deviation is 1077. 
Thus, a standard Poisson model is not appropriate due to overdispersion. Instead, I use 
negative binomial regression.171 Each one-unit increase in the independent variable is 
associated with a change in the log of the expected count.  
 While I standardized killings based on the population in Rwanda, I do not use 
rates here because the denominator is unclear. For example, I do not know the total 
number of soldiers who could have been killed, let alone how many were present within a 
municipality. Likewise, while civilians were generally killed within their own 
municipality, it is clear that men and people of a certain age were targeted more often (as 
further discussed in Chapter 6). Thus, the entire population or even the population of 
Bosniaks may not be the most appropriate denominator, and count variables are more 
appropriate.  
In addition, municipalities were clustered within seven regions. As such, models 
must control for regional-level variation in killing. As in Chapter 3, fixed effects models 
are preferred due to the nested nature of the data (municipalities nested within regions), 
which violates the assumption of independence required for regression. A Hausman test 
confirms that fixed effects are preferable to random effects.  
As population may influence the number of people killed, I include logged 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 No municipalities had zero soldier deaths, and only one (Posusje) had zero recorded 
civilian deaths. Thus, a zero-inflated model is not necessary.  
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population in each model. As noted above, I also control for spatial autocorrelation by 
including spatially lagged dependent variables in each relevant model. This is the average 
number of (all, civilian, or total) deaths in contiguously bordering municipalities, and the 
models are spatially lagged negative binomial regression models with fixed effects for the 
region.  
 Similarly, I model camp presence in two ways. First, I assess whether or not 
camps were present within a municipality. As this is a binary indicator (0 or 1), I utilize 
logistic regression. In addition, I analyze the number of camps present. As the conditional 
variance exceeds the conditional means, I again utilize negative binomial regression  
models. In addition, there were 44 municipalities without any camps, so I analyze 
whether zero-inflated negative binomial models better fit the data. As Allison (2013) 
notes that zero-inflated negative binomial models are not necessary for count data with 
many zeros and that the differences between the models are often negligible, I present 
binary regression with simple negative binomial regression models. And, as with killings, 
I include a fixed effect for region as well as a spatially lagged variable for the number of 
camps and a control for population.  
Results: Regional Variation in Violence  
To assess the factors that influenced this variation in violence, Table 4.3 presents 37 
separate negative binomial regression models with a control for population and clustered 
standard errors. As seen in the table, civilian deaths are significantly greater in areas with 
higher percentages of Bosniaks, while solider deaths are not. This provides some 
evidence that Bosniaks were targeted. However, the significant negative effect of the 
squared term indicates that the positive effect of percent Bosniak was diminished in 
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municipalities where Bosniaks were the majority, as racial threat theory would predict.172 
In addition, while the percentage of Serbs was not associated with municipality-level 
killings, it was associated with the number of concentration camps, indicating that camps 
were instituted in places with higher percentages of Serb residents.  
 A general measure of ethnic fractionalization is not significantly associated with 
any form of victimization, though the measure of ethnic polarization is significant for all 
types of death. Again, this measure captures how close a community comes to having two 
large ethnic groups, suggesting that killings of both soldiers and civilians were most 
likely in municipalities with two large ethnic groups.  
 Turning to measures of social disorganization, divorce is associated with higher 
levels of killing and strongly associated with the presence of concentration camps, though 
intermarriage between Serbs and Bosniaks did not significantly impact the violence. In 
addition, higher percentages of residents who moved within the last five years is 
associated with higher levels of soldier deaths but not other forms of violence, which is 
probed in multivariate analysis.  
 Neither unemployment nor income levels is associated with victimization. In 
addition, the percent of young men is not associated with levels of victimization. Yet, as 
noted above, this measure is likely masking more complex processes, as higher 
percentages of Serb men may have participated in the violence, while higher percentages 
of Bosniak men may capture increased victimization targeting men. Intermarriage is also 
not significantly associated with the violence. While many scholars and most narratives 
of Bosnia suggest tremendous amounts of intermarriage, this was, in some ways, a large 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  172 This effect is not significant in multivariate analysis, as much of it is captured in the 
measure of polarization.	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exaggeration (Botev 1994). Thus, there are mixed results for measures of community 
organization.  
 As to resource competition theories, support is not found for Malthusian ideas that 
resource scarcity, measured as arable land and population density, influenced the 
violence. Elevation (or rough terrain) is also not significantly associated with levels of 
violence. However, there is minimal evidence that more civilian deaths took place in 
areas with higher levels of literacy. Though it is worth cautioning that this effect is 
significant at the .1 level, this speaks to literature that suggests that more highly educated 
people participate in violence as outlined in Chapter 3 (Goldstone 2002; Lange 2011), 
and it is further tested in multivariate analysis. 
 An examination of the many organized actors moving throughout Bosnia finds 
that they are particularly important to understanding the patterns of violence. 
Specifically, the frontline is associated with higher levels of solider deaths but not higher 
levels of civilian deaths or concentration camps, illustrating the importance of 
disaggregating by type of death and victimization when analyzing the frontline (Beger 
2012). Serb paramilitary and the Bosnian Serb Army presence is strongly associated with 
all forms of victimization, standing out from other paramilitaries and armies and 
indicating that, while all sides were involved in the conflict, those acting on behalf of 
Serbia and Serbs were particularly deadly. Serb paramilitary presence had a particularly 
strong effect on violence against civilians and concentration camps.  
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Table 4.3: Bivariate Predictors of Municipality Variation in Violence 
Control for Population Included in Each Negative Binomial Model 
Independent Variables Model 
All  
Deaths 
Civilian  
Deaths 
Soldier 
Deaths Camps173 
      
Targeted Violence      
Bosniak 1 0.018* 0.033** 0.011 0.003 
  (0.010) (0.015) (0.007) (0.012) 
Bosniak Squared 2 -0.000* -0.001** -0.000 -0.001*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Serb 3 0.002 0.005 0.001 0.032** 
  (0.007) (0.014) (0.005) (0.014) 
Ethnic Fractionalization  4 0.014 0.016 0.013 0.017 
  (0.012) (0.022) (0.090) (0.012) 
Ethnic Polarization 5 0.018*** 0.029** 0.012*** 0.010 
  (0.007) (0.011) (0.004) (0.010) 
Community Organization       
Divorce 6 0.004* 0.005* 0.003* 0.009*** 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Intermarriage 7 0.094 0.029 0.135 0.787 
  (0.581) (0.895) (0.414) (1.105) 
Unemployment 8 0.020 0.045 0.005 -0.067 
  (0.034) (0.063) (0.017) (0.064) 
Average Economy 
Worker Salary (100s) 9 -0.004 -0.010 -0.001 0.001 
  (0.010) (0.019) (0.005) (0.017) 
Recently Moved  10 0.015 -0.025 0.045** -0.012 
  (0.021) (0.026) (0.023) (0.068) 
Young Men 11 0.045 0.077 0.019 -0.205 
  (0.070) (0.120) (0.038) (0.157) 
Resource Competition      
Population Density (log) 12 -0.094 -0.200 -0.013 0.038 
  (0.141) (0.233) (0.070) (0.086) 
Arable Land (log) 13 -0.013 0.021 -0.036 0.238** 
  (0.077) (0.143) (0.031) (0.108) 
Literacy 14 0.074 0.118* 0.040 0.090 
  (0.050) (0.068) (0.033) (0.059) 
High School Education 15 -0.021 -0.039 -0.008 -0.004 
  (0.022) (0.032) (0.013) (0.020) 
College Education 16 0.008 0.016 0.000 0.024 
  (0.035) (0.053) (0.022) (0.093) 
Organized Actors      
Frontline 17 0.503** 0.574 0.456*** 0.015 
  (0.244) (0.416) (0.151) (0.396) 
Serb Paramilitary 18 0.879*** 1.498*** 0.499*** 1.461*** 
  (0.251) (0.248) (0.191) (0.346) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  173	  Logistic regression of whether camps were present (0 or 1) and zero-inflated models 
yielded almost identical results (which include the number of camps) and are not shown. 	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Croatian Paramilitary 19 -0.143 -0.356 -0.018 -1.201*** 
  (0.333) (0.610) (0.179) (0.419) 
Bosniak Paramilitary 20 0.198 0.042 0.290*** -0.349 
  (0.164) (0.404) (0.083) (0.480) 
Yugoslav People's Army 21 0.006 0.033 -0.019 0.257 
  (0.119) (0.197) (0.071) (0.192) 
Republika Srpska Army 22 0.045*** 0.069** 0.033*** 0.052*** 
  (0.017) (0.029) (0.011) (0.019) 
Serbian Army of Krajina 23 -0.019 -0.096* 0.016 -0.038 
  (0.033) (0.056) (0.018) (0.049) 
Croatian Defense Council 
Forces 24 -0.016 -0.044 0.000 -0.038 
  (0.020) (0.027) (0.014) (0.039) 
Croatian Army 25 -0.045 -0.077* -0.024 -0.024 
  (0.036) (0.045) (0.032) (0.032) 
Bosnian Armed Forces 26 0.026* 0.031 0.024** 0.012 
  (0.016) (0.029) (0.010) (0.021) 
Safe Area 27 0.403*** 0.400 0.406** 0.083 
  (0.145) (0.326) (0.169) (0.373) 
Broader Spatial and 
Temporal Factors      
Borders Serbia 28 1.072*** 1.717*** 0.497*** 1.495*** 
  (0.193) (0.281) (0.125) (0.469) 
Distance from Serbia 
(log) 29 -0.394*** -0.542*** -0.266*** -0.335** 
  (0.129) (0.184) (0.096) (0.166) 
Distance from Croatia 
(log) 30 0.421** 0.645** 0.295* 0.244 
  (0.199) (0.262) (0.161) (0.272) 
Serb Autonomous Region 31 -0.377 -0.681 -0.194 0.296 
    (0.380) (0.664) (0.219) (0.622) 
Carrington-Cutileiro Plan  32 -0.325 -0.722 -0.120 0.554 
  (0.416) (0.768) (0.233) (0.664) 
Past Violence 33 0.478*** 0.715*** 0.302*** 0.997*** 
  (0.116) (0.230) (0.105) (0.383) 
Elevation  34 0.916*** 1.567*** 0.663*** -0.586 
  (0.281) (0.536) (0.205) (0.358) 
Average Roads (log) 35 -0.043 -0.287* 0.063 -0.142 
  (0.072) (0.150) (0.044) (0.164) 
Urban 36 0.000 -0.002 0.001 0.014 
  (0.005) (0.010) (0.002) (0.017) 
Capital 37 0.235 0.351 0.146 -0.359 
  (0.298) (0.552) (0.136) (0.310) 
      
Standard errors clustered by region    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Control for population not shown   
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Despite their designation, Safe Areas had more soldier deaths (and, 
correspondingly, total deaths). Additional research will need to ascertain whether other 
factors may have influenced cities initial designation as Safe Areas and whether violence 
in Safe Areas changed over time. Nevertheless, it is clear that Safe Areas did not have 
significantly lower aggregate levels of any form of victimization.  
 Lastly, looking at broader spatial and temporal factors, areas that bordered Serbia 
had higher levels of each form of victimization, suggesting that the strategic importance 
to Serbia influenced the magnitude of violence. In line with this, each increase in distance 
from Serbia was associated with less violence, while each increase in distance from 
Croatia (thus, toward Serbia) was associated with greater violence. Areas deemed under 
Serbian control in the Carrington plan did not have higher levels of violence, though 
areas with past violence against Serbs had higher levels of all forms of killing and camps, 
suggesting that enduring collective memory from World War II may have influenced 
violence in the 1990s. Areas with higher elevation had higher levels of violence, though 
violence was not significantly different in urban and capital areas than in rural areas.  
Multivariate Analysis 
To assess whether these relationships hold in multivariate analysis, Table 4.4 
includes negative binomial models with region fixed effects. While I built models 
gradually, I present final models below due to the number of models created. As noted 
earlier, each model includes controls for population, a measure of spatial autocorrelation, 
and regional fixed effects (with Centralna Bosna excluded). Variables that were 
insignificant in bivariate analysis, as well as those that did not significantly improve the 
fit of the model, are excluded.  
 220	  
 As seen in Table 4.4, when other factors are taken into account, percent Bosniak 
is associated with higher levels of all deaths, though the effect is particularly strong for 
civilian deaths. Concentration camps, by contrast, were located in municipalities with 
higher percentages of Serbs, as was the case in bivariate analysis. Notably, polarization is 
highly associated with all forms of violence and is, in fact, the strongest theorized 
predictor. Thus, as seen in Chapter 3, while the presence of certain ethnic groups does not 
influence the onset of violence at the state level (Chapter 2), it does influence the 
magnitude of violence once those ethnicities are politicized and polarized. Areas with 
two strong groups saw the highest levels of violence, illustrating that areas that were not 
under clear control saw comparatively more violence.  
 Unlike Rwanda, measures of community organization have almost no explanatory 
power in Bosnia. Rather, divorce is nominally associated with higher levels of 
concentration camps, which may suggest that more civilians were involved in creating 
and running concentration camps and that community-level controls would thus matter 
more for this form of violence. As noted in bivariate analysis, measures of resource 
competition and strain do not explain variation in the violence. Furthermore, the spatial 
weight—capturing surrounding victimization—is not significant, suggesting that there 
were not other spatial patterns in the magnitude of the violence. 
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Table 4.4 Negative Binomial Fixed Effects Models of Municipality Violence  
Predictors All Deaths Civilian Deaths Soldier Deaths Camps 
Targeted Violence     
Bosniak 0.008*** 0.011** 0.006*** 0.008 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.009) 
Population (log) 0.808*** 0.706*** 0.835*** 0.429** 
 (0.076) (0.141) (0.064) (0.199) 
Serb 0.005** 0.005 0.004** 0.033*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.008) 
Polarization 0.014*** 0.025*** 0.009*** 0.018** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.008) 
Community Organization    
Divorce 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.004* 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Organized Actors     
Serb Paramilitary 0.356*** 0.611*** 0.192** 0.574** 
 (0.105) (0.179) (0.092) (0.277) 
Serb Army 0.013** 0.012 0.017*** 0.035** 
 (0.006) (0.011) (0.005) (0.016) 
Broader Spatial and Temporal Factors 
 
Previous Violence 0.160 0.324 0.037 0.691** 
 (0.125) (0.231) (0.106) (0.274) 
Distance Serbia (log) -0.247** -0.395** -0.090 -0.497* 
 (0.106) (0.194) (0.088) (0.254) 
Elevation (log) 0.170* 0.306** 0.109 -0.153 
 (0.090) (0.154) (0.080) (0.291) 
Surrounding Violence 0.103 0.140 0.128* -0.006 
 (0.081) (0.117) (0.076) (0.045) 
Regions     
Neretva -0.127 0.639** -0.481*** 1.404** 
 (0.158) (0.271) (0.144) (0.583) 
Podrinje 0.060 0.297 -0.035 0.392 
 (0.244) (0.437) (0.208) (0.690) 
Posavina 0.100 0.482 -0.011 0.718 
 (0.193) (0.349) (0.164) (0.609) 
Pounje 0.796*** 1.868*** 0.189 2.251*** 
 (0.224) (0.406) (0.191) (0.610) 
Sarajevo -0.026 0.162 -0.076 1.139** 
 (0.181) (0.324) (0.157) (0.580) 
Vrbas 0.299* 0.629** 0.057 1.645*** 
 (0.176) (0.307) (0.151) (0.545) 
Constant -2.517 -3.205 -4.134*** -1.676 
 (1.772) (3.108) (1.474) (4.157) 
     
Observations     109      109          109          109 
McFadden’s R2 0.132 0.120 0.140 0.195 
Standard errors clustered by region    
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*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Model building available by request; Centralna Bosna excluded   
 
 Armed actors and their movements clearly impacted the magnitude of 
victimization, however. Specifically, the presence of Serb paramilitaries is associated 
with higher levels of all violence analyzed, while the presence of the Army of Republika 
Srpska is associated with higher levels of soldier deaths (and, correspondingly, all deaths) 
as well as concentration camps. The frontline was also significantly associated with 
soldier deaths but is highly correlated with the presence of the Army of Republika 
Srpska—a stronger predictor—and thus excluded.  
 Lastly, there is evidence that municipalities that saw Serb concentration camps 
during World War II had higher numbers of Serb-run concentration camps during the 
violence. This suggests that a collective memory of violence may have influenced 
violence or perhaps even created a repertoire of violence. In addition, distance from 
Serbia is associated with lower levels of civilian deaths and concentration camps, 
suggesting the strategic importance of areas near Serbia and confirming that strategic 
importance of land (not just any land, but land imbued with cultural significance) played 
a role in patterns of genocidal victimization.174  
An Integrated Conceptual Model of Regional Variation in Bosnia 
This analysis has examined municipality-level variation in deaths and concentration camp 
locations during the Bosnian war and genocide. I have drawn upon theories from 
criminology, the study of political and ethnic violence, and genocide studies to specify 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  174	  Elevation is also significantly associated with higher levels of civilian deaths (and all 
deaths), as theories of civil war would predict. However, while these theories focus on 
distance from the purview of the state, in this case, elevation may signify distance from 
the eyes of other actors, like international media. 	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factors that influence community-level victimization. Notably, I have also disaggregated 
types of violence, examining soldier deaths, civilian deaths, and concentration camps.  
Overall, I have found that each form of killing took place in areas with higher 
percentages of Bosniak civilians, while concentration camps were located in areas with 
higher percentages of Serb civilians. This confirms the targeting of Bosniak citizens, 
though it is likely that Serbs set up concentration camps in areas they already controlled 
or just after gaining control because they had the time to do so. In other words, killing 
may have been used to establish control of a region, while camps were utilized to “clean” 
the region once that region is seen as under control. As they faced lower threat levels 
from the Bosnian army and other forces, they were able to terrorize the population by 
instituting camps.  
Communities with two populous ethnic groups also had higher levels civilian 
deaths, soldier deaths, and concentration camps, indicating that measures of polarization 
are more appropriate than general measures of fractionalization, which had no significant 
effect. This is well in line with research that suggests that areas that are not under clear 
control see higher levels of violence (Tilly 1976; Kaylvas 2006). It also suggests that 
there was much strategy behind the violence.175 
Theories of differential social organization, key explanatory theories for 
understanding the violence in Rwanda, show little promise in explaining the violence in 
Bosnia. While municipalities with more divorce saw more concentration camps, other 
variables, such as unemployment, were not significant. Several things may explain this. 
First, I am unable to examine Serb employment (or Serb employment relative to Bosniak 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  175	  As noted above, this could not be tested for the case of Rwanda, as no commune had a 
majority of Tutsis. 	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employment) rather than general employment, which may yield differences. Second and 
perhaps more importantly, many of the citizens who participated in the violence did so 
through their careers. For example, many people told me that police or firefighters 
participated in the violence, showing the limits of theories of community organization 
when the violence is more institutionalized. Indeed, Rwanda had much higher levels of 
participation by lay people who were not previously formally organized, as further 
discussed in Chapter 6.  
Rather than community organization, the presence of certain armed actors—
specifically Serb soldiers and Serb paramilitaries—influenced the violence. Closely 
related, the strategy of these armies and their leaders also influenced patterns of violence. 
Areas of broader strategic importance to Serbia saw higher levels of civilian victimization 
(compared to soldier deaths). This suggests that broader strategic goals of “Greater 
Serbia” influenced municipality-level patterns in genocidal violence. Interestingly, areas 
that saw Serbs interned in concentration camps during World War II saw significantly 
higher levels of concentration camps but not other forms of violence, again suggesting 
that collective memories likely influenced the way in which the violence unfolded, as this 
form of violence was particularly used against Serbs during World War II.  
Notably, as in Rwanda, there was not support for Malthusian ideas that resource 
scarcity, measured as arable land and population density, influenced the violence. 
Furthermore, one of the international community’s interventions in the violence—
labeling certain areas as Safe Areas—did not significantly impact the violence, 
suggesting that this intervention did not have a significant impact on the types of violence 
tested in the aggregate, though this remains to be further analyzed over time. Note that 
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even with Srebrenica excluded, Safe Areas did not have significantly less violence.  
There are a number of limitations to these findings. First, the data utilized here 
provide the best estimates of victimization during the violence, but an exact number of 
those killed will likely never be known. Similarly, although I focus here on certain forms 
of victimization, many other forms of violence, such as sexual violence, were prominent. 
In addition, while the municipalities were small geographic units and clearly 
administrative units ruled by mayors, smaller units of analysis may be preferred to test 
some of these theories.  
Furthermore, as discussed above, there are also limits to the quantitative 
measures. It is difficult to disentangle civil war from genocide, and this dissertation 
illustrates that attempting to do so requires a number of assumptions. Ideally, I would be 
able to disaggregate various statistics by ethnicity, but this is not possible given the 
current availability of 1991 Yugoslav census data. Quantitative data are also unable to 
fully account for strategy and related actions of individual actors—clearly an important 
aspect of this story. As noted in Chapter 3, this dissertation does not seek to downplay 
individual actions but rather seeks to model more structural characteristics.  
Temporal Variation 
Thus far, I have analyzed municipality-level variation in soldier deaths, civilian deaths, 
and concentration camps, finding that institutionalized actors and their strategy had the 
largest effect on the violence. It is also important to consider variation in violence over 
time. As discussed in Chapter 3, violence during genocide does not occur at a constant 
rate, and violence may not begin in each municipality at the same time.  
Regrettably, data on camps over time do not exist. Furthermore, the RDC is not 
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yet willing to share complete data on municipality deaths of soldiers and civilians by 
month.176 Nevertheless, I am able to analyze two forms of temporal variation: onset of 
violence (killings) by municipality and total deaths by year by municipality. Little is 
known about the onset of violence by municipalities, as no study has analyzed variation 
in onset to date. In addition, only one study has considered variation in deaths in Bosnia 
over time. Nevertheless, as the map shows, there was indeed variation in the onset of the 
violence. 
Figure 4.6: Onset of Violence in Bosnia  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176 Note that I will hopefully obtain these in the future and use them in a paper on the 
micro-level effects of various interventions in the violence.  
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Even an examination of the total number of people killed over time is telling. 
Figure 4.7177 shows total deaths by year, and it is evident that, excluding sporadic attacks 
and violence in 1991, the first year of systematic violence—1992—saw by far the highest 
number of people killed. The subsequent two years saw declines in violence, but violence 
spiked again as it neared termination in 1995.  
 
Figure 4.7: Deaths in Bosnia by Year 
 
 
Disaggregating the number of deaths by solider and civilian deaths illuminates 
that this trend proves similar for both soldiers and civilians. Each saw by far the highest 
number of deaths in 1992, the first year of systematic violence. There were also 
subsequent declines in civilian and soldier deaths in 1993 and 1994, and 1995 saw an 
increase in both. For civilian deaths, the uptick is particularly large, reflecting the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  177	  Year of death is missing for less than 3 percent of deaths.	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massacre at Srebrenica, where almost 8,000 Bosniak civilians were killed in a matter of 
days.  
Figure 4.8: Civilian Deaths in Bosnia by Year 
 
 
Figure 4.9: Soldier Deaths in Bosnia by Year 
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To analyze what else may have accounted for this variation over time, I consider both 
determinants of onset and yearly levels of death below.  
Data and Analytic Strategy-Temporal Variation 
To test the factors that influenced the onset of violence in each municipality as well as the 
magnitude of deaths by year in each municipality, I rely upon three main sets of data.178 
In each, violence is operationalized as any form of violence (armed or civilian), as they 
often took place in tandem and cannot be temporally disaggregated in most sources of 
data. Currently, data on onset are not available from the RDC or, to my knowledge, from 
any other organization or scholar. Thus, I create my own measure.  
First, I rely upon Balkan Battlegrounds (2002), the two-volume explanation of the 
violence produced by the CIA that I used to obtain information on troop movements. As 
noted, the CIA created these volumes, as well as 63 maps, to catalog the events of the 
violence across the country and over time. Thus, these volumes contain much information 
about when violence began. I created a measure of onset date based on this volume’s 
information. To assess its validity, I assessed these onset dates against data from the 
Armed Conflict Location and Event (ACLED) database. The ACLED data are created by 
Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) and are based on a number of sources.179 The unit 
of observation in these data is the event. Events always involve two actors, and many 
events coded are battles or attacks on civilians.  
In addition, I obtained data on onset dates for municipality from the ICTY. As 
there are millions of documents at the ICTY, I searched all judgments for the names of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  178	  I also supplemented these data sources by searching numerous reports. 	  179	  The data were coded by Ola Listhaug (Department of Sociology and Political Science 
at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology). 	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each municipality and read each instance during which a municipality was mentioned. 
For the majority of municipalities, the judgment clearly listed when violence began.  
I compared the onset dates across these three sets of data, finding agreement in 
many cases. Where the dates differed, I privileged the date listed in the ICTY judgment, 
as that was always supplemented with witness testimony, reports, or other in-depth 
evidence. After compiling dates, it became clear that there were two categories of onset. 
Namely, many municipalities saw violence within the first three months of the three-year 
conflict (66 percent), while others saw violence after the first three months (34 percent).   
 I also analyze deaths by year by municipality. These data were obtained from the 
RDC. Unlike the 2013 data used for the total number killed in each municipality in the 
analysis above, the data on total killed by year by municipality are from the 2008 data 
release, the most comprehensive data available over time. This release took place after 
the demographic assessment of the data, and the deaths in the 2008 data comprise 95 
percent of those in the 2013 data. Regrettably, these data do not allow me to differentiate 
between soldier and civilian deaths. Yet, as seen above, civilians and soldiers saw similar 
trends by year, which suggests that analyzing them together is permissible.  
 For each analysis, all other independent variables remain largely the same as 
those described above. As in Chapter 3, the spatial weight for the analysis of onset in 
Bosnia is a measure of the onset in contiguous municipalities. In addition, data on the 
presence of troops is a binary variable of whether troops were present during first three 
months of the conflict, while the Safe Area designation is excluded, as there were no Safe 
Areas in 1992.180  Descriptive statistics by onset are presented in Table 4.5. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  180	  I am not able to disaggregate paramilitary presence by month.	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Table 4.5 Descriptive Statistics by Onset (Early or Late) 
Independent Variables        Early Onset (72)       Late Onset (37) 
Targeted Violence    
Bosniak 39.67 36.62 
Serb 37.01 30.51 
Ethnic Fractionalization181  0.53 0.38 
Ethnic Polarization 0.47 0.34 
   
Community Organization   
Divorce 52.83 46.30 
Intermarriage 39.81 23.98 
Unemployment 59.07 61.38 
Average Economy Worker Salary (100s) 47.69 42.79 
Recently Moved  5.60 5.85 
Young Men 12.80 13.33 
   
Resource Competition   
Population Density 207 86 
Arable Land  10,382 6,942 
Literacy 11.17 11.60 
High School Education 31.53 29.25 
College Education 3.23 2.15 
   
Organized Actors   
Frontline 0.63 0.41 
Serb Paramilitary 0.49 0.03 
Croatian Paramilitary 0.17 0.05 
Bosniak Paramilitary 0.15 0.05 
Yugoslav People's Army (April-June) 0.40 0.03 
Republika Srpska Army (April-June) 0.42 0.14 
Serbian Army of Krajina (April-June) 0.00 0.00 
Croatian Defense Council (April-June) 0.24 0.19 
Croatian Army (April-June) 0.21 0.11 
Bosnian Armed Forces (April-June) 0.21 0.05 
   
Broader Spatial and Temporal Factors   
Borders Serbia 0.15 0.00 
Distance from Serbia (km) 84.97 122.50 
Distance from Croatia (km)  55.13 45.68 
Serb Autonomous Region 0.46 0.43 
Carrington-Cutileiro Plan 0.36 0.30 
Past Violence 0.24 0.03 
Elevation  637.86 677.29 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181 I transform ethnic fractionalization and polarization into percentages in bivariate and 
multivariate analysis.  
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Average Roads 101.43 102.30 
Urban Region 36.12 24.10 
Capital Region 0.07 0.00 
Note: In line with Chapter 3, these tables show the descriptive statistics by the original values (not the 
transformed values used in analyses, which are found in Table 4.2) 
 
Analysis 
 To analyze the factors associated with the onset of violence within a municipality, 
I utilize logistic regression. As noted in Chapter 3, this model is appropriate when the 
dependent variable is categorical. In this case there are two outcomes—early or late 
onset; thus, multinomial logistic regression is not needed.  
As in the analysis above, I begin by building bivariate models, shown in Table 
4.6. I review these briefly and then turn to multivariate models, illustrated in Table 4.7. 
Results are presented in odds ratio, so coefficients larger than one suggest that the 
variable is associated with higher odds of early onset (coded as 1), while coefficients less 
than one suggest that the variable is associated with lower odds early onset. I cluster 
standard errors by prefecture due to the nested nature of the data.  
 Next, I analyze deaths by year. As with the analysis of the magnitude of death, I 
rely upon negative binomial regression as well as fixed effects for regions as well as for 
years. Many of the measures—particularly those from the census—do not change over 
time. In reality, they almost certainly did change. However, there are not data or even 
estimates of how unemployment or ethnicity changed over time; thus, I include the 1991 
measure in each year. Geographic measures, such as being near a border, and historical 
factors, such as violence during World War II, do not vary by year. Some factors do vary 
temporarily, however. Namely, I include data by year for the location of all troops as well 
as the years in which certain municipalities were declared to be Safe Areas. I include a 
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lagged dependent variable to control for the potential effect of deaths in the previous 
year.  
Onset of Violence 
Table 4.6 presents 32 logistic regression equations of onset. Each model includes one 
predictor and assesses its relationship with early onset (April through June 1992). The 
capital and whether a municipality bordered Serbia are excluded from the models, as, in 
each case, the municipality saw an early onset of violence. In other words, the entire 
capital region saw an early onset, and each municipality bordering Serbia experienced 
early onset of violence.  
 Percentages of Bosniaks and Serbs influenced the magnitude of violence but did 
not appear to influence the onset of the violence. Increases in ethnic fractionalization and 
ethnic polarization each are significantly associated with higher odds of early onset, 
suggesting that violence first took place in areas that were not clearly under the control of 
any one ethnic group. More diverse areas saw violence first. However, this does not 
necessarily mean that ethnicity caused the onset of violence; the difference may have 
been part of a more strategic plan to take control of areas without a clear majority. 
Regardless, these effects are further probed in multivariate analysis.  
 In general, measures of community organization do not influence the onset of 
violence; those that had significant effects were significant in unexpected ways. While 
divorce is associated with the magnitude of some violence, it is not associated with the 
onset. Yet, areas with higher levels of intermarriage had earlier onset. As in Rwanda, this 
is likely due to the increasing prevalence of intermarriage in areas that were more 
ethnically diverse, and the inclusion of variables that capture societal diversity in 
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multivariate analysis will further explore this effect. In addition, areas with higher 
unemployment had lower odds of earlier onset. Multivariate analysis will allow for 
further assessment of whether other factors are behind these effects.  
 Turning to resource competition theories, resource scarcity and population density 
are not associated with the onset of violence. Yet, the presence of organized actors clearly 
impacted the onset of the violence, as they were generally responsible for initiating 
violence. These effects are all quite large, as these are all bivariate indicators. The 
presence of Serb paramilitaries is particularly linked to early onset. The presence of the 
JNA is also particularly strong, followed by the presence of the Army of Republika 
Srpksa and the Bosnian army that was fighting it.  
 In terms of broader spatial and temporal factors, distance from Serbia is 
associated with later onset. Every municipality that bordered Serbia saw the onset of 
violence within the first three months of the conflict, likely linked to the strategic location 
in terms of expanding “Greater Serbia.”  As with magnitude, areas that saw violence 
against Serbs during World War II had earlier onsets. Finally, urban regions saw earlier 
onset, which can perhaps help explain some of the other findings in this section (urban 
regions have more highly educated people and lower levels of unemployment). Indeed, 
this perhaps reflects the pattern of paramilitaries (and, to a lesser degree, armies) taking 
over cities and then spreading out to villages within the municipality.  
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Table 4.6 Bivariate Predictors of Early Onset of Violence in Bosnia  
Results Presented in Odds Ratios 
    Early Onset 
Predictors Model (April -June 1992) 
Targeted Violence   
Bosniak 1 1.005 
  (0.010) 
Serb 2 1.009 
  (0.013) 
Ethnic Fractionalization  3 1.048*** 
  (0.018) 
Ethnic Polarization 4 1.026** 
  (0.013) 
Community Organization   
Divorce 5 1.002 
  (0.003) 
Intermarriage 6 1.032*** 
  (0.007) 
Unemployment 7 0.848** 
  (0.055) 
Economy Salary (100s) 8 1.049*** 
  (0.018) 
Recently Moved 9 0.933 
  (0.126) 
Percent Young Men 10 0.775 
  (0.124) 
Resource Competition   
Population Density 11 1.266 
  (0.213) 
Arable Land (log) 12 1.191* 
  (0.323) 
Literate 13 0.970 
  (0.084) 
High School Education 14 1.045 
  (0.037) 
College Education 15 1.571*** 
  (0.164) 
Organized Actors   
Frontline 16 2.444 
  (1.415) 
Serb Paramilitary 17 34.054*** 
  (36.741) 
Croat Paramilitary 18 3.500** 
  (1.899) 
Bosniak Paramilitary  19 3.156* 
  (1.874) 
Yugoslav People's Army (April-June) 20 24.279*** 
  (21.537) 
Republika Srpska Army (April-June) 21 4.571*** 
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  (2.542) 
Croatian Defense Council Forces (April-June) 22 2.171 
  (1.134) 
Croatian Army (April-June) 23 1.325 
  (0.694) 
Bosnian Armed Forces (April-June) 24 4.605*** 
  (2.712) 
Broader Spatial and Temporal Factors   
Distance from Serbia (log) 25 0.990** 
  (0.005) 
Distance from Croatia (log) 26 1.008 
  (0.010) 
Serb Autonomous Region 27 1.111 
  (0.517) 
Carrington-Cutileiro Plan 28 1.336 
  (0.657) 
Past Violence 29 11.127*** 
  (9.953) 
Elevation (log) 30 0.710 
  (0.431) 
Average Roads (log) 31 1.154 
  (0.152) 
Percent Urban 32 1.056*** 
  (0.011) 
   
Observations                109 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
 
 Table 4.7 includes multivariate logistic regression models of onset with clustered 
standard errors. Overall, patterns from bivariate analysis remain. In terms of targeted 
violence, ethnic polarization is associated with earlier onset, again indicating that areas 
that were not under clear control were targeted first (Tilly 1978; Kalyvas 2006). While 
this cannot be tested quantitatively in Rwanda, it was clear that the area that would be 
perceived to be most under Tutsi control—Butare—was targeted last.  
 Cities were also targeted earlier. In particular, municipalities with more urban 
regions had higher odds of earlier onset. Several other variables that were significant in 
bivariate analysis—such as college education levels and intermarriage—are captured in 
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this effect, which is also supported by the negative influence of unemployment (capturing 
agrarian employment). This likely points to a strategy to first take over the areas of 
control within a municipality and then spread outward. Indeed, anecdotal reports of the 
violence generally begin with soldiers and paramilitaries182 taking over municipal offices.  
 Strategy is also reflected in other predictors. Areas that are more distant from 
Serbia saw higher odds of later violence. In other words, areas that were perhaps more 
strategic were targeted first. JNA presence was also particularly important for early onset. 
Indeed, while the JNA was withdrawn after the conflict began, this confirms that they 
were particularly involved in perpetrating violence at its onset.  
 Overall, it is clear factors that influenced the magnitude of the violence also 
influenced the onset of the violence, with strategic importance having an even stronger 
effect on the magnitude. Recall that this was not the case in Rwanda, where there was 
less of a coordinated strategy for how the violence would unfold and where violence was 
perpetrated by a much higher percentage of the population rather than by armies and 
paramilitaries. As a result, in Rwanda, the factors that influenced the onset were much 
more contingent on local politicians as well as the actions of particular individuals, such 
as clergy, and did not match the factors that influenced the magnitude of violence. 
  To be clear, onset in Bosnia was likely influenced by municipal authorities. 
Ideally, I would be able to include a measure of the ethnic composition of municipal 
authorities, as patterns of violence may have varied based on whether the municipality 
was controlled by Serb leadership. Nevertheless, it is clear that a coordinated plan 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  182	  Paramilitary presence is excluded from multivariate analysis. It is significantly 
associated with earlier onset, though the data are not time variant and thus include 
paramilitary presence at any time throughout the three years. 	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dictated the onset of violence within Bosnia.  
 
Table 4.7 Logistic Regression of Early Onset of Violence in Bosnia 
Results Presented in Odds Ratios 
  Model Model 
Predictors 1 2 
      
Polarization    1.032***     1.025*** 
 (1.014 - 1.049) (1.012 - 1.038) 
Unemployment    0.855***   0.847** 
 (0.769 - 0.950) (0.740 - 0.969) 
Percent Urban   1.023* 
  (0.998 - 1.050) 
Yugoslav Army      40.019*** 
  (3.029 - 528.771) 
Distance from Serbia        0.273*** 
  (0.124 - 0.604) 
Onset Weight   1.029** 1.006 
 (1.003 - 1.055) (0.980 - 1.032) 
   
Observations           109            109 
McFadden’s R2  0.337            0.391 
Robust confidence intervals in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Magnitude by Time 
Before reviewing and concluding, I also briefly consider the effect of various predictors 
over time. As it is impossible to include time-varying data on most indicators, this 
analysis is brief and is meant only to analyze the effect of different variables in each year 
and whether some of the variables that are time-varying, such as the presence of Safe 
Areas or the movements of armed actors, influenced the violence differently. As noted 
above, this analysis relies upon the 2008 data release from the RDC and is not able to be 
disaggregated into soldier and civilian deaths.  
 As descriptive statistics have been reviewed several times, I will move directly 
into a brief analysis. Specifically, to examine the influence of different predictors at 
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different times, I run five different models—all years combined, 1992, 1993, 1994, and 
1995—included in Table 4.8. Model 1, which combines all years with fixed effects for 
region and year, illustrates that the influence of predictors on all deaths from the 2008 
data release is very similar to that on all deaths (civilian and soldier combined) in the 
analysis above. Namely, the magnitude of violence is mainly driven by ethnic 
composition (percent Bosniak as well as polarization), the movement of armed actors 
(Bosnian Serb Army and Paramilitaries), and strategies, reflected in the polarization 
measure as well as distance from Serbia.183 
Examining deaths by year yields several interesting trends.184  First, the only 
constant factors that significantly influenced violence in each year were the population 
and the percent Bosniak. Model 2 (and, to a degree, Model 3) reveals that strategy and 
targeted violence mattered more earlier in the violence, as distance from Serbia and 
polarization are significant in these years but not in later years. The number of months 
that the Serb army was present is significantly associated with higher levels of violence in 
1992. The presence of the Serb paramilitary, as well as Serb Autonomous regions, are 
also associated with more violence in 1992.  
 In 1993, Serb Autonomous regions, distance from Serbia, and Serb paramilitaries 
are no longer significantly associated with the level of violence. The presence of Serb 
paramilitaries and the number of months the Bosnian Serb Army were present also do not 
influence the level of violence. Instead, the presence of Croatian troops influenced the 
overall level of deaths. Croatian troops were involved throughout the violence, and this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  183	  As the two measures of deaths are correlated at .98, this is expected. 	  184	  I also ran models with a control for the number of killings in the previous year. This 
was not significant and did not change the results presented here.	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analysis shows that their presence was particularly associated with death in 1993, likely 
capturing soldier deaths.  
 
Table 4.8 Fixed Effects Models of Killing Over Time 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Predictors All Years 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Targeted Violence      
Percent Muslim 0.010*** 0.016*** 0.007** 0.013*** 0.010*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Population (log) 0.835*** 0.920*** 0.847*** 0.795*** 1.089*** 
 (0.073) (0.114) (0.075) (0.090) (0.114) 
Percent Serb 0.005 0.011** -0.004 0.008** 0.014*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
Polarization 0.011*** 0.009** 0.012*** 0.005 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Community 
Organization      
Divorce 0.001 0.001 0.003** 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Organized Actors      
Serb Paramilitary 0.196* 0.653*** 0.145 0.148 -0.067 
 (0.111) (0.152) (0.117) (0.131) (0.167) 
Serb Army 0.015** 0.048* 0.008 0.051*** 0.076*** 
 (0.006) (0.025) (0.018) (0.013) (0.027) 
Croatian Army 0.022*** 0.080* 0.094*** 0.019 0.083 
 (0.008) (0.046) (0.017) (0.017) (0.051) 
Broader Spatial and  
Temporal Factors     
Serb Auton. Region 0.078 0.509** 0.130 -0.015 0.155 
 (0.151) (0.223) (0.152) (0.167) (0.238) 
Distance Serbia 
(log) -0.177 -0.321* -0.034 0.124 -0.277 
 (0.118) (0.177) (0.109) (0.126) (0.183) 
Elevation (log) 0.144 0.110 0.081 0.110 0.245* 
 (0.090) (0.148) (0.092) (0.117) (0.147) 
Surrounding 
Violence 0.001* -0.000 0.002*** 0.002* 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Safe Area 0.217  -0.119 0.092 1.104*** 
 (0.189)  (0.183) (0.211) (0.278) 
Regions and Years      
Neretva -0.391** 0.371 -0.377** -0.784*** -0.639** 
 (0.155) (0.254) (0.172) (0.190) (0.249) 
Podrinje 0.064 0.979*** 0.174 -0.266 0.016 
 (0.243) (0.346) (0.250) (0.292) (0.396) 
Posavina -0.234 0.384 -0.512** -0.234 -0.110 
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 (0.201) (0.331) (0.205) (0.225) (0.303) 
Pounje 0.695*** 1.044*** -0.461* 0.227 0.897** 
 (0.235) (0.349) (0.235) (0.267) (0.378) 
Sarajevo -0.177 1.156*** 0.044 -0.307 -0.392 
 (0.191) (0.289) (0.203) (0.234) (0.285) 
Vrbas 0.128 0.553** -0.346* -0.221 0.354 
 (0.180) (0.267) (0.177) (0.201) (0.285) 
1993 -0.627***     
 (0.118)     
1994 -1.389***     
 (0.114)     
1995 -1.078***     
 (0.117)     
Constant -3.580** -3.743 -5.419*** -7.424*** -7.070*** 
 (1.635) (2.656) (1.530) (1.821) (2.373) 
      
Observations      432       109       109     109         109 
McFadden’s R2 0.094 0.119 0.172 0.146 0.167 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Centralna Bosna excluded in all models; 1992 excluded in Model 1  
 
 
 In addition, the declaration of Safe Areas in mid-1993 did not quantitatively 
impact the violence. This could be because the designation came partway through the 
year. As in Rwanda, this intervention came after the largest peak in the violence, 
suggesting that late interventions may not be as efficient as early ones (although there is 
no counterfactual to test this possibility). Divorce is also significantly associated with 
killings in 1993.  
 In 1994, the effect of Croatian troops is once again replaced by the effect of the 
Bosnian Serb Army (and the Bosnian Army). Most other effects remain, though the effect 
of ethnic polarization is no longer significant, again providing support that areas that 
were polarized saw violence first. The diminished significance may also reflect changing 
populations each year, something I regrettably cannot measure.  
In addition, Safe Areas are still not significantly associated with lower levels of 
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death in 1994 and are significantly associated with higher deaths in 1995, undoubtedly 
capturing the massacre at Srebrenica. Overall, this shows that the designation of Safe 
Area did not result in significantly lower violence in any year of the conflict. However, I 
only measure one form of violence here (killings). Further, as noted in Chapter 3, the lack 
of a significant effect does not mean that no lives were saved but that the effect was not 
large enough for significance by quantitative standards. Thus, this does not advise against 
Safe Areas but rather suggests that their timing may be crucial.  
These findings over time must be interpreted with caution, as many variables 
(such as ethnicity) show no change when there was, indeed, change. The effects of other 
interventions, such as airstrikes or other UN Security Council resolutions, are also left 
out. Yet, these findings show that the factors that influence the magnitude of violence 
change over time. For the case of Bosnia, polarization, distance from Serbia, and Serb 
paramilitaries had a stronger influence on magnitude earlier in the violence.  
Conclusion 
While genocide was unfolding in Rwanda, it was also unfolding in Bosnia. Although 
these two genocides occurred on different continents, this chapter has illustrated 
numerous similarities. The parallels are especially prominent in the factors that 
influenced each case’s onset. After examining these factors, I provided examples of 
victimization that took place once violence began (including killings, forced 
displacement, internment in concentration camps, gender-based violence, and numerous 
other forms of violence). Then, I discussed why the violence constituted genocide, 
arguing that the intent to destroy must be conceptualized broadly, with the 
conceptualization of destruction including death but also forced removal as well as the 
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destruction of culture. I differentiated between civil wars and genocide, arguing that both 
can occur at the same time and that one does not negate the other.  
I then analyzed regional and temporal variation in both the death of civilians 
(roughly capturing genocide) and the death of soldiers (roughly capturing civil war), as 
well as the number of concentration camps, which I argue also supports the designation 
of genocidal violence. Overall, I found that factors related to targeted violence, organized 
actors, and broader spatial and temporal factors influenced both the onset and the 
magnitude of the violence.  
Specifically, percent Bosniak was associated with increased levels of civilian and 
soldier deaths, while percent Serb was only associated with increased soldier deaths, 
signifying the targeted nature of the violence. Contrary to expectations, there were more 
concentration camps in areas with higher Serb populations, likely because Serbs set them 
up in places they felt were safe from attack. Highly polarized regions also saw significant 
levels of each form of violence, illustrating the importance of polarization rather than the 
sheer presence of the victim group.  
 Measures of community (dis)organization were not associated with the level of 
any of the forms of violence tested, save small effects from divorce. This is likely due to 
the organization of the perpetrators, largely members of militias and the army rather than 
members of communities, like in Rwanda. To be clear, members of communities did 
participate in the violence in Bosnia. Police officers and firefighters even assisted Serb 
soldiers and paramilitaries as they took over towns. This is not reflected in measures of 
social (dis)organization, however, as they participated through their positions in local 
administration. Nevertheless, their participation did influence the violence. In fact, in 
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locations where the police force and/or firefighters participated in the violence, there 
were significantly higher magnitudes of violence against civilians and concentration 
camps (analyses not shown). Likewise, these regions saw comparatively earlier onset of 
violence.  
 Formally organized actors had a much larger effect on the violence. Serb 
paramilitary presence was associated with all forms of violence, while Serb army 
presence was associated with most. Likewise, it is clear that strategic aims of Greater 
Serbia influenced both civilian violence and the location of concentration camps. 
Concentration camps were also likely influenced by memories of past violence against 
Serbs, who were victimized in concentration camps during World War II.  
 Similar factors influenced the onset of violence, with violence occurring first in 
more polarized regions, regions that bordered Serbia, and regions where the Yugoslav 
army was present. Urban regions saw comparatively earlier violence, reflecting the 
pattern of perpetrators first taking over a main administrative city and then moving to 
other towns within a municipality. This was coordinated, however, as the measure of 
surrounding violence was not significant, suggesting that a contagion effect did not 
significantly influence the patterns. 
It has been 20 years since this violence and the genocide in Rwanda unfolded. 
Now I turn to the last case study—an analysis of the Darfur region of Sudan, where 
genocide is currently unfolding.  
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Chapter 5: Genocide in Sudan 
 
 
“Darfur is more than an occasional headline in the newspaper or 20 seconds on a  
forgotten nightly newscast. It is where genocide continues to happen…”   
-Captain Brian Steidle, Author  
 
 
In early 2003, a group of armed citizens initiated a rebellion against the government of 
Sudan. In response, the government unleashed a campaign of terror on the rebels’ 
homeland—a region in western Sudan known as Darfur. Today, that terror has evolved 
into a complex episode of mass violence that is still unfolding. Many people have been 
killed, tortured, displaced, and otherwise victimized.  
 In this chapter, I extend analyses from Chapters 3 and 4 to an ongoing situation of 
genocide. I do so cautiously, as it is considerably more difficult to ascertain facts, obtain 
data, and analyze a situation that is currently taking place. Indeed, the twenty years since 
genocide occurred in Rwanda and in Bosnia have allowed for detailed surveys of victims, 
criminal investigations, and myriad scholar and practitioner analyses of the violence. 
Through time and distance, relative clarity about these cases was obtained. Yet, even 
after twenty years, many elements of the violence in each case remain contested and 
unknown.  
 Proceeding with caution and an understanding that I must treat this case study 
differently due to its ongoing nature, this chapter begins by considering the preconditions 
that led to genocide in Darfur, including polarized identities, instability, and threats to the 
regime. Throughout this history, I focus more closely on the relations between Darfur and 
the capital of Sudan, as violence in this case targeted only a certain part of the country. I 
document the violence and then analyze temporal and regional variation in the bombing 
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of villages as well as the damage and destruction of villages (among the most prominent 
forms of violence taking place in Darfur). In line with Chapters 3 and 4, I assess how 
meso-level factors related to targeted violence, community organization, resource 
competition, organized actors, and broader spatial and temporal factors influence patterns 
in the violence.  
 Although analyses are primarily descriptive, I find that the violence targeted 
certain groups, supporting theories that suggest the violence is genocidal. Yet, as in the 
other cases, the presence of those groups is not the only factor driving violence. The 
presence of organized, armed actors has also influenced patterns in violence in Darfur.  
Unlike Rwanda, however, the organization of the community has not influenced 
the violence, as armies and militias whose members generally come from outside of the 
villages have perpetrated attacks. The types of violence I analyze are more prevalent in 
villages than in urban centers, which are more heterogeneous and more heavily 
monitored. Levels of violence are also higher in regions with better vegetation as well as 
along the border and in areas with higher elevation, pointing toward the relevance of 
theories of meso-level violence in civil war and resource competition theories for this 
case.  
Before concluding, I briefly consider what may influence the ebbs and flows in 
the bombing of villages over time. I suggest potential actions that likely influenced 
increases and decreases in this form of violence, including rebel actions, peace talks, and 
international attention.  
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The Road to Genocide 
The Republic of Sudan is a large country in Northeastern Africa. While it was once the 
largest country on the continent,185 it became the third largest in 2011 when the southern 
portion of the state seceded to form the Republic of South Sudan. Much of the country is 
a vast plain covered by the Nile River and its tributaries, though deserts and mountain 
ranges are prevalent. 
Figure 5.1: 2003 Sudan 
 
 “Sudan” is known in Arabic as bilād as-sūdān (دﺩاﺍلﻝبﺏ نﻥاﺍدﺩوﻭسﺱلﻝاﺍ), or the “Land of 
Blacks.” Despite this literal translation, the ethnic composition of the state is anything but 
simple. In fact, some scholars suggest that over 600 ethnic and linguistic groups have 
resided within the country over the last century (Collins 2008). Global news media often 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  185	  Recorded history dates back to the Kingdom of Kush in 760 BCE. However, as in 
other chapters, I consider modern history in this narrative. 	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distinguish these groups by casting them as Arabs or Africans, associating Arabs with the 
northern regions of Sudan and Africans with what is now South Sudan. Scholars have 
criticized this distinction as vastly oversimplified (e.g., Flint and de Waal 2005; Mamdani 
2010), especially when applied to the violence in Darfur. Still, many people throughout 
Sudan self-identify as Arab or African186 (ADS 2004; Darfurian Voices 2011; Reeves 
2013). In fact, each of the 43 refugees I interviewed discussed Darfur in terms of Arab 
and African187 tribes and self-identified as African.  
  To understand these identities, I must turn to the roots of modern history in 
Sudan. Like Rwanda and Bosnia, some of these roots are found in imperialism.188 In 
1821, Egypt, itself controlled by the Ottoman Empire, invaded Sudan and successfully 
consolidated control over the region. While many groups were unhappy with foreign rule, 
the Egyptian conquerors immediately incorporated some Sudanese groups—like the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  186	  This distinction intersects with several other identities. For example, Sudanese Arabs 
are often semi-nomadic herders, while Sudanese Africans are often sedentary farmers, 
though there are more nuances within these distinctions (Straus 2006). Nomadic peoples 
generally move 300 miles or more twice a year; more settled farmers also move to new 
areas of farmland, though they typically move shorter distances (Flint and de Waal 2005). 	  187	  Many of the Darfuri refugees interviewed by the Atrocities Documentation Survey in 
2004, as well as refugees interviewed by 24 Hours for Darfur, self-identified as African 
and referenced Arabs in comparison.	  To better understand ideas surrounding race and 
ethnicity in Darfur, I asked each respondent I interviewed to discuss the differences 
between the two groups. While a few refugees responded that these identities were 
socially constructed and linked to power within society, the vast majority listed 
phenotypical differences (with Africans having darker skin) as well as cultural or 
linguistic differences. While there are varying ideas about when these differences became 
more prominent, scholars have documented the distinction during colonialism and nation-
building (Collins 2008; Mamdani 2009) and suggested that it became more prominent in 
the decades preceding the genocide. Throughout this chapter, I refer to each as they are 
referred to by those involved in the violence. I also use the term “tribe,” as each 
interviewee used the term. 	  188	  To be clear, there were many wars and other issues in Sudan before the advent of 
colonialism; as in Rwanda and Bosnia, not all problems stem from imperialism, though it 
does mark an important turning point in history.	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Shaigiya, an Arab tribe that was one of the largest tribes in Sudan—into their armies, 
beginning a long tradition of rulers showing favoritism (Natsios 2012).  
 Egyptian colonizers expanded across the country quickly. With its rich natural 
resources, as well as its agricultural potential and hydropower from the Nile and its 
tributaries, Sudan had many desirable features. Even more profitable, however, was the 
slave trade. Egyptian colonists transported between tens and hundreds of thousands of 
Sudanese men annually to conduct manual labor in Egypt throughout the mid-1880s 
(Collins 2008; Natsios 2012). As their rule expanded, they also instituted heavy taxes and 
undertook a mosque-building project, attempting to bring Islam to those who had yet to 
accept it and beginning a process of Arabization in what they considered an African 
country.189  
After six decades of Egyptian rule, a Sudanese Muslim cleric named Mohamed 
Ahmed initiated a revolution. He had been gaining support by preaching against imperial 
presence in Sudan and suggesting that Egyptian Islam was corrupt. In 1881, he 
proclaimed that he was a messianic redeemer known as a Mahdi and that violence was 
needed to defeat Turco-Egyptian rule. The Mahdist Revolution followed. The Mahdi died 
shortly after his victory, however, leaving a power vacuum and relatively tenuous 
stability in the newly independent country.  
In 1899, Egypt reasserted control over Sudan through several agreements with the 
United Kingdom, which had an interest in the region given its proximity to the Suez 
Canal. In theory, these “Condominium Agreements” split power between Britain and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  189	  While Islam was introduced to parts of the country peacefully during the 1300s (El-
Din 2007), residents of the region practiced Islam, Christianity, and a number of local 
religious traditions at this time. 	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Egypt, though the structure of the agreements ensured full British control of the country. 
The British colonial administration was centered in Khartoum, a city in Northern Sudan 
that Egyptians had founded on the Nile in 1821. Political power and resources were 
concentrated there. As the city grew, the colonial administration and local leaders 
exploited the western and southern regions of Sudan (Khalid 1990).190 Though this 
metropole economy brought some prosperity, it also divided the country, creating tension 
between the North and the South and bringing disproportionate prosperity to Khartoum 
and other cities in the North. 
At the advent of British-Egyptian colonialism, Darfur was still an autonomous 
neighbor of Sudan. It had become a political entity during the early 1600s, when several 
tribes formed the Fur Sultanate.191  The Sultanate based its power in Jebel Marra, a 
mountainous region and watershed within the semi-arid plains of Darfur.192 By 1800, it 
was a well-organized, powerful state (Flint and de Waal 2005; Lemarchand 2006).  
As the name implies, the Fur were a key tribe within the region. Yet, at least 40 
other tribes193 lived in Darfur. Almost everyone within the region practiced Islam, and 
many people spoke Arabic as well as traditional languages. Tribes self-identified as 
African or Arab, with African tribes—such as the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa—and Arab 
tribes—such as the Rizeigat and the Beni Halba—coexisting and intermarrying. As Flint 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  190	  Natsios (2012) notes that the British also isolated the South from the North in order to 
protect the North from slave traders, further influencing the uneven developments 
between the two regions of the country.	  	  191	  For a detailed description of the Darfur Sultanate, also known as the Keira Sultanate, 
see O’Fahey 1980.	  	  192	  The Darfur region is roughly the size of France.	  	  193	  Flint and de Waal (2005) note that between 40 and 90 ethnic groups—depending on 
one’s definition—have emerged from Darfur. Note that I use the term “tribe” because 
that is how each of the Darfuri refugees I interviewed referred to ethnicity and because 
the term is used in the literature. 	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and de Waal describe, “Darfur was an African kingdom that embraced Arabs as valued 
equals” (2005:3).194   
In 1916,195 British forces attacked the Fur Sultanate, killing the Sultan and 
incorporating Darfur into Anglo-Egyptian Sudan (Daly 2010). Traditional leaders took on 
new roles under what became known as “Native Administrations,” and British colonial 
officials tolerated leaders they believed would put down a Mahdist revival in the region, 
something the British continually feared. British leaders also sought to afford more 
systematic representation to Arab groups, empowering local sheikhs with judicial power 
and beginning a process of separating Arab and non-Arab communities (Tubiana, Tanner, 
and Abdul-Jalil 2012).  
British policy brought other changes to the region as well, often dividing peoples 
who had lived in relative peace. For example, British policy offered recognition and land 
tenure to some tribes but not others. While they had recognized the homelands for almost 
all sedentary groups (typically African), they had left some nomadic groups (typically 
Arab) dependent on customary land use rights (Flint and de Waal 2005). Thus, much like 
the Tutsis in Rwanda and the Bosniaks in Bosnia, tribes that were considered African 
owned a larger share of the land. As Mamdani (2010) notes, this also racialized 
ethnicities by categorizing people into natives and settlers.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194 Statistics on the ethnic composition of the region are scant before the first census in 
the 1950s. Then, 370,00 Darfuri residents self-identified as Arab, while 758,000 
identified as Western African tribes, such as Fur or Masalit.  195	  When Egypt and the Ottoman Empire conquered Sudan in 1821, they did not directly 
rule Darfur. The Fur Sultanate crumbled during an attack in 1874, but Sultan Ali Dinnar 
restored it in 1890 (Collins 2006).  
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This land was becoming increasingly important due to drought that hit Darfur in 
1926 (Daly 2010).196 Locusts attacked what little food could be grown, and the drought 
and famine resulted in the first recorded epidemic in Sudan. Entire Darfuri villages were 
wiped out. Khartoum did little to respond to the turmoil or the subsequent economic 
downturn. Thus, while some Darfuris already resented Khartoum’s grip over the region, 
resentment against the capital grew as its disinterest in developing Darfur became 
evident.197  
Resentment against the capital was also growing across the southern part of 
Sudan. The Anglo-Egyptian administration had deliberately separated Northern Sudan 
and Southern Sudan into two autonomous regions within one state (Collins 2008). Yet, 
the administration of Northern and Southern Sudan as separate regions—as well as the 
metropole economy mentioned above—resulted in uneven development and exacerbated 
the separation of the two regions in terms of linguistic, religious, and political 
orientations. 
Meanwhile, although Sudan had remained relatively immune to the violence of 
World War I, its position near Italian colonies and upstream from Egypt resulted in its 
involvement in World War II (Daly 2010). Sudan’s defense force fought alongside Allied 
forces on the East African Front, gaining military skills. At the War’s end, Sudan was 
relatively unscathed, and its solders—controlled by Khartoum—were more experienced.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  196	  This followed a drought in the region in 1913.	  	  197	  Beyond its failure to respond to the famine, British policy deliberately restricted 
education in the region to the sons of chiefs so that British rule would not be challenged. 
Darfur had just one elementary school, one tribal elementary school, and two sub-grade 
schools (Flint and de Waal 2005). 	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The end of World War II spurred several other developments within Sudan. 
Sudanese nationalism grew, and a Graduates Congress of intellectuals began to demand 
an end to divisions in Sudan and, later, to British rule (Fluehr-Lobban 1990). British 
colonial authorities decided to merge Northern and Southern Sudan in 1946, and began to 
consider possibilities for development throughout the country. Throughout the 1940s and 
early 1950s, the British implemented five-year plans to facilitate economic and 
infrastructural growth in Sudan. As with other colonial initiatives, these plans privileged 
northern regions. They made scant mention of Darfur, contributing to its marginalization 
and continuing resentment of the colonial regime (Daly 2010).  De-colonization soon 
began to occur across the continent, and colonial authorities and Sudanese citizens started 
seriously discussing an independent Sudan. In 1953, the United Kingdom and Egypt 
decided to grant Sudan its independence and began preparations. Meanwhile, tensions 
between North and South Sudan, which had been on the rise for decades, grew 
treacherous. In 1955, an insurgency broke out in the southern part of the country, 
marking the beginning a civil war. The Southern insurgency was poorly organized but 
drew much support. It quickly developed into a well-organized secessionist movement 
and a guerrilla army—the Anyanya guerilla army.  
Despite the war, the independence process continued, and Sudan became 
independent in 1956. Independence did not bring stability, however. In 1958, Major 
General Ibrahim Abboud staged a military coup, displacing the newly established 
government and implementing a military regime. The regime banned political parties and 
pursued policies of Arabization, seeking to spread Islam and Arab culture throughout the 
country. It instituted an Islamic center in Juba—the administrative center of the South, a 
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predominantly Christian region. It also switched the official “day of rest” from Sunday to 
Friday (in line with Islamic teachings) and replaced English with Arabic in all public 
schools.  
 Many of these changes strengthened Southern resolve and added fuel to the 
ongoing civil war. Although Darfur’s participation in the civil war was limited, 
grumblings about its own marginalization continued. Small rebellion groups, such as the 
Red Flame, Soony, and the Darfur Development Front, became active within the region. 
The Red Flame was organized by people who remained largely underground, and they 
produced leaflets condemning the economic structure of the region. Soony, comprised 
mainly of local soldiers, called for an end to exploitation, resulting in a purge of the 
army. Several educated civilians formed the Darfur Development Front, open to both 
Arabs and Africans who sought development of the Darfur region.  
Abboud’s military regime ruled Sudan until 1964, when a series of strikes and 
protests known as the October Revolution jarred the country. Parliamentary elections 
were held in 1965, and Muhammad Ahmad Mahjoub came to power, along with a 
coalition government of the Umma Party, associated with the Mahdist movement. 
Instability was becoming the norm in Sudan, however, as Colonel Gaafar Nimeiry staged 
a coup in May 1969, immediately abolishing all political parties and suspending the 
constitution. He renamed the country the Democratic Republic of the Sudan and created a 
Revolutionary Command Council to run the country. The Sudanese Communist Party 
briefly came to power in 1971 by way of another coup, but Colonel Nimeiry regained 
control of the state within days.  
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To be sure, the government of Sudan was precarious. Instability also wracked 
Sudan’s economy, which depended on agriculture and was unprepared to withstand the 
desertification and drought that continually plagued the country. Darfur felt the effects of 
desertification particularly hard because of its distance from large water sources like the 
Nile and, more importantly, because of government changes to policies regarding land 
ownership (Assal 2006). These effects were exacerbated by in-flows of refugees fleeing 
civil war in Chad, as well as Chadian rebels who, encouraged by Muammar Gaddafi’s 
pan-Arab ideals, created bases in the Darfur region (Straus 2006). The presence of these 
rebels in the 1970s contributed to the availability of cheap weapons and promoted Arab 
supremacy within Darfur—an idea that many Arab tribes began to take seriously (Straus 
2006).  
Arab supremacy was beginning to take hold in other parts of the country as well.  
When Nimeiry took power, he deliberated changed the blue, yellow, and green Sudanese 
flag to one with horizontal red, black, and white stripes based on the Arab Liberation flag 
shared by Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. He also propagated the dream of pan-Arabism, 
or the idea that Arabs in the region constituted a single nation, thereby excluding those 
who were not identified as Arab.  
 The civil war came to a close in 1972 with the Addis Ababa agreement, which 
designated South Sudan as an autonomous region. Shortly afterward, surveyors 
discovered oil in South Sudan. Colonel Nimeiry—who had been building his 
government’s armed forces by obtaining arms from the Soviet Union, China, Egypt, and 
the United States—began disrespecting the Addis Ababa agreement after this discovery. 
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In 1983, he breached the agreement by declaring all of Sudan to be an Islamic State198 
and instituting what have become known as the September Laws—a series of laws meant 
to Islamicize the country. He terminated the Southern Sudan Autonomous Region. As 
Southern Sudan was not about to lose its new autonomy, it took up arms against the 
government in Khartoum once again through a movement called the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army.  
While I do not analyze the violence of the second civil war in depth, numerous 
scholars have suggested that, in the course of the war, the government of Khartoum 
committed genocide (Salih 1995; Totten 2012). Northern soldiers invaded the land of 
southern farmers in the Nuba Mountain region, selling their land and sending the farmers 
to concentration camps. Sudanese government soldiers murdered young men, sexually 
victimized many women,199 and deliberately withheld foreign aid. Like in Bosnia and 
Rwanda, this previous violence may have served as a “dress rehearsal” or, at a minimum, 
may have shown leaders that they could act with impunity.  
Drought and famine hit again in 1984 and 1985, exacerbating widespread unrest. 
In 1985, Major General Siwar Abd al-Rahman Muhammad al-Dhahab overthrew 
Nimeriy and instituted the Transitional Military Council (Collins 2008). As a new 
strategy in ongoing civil war, the new regime strategically armed the Missiriya and 
Southern Rizeigat tribes—Arab tribes residing in South Darfur and parts of South Sudan. 
The Sudanese state did not pay these militias, but the militias—popularly known as the 
murahaliin—were allowed to keep whatever they looted from southern Sudanese 
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  For more on Islamization in Sudan, see Fluehr-Lobban 1990.	  
199 These are general trends, though it is important to note that many women were killed 
and many men were sexually victimized.  
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communities. Using state-armed militias to fight the government’s internal battles 
became popular: it reduced expenses, avoided the potential political costs of a military 
draft, and mitigated concerns about officer loyalty and the coup attempts200 (Flint 2009). 
As in Bosnia, militias may also have allowed the government to distance itself from 
culpability.  
Elections held in 1986 brought Sadiq al-Mahdi, the great-grandson of Madhi, to 
power. He created a coalition government comprised of the Umma Party, the Democratic 
Unionist Party, the Nationalist Islamist Front, and representatives from the South (Daly 
2010). Yet, the coalition government proved unstable and ineffective. Meanwhile, the 
economic situation in Sudan was similarly dire, and the Sudanese pound had lost 90 
percent of its value from the previous decade (Daly 2010).  
The effects of this economic downturn penetrated all regions of Sudan, though 
Darfur was hit particularly hard. The conflict in Chad had escalated during the late 1980s, 
bringing sporadic violence to the Darfur region. As a form of self-defense, Zaghawa, Fur, 
and several Arab tribes began forming militias. As in both Rwanda and Bosnia, these 
loosely organized militias rallied around the concept of self-defense, perhaps creating 
structures and patterns for future violence. Notably, the Government of Sudan also 
mobilized many members from the region to join the army and militias to fight the war 
with the South. In fact, some of these militias attacked Southern Sudanese tribes living in 
Southern Darfur. For example, militias from the Arab Rizeigat tribe perpetrated the 1987 
Ed Daein massacre of displaced Dinka peoples with impunity. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  200	  This may be yet another reason for the relationship between coups and genocide, 
found in Chapter 2, which deserves additional academic attention. 	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In 1987, a group of Arab tribal leaders from Darfur addressed an open letter to 
Sudanese Prime Minister al-Sadiq al-Mahdi. They complained of underrepresentation in 
regional government (Daly 2010:265).201 In a subsequent manifesto, Quraysh I, they 
explicitly advocated the destruction of the regional government and the elimination of 
black tribal leaders.202 Just like the Hutu 10 Commandments and the 1986 Serbian 
Memorandum, Quraysh I spread a dangerous ideology that suggested one group was 
marginalized in large part due to the success of another. Perhaps motivated by the 
manifesto, as well as the pan-Arab ideology of Chadian soldiers, Arab self-defense 
militias attacked Fur villages in Jabal Marra, killing hundreds (Natsios 2012). Fur 
refugees poured into towns, and the influx of refugees, guns, and militias, as well as the 
tumultuous environmental conditions, exacerbated the already tense political situation in 
Darfur.  
In response, a group of Darfur intellectuals formed the National Council for the 
Salvation of Darfur. They claimed that all of Darfur (not just Arabs in Darfur) had been 
marginalized for decades and organized demonstrations. Fur nationalism increased, along 
with sporadic violence that was longer and more intense than violence seen in the Darfur 
region before the 1980s. While this did not rise to the level of political parties divided by 
ethnic lines as in Rwanda and Bosnia, it was clear that ethnicity was becoming politicized 
and serving as a basis for collective action.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  201	  This was partially a response to the Prime Minister’s choice of a Fur governor for 
Darfur.	  	  
202 Interestingly, the document also suggested disrupting their schools, much like the 
Hutu 10 Commandments suggested disrupting Tutsi education. This suggests that 
education is seen as a part of the culture and community and perhaps something to be 
destroyed during genocide, a phenomenon worthy of additional study.  
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Meanwhile, a military coup staged in June 1989 brought Omar al-Bashir—the 
current President of Sudan—and a military junta to power (Collins 2008). The coup drew 
heavily from Islamist ideology, proclaiming that a “Revolution of National Salvation” 
was needed (Salmon and Walmsley 2007:8). Just eight days after the coup, the new 
regime signed a tenuous peace agreement with leaders in Darfur. However, Khartoum 
never implemented the agreement, leaving the Fur and other tribes in Darfur with even 
more bitterness toward the central government (Natsios 2012).  
 Five months into Bashir’s rule, the government passed the Popular Defense 
Forces Act, supporting the formation of state-armed militias and self-defense committees 
that had begun in 1985 (Salmon and Walmsley 2007). According to the Act, the Popular 
Defense Forces (PDF) were intended “to train citizens on military and civil capabilities, 
to raise security awareness and military discipline among them, in order to act as a 
support force to the other regular ones on request” (Government of Sudan, 1989, Article 
5). They recruited heavily among certain Arab groups203 and students. Many fought 
against the SPLA during the ongoing civil war, though others were meant to protect the 
regime from new uprisings and military interventions (Salmon and Walmsley 2007).  
Bashir also appointed regional governors who stripped tribal leaders of their 
authority, redrew political boundaries, and quashed local customs. These individuals 
were generally part of the National Islamic Front, a political organization that began to 
dominate Sudan when Bashir took office, and the process helped immobilize potential 
opposition in Darfur, though it infuriated both Arab and non-Arab tribes in the region 
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  Eventually, only Arab groups were recruited to join the PDF (Hagan and Kaiser 
2011). 	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(Collins 2008). Bashir purged leaders in the army and dismissed thousands of public 
employees (Daly 2010), though he also began strengthening the army.  
 As the 1990s began, GDP declined while hyperinflation and debt soared. Sudan 
was politically ostracized. In 1995, President Mubarak of Egypt accused Sudan of 
involvement in a plot to assassinate him in Addis Ababa; rather than distancing 
themselves from the attack, a high-ranking official within Sudan (Hassan al-Turabi) 
praised it. In 1998, the U.S. bombed a pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum that was 
supposedly a source of terrorist explosives, following its 1993 declaration that Sudan was 
sponsoring terrorism. Sudanese relations with many other countries declined, due in large 
part to these events.  
Meanwhile, violence continued in Darfur, which was feeling the effects of 
marginalization. Indeed, when I asked Darfuri refugees to describe life in Darfur before 
the violence, almost all mentioned its marginalization. One said, 
Life was good in a sense because there was no killing. But there were no services. 
If you were sick, you had to travel far. There was not electricity. And there were 
not many schools or chances for education (Uganda, March 2014). 
 
Yet, it is important that while most narratives of the violence cite resource scarcity and 
climate change as a key factor prior to 2003, the two decades before the violence did not 
see a decrease in either rainfall or vegetation (Kevan and Gray 2008; Brown 2010). Thus, 
while drought and desertification clearly were taking place in Darfur over the 20th 
century, the decades most proximal to the conflict were not comparatively riddled with 
either. This suggests that the relative scarcity in Darfur in comparison to the rest of the 
country is perhaps just as important, if not more important, than resource scarcity among 
and between Darfuris.   
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In 1994, the government had divided Darfur into three regions—North Darfur, 
South Darfur, and Western Darfur. The Fur’s land was split three ways, making them 
minorities in each of the three states. The reform also created tribal hierarchies, as the 
government instituted numerous new positions and gave those positions to Arabs. As a 
Darfuri refugee recalled, “We would never have distinguish[ed] between this tribe or that 
tribe, but the reign of Bashir created things that never existed before in Sudan” (Darfurian 
Voices 2011). Unrest grew—particularly among the Masalit tribe in Western Darfur—
and sporadic violence broke out in 1995 (Collins 2008). Government-armed militias, 
comprised mainly of members of Arab tribes, responded to the violence. Prominent 
members of the Masalit were arrested and tortured (Flint and de Waal 2005: 59), though 
members of militias went unpunished for their actions.   
 Back in Khartoum, Bashir tightened his rule on Sudan amid internal competition 
and strife within his ruling party. For example, in 1999, he declared a state of emergency 
and dissolved the National Assembly204 after a power struggle with the Speaker, the 
aforementioned Hassan al-Turabi. At the same time, a plan of action called Quraysh II 
surfaced (Daly 2010:266). This plan claimed that Sudan, from the Nile to Lake Chad, had 
been usurped from its rightful owners, the Arab descendants of the Prophet Muhammad. 
Following the Quraysh I, it laid out aims and strategies to achieve Arab dominance in 
Darfur. It proposed feigning collaboration at the national level while secretly infiltrating 
the government (Flint and de Waal 2005).  
 The civil war between the North and the South continued, though the Government 
of Sudan and the SPLA/M entered peace negotiations in 2001. Darfur was not part of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  204	  Prior to this, he dissolved the Revolutionary Command Council, further increasing his 
power over Sudan. 	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these negotiations, leaving many Darfuri residents complaining about marginalization 
once again. As a refugee recalled, “We did not necessarily expect to be part of the 
negotiations since we were not part of the war, but we wanted our situation to change too. 
[It] was frustrating” (Uganda, March 2014). Community security forces from Fur, 
Masalit, and Zaghawa villages gradually became convinced of the need to act against the 
Sudanese state, much like the RPF in Rwanda. These security forces formed the Darfur 
Liberation Front, which evolved into the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) (Tanner and 
Tubiana 2007).205 
Another rebel group, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), also emerged in 
the early 2000s. Like the SLA, the JEM mobilized around the marginalization of Darfur. 
Shortly after they formed, members of the JEM compiled The Black Book: Imbalance of 
Power and Wealth in Sudan and circulated it across the country. The Black Book detailed 
the extent of the marginalization and neglect of all parts of Sudan except for the 
immediate area around the capital (Flint and de Waal 2005), highlighting the lack of 
services in Darfur, including education and health services, as well as the poor access to 
water and comparatively higher infant morality rates. The book reached many parts of the 
country, including Khartoum.  
 Fearing uprising in Darfur, government-sponsored militias launched an offensive 
against Fur citizens in 2002. Mohammed, a refugee, recalled, “One of the first militias 
was comprised of Fur. So, the government said that the Fur are all rebels. But, they 
targeted civilians” (Uganda, March 2014). The militias killed an estimated 160 Darfuris, 
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  Rebel groups in Darfur have changed, splintered, and reformed numerous times 
throughout the violence. I do not consider or discuss all of the changes here, but for more 
information, see Tanner and Tubiana 2007.	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wounded many more, and caused the displacement of tens of thousands in the final 
months of 2002—mirroring rises in violence and displacement during the 1990s in 
Rwanda. Echoing both Rwanda and Bosnia, this preliminary violence targeted leaders 
within the communities. Numerous refugees shared with me that the violence first went 
after political leaders and educated members of their communities.  
The militias perpetrating this violence, increasingly known as the Janjaweed 
(“men on horses”), were comprised mainly of Arabs. More specifically, scholars have 
suggested that the Janjaweed were former bandits, demobilized soldiers, fanatical 
members of a Libya-sponsored pan-Arab paramilitary force, and young Arabs with land 
conflicts with neighbors, although research must confirm these suggested trends. They 
faced few consequences for their actions. As a resident of Darfur noted, “When the 
Janjaweed burned a village, our people went to the police, but the government didn’t care 
about it. But if Zaghawa attacked Arabs, they went quickly to kill the Zaghawa” (quoted 
in Flint and de Waal 2005:65).  
 The government of Sudan was practically engaged in two wars—one in Darfur 
and one in South Sudan—though the latter appeared to be nearing an end. In early 2002, 
the government and the SPLA agreed to a ceasefire pertaining to the Nuba Mountains, 
and peace talks in Kenya led to breakthroughs toward ending the civil war. Parties to the 
conflict signed the Machakos Protocol206 in July 2002, which paved the way for the 
South to seek self-determination. While this was a promising step toward ending what 
had become an almost permanent state of war, it also meant that Khartoum faced the 
prospect of losing almost half the country and the majority of its oil reserves.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
206 This protocol was the first in a series of agreements that has become known as the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement.  
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 Thus, as in Rwanda and Bosnia, several preconditions existed. At the societal 
level, ethnicities had become polarized and politicized, especially with state-led 
Arabization campaigns in the latter part of the century. While this ideology did not blame 
others for the marginalization of Arabs to the degree blame was placed in Rwanda or 
Bosnia, it deemed certain ways of life and ethnicities as superior (and, by extension, 
others as inferior) and suggested that those adhering to those ways of life deserved more. 
This ideology was reflected in society through the neglect of the region and the actions of 
militias.  
The state had struggled to become stable after its independence in 1956, with a 
series of coups and droughts that influenced instability and strain. Strain was further 
exacerbated by two civil wars with the southern part of the country and the threat of 
uprising in Darfur. As in Rwanda and Bosnia, the logic of war likely became closely 
linked to the logic of mass violence, with the state extending who it viewed as the enemy 
in a civil war to an entire group of people rather than an armed faction. Even as the civil 
war was ending, the government faced losing land and precious commodities, just as the 
Habyarimana regime had faced sharing power with rebellious Tutsis and Serbia had 
risked losing its control over Bosnia. As Sudan grew politically and economically 
ostracized by the international community, it was primed for violence.  
Descent into Genocidal Violence 
At the outset of 2003, violence in Darfur began to escalate as rebel movements grew and 
gained traction. Indeed, Darfuris had just witnessed that groups willing to fight the 
government, as in the South, could be successful, and low-level violence between 
government militias and emerging rebel groups was beginning to escalate. On February 
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26, 2003, several hundred SLA rebels attacked a government garrison in Golu, a town in 
Western Darfur. Two hundred government soldiers were killed in the attack, marking a 
rise in violence and SLA organization. Golu is widely cited as the genocidal “spark,” 
linking the rebellion and organization in Darfur to the government’s deadly response.  
After the rebels took another town in March, President Bashir promised that 
Sudan’s army would be “unleashed” to “crush” the rebellion (Flint and de Waal 
2005:99). Although the army was already operating in Darfur, it had yet to successfully 
quash the rebellion—in large part because of its lack of practice in desert warfare. 
Meanwhile, the rebels planned to attack the government’s planes in an attempt to 
dissuade aerial bombardments of villages, an increasingly prevalent tactic207 that left the 
rebels defenseless. On April 25, 2003, a joint force of SLA and JEM rebels attacked an 
air base in El Fasher, a city in Northern Darfur. They destroyed several Antonov 
bombers, killed at least 75 troops, and captured another 32 (Flint and de Waal 2005). In 
many ways, this attack was as much of a spark as that at Golu; it demonstrated to 
Khartoum that the rebels could damage the Government’s weapons and supplies—and 
were not backing down.  
 In May, the rebels successfully attacked government forces in Northern Darfur. 
Meanwhile, the government turned to its usual strategy of mobilizing militias throughout 
the region. As in Bosnia, some of these militias included people with criminal records 
(Flint 2009). In addition, non-locals were mobilized. According to a Darfuri refugee with 
whom I spoke,  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  207	  As I further explain later, the late 1990s and early 2000s saw sporadic government 
bombing of villages in Darfur (confirmed by numerous human rights organization reports 
and ACLED data).	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The Janjaweed were recruited from many places. Some were from local villages, 
but others were from other countries—Chad, Libya, and others. They were 
recruited in the 1990s but also as the rebels were attacking the government 
(Uganda, March 2014).  
 
Local Darfuri government leaders were also promised development projects in exchange 
for contributing militia members from the region (Flint and de Waal 2005). Yet, while 
there are records of both Arabs and Africans joining the militias (Flint 2009), the 
government directly recruited Arab tribes and Arabs generally led the militias.  
 Soon, a full-fledged campaign of destruction was under way in Darfur. It was 
clearly targeting civilians alongside rebel groups. The government of Sudan initially 
denied participation in the violence, but their involvement was easily confirmed by the 
aerial bombardments that rained down on villages of Darfur. Many claim that these 
bombardments disproportionately targeted villages associated with African tribes, such as 
villages where Masalit, Fur, Zaghawa, and others resided (see, for example, numerous 
Human Rights Watch reports from 2004).   
 Often, the government soldiers bombing a village worked in tandem with the 
Janjaweed, who would enter a village after it was bombed, killing survivors, destroying 
buildings, and taking property (Human Rights Watch 2004; UN Commission Report 
2005; author interviews). Other times, the Janjaweed and government soldiers would 
attack a village without assistance from the Anatov bombers that have become infamous 
in Darfur. Rape and many other forms of gender-based violence208 have also been 
common, with government soldiers, Janjaweed, and other perpetrators saying that they 
hoped to create Arab babies. Numerous refugees also recall babies being cut out of 
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  In ongoing papers with Gabrielle Ferrales and Suzy McElrath, I consider the forms 
and variation of gender-based violence against both males and females in Darfur.	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women’s stomachs, killing both the unborn child and the mother (Hagan and Rymond-
Richmond 2009; author interviews).  
 These patterns have repeated throughout the Darfur region. For example, in mid-
February 2004, government forces and Janjaweed militias attacked the village of Barey in 
North Darfur. Shortly afterward, residents of the neighboring village of Ankar witnessed 
between 400 and 500 Janjaweed advancing toward them. Some villagers fled, and soon, 
government forces began bombing the village with Antonovs. Over the span of two 
hours, the planes dropped between 20 and 35 bombs. Once the bombing had ceased, 
government soldiers and Janjaweed moved into the village. They looted livestock, 
clothes, and valuables, and they burned the buildings that had withstood the bombing, 
leaving the village completely destroyed (UN Commission Report 2005).  
 A Darfuri refugee recalled a similar attack in the village of Kabar. When 
interviewed by the Atrocities Documentation Survey (2004)209, she shared, 
I was at home with my two children, mother and grandmother when the attack 
started. I saw a plane with a black bottom drop bombs on the village. I took my 
two children and we fled, but the main road was blocked by solders in pick-ups 
and on horses wearing camouflage uniforms. We ran down a small alley and into 
the bush. The soldiers were firing…While running away I stopped at my father’s 
shop and found him dead and the shop looted…I saw two other dead bodies—two 
men I knew from the village were shot while collecting firewood. I also saw a 
one-year-old child of a women killed while it was on her back.  
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  The United States Government conducted the Atrocities Documentation Survey at the 
outset of the conflict. Trained workers interviewed more than 1,000 refugees in select 
camps in Chad between in July and August 2004. Numerous organizations (e.g., USAID, 
the Coalition for International Justice) worked on the survey instrument, and the teams 
used a semi-structured interviewing approach that allowed refugees to give the broadest 
possible accounts of what they had experienced. Interviewees were selected using a 
random sample design.  	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A refugee who fled Kornoi, a village in North Darfur, told of a similar attack. In his 
village, too, it started with bombing; then soldiers entered the village and went to the 
market, where they killed civilians. Next, they entered homes, including his: 
They came and beat me and took my clothes… They took my clothes in front of 
everyone and burned them. I ran and left on a donkey but they chased me and 
took the donkey away. They whipped me on the back, saying “You are Zaghawa, 
why do you stay here? You must go” (ADS 2004). 
 
As these examples suggest, soldiers and Janjaweed militia members have victimized 
numerous citizens in villages around Darfur. Every refugee I interviewed shared a story 
of their village’s destruction at the hands of government soldiers and/or Janjaweed, 
forcing them to vacate the village, often without their family members. As in Rwanda and 
Bosnia, each example is a significant story, but there may be patterns in the collection of 
stories that help us understand how and why violence is unfolding in the Darfur region.  
Patterns of Violence 
Undeniably, the ongoing violence in Darfur has taken a number of forms, but there are 
distinct patterns in the violence. First, the Government of Sudan and its forces have 
bombed many villages, leaving them damaged and destroyed. This form of violence was 
not prevalent in Bosnia or Rwanda, where ethnic groups co-resided within the same cities 
and villages. While people of different ethnicities coexist in Darfur, the vast majority of 
villages are relatively homogenous,210 which may have been a key reason behind the 
different form of victimization. In addition, the sheer size of Sudan and the distance 
between Khartoum and the Darfur region perhaps influenced the choice of aircraft.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  210	  As is further explained below, I am still in the process of obtaining census data to 
further analyze the villages. However, when I asked each of the 43 refugees I 
interviewed, every person explained that villages are organized by tribe, with one tribe 
residing within one village.	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Attacks by plane have often been coordinated with attacks on the ground, which 
include unknown numbers of massacres, gender-based violence, torture, humiliation, 
abduction, looting of property and livestock, and other forms of violence. At the outset, 
Sudanese Forces and the Janjaweed—discussed in more detail below—were responsible 
for these attacks. Sudanese Forces controlled the planes; then soldiers usually entered 
villages in Land Cruisers followed by Janjaweed riding horses and camels. After killing 
civilians,211 they loot property, destroy buildings, and sometimes set the village on fire.  
As refugees recalled, attacks generally occurred in the morning when residents of 
the villages were either sleeping or at prayer and on days in which people were out of 
their homes, such as the weekly market days, Monday and Thursday.212 Bombings also 
occurred near nightfall, when the fires from evening meals easily identified where people 
were congregated.  
The attacks have resulted in an unknown number of deaths. Estimated death tolls 
generally fall between 200,000 and 500,000, though they are uncertain and generally only 
cover some of the years of the violence.213 For example, Hagan and Palloni (2006) 
suggested that the death toll was likely close to 400,000 by 2006. That same year, 
scholar-activist Eric Reeves (2006) estimated that between 480,000 and 530,000 people 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  211	  Several refugees I interviewed recalled that some civilians were called by name, as if 
there were lists of who to target. This is not well documented and needs to be further 
explored.	  	  212	  These patterns were evident in the stories of the refugees with whom I spoke and in 
the ADS survey data. Notably, such patterns speak to many different temporal clocks in 
the violence, including daily and weekly clocks. For more on the temporal clocks of 
genocide, see Uggen, Nyseth Brehm, and McElrath 2014.	  	  
213 For a detailed discussion of estimates of the death toll, how they are affected by 
disciplinary factors, and their change over time, see Hagan, Schoenfeld, and Palloni 
2006. In addition, see p. 295 of Degomme and Guha-Sapir 2010 for an excellent 
summary of mortality estimates.  
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had died. Epidemiological estimates have generally been lower (e.g., Guha-Sapir and 
Degomme 2005), with some finding that while violence was the main cause of death in 
2004, subsequent years saw larger shares of disease-related mortality (Degomme and 
Guha-Sapir 2010). Still others have suggested that all estimates of the death toll have 
been exaggerated (e.g., Mamdani 2010). Clearly, various snapshots at different points in 
time and culled through different methods have led to a murky picture of total deaths. It 
is unlikely to become clearer until long after the violence has ended.  
Beyond death, the attacks have influenced displacement. By the end of 2004, 
there were between 1 million and 1.65 million internally displaced peoples in Darfur (UN 
Commission Report 2005), and more than 200,000 refugees were living in refugee camps 
in Eastern Chad, among other countries. Today, the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (2013) estimates that 1.8 million people remain displaced in Sudan,214 while 
hundreds of thousands of Sudanese refugees reside in neighboring countries.215  
Scholars and practitioners have debated how to label these and other forms of 
violence in Darfur. Several human rights organizations and prominent leaders, including 
George W. Bush, called the violence  “genocide” as stories from the region reached the 
world through global news media in 2004. That same year, the UN created a Commission 
of Inquiry, which found that crimes against humanity and war crimes had been 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  214	  Recent UNHCR statistics cite 632,014 Sudanese refugees abroad, but this does not 
disaggregate between refugees from different time periods or between Sudan and South 
Sudan.	  	  215	  As in other episodes of mass violence, statistics on the many other forms of violence 
are unclear. Yet another form of violence, generally unmentioned in studies of Darfur, is 
the changing of place names also seen in Bosnia. Numerous interviewees told me that the 
government and local Arab leaders changed the names of villages from original African 
names to Arabized versions. Several recalled discussions regarding changing the name of 
Darfur so that it would no longer be known as “land of the Fur.” This reflects a conscious 
attempt to eliminate a people from a region and to change a culture. 	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committed in Darfur, but did not label the violence genocide. Nevertheless, the finding of 
crimes against humanity and war crimes was enough for the UN Security Council to refer 
the situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2005. After investigation, the 
Chief Prosecutor of the ICC issued several warrants, including one for Sudanese 
President Omar-al-Bashir, making Bashir the first sitting head of state indicted for the 
crime of genocide.216  
 As discussed in Chapter 1 and at length in Chapter 4, scholars are not bound to 
the legal definition of genocide. They have varying opinions about whether the former 
ICC Prosecutor’s assessment of the violence was correct. In fact, some have been 
reluctant to use the term “genocide,” arguing that the violence amounts to a repressive 
counter insurgency, war, and mass atrocity, but not genocide (e.g., Flint and de Waal 
2005).  
Others argue that genocide, defined as actions taken with the intent to destroy a 
social group, is taking place in Darfur. For example, Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 
(2008, 2009) contend that many of the attacks in Darfur have been racially motivated. 
Drawing upon the Atrocities Documentation Survey (ADS),217 they analyze the racial 
epithets heard by Darfuri refugees when they were attacked (ADS 2004). Often, these 
included “Nuba” (black), “Blacks,” and “Tora Bora” (terrorist). For example, one refugee 
recalled that his attacker screamed, “You blacks, you are food for vultures. Donkeys have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  216	  Currently, no trials related to the situation in Sudan have begun.	  	  217	  The United States Government conducted this survey in refugee camps in Chad in 
2004.	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more value than you. You are slaves.”  Another heard, “Slaves, slaves, slaves; kill the 
slaves.”218   
Similarly, in my interviews with 43 refugees from Darfur, each recalled racist and 
dehumanizing language during attacks on their villages.219 Most prominently, almost 
everyone recalled hearing shouts of “Abd,” which means slave. Victims of rape also 
recall racial epithets linked to the creation of Arab babies. For example, a woman who 
was attacked in her home was told, “You are black peoples’ wives and you bear black 
children, but now you have to bear white peoples’ child.” Others reported that children 
were targeted, presumably in an attempt to eradiate “the Blacks.”  As one survivor 
recalled, a soldier explained the killing of a child by stating that, “A puppy can become a 
dog,” explaining the targeting of youth and dehumanizing the victims. Many of the 
Darfuri refugees in Uganda told me they had left Darfur particularly because young boys 
were being targeted.  
According to Hagan and Rymond-Richmond (2008, 2009), these racial epithets 
are verbal indicators of racialized intent to destroy groups considered African and, 
particularly, the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa tribes.220 The ADS provides strong 
supporting evidence, as these three tribes reported disproportionate levels of violence and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  218	  Importantly, as Hagan and Rymond-Richmond (2008) show, several government 
ministers were directly involved in the mobilization of the Janjaweed. Likewise, the 
government supplied aircrafts for the destruction of Darfur; and, as the ICC has argued, 
the state-led Arabization campaign influenced intent from the top-down. It is difficult to 
fully document the scope of this planning, as the violence is still ongoing.  
219 This is higher than the percentage in the ADS data; however, the much smaller 
number of interviewees for my project is likely key. Note that I asked respondents if they 
heard anything during attacks but never explicitly asked about racial slurs.  
220 Just as Hutus and Tutsis or Bosnians and Serbs were not monolithic groups, these 
groups are far more complex in reality. There are intraethnic differences, as well as 
diverse class and regional identities.  
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disproportionate recollections of racial epithets. Notably, these are also the tribes that are 
associated with the rebel insurgency in Darfur (Lemarchand 2006). Yet, this does not 
mean that intent to destroy these groups could not be multifaceted, rooted in group 
members’ identity as African221 and their purported association with rebel groups in 
Darfur. In fact, as will be further discussed in Chapter 6, the extension of civil war 
mentalities to civilian populations is not an isolated trend in Darfur, but an occurrence in 
other genocides.  
As Mann (2011) writes, the utterance of racial epithets also does not necessarily 
suggest pre-planned intent.222 Rather, these racial epithets were likely often influenced by 
the situations themselves and, as Hagan and Rymond-Richmond (2008, 2009) argue, 
developed through collective action. Mann suggests that this casts doubt on the intention 
behind the actions, thus casting doubt on whether the violence was genocidal, but it is 
important to stress that intent does not need to be meticulously planned, as images of the 
Holocaust often suggest.223  Rather, intent can develop within the scope of a situation, as 
was likely often the case in Darfur.  
Furthermore, the use of racial slurs does not mean that every perpetrator was 
motivated by genocidal intent or that perpetrators motivated by an intent to destroy were 
not also motivated by material or other gains; human motivations are multidimensional. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  221	  Indeed, while the United Nations Commission of Inquiry concluded that these groups 
were not objectively distinct from other groups in the region (UN Commission 2005:129) 
and thus not groups protected by the Genocide Convention, a more sociological view of 
race and groups is necessary. As discussed in Chapter 1, race and ethnicity—as well as 
all social groups—are socially constructed everywhere, including in Darfur. 222	  Mann also notes that intent cannot necessarily be inferred from what people say, 
though it is perhaps one of the best inferences that exist.	  	  223	  Beyond creating documents with explicit plans, Nazi leaders met at the Wannsee 
conference to explicitly plan the Holocaust. Few other genocides have been documented 
in such great detail, though this does not mean they were unintentional.	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Flint (2009), for example, argues that local politics sometimes trump identities in Darfur, 
not unlike the other factors that influenced participation in the violence in Rwanda or 
Bosnia. In addition, even if some Janjaweed members were motivated only by material 
gains, they were still enlisted and trained within a broader structure that sought to remove 
Black African tribes.224 
The Perpetrators   
 The perpetrators of the violence include members of the Sudanese government, 
the Sudanese Armed forces, Janjaweed militias, and other paramilitaries. Unlike in 
Rwanda and Bosnia, scholars have yet to complete in-depth analyses of the planning of 
the genocide at the state-level, in large part because ongoing violence restricts the ability 
to access documents or interview key government figures. Yet, the research conducted by 
the Chief Prosecutor at the ICC has found that orders to bomb villages and to arm and 
mobilize the Janjaweed came directly from the government, including President Omar al-
Bashir (ICC 2007, ICC 2009).  
Under the government’s command, members of the Sudanese Armed Forces225 
have also been directly involved in the violence. In 2004, there were approximately 
200,000 soldiers in the Sudanese army (UN Commission Report 2005). The government 
has supplemented them with paramilitaries of citizens known as the PDF. Members of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  224	  Indeed, many argue that violence has not been intended to completely destroy the 
residents of Darfur but to remove them from the land. As argued in Chapter 4, however, 
the intent to remove—with no intent of governing those people—is also genocidal. Even 
by strict legal standards, the intent to destroy can be accomplished by forced outmigration 
and harsh living conditions, something that has also been documented in Darfur (Hagan 
and Kaiser 2011).  
225 For more on the myriad branches of the Sudanese Armed Forces, see the work of the 
Small Arms Survey and the branches mentioned in the ICC warrants.   
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Armed Forces have bombed the villages of Darfur, and the Armed Forces and the PDF 
have attacked many villages on the ground.    
 The Janjaweed226 have also been key perpetrators. As noted above, these 
militias—also referred to as fursan (horsemen) and mujahedeen—are typically Arab227 
militias (Human Rights Watch 2004; UN Commission Report 2005). While Janjaweed 
take orders from the Government, they also have their own leaders, with some—such as 
Musa Hilal228 and Ali Kushayb—gaining international notoriety early in the violence. 
Their rank and file members come from both inside and outside of Darfur, though it is 
rare that they attack their own communities. For example, only a small fraction of the 
events reported in the ADS were instances in which the victim identified the perpetrator 
as someone from their community. While some refugees I interviewed reported knowing 
their attackers from previous relationships between villages—suggesting that there were 
ties between some members of the Janjaweed and their victims—the perpetrators are 
rarely, if ever, from the same village as their victims. Thus, as discussed in more detail in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  226	  In 2004, the United Nations Commission of Experts estimated that there was at least 
one large group of Janjaweed, as well as several smaller groups, acting within each of 
Darfur’s three states. Today, there are no reliable estimates of the number of Janjaweed, 
in part due to their nomadic nature and in part because many refugees use the term 
“Janjaweed” as a blanket term for any perpetrators. 	  
227 The fact that the Janjaweed are described as Arab militias does not imply that all 
Arabs take the side of the Janjaweed. As the Commission Report (2005) noted, many 
Arabs in Darfur were opposed to their actions, with some fighting on the side of the 
rebels. In addition, non-Arabs have been part of the militias.  228	  Several refugees noted that Musa Hilal started urging reconciliation in 2013, a claim 
corroborated by others. 	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Chapter 6, the organization of the perpetrators in Darfur is much closer to that in Bosnia 
than the mass public participation of neighbors in Rwanda.229   
Disaggregating the Violence 
To better understand the patterns in the violence, it is necessary to disaggregate 
victimization numbers by time and space. Numerous NGOs attempting to track the 
violence (such as the Enough Project, Human Rights Watch, Bloodhound, and the Small 
Arms Survey)230 have shed light on some of these patterns, generally finding that 
violence was most intense between 2003 and 2005. Less is known about regional 
variation in the violence, in part because the ongoing nature of the conflict and the 
perilous situation in Darfur—including the restriction of aid organizations and the barring 
of journalists and human rights organizations from even entering the region at different 
points in time—has limited the information available.  
 Nevertheless, several scholars have attempted to document and explain patterns in 
the violence. As previously noted, Hagan and Rymond-Richmond (2008; 2009) utilize 
ADS data to better understand the violence in 2003 and part of 2004. Using hierarchical 
linear models, they analyze the factors that influenced variation in the reporting of racial 
epithets and the severity231 of victimization reported by Darfuri refugees in Chad. Among 
other things, they conclude that racial epithets were heard more often when the Janajweed 
and Sudanese soldiers attacked together, while violence was particularly strong when 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  229	  Notably, the rebel forces in Darfur have also committed violence and crimes, likely 
amounting to war crimes and crimes against humanity but not genocide, much like in 
Rwanda and Bosnia. I do not analyze this violence, as it is not genocide.  	  230	  While this also occurred to a degree in Rwanda and Bosnia, twenty years have 
brought increases in (I)NGOs as well as technology and other changes.	  	  231	  This is based on a severity score the authors create; see Hagan and Rymond-
Richmond 2008 for additional details.	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they attacked together and when Sudanese soldiers attacked alone. They find that rebels 
were less likely to be in villages with higher levels of victimization, casting doubt on the 
notion that the violence was simply a counter insurgency. In fact, villages with larger 
populations of several African tribes232 saw higher levels of racial epithets and 
victimization, supporting claims that they were targeted. 
 Using the same data, Hagan and Kaiser (2011) examine two intervals of attacks in 
2003 and 2004,233 finding that the risk of violence was greater in the second wave, which 
they pinpoint in December 2003. They also document the pattern of state-led attacks of 
food, livestock, and water in these years—victimization they argue was genocidal, but is 
rarely considered in analyses of genocide.  
 Focusing on a later period of violence, de Waal, Hazlet, Davenport, and Kennedy 
(2014) draw upon data primarily from the United Nations Peacekeeping Operation in 
Darfur (UNAMID) to document ebbs and flows in 2008 and 2009, finding what they 
characterize as “spikey” periods of intense violence followed by periods of less sustained 
violence and documenting more violence in South Darfur than in Northern or Western 
Darfur. They conclude that numerous combatants and sub-groups perpetrated this 
violence, suggesting that the conflict defies easy categorization.234   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  232	  Fur, Masalit, and Jebal peoples were significantly more likely to hear racial epithets 
during attacks and were linked to higher levels of victimization. Notably, Zaghawa—
another African tribe commonly listed as victims, do not report these vocalizations. 
Hagan and Rymond-Richmond note their villages may have been bombed more 
frequently. 	  233	  According to their operationalization of time, the first wave of violence ended in June 
2003 and the second wave started in December 2003.	  	  234	  Similarly, Gramizzi and Tubiana (2012) document three key waves of violence, 
beginning with a first wave (2003 to 2005) that largely consisted of Arabs attacking non-
Arabs. Then, they find that Arab groups began to turn against one another in 2006 
(second wave) and that 2008 brought a third wave in which Arab groups grew more 
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 Many other studies and NGO reports, many of which are cited above in the 
discussion of patterns of victimization, have sought to document the violence in Darfur. 
They have often documented patterns over time or by region for certain years of the 
violence. Yet, no studies to my knowledge have examined violence spanning more than a 
few years. Even Hagan and Rymond-Richmond’s groundbreaking study covers a limited 
range of time—2003 and part of 2004—and a limited geographic region, including just 6 
of the 21 localities (counties) in Darfur that were closest to the Chadian border.  
Thus, in the remaining pages of this chapter, I analyze several forms of violence 
by geographic region and by year. Specifically, I focus on variation in the bombings of 
villages as well as the damage and destruction of villages at the locality (county) level. In 
2003, there were 21 localities in Darfur. Since then, the administrative boundaries of 
Darfur have changed several times, though data on the dependent and independent 
variables are mainly available at the previous administrative boundaries.  
Figure 5.2 illustrates the locality-level variation in bombings in Darfur (displayed 
by quantiles). As in Chapter 3 and 4, regional variation in genocidal violence is 
immediately apparent. It ranges from no documented bombings in two localities to up to 
162 bombings over nine and a half years. In addition, it appears that there were generally 
more bombings in the West and North of Darfur and fewer in the South.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
reluctant to fight on behalf of the government, leading the government to turn to non-
Arab militias. As I analyze bombings by the government and the related damage and 
destruction of villages, this changing nature of aspects of the conflict is not part of this 
analysis.  	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Figure 5.2: Bombings in Darfur, 2003 to 2012 
Bombings
 0 - 3
 4 - 9
10 - 23
24 - 81
82 - 162
 
 Figures 5.3 and 5.4 display the villages in Darfur that have been destroyed and 
damaged, respectively. It is evident that violence has been particularly concentrated in the 
center of Darfur, again with more destruction in the West and North, but also a 
substantial amount of destruction in the South—a pattern supported by many of the 
people I interviewed. These figures illustrate that more villages have been completely 
destroyed rather than damaged.  
 
 280	  
Figure 5.3: Destroyed Villages in Darfur, 2003 to 2010 
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Figure 5.4: Damaged Villages in Darfur, 2003 to 2010 
 
  
 In part, this variation may reflect the general settlement pattern in Darfur, 
displayed in Appendix D (for example, the very northern part of Darfur is largely desert 
and has few settlements). Yet, other factors may also influence the variation. I consider 
the potential explanatory power of theories related to targeted violence, community 
organization, resource competition, organized actors, and broader spatial and temporal 
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factors. As I discussed many of these theories in Chapters 3 and 4, I review them only 
briefly here. Note that, while some theories lend themselves to well-informed hypotheses, 
others influence competing expectations. In the latter case, I present each expectation 
without advocating for one over the other. 
Targeted Violence 
 As many scholars and activists have suggested that violence in Darfur targeted 
certain groups, the presence of these groups may be linked to violence. Indeed, as was 
found in Rwanda and Bosnia, the location of victim groups is likely a key influence on 
the location and magnitude of violence during genocide. Accordingly, I hypothesize that 
areas where Fur, Masalit, and/or Zaghawa tribes reside see higher levels of violence, 
which would confirm the targeted nature of the violence. In line with this, I hypothesize 
that areas where Arab tribes live saw lower levels of violence.235   
 Notably, Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa tribes only reside within the Darfur region of 
Sudan. This contrasts with Bosnia and Rwanda, wherein the targeted victim groups lived 
throughout the country. While this is perhaps not the only reason for the isolated violence 
in Darfur, relative isolation is the most prominent explanation for why genocide in Sudan 
remained largely within the confines of Darfur.236   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  235	  As explained in detail below, there are minimal data to test the how the ethnic 
composition of different communities in Darfur was related to violence. Particularly, 
census data before violence began in 2003 are not widely available, and no census data 
regarding tribes are currently available. Thus, I am unable to analyze detailed measures 
of the percentage of ethnicities in communities or more fine-grained measures of general 
ethnolinguistic diversity of ethnic polarization. I can, however, test ethnolinguistic data 
from ethnolinguistic maps235 as a general test of the presence of ethnic groups and the 
association with violence.    	  236	  As explained above, Arabization and Islamization ideologies were also spread in the 
years prior to the violence. At the moment, there is no way to measure the spread or 
impact of these ideologies, as almost all inhabitants of Darfur were Muslims and as it is 
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Community Organization  
 In Chapters 3 and 4, I analyze how factors related to community organization 
(drawn from criminological theories of social disorganization) influenced the violence. 
Yet, as I mainly consider bombings and the destruction of villages in the subsequent 
analysis, measures of community organization are not theoretically meaningful as 
theorized, illustrating important differences in the factors that influence meso-level 
variation in violence during genocide. Recall that in Rwanda, these measures (such as 
marriage rates) influenced the rate of violence because many of the perpetrators were 
from the communities and were not part of formally and previously organized groups. In 
Darfur, the bombings were perpetrated exclusively by the government of Sudan, meaning 
that community members did not participate in this form of violence. Likewise, villages 
were damaged and destroyed by bombs, but also by soldiers and Janjaweed militias that 
had previously been organized and recruited. As noted above, they were rarely members 
of the communities they attacked, but rather members of nomadic tribes that interacted 
with villages, again showing that measures of community organization are less 
meaningful in this context and also suggesting that these measures should be explored in 
the future with regard to nomadic communities. 
 Because of this, I do not hypothesize that measures of marriage, employment, or 
others measures that capture community organization influenced the bombings or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
less clear if and how ideologies were spread. As the participants were recruited rather 
than local citizens who simply joined violence as it was unfolding, I would expect that 
the presence or spread of the ideology would matter much less in this case than it did in 
Rwanda. 	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damage/destruction of villages in Darfur.237 This also illustrates that measures of 
community organization are less likely to apply to genocide when the victims and 
perpetrators are residentially segregated or, for other reasons, do not reside in the same 
community.  
Resource Competition 
 Almost every scholar and practitioner that discusses Darfur suggests that the 
violence is rooted in population pressure and resource scarcity (as was the case with 
theorizing about Rwanda). As mentioned in Chapters 3 and 4, these ideas find support in 
broader theories linking resource scarcity to conflict (e.g., Homer-Dixon 1994; Urdal 
2008). Population pressures can cause strain within a country (Henderson 1993), and this 
strain may influence people to commit criminal acts (Savelsberg 2010; Agnew 2011). 
Population pressure has also been linked to civil war violence (Raleigh and Urdal 2007) 
and posited as a factor that influences genocide, though I did not find an association 
between population pressure and the forms of violence analyzed in Chapters 3 and 4. 
Nevertheless, I test a measure of settlement density and anticipate that population density 
is associated with higher levels of violence.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  237	  If anything, the measures I use in previous chapters to operationalize community 
organization may reflect other phenomena, such as the marginalization of areas with 
certain tribes, or the targeting of certain groups, such as educated peoples or young men 
(both suggested as targets during interviews). They may also yield insights into villages 
from which more members of Janjaweed were recruited, which is something I will 
explore in the future (the home villages of Janjaweed are currently unknown). In 
addition, the census data to test these measures do not exist. I have been waiting for two 
years for IPUMS International to finish these data, not yet finished due to problems with 
the data. Once the census data are ready, I will test measures related to community 
organization to ensure their lack of significance (or, if they are significant, to explore 
alternate explanations). 	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 Resource competition theories argue that resource scarcity makes salient 
boundaries between groups, which can, in turn, influence violence (Olzak 1990, 1992; 
Soule 1992). For the case of Darfur, it is rare to read an account that does not mention 
increasing desertification and subsequent decreases in land as key causes of violence. 
However, the relationship between resources and the violence has not been tested 
empirically. Thus, to measure the effect that land scarcity may have had on the violence, I 
rely upon two measures. First, I analyze a measure of the percentage of households in 
each locality that own land.238  Second, I analyze the type of vegetation present in each 
locality. 
 As with community organization, the explanatory power of these measures may 
only go so far. Indeed, the perpetrators would need to be in competition for the resources, 
which may not be the case when the perpetrators and victims do not reside in the same 
region. Yet, many members of the Janjaweed are from the Darfur region, so they may 
perceive competition within localities.  
Theories pertaining to resource scarcity would suggest that areas with lower 
levels of land ownership and less desirable (or no) vegetation would see higher rates of 
violence, as there are less resources and, thus, likely increased competition. Yet, 
measures of vegetation and land ownership may also capture the desirability of the land 
in a region, meaning that the particularly coveted land may have been targeted during the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  238	  In the future, it would be ideal to analyze land-ownership by ethnicity along with a 
more detailed study of hakura, the system of land ownership in Darfur, possible when 
census data become available. Indeed, I hypothesize that changing notions of land 
ownership have a higher impact on the violence when compared against stagnant 
measures. Notably, I will also search for other measures of land ownership, such as the 
amount/size of land. 	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violence.239 Indeed, numerous reports have documented that the Janjaweed militias were 
promised land in return for the villages they destroyed (Human Rights Watch 2008), and, 
as noted in Chapter 2, resource abundance has also been linked to conflict. Such 
abundance would also not necessarily need to be within the confines of a community, as 
perpetrators may travel to obtain perceived riches. Because of this, it is also possible that 
areas with better vegetation saw more violence, as this would capture an aspect of the 
desirability of the land.  
Organized Actors  
 The presence of organized actors is also likely linked to violence,240 as certain 
armed and organized actors perpetrated the violence and as the presence of organized 
actors was significantly associated with violence in both Rwanda and Bosnia. In Darfur, 
however, the presence of certain groups is far less documented than in former cases. 
Nevertheless, using existing data, I analyze how the presence of several armed groups, 
including Janjaweed and rebels,241 influenced the violence.  
 Documented reports and interviews suggest that Janjaweed militias set up camps 
around Darfur. While the groups changed camp locations often, Human Rights Watch 
attempted to document the main Janjaweed camps in 2004, which I am able to assess in 
relation to violence that year. The presence of Janjaweed soldiers may be associated with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  239	  I also sought to assess whether the presence of oil is associated with higher levels of 
violence. However, according to available data, oil is only present in one city. 	  240	  Indeed, without them, there would not be violence. Yet, analysis of particular 
perpetrators allows us to further understand which perpetrator groups shared higher 
responsibility for the violence.	  	  241	  Sudanese armed forces clearly participated in attacks. Yet, detailed information about 
the movements of the Sudanese military does not exist (or is not yet public). I was able to 
compile data on the presence of military bases; however, there was one military base in 
each locality, so until I examine these data at sub-locality levels, this variable is not 
meaningful. 	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increased victimization, as their presence likely facilitated easy attacks on surrounding 
villages. Yet, the presence of Janjaweed camps may also be associated with decreased 
victimization, as Janjaweed may have set up camps in areas they effectively controlled.  
 As the government of Sudan claimed the violence was a counterinsurgency, and 
as it is clear that rebels were also attacking different places in the region, rebel presence 
may also have influenced the violence. However, Hagan and Rymond-Richmond (2008, 
2009) found that reported rebel presence was not associated with higher levels of 
victimization in 2003 and 2004, suggesting that the violence was not merely a 
counterinsurgency. The data to effectively analyze whether rebel presence was associated 
with violence throughout the conflict is not yet available. Yet, certain areas were 
associated with the rebels. Thus, while I am unable to fully test the effect of rebel 
presence, I can analyze whether rebel strongholds242—those few key areas that rebels 
have controlled throughout most of the violence—were associated with violence.243  
Broader Spatial and Temporal Factors 
Numerous broader spatial and temporal factors may have also influenced patterns 
in the violence. While not significant in Chapters 3 or 4, conditions favorable to 
insurgency, measured by rough/mountainous terrain, are strong predictors of civil war at 
the macro level (Fearon and Laitin 2003) as well as at meso levels (Murshed and Gates 
2005; Bohara, Mitchell, and Nepal 2006; Cederman, Buhaug, and Rod 2009). To test 
whether these conditions also influenced genocidal violence in Darfur, I include a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
242 It is also possible that key rebel leaders’ home villages saw higher levels of violence, 
in part perhaps because the government may have tried to harm the leaders by harming 
their home villages. Currently, as I am analyzing locality-level data, I do not test this.  
243 As in Rwanda and Bosnia, there were some interventions. In particular, the UN sent 
troops to monitor the region. The precise presence of these UNAMID troops is not yet 
public information.  
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measure of elevation to capture rough terrain, which I expect is associated with higher 
levels of violence.  
 In Chapters 3 and 4, I also analyzed whether the capital saw higher rates of 
violence. This is not a meaningful for Darfur, as violence has only taken place in one 
region of the country, and it does not include the capital. However, other urban (in this 
case, the few larger cities) areas within Darfur may have seen more violence, as was the 
case in Rwanda. Refugees with whom I spoke explained that, as in both Rwanda and 
Bosnia, the violence began with the targeting of elites. Yet, as in other studies of 
violence, the remoteness of villages may also have been linked to violence (Su 2011), this 
time perhaps due to the lack of international attention and monitoring. Thus, I assess 
whether urban areas saw more violence.   
  Studies of political violence have also found higher rates of violence near 
borders, perhaps due to the instability of border regions as contested spaces (Hegre, 
Ostby, and Raleigh 2009) or, in the case of Bosnia, larger geo-political interests. In 
Darfur, there is evidence of instability along the border in years prior to the violence. In 
addition, weapons can be more easily smuggled across borders (Hegre, Ostby, and 
Raleigh 2009), which would not influence bombings but could influence damage and 
destruction to villages. Thus, I include a measure of distance from Chad244 and 
hypothesize that regions closer to Chad had higher levels of violence.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  244	  I also assessed distance from the Central African Republic, another country to which 
refugees fled. Yet, as the majority of refugees fled to Chad, I include it in the analysis.	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Violence may also have been influenced by past violence, possibly linked to 
cycles of violence, memories of violence,245 impunity, or previously mobilized actors 
within a region, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. Indeed, sporadic violence against 
African tribes took place in Darfur in the years leading to 2003,246 and these places may 
have seen higher levels of violence due to an existing structure that facilitated violence 
and displayed impunity (Flint and de Waal 2005). However, there were also clashes 
between government troops and rebel groups before 2003, and these locations may also 
have seen more violence—this time because of a potential association with rebel groups. 
Thus, I differentiate between violence against civilians and armed clashes before 2003 
and anticipate that each saw more violence during the genocide.247  
Finally, I analyze a measure of spatial autocorrelation. This measure, meant to 
capture violence in surrounding communities net of other factors discussed above, was 
significant in Rwanda but not Bosnia, suggesting that surrounding violence may matter 
more when the perpetrators are largely drawn from the community than when violence is 
strategically implemented from “above.”  To test this, I include a measure of surrounding 
violence, although, in line with Bosnia, I anticipate that it is not significant.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  245	  Several refugees noted that the Fur Sultanate enslaved Arabs and that this memory 
may persist among Arabs today. I have yet to find documented proof of this, but the 
memory and historical narrative (regardless of its historical truth) may be a factor in the 
violence.	  	  246	  There was also violence between militias from regional conflicts, and I am working to 
obtain data on the dates and locations of these violent events.	  	  247	  Alternatively, as was the case in Rwanda, it is possible that regions that saw previous 
targeted violence saw no significant difference or even less violence during the genocide, 
as the previous targeted violence may have been successful in eliminating groups from 
the region.	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Figure 5.5: Theories of Regional Variation Tested 
 
Data and Analysis 
To analyze variation in violence in Darfur, I rely upon several sources of data. First, I 
measure bombings in the Darfur region using data from the They Bombed Everything 
that Moved Project. This project, spearheaded by Eric Reeves,248 documents bombings 
that targeted civilians249 in Darfur between 1991 and June 15, 2012. I restrict the dataset 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  248	  Note that while Reeves is also an activist (as are many scholars), this project was 
undertaken with scholarly rigor. I also analyzed a small subset of the data tracked to their 
original sources and found no issues. 	  
249 To determine whether the bombing targeted civilians, Reeves (2011:42) used the 
following criteria (paraphrased from Reeves): (1) Use of Antonov aircraft (“bombers”) 
near areas with significant civilian populations. The Antonov is very inaccurate, thus 
indiscriminate; (2) Use of helicopter gunships—which fly low and fire with considerable 
accuracy—can be judged to be attacks against civilians if they are the primary victims of 
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to 2003 and 2012, as systematic genocide began in 2003. The dataset includes every 
bombing reported in what Reeves deemed reliable sources. For Darfur, these criteria 
include: 
1. Confirmation by a United Nations or nongovernmental humanitarian 
organization; 
2. Confirmation by a credible human rights organization; 
3. Confirmation by Sudanese church sources; 
4. Eyewitness accounts by journalists; 
5. Reports by civilians if there was more than one witness (this includes reports 
from Radio Dabanga, which often cited a specific witness who had been 
determined by Radio Dabanga to be representative of the targeted community); 
6. Forensic investigation confirming a bombing; and  
7. Confirmation by the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Mission in Darfur  
    (UNAMID) or its predecessor (AMIS).250  
 
 As these bombs were all dropped from planes, it is clear that they were part of the 
government’s scorched earth campaign and that government soldiers were involved in 
some way. It is unlikely that every bombing is reported, due to insufficient reporting 
presence in the region, and multiple bombings within a short period of time (such as five 
bombs dropped on a city within a matter of minutes or hours) are counted as one 
bombing event.  
 I analyze bombings by locality. The geographic administrative boundaries have 
changed numerous times throughout the last decade in Sudan, and Reeves collected data 
according to 2003 village names.251  Villages are aggregated within 21 localities, which 
are aggregated within three states—North Darfur, South Darfur, and West Darfur. As 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
an assault; (3) Eyewitness accounts of the purpose of particular missions by Antonovs, 
helicopter gunships, or military jet aircraft; and (4) Photographic or forensic evidence 
indicating civilians or humanitarians were the targets of an aerial attack. 250	  Reeves only included reports by Darfuri rebel groups as confirming evidence and to 
augment information, such as the location and time of the act. 251	  As there are numerous spellings for the same village as well as villages with the same 
name, this proved a challenging task. For more details, see Reeves 2011 and Reeves 
2013.	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most independent variables do not exist at the village level, I analyze data at the locality 
level using the 21 localities that existed in 2003.  
 I also analyze the number of villages that were destroyed or damaged within each 
locality. The US State Department collected these data utilizing several methods, 
including satellite imagery, and attempted to include all villages damaged or destroyed 
between February 2003 and December 2010.252 Damaged villages and bombings are 
correlated at .9, suggesting close correspondence, while destroyed villages and bombings 
are only correlated at .2, suggesting that villages that were completely destroyed were 
victimized by government soldiers and/or Janjaweed militias on the ground (though 
sometimes in tandem with bombings).253   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  252	  The precise date of destruction or damage is not included; rather, the dataset includes 
the date that damage or destruction was confirmed.	  As the name implies, “destroyed” 
villages were completely destroyed, while “damaged” villages sustained some damage to 
village infrastructure but were not completely destroyed.	  	  253	  	  Data do not exist to conduct a comprehensive analysis of killings to match the 
analyses in Chapters 3 and 4. I originally sought to create my own database from open 
source materials, including human rights organization reports, intergovernmental 
organization reports, and numerous other sources. A research assistant and I coded over 
100 reports—some well over 100 pages—in an attempt to create a database of killings. 
However, these data skew far toward early years of the violence, and while it is clear that 
these years did see more violence, I hypothesize that the lack of data in the latter years is 
due to lack of interest as well as lack of access. In addition, it is tremendously difficult to 
ascertain repeat information across sources, in large part due to lack of specificity in the 
location and varying estimates of death tolls. Furthermore, most sources do not seek to 
compile a comprehensive list of fatalities but to document select examples. Finally, as 
detailed above, the percentage of people who died due to direct killings in Rwanda and 
Bosnia is very high; in Sudan, demographic experts estimate high percentages of indirect 
deaths. While this does not mean the deaths are not genocidal, it suggests that many other 
factors influence death tolls. Because of these reasons, I do not analyze data on deaths at 
this time, though I have them for the book project and am working on ways to analyze 
them.	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 Independent variables come from a variety of sources. As noted above, complete 
census data from before 2003 are not publically available.254 I was able to obtain several 
measures from published census tables in various libraries around the United States. As 
the administrative boundaries in 1993 were quite different, this required matching 
administrative boundaries across years, which I did using ArcMap.255  I created other 
measures, such as distance from the border and elevation, in ArcMap as well. Additional 
measures, such as ethnoliguistic diversity, vegetation, and previous violence, come from 
sources listed in Table 5.1.  
  
                     Table 5.1: Dependent and Independent Variables by Locality 
Variable Description Coding Source Mean Range 
Dependent Variables     
Bombings Number of 
bombing events 
that took place in 
locality between 
2003 and 2012  
Number Reeves 2013 32 0 to 162 
Damaged 
Villages 
Number of villages 
in locality damaged 
between 2003 and 
2010 
Number U.S. State 
Department 
24.43 0 to 131 
Destroyed 
Villages 
Number of villages 
in locality 
destroyed between 
2003 and 2010 
Number U.S. State 
Department 
143.71 0 to 517 
      	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  254	  As noted,	  I have been trying for two years to obtain census data. IPUMS International 
has the census data from 1993—the last census before the genocide—but they will not be 
formatted to share for another year or so due to the prevalence of errors.  255	  Specifically, in the 1993 census data, there are 10 localities, while there were 21 when 
the violence began. Using ArcGIS, I was able to match localities to their previous 
administrative boundaries and assigned the remaining 11 localities values based on the 
1993 value. This is clearly imperfect, but there are no other options today.	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Targeted Violence     
Fur Significant Fur 
population 
0 = Not Fur                 
1 = Fur 
Izady 2012 
and LL-
Map256 
0.52 0.00 to 1.00 
Zaghawa Significant 
Zaghawa 
population 
0 = Not Zaghawa             
1 = Zaghawa 
Izady 2012 
and LL-Map 
0.14 0.00 to 1.00 
Masalit Significant Masalit 
population 
0 = Not Masalit          
1 =Masalit 
Izady 2012 
and LL-Map 
0.14 0.00 to 1.00 
Arab Significant Arab 
population 
0 = Not Arab          
1 = Arab 
Izady 2012 
and LL-Map 
0.29 0.00 to 1.00 
African Significant Fur, 
Zaghawa, and/or 
Masalit 
populations257 
0 = Not African 
1 = African 
Izady 2012 
and LL-Map 
0.71 0.00 to 1.00 
Mixed Significant Arab 
tribes and Fur, 
Zaghawa, or 
Masalit 
0 = Not Mixed   
1 = Mixed 
Izady 2012 
and LL-Map 
0.62 0.00 to 1.00 
Resource Competition     
Settlement 
Density 
Villages per square 
kilometer 
   Number ArcGIS 0.04 0.0 to 0.1258 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  256	  LL-Map is a joint project of Eastern Michigan University and Stockholm University, 
in collaboration with several archives in the US, Europe, and Australia. They have a 
collection of maps, including a collection of linguistic maps. I used these, as well as 
Izady’s (2012) linguistic map of Sudan, to ascertain areas where Fur, Masalit, Zaghawa, 
and Arabic tribes were prominent. While this is not perfect, as all groups in Darfur speak 
Arabic, African tribes—including the three key tribes targeted—also have their own 
languages, which are considered in the linguistic maps. I checked the results with two 
residents of Darfur. As noted above, these data do not designate everywhere were certain 
tribes resided but locations where there were significant populations of these groups. 
Regrettably, neither source includes their operationalization of “significant.” 257	  While there are other African tribes within the region, this measure captures the 
African tribes who are documented as targeted. 	  
258 The number of villages ranges from 56 to 1,092 within a locality. Because of the low 
settlement density per kilometer, I multiply this number by 100 in the bivariate analysis 
below.  
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Land 
Ownership 
Percentage of 
households that 
own land 
   Percentage 1993 Census 74.00 15.74 to 93.46 
Vegetation Arable land present 0 = Not Arable259 
1 = Arable 
ArcGIS and 
Earth 
Explorer 
0.24 0.00 to 1.00 
Organized Actors     
Janjaweed 
Camps 
Number of known 
Janjaweed camps in 
2004 
    Number Human 
Rights Watch 
Reports 
0.86 0 to 5 
Rebel 
Strongholds 
Areas rebels 
controlled for the 
majority of the 
conflict 
Number Author 
interviews 
0.05 0.00 to 1.00 
Broader Spatial and Temporal Factors    
Past 
Civilian 
Violence 
Violence that 
targeted civilians 
between 1995 and 
2003 
0 = None 
Documented 
1 = Past 
Violence 
ACLED 0.33 0.00 to 1.00 
Past 
Clashes 
Armed clashes 
between 1995 and 
2003 
0 = None 
Documented 
1 = Past 
Violence 
ACLED 0.24 0.00 to 1.00 
Elevation Average elevation 
(logged) 
  Meters ArcMap 6.58 6.09 to 7.21 
Distance 
from Chad 
Kilometers from 
the Chadian border 
(logged) 
  Kilometers ArcGIS 4.85 2.75 to 6.10 
Border 
Chad 
Borders Chad  0 = No Border 
 1 = Borders   
       Chad 
Map 0.43 0.00 to 1.00 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  259	  As is seen in the figure of arable land below, quantification is somewhat crude. For 
now, localities with approximately 50% or more cropland, forest, or non-savanna, non-
desert habitat are assigned a “1,” while others are assigned a “0.”	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Methodological Strategy 
Due to the paucity of data and the relatively small number of localities (21), I rely upon 
more simple, descriptive methods than I utilized in previous chapters. Though far from 
complex, descriptive statistics can tell powerful stories, especially when the patterns are 
undocumented and unknown. As I documented patterns in locality-level variation in the 
violence in Darfur in Figures 5.5 through 5.9, I begin with bivariate relationships to 
assess factors that may have influenced locality-level variation in violence. To evaluate 
these relationships, I first present a series of maps with selected independent variables of 
interest juxtaposed over the locations of damaged and destroyed villages. Then, I conduct 
negative binomial bivariate regression260 with 1) bombings and 2) damaged and 
destroyed villages as the outcomes, in order to test each variable in Table 5.2. As in 
Chapter 4, negative binomial models are appropriate because the dependent variable is a 
count variable.261 I cluster standard errors by the three states (North Darfur, South Darfur, 
and West Darfur) to adjust the standard errors accordingly.  
Notably, I also assessed the percent damaged and percent destroyed villages (not 
shown) as an outcome to ensure that the sheer number of villages was not driving any of 
the relationships presented below. As anticipated, settlement density is significantly 
related to the number of damaged and destroyed villages, though it is not the only factor 
at play and does not explain other relationships explored below.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  260	  When village-level data become available, I will test these findings through 
multivariate analysis. 	  261	  As in Chapter 4, I also assessed Poisson regression models. The results were 
qualitatively similar (and, in most cases, quantitatively identical), but due to 
overdispersion, I use negative binomial regression here.	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 After exploring factors that influence regional variation in the violence, I turn to 
violence over time. First, I analyze bombings by month. Again, as there are not many 
theories regarding what influences the life course of a violent episode and as data to 
rigorously test potential explanations do not exist, I document patterns and discuss 
potential driving forces. I briefly document the spread of damaged and destroyed villages 
by region over time, focusing on basic patterns. 
Locality Variation in Damage and Destruction  
 By definition, genocide involves the targeting of certain groups. In Darfur, these groups 
include members of the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa tribes.262  Each of the 43 refugees I 
interviewed in Uganda was a member of one of these three groups. Likewise, more than 
85 percent of the refugees interviewed by the ADS in Chad identified with one of these 
three groups, supporting claims that the violence targeted certain peoples.   
 More broadly, Figure 5.6 shows the location of damaged and destroyed villages263 
relative to significant ethnolinguistic groups within each locality. Though this is a 
relatively simple measure of the ethnicity of residents, the figure clearly displays that Fur, 
Masalit, and Zaghawa peoples generally reside where villages were damaged and 
destroyed. In line with this, localities dominated by Arab tribes, particularly in the 
southern part of Darfur, saw far less violence between 2003 and 2010.  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
262 Note that Hagan and Rymond-Richmond also found that Jebal peoples had seen 
higher levels of violence, which I will explore when I have access to census data.  263	  In this and all subsequent figures, I display damaged and destroyed villages together 
unless specified otherwise.	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Figure 5.6: Damaged and Destroyed Villages in Darfur 
 by Ethnolinguistic Communities 
Ethnolinguistic Communities
Predominantly Arab
Fur, Masalit, or Zaghawa
 
Of course, there is likely more variation within these patterns. While villages in 
Darfur are relatively homogenous, localities generally consist of a mix of Arab and 
African tribes. Indeed, even at the village-level, there are potentially villages where Arab 
and African tribes reside (this will be assessed when census data are available). 
Nevertheless, it is clear from the figure that areas where Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa tribes 
generally reside saw much higher levels of destruction and damage to villages, lending 
strong support to the notion that the violence targeted certain groups.   
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Turning to theories of resource competition, Figure 5.7 shows damaged and 
destroyed villages relative to the percentage of the population that owned land in 1993. 
Overall, it appears that there may have been less damage to villages in places where 
higher percentages of the population owned land, which would support theories of 
resource competition.  
  
Figure 5.7: Land Ownership in Darfur in 1993 
Land Ownership (%)
  0 - 15
16 - 76
77 - 85
86 - 90
91 - 94
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However, the desirability of land may matter more than land ownership, as 
Janjaweed and government soldiers chased landowners off their land and subsequently 
destroyed villages, likely as a strategy to prevent villagers’ return. To assess the 
desirability of land, Figure 5.8 shows destroyed (left) and damaged (right) villages in 
relation to prominent forms of vegetation. Greener areas designate cropland, forest, and 
other more desirable regions, while tans and light greens designate savanna and arid 
plains.  
Figure 5.8: Destroyed (Left) and Damaged (Right) Villages by  
Vegetation Type 
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As seen in the figure, many destroyed villages are in areas that are not arable, 
suggesting that the sheer presence of desirable land does not drive the patterns in the 
conflict by itself. Yet, desirable land may have influenced participation in the violence, as 
numerous interviewees and other sources suggest that Janjaweed militia members were 
promised land in return for their participation. Indeed, it appears that a higher percentage 
of damaged villages (right) are in areas with arable land, while a higher percentage of 
destroyed villages (left) are in areas without arable land. This suggests that there may 
have been a strategy to not completely destroy villages in areas with the most desirable 
land, perhaps because members of the Janjaweed hoped to one day own the land.264  
The presence of certain organized actors may also have influenced spatial patterns in 
violence. Accordingly, Figure 5.9 displays localities by the number of known Janjaweed 
camps in 2004 in relation to location of villages that were damaged and destroyed that 
year. While it is clear that Janjaweed had camps in areas with little violence, it is also 
clear that their camps were associated with pockets of violence—most notably, the three 
most concentrated areas of damaged and destroyed villages are in the three localities with 
the highest number of Janjaweed camps.  
Yet, the places that saw armed conflict before 2003—which generally consisted 
of rebel attacks and elicited responses—were not necessarily the places that saw this form 
of violence during the first few years of the genocide. As shown in Figure 5.10, these 
localities did experience some violence as the genocide began, though many other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  264	  Mann (2011) and other scholars have questioned why attacks on villages would occur 
if the Janjaweed wanted the land. Clearly these figures are only preliminary evidence, 
and more fine-grained analysis will better reveal these patterns. 	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localities also witnessed much damage and destruction, further proven in bivariate 
analysis.  
 
 
Figure 5.9: Damaged and Destroyed Villages and Janjaweed Location in 2004 
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Figure 5.10: 2003 and 2004 Damaged and Destroyed Villages with Previous Violence 
Previous Battles
No Violence Recorded
Previous Violence
 
 
Lastly, a few observations about broader spatial and temporal factors can also be 
drawn. First, it appears that many villages along the border with Chad had higher levels 
of violence—perhaps due, in part, to the general instability of populations along borders, 
the ease of access for groups from Chad, or even the targeted prevention of people fleeing 
to camps in Chad. Yet, it also appears that this was largely the case for regions dominated 
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by African tribes. Indeed, there is less damage and destruction along the Chadian border 
in South Darfur, where more Arab tribes live.265  
In addition, though it is difficult to display on the map, the three capital cities—
Nyala, El Fasher, and Al Geneina—were not damaged or destroyed, indicating that there 
was less destruction and damage in more urban areas compared to the rural villages. 
Again, while these cities are not urban in the traditional sense of the word, their 
populations ranged from 200,000 (Geneina) to 560,000 (Nyala); and each has an airport. 
Many of refugees with whom I spoke fled their village to find refuge in one of the three 
capital cities, as it was common knowledge that there was more violence in the villages. 
There may be several reasons for this, but chief among them are likely the relatively 
heterogeneous populations and the public nature of cities, which hosted foreigners, 
NGOs, journalists, and other potential watchdogs. In other words, as in Bosnia, the 
remoteness of villages may have provided some cover for the government to attack and 
then blame the attack on rebel groups or paint it as well-founded attack on rebel groups, 
as few outside sources would have been present to argue the contrary.  
This does not mean that violence did not occur in the cities but that it occurred in 
a different, less noticeable form. For example, many respondents noted that the 
government set up roadblocks to stop displaced peoples as they entered cities and that 
members of Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa tribes could be stopped and detained for allegedly 
supporting rebel activity. A number of young males with whom I spoke were also 
arrested (and subsequently tortured) in cities, often under the auspices of having 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  265	  Note that, in more Northern communities along the border, the percentage of African 
tribes (specifically Zaghawa and Masalit tribes) is higher than in communities that saw 
some destruction but less than further down the border, where some Fur tribes live. 
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supported rebels. Even Darfuri refugees in Khartoum faced discrimination within the 
education system, suggesting again there was less damage and destruction in cities but 
that violence shifted forms to discrimination, targeted arrest, and other injury that could 
escape scrutiny or be blamed on other factors.  
Bivariate Analysis 
 In addition to the descriptive maps shown above, I analyze bivariate relationships 
to further explore patterns in locality-level variation in violence in Darfur. As basic 
descriptive statistics and binary relationships can be quite meaningful and illustrate 
patterns, Table 5.2 includes 17 separate bivariate models that assess the relationship 
between quantitative indictors reviewed above and bombings and destroyed/damaged 
villages (considered together).  
 Measuring ethnicity, albeit in a rudimentary way, confirms patterns from the 
maps but adds more nuance. Particularly, areas with significant Zaghawa and Masalit 
presence generally saw higher levels of violence, though areas with Fur presence did not. 
This is likely due to the relatively simple measure of ethnicity (whether a group was 
present), as Fur peoples were spread out among many regions. These results confirm 
patterns found by Hagan and Rymond-Richmond (2008, 2009). In their study, Zaghawa 
tribes saw comparatively less physical victimization, which they explain by noting that 
areas where Zaghawa tribes lived saw higher rates of bombing—a finding supported 
here. By contrast, they find that Masalit peoples saw much higher levels of victimization 
by soldiers and Janjaweed on the ground, which also could partially explain their 
significant positive relationship with damaged and destroyed villages and the  
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Table 5.2 Negative Binomial Bivariate Analysis of Locality-Level Violence in Darfur 
 
Variable Model Bombings 
Damaged/Destroyed 
Villages 
Targeted Violence   
Fur 1 0.162 0.095 
  (0.581) (0.577) 
Zaghawa 2 1.313*** 0.231* 
  (0.268) (0.128) 
Masalit 3 -1.548*** 0.349*** 
  (0.459) (0.061) 
Arab 4 -1.871*** -0.886*** 
  (0.312) (0.217) 
African 5 1.871*** 0.886*** 
  (0.312) (0.217) 
Mixed 6 1.855*** 0.447 
  (0.301) (0.523) 
Resource Competition   
Settlement 
Density 7 0.140 0.254** 
  (0.100) (0.108) 
Land 
Ownership 8 -0.017** -0.006* 
  (0.008) (0.003) 
Vegetation 9 2.015*** 1.005*** 
  (0.397) (0.359) 
Organized Actors   
Janjaweed 
Camps  10 0.510*** 0.326*** 
  (0.179) -0.116 
Rebel 
Strongholds 11 1.008** 0.192*** 
  (0.492) (0.045) 
Broader Spatial and Temporal Factors  
Past Civilian 
Violence 12 0.129 0.366 
  (0.959) (0.605) 
Past Clashes 13 0.316 0.889** 
  (0.319) (0.419) 
Elevation 
(log) 14 2.695*** 1.483** 
   (0.753) (0.458) 
Distance from 
Chad (log) 15 -0.106 -0.118 
  (0.216) -0.203 
Border Chad 16 0.079 0.192*** 
    (0.425) (0.038) 
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Surrounding 
Violence           17 
0.035*** 
(0.009) 
0.030** 
(0.016) 
    
Standard errors clustered by state  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
 
simultaneous negative relationship with bombings.266 In any regard, it is also clear that 
villages where Arab tribes were the majority saw significantly lower levels of each form 
of victimization, while areas with Fur, Zaghawa, and/ or Masalit (“African”) tribes saw 
comparatively higher levels of bombings and damaged/destroyed villages.  
In terms of resource competition, Table 5.2 confirms visual patterns as well; areas 
where higher percentages of people owned land saw significantly less bombing and 
damaged/destroyed villages. While these measures are unable to capture the complex 
migratory patterns that may also influence resource scarcity, it is clear that areas with less 
land ownership saw higher levels of violence. Areas with more vegetation saw 
significantly higher levels of each form of violence, perhaps suggesting that the 
motivation to claim land drove patterns of violence. As Shatta, a refugee, explained, 
Before the genocide, no one talked about their land in the same way. But, the 
government promised Janjaweed militias could have the land. Maybe because of 
this, the rebels also started reminding people that their land was important. Land 
became like a tool (Uganda, March 2014).  
 
Again, visual patterns suggest that villages were completely destroyed in areas with less 
desirable land and damaged (but not destroyed) in areas with more desirable land.  
 Also confirming trends displayed in the figures, areas where the Janjaweed had 
camps in 2004 had significantly more violence, again suggesting that their proximity is 
associated with more violence, which was expected and found more generally in Rwanda 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  266	  The reasons behind these findings are less clear, and I will explore them in the future.	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and Bosnia. Rebel strongholds—in this case, the mountainous Jebel Marra region—also 
saw significantly higher levels of each form of violence. It is likely that the rebel 
presence and control over this region made it a target, though it is also noteworthy that 
this region is one of the most fertile places in Darfur and is most associated with the Fur 
Sultanate, suggesting a multifaceted reason behind the increased violence in its hills.  
 Areas where there were clashes between two armed factions (generally Arab and 
Africans) before 2003 saw more damage and destruction to villages in 2003 and 2004, 
suggesting that these areas were perhaps targeted first in retaliation.267 Yet, areas that saw 
higher violence against civilians before 2003 did not have higher levels of violence 
during the genocide. While I cannot fully measure the presence of rebels and government 
retaliation during the violence, the sheer scale of the destruction in Darfur underscores 
that the violence targeted civilians, not just rebels.  
A specific border was associated with higher levels of violence, as was the case in 
Bosnia. However, Figure 5.5 suggests this was particularly true for African communities 
along the Chadian border, since there are far fewer damaged and destroyed villages in the 
Arab-dominated localities along the border in the south. Beyond targeting of certain 
communities, there may be several reasons for increased violence along the border, 
including the ease of access from multiple sides (as some reports suggest that Janjaweed 
attacked from Chad), the traditional instability of border communities, and the potential 
targeting of citizens attempting to flee to Chad.  
Elevation is significantly associated with both forms of violence, supporting 
theories that link elevation and violence. It is noteworthy that rebels controlled the area 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
267 While I do not display multivariate models, this effect remained with a control for 
whether the region had significant numbers of Fur, Masalit, or Zaghawa tribes.  
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with the highest elevation; as such, multivariate analysis is needed to better understand 
this effect. Lastly, the variables that capture surrounding violence are significant in 
bivariate analysis. However, once a control for the ethnic population is included (not 
shown), this is, as anticipated, no longer significant.  
 Overall, as in Rwanda and Bosnia, regional variation in violence in Darfur was 
associated with larger populations of the victim groups, confirming that where the victim 
group lives influences the patterns of violence in Darfur. The presence of armed actors is 
also associated with violence, which is logical, since they perpetrate much of the 
violence. Yet, unlike in Rwanda, community organization did not influence patterns, as 
the perpetrators were largely recruited externally or acting within official capacity.268  
More akin to Bosnia, strategic factors, such as whether the location was outside of the 
watchful eye of the international community and the desirability of land, influenced 
locality-level variation in Darfur’s violence. While the precise reasons reviewed here may 
vary, this supports insights from Chapters 3 and 4, which showed that who the 
perpetrators of genocide are and how they are organized is instrumental to understanding 
the patterns that unfold.  
Violence Over Time in Darfur 
Thus far, I have examined violence by region. Yet, Chapters 3 and 4 demonstrated clear 
patterns in genocidal violence over time, and Darfur is likely no different. Thus, before 
concluding, I briefly turn to violence over time in Darfur. As I do not have a complete 
picture of the forms of violence, even to ascertain violence that strictly occurred on the 
ground, the examination of onset dates is not possible. Instead, I rely on descriptive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  268	  As noted above, these measures may have influenced the recruiting patterns (and who 
was recruited), which I will assess in the future.	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statistics. First, I analyze bombings over time. Then, I integrate a spatial element by 
examining the damage and destruction of cities by time and by locality. As I do so, I 
discuss probable influences on the ebbs and flows in violence. I do not intend for this to 
be a causal discussion and do not yet have the adequate data to rigorously test these ideas. 
Thus, they are informed hypotheses and suggestions to be explored and tested at a future 
time, with a particular eye to factors that likely influenced and abated violence, focusing 
on strain and international attention.  
 Figure 5.11 illustrates bombings by year in Darfur, showing that the violence was 
certainly not constant over time. Specifically, aerial bombardments on villages were 
greatest in 2004, took a large dive in 2005, and then ebbed and flowed since then, with 
spikes in 2006, 2008, and 2011.  
 Looking at this in greater detail, systematic violence began in 2003, following 
several rebel attacks. Both sides mobilized and organized after this point, and violence 
escalated, with the most violence seen in 2004. While this figure only reflects bombings, 
almost every Darfuri refugee I interviewed recalled much violence in 2003 and early 
2004, suggesting a broader pattern across forms of victimization.269 
There may be numerous reasons for the drop in bombings in 2005, but one key 
reason is likely the war with South Sudan. In January 2005, the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement and the Government of Sudan signed the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement, effectively ending the Second Sudanese Civil War. While Darfur was not 
directly involved in the war, this agreement likely meant two things. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  269	  This pattern is also supported by a higher number of damaged and destroyed villages 
in 2003 and 2004.	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Figure 5.11: Bombings by Year in Darfur 
 
 
 First, the agreement may have decreased strain that was felt by the Sudanese 
government.270 Second and perhaps more importantly, there was much international 
attention surrounding the agreement, and many journalists, human rights organizations, 
and prominent members of the international community were present in Sudan in the 
months following January 2005. While the presence of many monitors may have not kept 
violence from occurring on the ground, it is quite likely that their presence may have kept 
the government from using its own planes (clearly recognizable, since only the 
government owns planes in Sudan) to bomb the Darfur region.  
 To better understand these and other patterns, it is instructive to consider violence 
by month and to consider situations that may have increased or decreased violence. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
270 It also may have meant that more troops and energy could be diverted to Darfur 
instead.  
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Without a detailed account of decisions from the inside—again, impossible until 
interviews and other forms of research can be conducted long after the violence has 
ended—it is difficult to know precisely what influenced the ebbs and flows of violence. 
Nevertheless, knowledge of occurrences both within Sudan and outside of it can begin to 
shed light on the patterns. Specifically, I focus on key rebel attacks, which would likely 
place pressure and strain on the government; peace talks, which could quell violence271 
by increasing monitoring and international attention as well as through influencing 
calculated elite decisions, in line with elite rationality theories (Valentino 2004; Midlarski 
2005); and other forms of international attention, which may also serve to quell violence.  
While I will not walk through every month of the last decade, a few examples—
selected as representative of other trends—can illustrate these points. For instance, Figure 
5.12 shows bombings over time in 2003, the first year of the genocide. As seen in the 
figure, there was one documented bombing a month between January272 and April 2003. 
During this time, the rebel groups were beginning to attack the government soldiers, 
culminating in the April 25, 2003, attack by both JEM and SLA forces on military 
barracks in El Fasher. Following this attack, the government response escalated, with an 
increase to four bombings in May and five in June, which coincided with mounting rebel 
activity. In this period, the government also mobilized the Janjaweed. Then, in July, the 
government-armed Janjaweed began a large offensive led by Musa Hilal (HRW 2008). 
While the bombings do not capture the offensive on the ground, many eyewitness reports 
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  It is also possible that peace talks could place strain on the government and have the 
opposite effect, though data below show this is likely not the case—at least in the weeks 
immediately following the talks.	  	  272	  Again, the bombing in January serves as a reminder that there were bombings on 
villages before the rebel attacks, but that these bombings escalated afterward.	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suggest that bombings were coordinated in tandem with the offensive on the ground, a 
likely reason for the large increase in bombings in July.  
 
Figure 5.12: Bombings in Darfur by Month in 2003 
 
 In early September 2003, the government and one of the rebel groups—SLM—
signed a 6-week ceasefire. Air strikes did not completely stop, but there was a noticeable 
decrease in bombings. The ceasefire did not last long, as bombings increased again in 
November, with each side claiming the other violated the agreement—a pattern that has 
repeated many times throughout the conflict.  
 Disaggregating 2004 by month (Figure 5.13) shows the large spike in 2004 was 
largely driven by an increase in bombings in January. The precise reason is not yet clear, 
though it appears that the government set in motion a coordinated attack on many 
villages, suggesting that the genocidal response was part of a strategy. Afterward, 
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bombings remained high (compared to 2003), though there was a large general decrease 
after January 2004. There may be several reasons, but it is noteworthy that the end of 
January is when humanitarian organizations began arriving in Darfur, potentially serving 
as guardians or monitors of the situation. Even within this, though, there were ebbs and 
flows in 2004. April, for example, saw a decrease in bombings following another short-
lived ceasefire, negotiated between the government and both rebel groups (SLA and 
JEM) and signed April 8th. June saw a drop in violence as well, potentially because the 
first international observers from the African Union Ceasefire Commission arrived in 
Darfur, which was also visited by Kofi Annan and Colin Powell in the same period. 
Again, while findings in Chapters 3 and 4 cast doubt on the effectiveness of neutral 
observers with no mandate to forcefully intervene, patterns thus far suggest that the 
presence of observers may have influenced certain actions and, at least in Darfur, may 
have impacted the use of easily recognizable government planes to commit atrocity. The 
fact that bombings did not stop and that some attacks occurred within plain sight of 
international observers makes clear that mere presence was not enough to prevent 
violence, though international arrival may have abated some of the more prominent forms 
of violence (especially earlier in the conflict when it was still unclear how members of 
the international community would react).  
 The end of August saw another drop in violence, this time coinciding with the 
resumption of peace. These lasted three weeks before breaking down, potentially 
explaining some of the decrease in violence in September and mirroring the short 
decrease in violence after the ceasefire in 2003. In November 2004, the government and 
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rebels had signed yet another agreement, implementing a no-fly zone over Darfur. 
Bombings continued, however, and even escalated in line with increased rebel attacks.  
December 2004 and the beginning of 2005 brought another surge in government 
violence. Shortly after 2005 began, however, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was 
signed, bringing much international attention to Sudan, both in the form of people 
interested in its governance and in additional attention on Darfur, which was viewed as 
the remaining warzone in the state. Violence remained subdued until July 2005. A small 
uptick in violence coincided with the death of John Garang, a key leader in Southern 
Sudan who had served briefly as First Vice President of Sudan. Many scholars and 
practitioners cite his death as detrimental to stability in Sudan, as he was instrumental to 
the peace process between the North and the South.  
 
Figure 5.13: Bombings in Darfur, 2004-2005 
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Each subsequent year has seen similar ebbs and flows in violence. Some peace 
agreements, like the May 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement and the July 2011 Doha Peace 
Agreement, were followed by periods of sustained decreases in bombings, with some 
lasting up to several months. Yet, as with the other peace agreements, there were not 
lasting effects. The ICC issued several indictments in relation to the violence throughout 
this time, including indictments in July 2008 and March 2009 for President Bashir. It is 
unclear how these affected bombing, as July 2008 saw an increase in violence, while 
March 2009 saw a decrease. Yet, even if the influence on bombings is questionable, it is 
well known that Bashir kicked aid organizations out of the country after the second 
indictment, and that action directly influenced the survival and health of many internally 
displaced peoples as well as a lack of monitoring on the ground.  
Briefly examining violence by region over time also yields interesting patterns. 
Figure 5.14 shows villages destroyed by year.273 Villages denoted by lighter green signify 
those destroyed in the earlier years of the violence. While these are located in a number 
of localities, it is evident that more villages were destroyed in the north and particularly 
the western part of Darfur in 2003 and 2004. Then, in 2005, violence appeared to shift to 
southern Darfur as well as to villages along the border. Again, future research will reveal 
reasons, but the vast majority of the targeted tribes live in the regions targeted in 2003 
and 2004, which may suggest that the strategy was to start with the regions of most 
interest first, as was the case in Bosnia.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
273 I have chosen to show destroyed villages (as opposed to damaged villages) as the 
number is much higher. The trend is very similar for damaged villages, however.  
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Figure 5.14: Villages Destroyed by Year in Darfur 
 
Year of Destruction
Destroyed 2003 and 2004
Destroyed 2005 and 2006
Destroyed 2007 to 2010
 
Conclusion 
Today, genocide continues in the Darfur region of Sudan. In this chapter, I have 
documented some of the patterns of this violence, showing how bombings and the 
damage and destruction of villages varied across the 21 localities in Darfur and 
presenting some patterns over time. As the violence is ongoing, there are many 
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uncertainties regarding victimization, and it is considerably more difficult to obtain data 
here than in other cases. Nevertheless, some preliminary conclusions can be drawn.   
 First, violence in Darfur has targeted groups that the government and Janjaweed 
militias deem to be “African.”  Interviews confirmed that the binary between “Arab” and 
“African” is perceived as real in Darfur; in other words, although some scholars argue 
this distinction is rooted in Western understandings of the violence, it is clearly a way 
that people in Darfur categorize themselves and one another. Yet, this distinction is likely 
also relatively new274 and has changed over time, much like identities in Rwanda and 
Bosnia changed and took on new meanings before the genocide. 
 The targeting of certain groups is not the only factor that influenced the violence. 
As suggested by scholars and practitioners, land appears to be an important part of the 
story. Specifically, places with higher levels of land ownership had lower levels of 
violence. Although I will also analyze this in the context of the traditional system of land 
ownership in Darfur and with updated data (available in the next two years from IPUMS 
International), this pattern suggests that areas with less competition over land (in terms of 
ownership) saw lower levels of violence, in line with theories of resource competition. 
Yet, there is also evidence that areas with better vegetation saw higher levels of violence, 
indicating that resource abundance is also an important factor, perhaps indicating that 
patterns of attack may have been driven by the goal of gaining land, which was promised 
to members of the Janjaweed militias.  
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  When I asked younger refugees (in their 20s and 30s) about this distinction, they all 
noted that it had existed as long as they can remember. Several older refugees recall the 
distinction coming into place after Bashir came to power. 	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 To be clear, the significance of vegetation does not negate that the violence is 
genocide. Intent to destroy, both through killing but also removal from land, is present at 
the state level and systematically throughout the Janjaweed, as was reviewed above. Yet, 
like in Rwanda, other factors are at play, again suggesting that motivations during 
genocide are multifaceted.  
 The presence of organized actors also influenced the violence. Areas where the 
Janjaweed were present in 2004 saw comparatively more violence that year, though this 
will need to be tested for additional years. Rebel strongholds also saw more violence, 
suggesting that genocide became like a strategy of civil war, much like it did in Bosnia. 
Perhaps because of this connection to civil war, other factors that have been found to be 
associated with meso-level civil war violence, including elevation and presence along a 
border, have also been associated with higher levels of violence in Darfur.  
 Beyond this, factors tested in previous chapters had less explanatory power. 
Unlike in Rwanda, measures of community organization are not meaningful, as the 
violence was perpetrated by armies and previously recruited militias (whose members 
generally did not attack their own villages). In addition, while surrounding violence is 
significant in bivariate analysis, multivariate analysis (not shown) illustrated that this was 
no longer significant once ethnicity is included in the model.  
 This analysis of locality-level violence is not without limitations. As I have 
stressed repeatedly, the ongoing nature of the violence has meant that much data are still 
unavailable. Similarly, until census data become available, I will not be able to analyze 
full multivariate models. Bivariate analyses and depictions of patterns are powerful and 
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can tell an important—if importantly tempered—story. That said, the patterns do shed 
light on the meso-level variation in the violence, a central goal of this project.  
 Brief analyses over time revealed that violence has ebbed and flowed since 2003. 
While I am unable to fully interrogate relationships, several spikes and drops in violence 
coincided with patterns. First, bombing and the Janjaweed surge at the outset of the 
violence occurred concurrently, suggesting coordination. Second, it appears that peace 
talks did lessen the amount of violence (at least in terms of bombings), though the effects 
of the talks usually only lasted about one month. Third, there is some evidence that the 
presence of the international community in 2005 was associated with a decrease in 
violence, though this requires much more thorough investigation, including an analysis of 
the decisions of leaders within the government, which will not be possible until after the 
violence has ended.  
 In the future, I will also analyze the effects of interventions in the violence. Yet, 
after more than 10 years, violence continues. Clearly, no intervention has been enough to 
stop the violence. Almost every refugee I interviewed asked me why people seem to have 
forgotten about Darfur and why violence continues. I had no answers.  
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Chapter 6: Case Comparisons and Insights 
 
 
“It is a case of genocide, of destruction, not of individuals only, 
but of a culture and a nation.”  
–Raphael Lemkin 
 
 
International actors have long vowed to prevent genocide. It has not yet worked. Actions 
taken with the intent to destroy a social group continue to occur with alarming frequency. 
During the 20th century, genocide killed more people than all of the wars of the century 
combined, leaving millions of others displaced and impacting untold cultures. In this 
dissertation, I have sought to understand why and how genocides occur. After introducing 
the concept of genocide and this project’s three core interventions in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 
considered macro-level factors associated with the onset of genocide globally between 
1955 and 2005. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 focused on case studies of the genocides in Rwanda 
(1994), Bosnia (1992-1995), and the Darfur region of Sudan (2003-present), detailing the 
preconditions of genocide in each case and analyzing violence by region and over time. 
 In this final chapter, I summarize and integrate findings from this project. I first 
return to the preconditions of genocide, focusing on how the case studies support 
conclusions from Chapter 2 and assessing whether anything else can be gleaned from 
studying the preconditions of three of the world’s most recent genocides together. Then, I 
analyze the factors that influenced regional and temporal variation in each case, looking 
for broader patterns in how genocide unfolded and assessing how theories from genocide 
studies, criminology, and the study of political and ethnic violence explain these patterns 
(Interventions 1 and 3, as detailed in Chapter 1). To capitalize on the ability to examine 
both the macro-level factors that influenced the onset of genocide and the meso-level 
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factors that influenced the process of genocide, I then briefly compare findings from 
Chapter 2 with findings from the case studies (Intervention 2). Finally, I use insights from 
each of these analyses to extend a recent theory of genocide proposed by Hagan and 
Rymond-Richmond (2008, 2009).  
Risk Factors of Genocide 
In Chapter 2, I assessed the factors associated with the onset of genocide globally 
between 1955 and 2005. Drawing upon a discrete time hazard model, I considered 
numerous theories about why genocide takes place. Many were based on case studies of 
particular episodes of genocide; while each historical event is unique, my goal was to 
generalize these events to identify general risk factors of genocide. To do so, I relied 
upon societal-, state-, and international-centered explanations (as opposed to individual- 
or group-centered explanations, as explained in Chapter 1), finding that genocide is not 
random and that factors related to each conceptual level are associated with its onset.  
At the societal level, Chapter 2 identified an ideology that excludes a segment of 
the population as a prominent risk factor of genocide, in line with theories that focus on 
the importance of an ideology that casts members of society as unworthy or sub-human 
(see, for example, Harff 2003; Weitz 2003; Kiernan 2007; Hagan and Rymond-
Richmond 2008 and 2009, and hundreds of case study examples). Each of the three case 
studies I presented highlighted the importance of ideology in defining and demonizing 
the victim groups well before genocide occurred. In Rwanda, the ideology associated 
with Hutu power blamed Tutsis for the marginalization of Hutus and cast them as 
outsiders. Meanwhile, rising Serb nationalism accused Bosniaks of inhabiting what was 
rightfully Serbian land and painted them as deviants who had wrongfully accepted Islam, 
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and the Sudanese government’s policy of Arabization declared that a certain form of 
Islam was superior and that its adherents belonged in the Darfur region. Similarly, 
perpetrators cast victim groups as outsiders. Tutsis were from Northern Africa and had 
invaded the rightful homeland of the Hutu; Bosniaks were Turkish invaders; and African 
tribes were living on land that “rightfully” belonged to Arabs, having only relatively 
recently become part of Sudan.275  
A version of each ideology was also laid out in a clear manifesto. The Hutu 10 
Commandments, the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, and 
the Quraysh I and II put many of these ideas into writing. While the level of blatant 
advocacy for violence varied, each document served to organize and define future 
perpetrator and victim groups by creating us/them mentalities (Semelin 2007). Each also 
propagated utopian ideas about the future—a future that would be better for one group, 
often at the expense of others (Weitz 2003).  
In line with the ideologies, members of society began to see themselves and other 
citizens as belonging to two or three main groups (Hutu or Tutsi in Rwanda; Bosniak, 
Croat, or Serb in Bosnia;276 and Arab or African in Sudan—each along varying timelines 
and each in large part due to a legacy of colonialism and leaders’ manipulation of 
identities). Those identities became primary identities, and political leaders boiled 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
275 To be clear, the tribes in the Darfur region had long lived on the land, yet the ideology 
nevertheless cast them as outsiders and unworthy of the land.  276	  While ethnicity was being reified, recall from Chapter 4 that there were also 
movements urging people to claim Yugoslav identity, particularly beginning after WWII 
and heightening in the 1960s. As Sekulic, Massey, and Hodson (2006) show, claiming a 
Yugoslav (as opposed to an identity tied to one of the republics) identity was more 
prominent in youth, children of mixed marriages, Communist party members, and a few 
other groups, though it was not enough to counter the heightened ethnic nationalism 
during this time period.	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multifaceted identities down to essentialist notions (see Calhoun 1997:18 for a definition 
of essentialism). They were also racialized as us/them groups (often attached to 
phenotypical characteristics) that drew sharp boundaries and did not allow for 
multiplicity. Rwandan students, for example, were not allowed to claim a mixed 
background during morning roll call and would rather need to stand when the teacher 
called either Hutu or Tutsi. Even for the case of Darfur—criticized by scholars who argue 
categories of “Arab” and “African” are vastly oversimplified (e.g., Mamdani 2010)—
each of the 43 Darfuris with whom I spoke discussed the violence using these two 
essentialized categories. This does not mean that they always saw themselves as African 
and others as Arab—much like Hutu and Tutsi identities once had very different 
meanings in Rwanda—but that meanings associated with identity are fluid and change 
over time (Jenkins 1994; Brubaker 2004).277    
As groups became essentialized, contentions over power arose. Indeed, Chapter 2 
illustrated that countries where there was contention over the ethnicity of the ruling elite 
had much higher odds of genocide. Decades before the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, Hutus 
began to complain that Tutsis’ power was disproportionate to their share of the 
population. Likewise, Bosnian elites engaged in multiple discussions regarding ethnicity-
based power sharing, with Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats each campaigning for equal 
representation of their ethnic group. Darfuri rebels also began to demand more power 
well before the genocide, as was evidenced in the JEM’s publication of The Black Book 
and increasing requests for African representation in Darfur governance.  	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  Recall in Chapter 2 that I measured both ethnolinguistic diversity (associated with 
lower odds of exclusionary ideologies) as well as ethnic polarization, and neither was 
significantly associated with the odds of genocide. The fluidity of ethnicity complicates 
but does not wholly undermine quantitative measures.	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As ethnic identities became linked to power, they also became a foundation for 
political organization. Rwandans, for example, began engaging in collective action based 
on their ethnicity in the 1950s, when they formed political parties like Parmehutu, a 
political party for Hutus. Bosnians joined popular ethnic-based political parties,278 
reifying and essentializing ethnic identities and collapsing ethnicity and political 
identities. Even in Darfur, without ethnic-based political parties, people engaged in 
ethnic-based collective action as they expressed grievances against the government. 
While ethnic-based political organizing is not sufficient to lead to genocide, it likely 
reified groups, formed networks, and laid the groundwork for future action based on 
ethnicity—illustrating how the case studies extend findings from Chapter 2.  
Thus, ideology, contention over the ethnicity of those in power, and ethnic-based 
political action are important preconditions of genocide at the societal level. Yet, these 
factors also point toward the significance of the state; in line with state-centered 
approaches to genocide, Chapter 2 illustrated that numerous factors related to the state are 
key to understanding the onset of genocide. However, it found the characteristics of the 
state itself, such as its GDP or the type of government, matter less than the context in 
which the state is operating.  
Particularly, situations that cause instability and strain—like coups and 
revolutions—are associated with higher odds of genocide. Indeed, Rwanda and Sudan 
each saw coups that brought a series of repressive leaders to power and influenced 
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  It is feasible that organization (as well as contention surrounding elites) could take 
place around other group characteristics as well, though these three genocides each 
unfolded along ethnic and racial lines.	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instability within the government.279  The Habyarimana and Bashir regimes experienced 
civil wars that threatened their rule well before genocide occurred. Each of the three 
regimes also experienced civil war as the genocides were unfolding, supporting Chapter 
2’s finding that civil war is the strongest predictor of genocide and existing theories that 
argue that civil war and genocide are linked (Krain 1997; Straus 2006). As discussed in 
Chapter 2, civil wars influence threat and strain felt by a regime. In addition, during a 
civil war, a state becomes inwardly violent against its own citizens, which may create a 
structure that could facilitate other future violence against civilians.  
Again, the case studies illustrated these dynamics in more detail. In Rwanda, the 
invasion of the Rwandan Patriotic Front in October 1990 placed much strain on the 
government, whose members risked losing power. Beyond that, it afforded the 
government the opportunity to cast all Tutsis as enemies. The mentality of the civil war 
made all Tutsis potential threats to the state. In line with this, Rwandan leaders 
encouraged citizens to form self-defense groups, which created networks and “primed” 
(Hinton 2005) citizens for future participation in violence. These groups formed around 
the notion that civilians were in danger and might need to protect themselves, their ideals, 
and their families. In many cases, such ideologies also capitalized on memories of past 
marginalization.  
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  In each case, however, the coup most proximal to the genocide was followed by a 
longer period of stability. The Habyarimana regime in Rwanda and Bashir’s long grip on 
power in Sudan were both relatively stable and allowed the rulers to retain tight, 
autocratic grips. Although Tito’s rule in the Former Yugoslavia did not follow a coup, he 
had a similar grip on power in the region. While there are clear differences between these 
periods, this also illustrates that none of the countries was caught in a continual state of 
instability. 	  
 327	  
Likewise, leaders in Bosnia and Sudan mobilized militias in anticipation of future 
violence, illustrating that even the idea of impending civil war influenced the 
mobilization of potential perpetrators. Like the self-defense groups in Rwanda, leaders 
within the government of the former Yugoslavia and Sudan mobilized militias in Bosnia 
and in Darfur, instructing them that they may need to defend their country and 
simultaneously informing them of the potential material gains of participation, especially 
in Darfur. While future research will help us better understand who were involved in 
these militias,280 their mobilization before the violence directly impacted who became the 
perpetrators during the violence.  
In Rwanda, the civil war began three and a half years before the genocide, but a 
civil war also began alongside the genocide in 1994. The RPF reinvaded Rwanda as the 
genocide was unfolding, placing pressure on the government.281 Likewise, civil war 
unfolded alongside genocide in Bosnia, where Serbian, Bosnian, and Croatian forces 
fought for control of territory. Darfur, too, also saw civil war before the genocide, and the 
genocide itself could be considered part of a counterinsurgency strategy, suggesting that 
battles between rebels and soldiers could be classified as civil war. This paints a much 
more complex picture of genocide. Most scholarship on genocide has treated it as an 
isolated episode of violence—perhaps because the paradigmatic case of the Holocaust did 
not involve an ongoing civil war—but it is clear in these case studies that genocide often 
occurs alongside other forms of violence. 	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  Most literature on the perpetrators of genocide points to “ordinary” citizens, as 
mentioned in Chapter 1. Yet, literature on militias often suggests that their members are 
drawn from prior criminals and “thugs” within society (e.g, Mueller 2007). To this point, 
data to study the militias has been minimal; this will be a fruitful area for research.	  281	  In this and the other cases, the complication of civil war and genocide meant that 
leaders could frame the violence as civil war, not genocide.	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In fact, other forms of violence that targeted civilians took place before genocide 
in each case. In Rwanda, Tutsis were massacred in the late 1950s282—deemed by many to 
be genocide—and at several other periods in time before 1994. There was also genocide 
in Sudan during the 1980s. Though it did not take place in Darfur, it may have shown the 
government that it could act with impunity and that genocide was a viable option as a 
solution to perceived problems. The prior genocidal violence in these two cases speaks to 
theories of “repeat offenders” (Fein 1993a; Harff 2003), though much more research is 
needed to understand the connections between these episodes of violence over time. 
 More immediate to each case of genocide, sporadic violence against civilians 
began in Rwanda, Bosnia, and Darfur anywhere between a few years to a few months 
before full-fledged, systematic genocide began. For example, many Tutsis were tortured 
and massacred during the early 1990s in Rwanda, and the turn of the century saw the 
beginning of increased discrimination and targeted violence in Darfur. Bosnia also saw 
violence before the genocide, though the increase in violence began just several months 
before April 1992. In each case, the violence triggered waves of refugees, which could be 
seen as an early warning signal.  
Closely related, the regimes in Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, and Sudan each 
stood to lose power through peace negotiations that took place directly before the 
genocides. When Habyarimana’s plane was shot down, he was returning from peace talks 
that would lead to power sharing with Tutsis. Serbia risked losing control over Bosnia—
which it had claimed through its de facto control over the former Yugoslavia—in peace 
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  As previously noted, numerous scholars suggest that the violence in 1959 constituted 
genocide, though it is understudied. Accordingly, I ran models in Chapter 2 with this 
violence included as the first episode of genocide and with 1994 as the first episode. 	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talks that discussed power sharing just one month before the genocide. Darfur also saw 
peace talks directly before the genocide, and while these talks did not directly involve 
Darfur, Khartoum nevertheless stood to loose half of its land.283 Such immediate threat 
helps draw in (and upon) theories that suggest that genocide is a rational decision made 
by government leaders in response to a perceived problem (Valentino 2004; Mann 2005; 
Midlarsky 2005).  
These peace talks were all facilitated through international connections, and 
Chapter 2 also found that a country’s international relations influence the likelihood that 
genocide occurs. In particular, countries that had lower levels of trade saw higher odds of 
genocide, suggesting that engagement in the international system could decrease the odds 
of genocide. Likewise, the case studies highlight the importance of engagement in the 
international system, though they also show that certain forms of engagement work in 
nuanced ways. For example, Rwanda received some international attention as it 
seemingly began to democratize; its gains toward democracy may have made 
international actors less willing to criticize the violence and discrimination that was also 
taking place. The former Yugoslavia received some international attention that was tied 
particularly to the end of the Cold War, though rather than engaging with interested 
international parties, the attention influenced a turn inward. Likewise, Sudan turned 
inward after international political ostracization linked to its alleged ties with terrorism. 
 Thus, the case studies illustrate Chapter 2’s findings that exclusionary ideologies, 
salient elite ethnicities, autocratization, fewer years at risk, strain (in the form of civil 
wars, coups, and other factors), and lower levels of engagement in the international 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  283	  And Darfuri rebels were perhaps inspired by the South’s accomplishments, suggesting 
another potential influence of the peace talks.	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system are associated with higher odds of genocide, indicating that the state and the 
context in which it operates is key to understanding the situation in which genocide 
occurs. These factors also add context and nuance, indicating the importance of ethnic-
based political organization, the prevalence of violence before genocide begins, and the 
influence of strain, including the role of civil war and the prospect of losing power, even 
through peace agreements. 
 The case studies also shed light on a few patterns that were not associated with 
higher odds of genocide in Chapter 2. Namely, while colonialism (as measured) was not 
associated with the likelihood of genocide in the event history analysis, each of these 
countries had been under imperial rule at one time. That rule influenced their trajectories 
and, most clearly in the case of Rwanda, the exclusionary ideologies that contributed to 
the genocides.284 Although colonialism and imperialism are not sufficient to cause 
genocide, as the vast majority of countries were colonized at some point, such 
governance clearly affected identities and future violence. 
Theories about the role of population density, population growth, or arable land 
found similar weak support in Chapter 2. In the decades before the genocides in Rwanda 
and Bosnia, population pressure and resource scarcity did not factor prominently in terms 
of preconditions, refuting theories that focus on these Malthusian concerns (e.g., 
Diamond 2005) and finding support in newer research on the link between resource 
scarcity and violence (e.g., Theisen 2008). In Darfur, however, resource scarcity was an 
important factor, though it was more tightly linked to political decisions by Khartoum 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  284	  Indeed, models in Chapter 2 show that exclusionary ideologies are positively 
associated with colonialism, which finds further support through the case studies. 	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rather than depleted resources on the ground, suggesting that the state’s response (or lack 
of response) to resource scarcity is vital.   
 Taken together, these findings paint a picture of genocide as state-centric but 
highly influenced by societal and international contexts. In terms of theories of genocide, 
they provide some support for elite rationality theories of genocide (Valentino 2004; 
Midlarsky 2005) as well as theories that suggest genocide results from escalatory 
situations (Shaw 2003; Mann 2005). They also fall in line with theories that emphasize 
civil war (Shaw 2003; Straus 2006; Ulfelder and Valentino 2008), the role of strain 
(Savelsberg 2010), and the importance of an ideology that excludes segments of the 
population (Weitz 2003; Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008, 2009).  
On the other hand, these findings do not lend support to theories of genocide that 
emphasize bureaucracy or modernity (e.g., Bauman 2000). To be clear, I do not focus on 
the workings of the state or other criminal organizations, which is perhaps one reason for 
the lack of relevance of these theories. Yet, the case studies do not support the notion that 
genocide occurs because of the well-organized bureaucracies that have accompanied 
modernity, as only Rwanda was highly bureaucratic.285    
In line with more recent work, my analysis also breaks from earlier theories that 
emphasize primordial or ancient hatreds (e.g., Kuper 1981) as well as culture-specific 
explanations for genocide (Goldhagen 1996). This study also does not weigh heavily on 
the debate regarding whether genocide is perpetrated by a strong state, like Nazi 
Germany, or a weak state that is failing. Similarly, it does not emphasize a particular 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  285	  In addition, as I note in Chapter 1, I do not engage arguments that place genocide in 
modernity against other time periods, because I believe that a comparative perspective 
that includes genocides from previous time periods is necessary to make these claims.	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form of government (Arendt 1951; Rummel 1994; Harff 2003; Mann 2005), as Chapter 2 
found that the form of government is not significantly associated with the odds of 
genocide (though it did find the democratization is linked to lower odds of genocide, 
contrary to Mann’s [2005] argument). 
 Overall, these findings point toward a complex, multi-faceted explanation for 
genocide. While numerous authors argue about one factor versus another—for example, 
Hagan and Rymond-Richmond (2009) reject explanations of insurgency in favor of 
explanations tied to racial symbolization for the case of Darfur—I do not limit myself to 
either/or explanations but rather focus on genocide as a process that arises from many 
preconditions at multiple conceptual levels. This is not meant to suggest that every 
explanation is valid or that no explanation is valid, but that genocide is an intricate 
process informed by numerous factors. There is no one key precondition to genocide. 
Violence and Its Onset 
Many countries could experience each of the conditions discussed thus far yet not 
experience genocide. Indeed, what is missing in Chapter 2 but evident in Chapters 3-5 is 
the genocidal spark286—an event that serves as the catalyst to transform sporadic violence 
into systematic violence.287 An emerging body of literature focuses exclusively on 
escalating factors, though one theme of this dissertation is a focus on broader structural 
factors rather than specific events. Nevertheless, it is clear that there was some form of 
spark—or sparks—in each case. The plane crash on the night of April 6th was the spark 
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  Though genocide literature uses the term “genocidal spark,” this is analogous to a 
turning point in historical sociological terms. Specifically, it could be considered the most 
proximal turning point beofre the genocide.  
287 Again, while I do not consider these in detail here, it is feasible that these sparks could 
be either planned or spontaneous. 	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that marked a move toward more systematic violence in Rwanda, while the Bosnian 
declaration of independence was a turning point that directly influenced the subsequent 
escalation of violence there. Likewise, the Darfuri rebel attacks between February and 
April 2003 comprised a series of events that marked a turning point in the violence in 
Sudan.  
After each spark, violence began targeting elites. Terming this form of violence 
elitocide, Gratz (2011) argues its prominence in Bosnia, where key political leaders, 
educational elites, and religious leaders were targeted at the outset. I find elites were also 
targeted first in Rwanda and in Darfur, eliminating potential opposition and, in some 
ways, directly attacking culture. In each case, elites were targeted as the genocide began 
as well as sporadically before the onset of genocide, illustrating that this may be an 
important early process of genocide.  
None of the genocides stopped with elites, however. Perpetrators victimized many 
other citizens. This victimization was facilitated, in part, by dehumanization (Hinton 
1996; Stanton 1998) tightly linked to an exclusionary ideology that was present before 
the genocide began, as explained above. For example, Tutsis were called cockroaches 
and snakes; Bosniaks were deemed Turks; and members of the Fur, Masalit, and 
Zaghawa tribes were called slaves unworthy of Allah. Dehumanization and othering may 
have facilitated genocidal crimes by providing techniques of neutralization, allowing 
perpetrators to distance themselves from the victims and to rationalize crimes against 
them (Sykes and Matza 1957). It also served to essentialize identities; all Tutsis became 
cockroaches, all Bosniaks became Turks.  
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Indeed, most of these ideologies were dehumanizing, and another prominent form 
of dehumanization was the association of victim groups with filth or dirt (Chirot and 
McCauley 2006). In Rwanda, Tutsis were thrown in the river as trash to be swept out of 
the country. There are also records of massacres taking place in dumps, as Tutsis were 
literally seen as garbage (author interview). In Bosnia, “ethnic cleansing” became a 
popular term: Bosniaks were seen as filth. Likewise, refugees from Darfur recalled 
members of the Janjaweed chanting “clean up” as they attacked African villages. This 
rhetoric helped create situations favorable to crime, perhaps influencing perpetrators’ 
actions as well as bystanders who did not cease or object to the violence.  
As groups were demonized and targeted, other identities also came into play. To 
be clear, ethnic group membership became the primary identity in each case, though 
other characteristics also influenced who was targeted and how they were victimized. 
Crenshaw’s (1989) concept of intersectionality emphasizes how different identities 
interrelate to influence situations. For example, in Rwanda, the violence targeted all 
Tutsi, and because of this, the age pattern of those killed follows the age structure of 
Rwandan society, with a comparatively higher percentage of youth dying. Yet, according 
to the survey used in Chapter 3, 56 percent of those killed in Rwanda were men, and 44 
percent were women. Since men comprised about 47 percent of the population, they were 
perhaps targeted slightly more often in terms of killing during the genocide.  
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Figure 6.1: Percent Killed in Rwanda by Age 
 
Note: ND signifies no data on age. 
In Bosnia, by contrast, a much higher percentage of both soldiers and civilians 
killed were men—89 percent (the proportion is similar when just civilians are 
considered).288 This is perhaps directly linked to the civil war mentality and the 
organization of the perpetrators, as the vast majority of the perpetrators were members of 
armies and militias. As shown in Figure 6.2,289 data from the Bosnian Book of the Dead 
suggest that those killed in Bosnia were also far older than those in Rwanda (and again, 
this pattern is similar for both soldier and civilian deaths, showing that this does not just 
capture combatant ages and deaths).  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
288 Future work should assess why identities and situations influenced the targeting of 
certain groups within the victim group in Bosnia (as well as in other genocides).  289	  The intervals for this figure are uneven, as they are necessarily based on only 
aggregate data.	  
 336	  
Figure 6.2: Percent Bosniaks Killed in Bosnia by Age 
 
This both supports and disconfirms criminological research that suggests that people who 
commit homicide kill people of a similar age and gender, which is only sometimes the 
case during genocide and may depend on those targeted as well as the entire population. 
Data do not yet exist to analyze these statistics for the case of Darfur, though interview 
respondents suggested that young men and boys have been targeted, perhaps again linked 
to the civil war mentality and the age structure of the society.290  
Though these figures depict killing, perpetrators relied upon other forms of 
violence, which likely varied based on the victims’ characteristics. Each of the three 
cases involved forced displacement291 and the destruction of victims’ homes, which 
Porteous and Smith (2001:3) have termed domicide. In addition, each genocide involved 
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  Overall, it is difficult to estimate the total percentage of the victim groups that were 
killed in each case, as data on the population immediately before the genocides do not 
exist and ethnicity data are not yet available for Rwanda and Darfur and only minimally 
available for Rwanda. 	  291	  For an interesting analysis on the factors that influenced forced displacement in 
Darfur, see Hagan and Kaiser, forthcoming.	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sexualized and gender-based violence—clearly linked to gender identities—along with 
other forms of violence, such as humiliation, abduction, and torture.  
Certain types of violence were more prominent in each case. Rwanda was 
distinguished by large massacres, likely because victims congregated within churches and 
other public places, often at their own will though sometimes at the suggestion of local 
officials. Bosnia saw much more forced internment in concentration camps. This was 
perhaps linked to the use of concentration camps in the same location during World War 
II, though it may also be due to an effort to avert international attention (these could be 
cast as POW camps). And as noted in Chapter 5, Darfur has been distinguished by the 
bombing and destruction of villages, which may be partially explained by the relative 
homogeneity of the villages and their remoteness.292  
In Rwanda and Sudan, this violence remained largely contained within the state 
borders as the genocide was unfolding. The effects rippled well beyond the borders, with 
refugees pouring into neighboring countries, but violence in Rwanda and in Sudan took 
the form of a government killing its own citizens within its own borders. In Bosnia, the 
violence also remained within Bosnia, though it was part of a larger episode of violence 
involving countries that had been part of the same state only several years earlier. Thus, it 
was international in a sense, though it differed from other international genocides, such as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  292 Future research will need to ascertain reasons behind these different forms of 
violence, but one potential explanation may be that comparatively higher amount of 
international attention on a European country resulted in conscious decisions not to 
engage in large scale massacres. The use of concentration camps in this same location 
during World War II also may have created a repertoire of violence, a concept that a 
colleague and I explore in a separate analysis.   	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colonial genocides, where the victims and the perpetrators were not part of one sovereign 
country in the past. 
As covered in each chapter, clear similarities and differences emerged in who was 
perpetrating this violence. In each case, members of governments played a role in 
planning the violence, while armies and militias participated in the violence. Notably, the 
militias were generally mobilized, supported, and armed by the governments, again 
illustrating the importance of the state. Yet, the balance of perpetration from above and 
from below varied in each case. As discussed in each chapter and in more detail below, 
while previously formed militias and armies did participate in the violence in Rwanda, 
the vast majority of participants were local citizens who joined the violence as it was 
unfolding. In Bosnia, local citizens also participated, but in much smaller numbers and 
often through their positions (e.g., mayors, police, and firefighters) within the local 
administrative structures of communities. In Darfur, members of the armed forces and the 
previously recruited Janjaweed militias almost exclusively perpetrated the violence, and 
local members of the communities rarely if ever293 joined as the violence was unfolding.  
The creation of each of perpetrator groups was also accomplished through 
processes of identity formation vis-à-vis the victim groups. Perpetrator groups were 
primed in different ways before the violence began. As the violence unfolded, each group 
was encouraged by the connection between work and genocide. In Rwanda, radio 
broadcasts and politicians specifically urged people to go to “work.” Citizens were told 
that they were serving Rwanda and contributing to society by participating in the 
violence. Soldiers in Rwanda, the Former Yugoslavia, and Sudan participated in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
293 I have yet to find an example of this occurring.  
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violence through their jobs, serving and defending the government. Local political 
leaders and other community servants also participated through their jobs, typically 
meant to serve society and keep law and order.294   
Although I focus on the violence committed by the perpetrators, in each case, 
resistors also committed violence, refuting definitions of genocide as completely one-
sided (Chalk and Jonassohn 1990; Kalyvas 2006). In fact, while genocide involves 
disproportionate violence, every genocide has seen some form of resistance, ranging from 
uprising in concentration camps to armed insurgencies or armies fighting against a 
genocidal government.295 Both the RPF and local groups resisted the Rwandan 
government, with the RPF eventually taking over the capital and effectively triggering an 
end to the violence. Bosnian paramilitaries and a Bosnian army fought the Serbian (and 
Croatian) paramilitaries and armies, and Darfuri rebel groups have attacked the 
government and its soldiers numerous times over the past decade. These actions do not 
negate genocide, as it is the perpetrators’ intent and actions rather than the response of the 
victims that defines genocide. Yet, they further illustrate that genocide is a complex, 
interconnected web of violence, and crimes and atrocities committed by these actors 
should also be studied.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
294 Though I did not study this in great detail, it is likely that peoples’ jobs also dictated 
their specific participation in the violence, with policemen and firefighters running camps 
and soldiers and militia members engaging in violence (Hughes 1962).  
295 In each of the cases I consider, the organized opposition also committed crimes, 
including war crimes and crimes against humanity. I do not study these here, as these are 
not genocide. Yet, it is another common thread that can be drawn across the three cases:  
multiple forms of violence occur alongside genocide.  
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Patterns of Violence 
Though I have examined aggregate patterns to this point, I disaggregated the violence in 
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 to analyze regional-level variation in the magnitude and timing of 
violence. This is, in many ways, one of the most innovative parts of this dissertation, as 
the quantitative analysis of sub-national levels of violence is a new frontier for genocide 
studies (Owens, Su, and Snow 2013) and for the study of political violence more broadly 
(Kalyvas 2006). Specifically, I examined the rate of killing in Rwanda’s 145296 
communes; the number of civilian deaths, soldier deaths, and concentration camps in 
Bosnia’s 109 municipalities; and the number of bombings, damaged villages, and 
destroyed villages in the 21 localities in the Darfur region of Sudan.  
To assess what may have influenced regional and temporal variation in genocidal 
violence, I analyzed factors related to targeted violence, the spread of ideology, 
community organization, organized actors, and broader spatial and temporal factors. Each 
potential influence was informed by literature from genocide studies, criminology, and/or 
the study of political and ethnic violence. At the close of each chapter, I assessed whether 
and how each influenced the magnitude and timing of violence. Yet, a benefit of case 
studies is that they also allow me to compare across the three cases, which I turn to now.  
As anticipated, the ethnic composition of the geographic region significantly 
influenced the magnitude of violence in each case, as the violence targeted certain 
groups. In Rwanda, regions with higher percentages of Tutsi saw higher rates of killing. 
In Bosnia, the percent Bosniak in a municipality was significantly associated with higher 
levels of both civilian and soldier deaths, while areas where African tribes reside have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  296	  As detailed in Chapter 3, data are missing for three communes, so I technically 
analyze 142.	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seen more damage and destruction in Darfur. The case of Bosnia added more nuance, as 
the presence and number of concentration camps were associated with higher percentages 
of Serbs, likely because Serbs set them up in areas they controlled. In line with racial 
threat theory, there was also some evidence of a threshold effect in Bosnia, as areas with 
the highest levels of Bosniaks did not see significantly more violence. Instead, polarized 
areas—those with the presence of two significant communities—saw much higher levels 
of violence.297   
Numerous other factors influenced the violence in each case. For one, there was 
more violence in more populated areas net of the ethnic composition.298 Of course, 
people must be present in order to be victimized. Beyond this, in each case, people 
associated with the victim groups (or, in Rwanda, people whose identity was uncertain) 
were also victimized, suggesting another reason for the populous areas effect.  
 In each case, the presence of organized actors also influenced the violence. This is 
perhaps most surprising in Rwanda, where the frontline between the Rwandan Patriotic 
Front and the Rwandan Armed Forces was associated with higher rates of killing. While 
this measure does capture the civil war, it is also likely capturing both the presence of the 
Rwandan Armed Forces, who were committing genocide, and the strain caused in regions 
when the RPF was advancing on those forces. In Bosnia and in Sudan, the presence of 
armed actors, including both the army and paramilitaries, was also associated with higher 
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  Going forward, I will analyze measures of polarization versus fractionalization for 
Rwanda and Darfur, as I anticipate measures of polarization are more meaningful than 
measures of fractionalization in genocide, as illustrated by the case of Bosnia.	  	  298	  Recall that in Darfur, I have tested the settlement density, since population data do not 
yet exist. For Rwanda, this variable was also significant but is included as a rate in the 
dependent variable. Note also that for Rwanda and Bosnia, I am referring to population, 
not population density. 	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levels of violence. This was anticipated because, in each case, the armies and 
paramilitaries committed most of the violence. In fact, in Bosnia, paramilitary presence 
had a stronger effect on civilian deaths than army presence, suggesting that they were 
tasked with the “dirty” work  (and in this case, dirtier work) (Hughes 1962), something I 
will test for the case of Darfur in the future. Yet, the explanatory power of these 
measures, which seem self-evident in some ways, only goes so far. The presence of 
armed actors takes on a new meaning in the case of bombings in Darfur, where armed 
actors did not need to be “present” to commit damage.299  
 While armies and militias influenced patterns in violence, in Rwanda, the vast 
majority of the perpetrators were members of the communities who were not part of 
formally organized groups. Because of this mass public participation, factors associated 
with the communities significantly impacted the rate of violence. Specifically, marriage 
rates and Hutu employment in the formal sector were associated with lower rates of 
violence. These factors indicate the social (dis)organization of a community (Sampson 
and Groves 1989)—a theoretical concept from criminology that suggests that a 
community’s cohesion and trust influences community levels of crime—was associated 
with the rate of violence.300 This shows that these theories can be extended to the case of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  299	  Kalyvas (2006) suggests that control over an area is an important variable in meso-
level studies of civil war. The inclusion of these variables begin to capture and control for 
this, though I will explore some Kalyvas’s theories regarding zones of control in future 
work on Bosnia, for which I have created fine-grained data on the movements of certain 
actors and their control over regions.	  	  300	  Note that, in Rwanda, the defended communities perspective was not accurate. While 
traditional social (dis)organization theories suggest that communities organize against 
crime, communities can also organize toward crime (Sutherland 1947; Matsueda 2006). 
Lyons (2007) found that socially organized, affluent communities sometimes experience 
more hate crime, outlining a “dark” side of social organization. Though I anticipated that 
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genocide, though they may only apply when there is a significant amount of community 
participation in the genocide and when that participation is not heavily recruited prior to 
the genocide.301 
 Furthermore, as the general population committed violence in Rwanda, the 
ideology of genocide had to be spread to the population. The radio broadcast messages of 
hate and encouraged Rwandan citizens to participate in the violence, and preliminary 
evidence suggests that radio ownership is associated with higher rates of killing, further 
highlighting the role of ideology.302 In addition, the education system taught that Tutsis 
were outsiders and socialized students to see differences between Hutus and Tutsis, 
spreading the ideology to a more educated population. In line with this, areas with higher 
levels of education in Rwanda saw higher rates of killing.  
 Also as a result of who perpetrated the violence, the rate of killing in surrounding 
communes in Rwanda was significantly associated with the rate of killing in each 
commune. Violence beginning in a neighboring community may have served as a catalyst 
for potential victims to take shelter together in a church or for potential perpetrators to 
take action. In Bosnia and Darfur, measures of surrounding violence are not significant 
when other factors, like ethnic population, are controlled for, suggesting that the violence 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
a similar process may be at work during genocide, this was not the case in Rwanda (or in 
the other countries, for that matter). 	  301	  Indeed, in Bosnia and Darfur, these factors did not matter nearly as much, though 
there was minimal evidence that divorce was associated with concentration camps in 
Bosnia, a form of victimization that many citizens participated in. Going forward, I will 
attempt to assess whether these theories hold for other cases. While Rwanda perhaps had 
the highest rate of public participation out of any modern genocide, other genocides did 
see much public participation, and the relevance and generalizability of these theories 
stand to be tested. 	  
302 Note that, as explained in Chapter 3, I am waiting for data on radio coverage and plan 
to test this instead of radio ownership, which is highly related to wealth and thus 
excluded from most multivariate models.  
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did not spread in the same way. Again, as the perpetrators were not often members of the 
communities they were victimizing, this points to the importance of the perpetrators and 
their organization and suggests that, in Bosnia and Darfur, they acted on the basis of a 
top-down plan rather than bottom-up collective action. However, it is also noteworthy 
that there may be some more micro-level trends that I could not analyze. For example, 
several refugees from Darfur shared that they were able to flee their village when they 
saw bombs or smoke from a neighboring village, suggesting that, at a more micro-level, 
the patterns of violence may be different in Darfur. This would not affect bombing and 
destruction of villages, but it would likely affect rates of death or displacement, which I 
will explore in the future.  
 While community organization, the spread of ideology, and surrounding violence 
influenced community-level rates of violence in Rwanda, strategic gains seemingly 
mattered more in Bosnia and Sudan. In Bosnia, it is clear that the goal of achieving 
Greater Serbia influenced regional variation in the violence. Particularly, greater distance 
from the Serbian border was associated with significantly fewer civilian deaths and 
camps. In other words, higher levels of civilian violence took place by the Serbian 
border, likely due to the strategic goal of garnering more land for Greater Serbia, lending 
support to theories that suggest that materialistic gains drive violence. While the border 
was not associated with violence in Rwanda, preliminary analysis revealed that there was 
more of certain forms of violence—specifically damaged and destroyed villages303—
along the Chadian border in Darfur. As noted in Chapter 5, this is perhaps because of the 
ease of reaching these communities from multiple sides. It also follows research that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  303	  There were not more bombings, however, perhaps because they can be indiscriminate 
and perhaps because of fears regarding bombing too close to another country’s land.	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suggests that borders are contested areas that tend to see more violence, both during civil 
wars (e.g., Hegre, Ostby, and Raleigh 2009) and in times of peace.  
 Several other theories related to civil wars were relevant for Bosnia and Darfur. 
Elevation was significantly associated with higher rates of civilian deaths in Bosnia and 
damaged and destroyed villages in Darfur. The presence of rebel groups in elevated areas 
in Darfur complicates this measure, but it does speak to the remoteness of the areas, a key 
reason that elevation is hypothesized to influence both macro- and meso-level variation in 
civil wars (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Bohara, Mitchell, and Nepal 2006; Cederman, 
Buhaug, and Rod 2009). While these may apply to numerous forms of violence, the fact 
that these genocides were in some ways perpetrated like civil wars surely influenced the 
relevance of strategic, spatial, and temporal factors. 
In Rwanda, the capital saw comparatively higher levels of killing, perhaps in part 
because there was a coordinated plan that unfolded under the eyes of the central 
government. There was more room for variation in other parts of the country. In Bosnia, 
violence also took place in both urban and rural areas, and, like in Rwanda, there was 
generally not a statistically significant difference between the two. In Darfur, however, 
the three capital cities—arguably the only urban areas in the region—saw much lower 
levels of bombings and destruction. The comparative heterogeneity of the cities is likely 
one reason. Another may be that these three cities remained in the watchful eye of the 
international community,304 which may help explain the shift in violence to unfounded 
arrests and discrimination. Indeed, although this is different to capture quantitatively, 
especially with analyses of only some of the forms of violence, Bosnia also saw some 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  304	  Clearly, the presence of the international community is not enough to prevent all 
violence: there are records of violence taking place right in front of peacekeepers’ eyes. 	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differences in the form of violence in cities, as Sarajevo and several other key urban areas 
saw sieges that kept people living in constant fear but generally did not see massacres.305   
 In terms of time, memories of violence may also be at play, though this is an area 
that merits much additional research. In Rwanda, previous violence in each region was 
not associated with violence during the genocide, suggesting that meso-level factors 
related to memory (or perhaps impunity or even previously formed networks) did not 
directly influence these patterns. Yet, in Bosnia, the number of Serb concentration camps 
during World War II was related to the number of Serb-run concentration camps between 
1992 and 1994, suggesting that memories of specific forms of violence may influence the 
chosen forms of violence during genocide. Likewise, in Darfur, previous battles were 
associated with damage and destruction of villages in 2003, again suggesting connections 
between violence that occurred before the genocide and the violence that unfolded during 
genocide. As genocides are not isolated events and processes but are part of broader 
histories, future studies should consider connections between violence before and after 
genocide (Karstedt 2013).  
 Finally, contrary to the intentions, interventions did not significantly reduce 
violence in any case. In Rwanda, the presence of French troops did not lower the odds of 
genocide, in large part due to their late arrival. In Bosnia, Safe Areas where UN troops 
were present had more violence, although this effect is partially driven by Srebrenica, a 
Safe Area where 8,000 Bosniak men were murdered in just several days. This is not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  305	  Rwanda did not see this, and though it is speculative, one reason may be the 
comparative lack of international interest as the genocide was unfolding.	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meant to argue against interventions but to highlight the importance of timing. I will 
further test for the case of Darfur when data become available.306  
 Several other common explanations of meso-level violence were negated in 
Rwanda and Bosnia.307 First, intermarriage is often discussed as having an ameliorative 
effect on violence and, more broadly, serving as a sign of tolerance (e.g., Alba and 
Golden 1986). In Rwanda and Bosnia, however, intermarriage was not significantly 
associated with lower levels of violence. While this finding is unexpected, intermarriage 
may be a marker of tolerance before the process of genocide begins, at which point 
identities become essentialized. Indeed, the first of the Hutu 10 Commandments was that 
any Hutu who married a Tutsi woman would be considered a traitor. This perhaps meant 
that those Hutus were targeted, perhaps partially explaining the lack of the significant 
negative effect. In Bosnia, the same thought process might have been prevalent.   
 Population density and resource scarcity did not influence the rate of violence in 
any of the three cases (in fact, population density in Rwanda was associated with less 
violence in some models, perhaps because these communities came into contact with one 
another and because population density is associated with economic growth [Crenshaw 
and Robinson 2010]). This refutes a number of theories (Homer-Dixon 1994; Urdal 
2008). Yet, I interpret these results cautiously, as more fine-grained analyses may reveal 
different patterns at more micro levels. Second, while these findings suggest that resource 
scarcity (as measured) or population density as measured do not influence the rate of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  306	  I have a fine-grained dataset of all interventions (including economic sanctions, for 
example) in Bosnia, which I will also test against killing over time when the final data 
become available. I am also working to analyze the impact of economic sanctions on 
genocide more broadly.	  	  307	  Recall that I am not yet able to test this measure for Darfur, as census data are not 
available.	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violence, places of particular forms of abundance in both Rwanda and Darfur saw less 
violence. In Rwanda, Hutu employment in the formal sector was associated with a 
decreased rate of violence, while Tutsi employment in the formal sector was not. 
Likewise, in Darfur, regions with higher levels of land ownership saw decreased 
violence. This suggests that multiple other measures of resource scarcity and resource 
abundance should be analyzed and that, rather than broad measures of scarcity that rely 
upon population density and arable land, context-specific measures that pay more 
attention to the meaning attached to certain commodities should be explored.  
The increased violence in arable areas of Darfur further complicates the effect of 
scarcity, instead showing an instance in which people and culture were apparently 
damaged but land was specifically not destroyed because the abundant resources were 
coveted by the attackers (Collier and Hoffler 2004; Ross 2006). Again, the context-
specific resources likely matter here. In addition, this may suggest that motivations for 
participation, such as the potential to achieve land, may also influence meso-level 
patterns, though this may vary based on whether the perpetrators live within the same 
village or travel to attack other places, as did the Janjaweed.  
 Overall, factors that influenced regional variation in each form of violence 
included the presence of the victim group, the size of the general population, and the 
presence of organized actors (specifically armies and/or militias). As members of the 
community participated in the violence in Rwanda, community-level measures like 
marriage and employment influenced the rate of violence, which was also influenced by 
violence in surrounding communities. Likewise, methods used to spread the ideology 
against the Tutsis—including the radio and the education system—influenced the rate of 
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killings. This was not the case in Bosnia or Darfur, where the vast majority of 
perpetrators participated through their formal employment—especially those in armies, as 
well as local government officials, police, and firefighters—or were recruited into 
militias through specific mechanisms. In these cases, patterns of organizational action 
drove the violence,308 with organizations that were connected to the state perpetrating the 
majority of the violence. In Bosnia, this mainly involved distance from the Serbian 
border, as places that were closer had higher levels of violence because they were 
particularly important for Greater Serbia. In Darfur, borders and the remoteness from 
cities mattered.  
Beyond magnitude, I analyzed the onset timing of violence, finding that violence 
did not begin at the same time throughout the country in any case. Indeed, while I 
previously mentioned the spark that begins genocide at the state level, the case studies 
also made clear that there are probably sparks at sub-national levels, something currently 
missing from genocide studies literature. For example, violence did not begin in the 
Butare region of Rwanda until the interim President traveled to give a speech in the 
region and removed the current governor. I do not study these particular sparks, as I seek 
to understand structural factors that influence onset. Instead, for Rwanda and Bosnia,309 I 
analyzed the factors that may have influenced the onset of genocidal violence, 
conceptualizing early and late onset in Bosnia and early, middle, and late onset in 
Rwanda. As there are not theories regarding the onset of violence, I analyzed if and how 
the factors tested regarding the magnitude of violence also explain its onset.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
308 I do not study organizational-rule breaking in this dissertation. See Savelsberg 2010 
for additional insights.	  	  309	  As noted in Chapter 5, my temporal analysis for Darfur was limited to a descriptive 
analysis of aggregate ebbs and flows over time due to a lack of data. 	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  In general, I found that the factors that influenced the magnitude of violence in 
Rwanda generally did not influence the onset. One parallel is that regions with higher 
levels of radio ownership saw earlier onsets of violence—likely because the radio 
broadcast messages urging people to participate in the violence and spreading fear that 
the Tutsis were responsible for shooting down the President’s plane. Beyond this, factors 
that influenced the magnitude and onset differed. For example, cities saw earlier onset, 
again linked to the plan and leaders’ proximity facilitating this plan, although the 
urban/rural divide did not influence the magnitude of the violence. By contrast, regions 
with higher percentages of Catholic—which also did not influence magnitude—saw 
slightly later onsets, perhaps linked to the actions of clergy who sought to protect people. 
Alternatively, this effect may be explained by the sheer number of people who fled to 
their local churches, which may have slightly delayed, but not, in the end, deterred 
violence. Tutsi formal employment is also associated with later onset, suggesting that the 
integration of Tutsis into daily life may have delayed violence, though it did not influence 
the magnitude of violence.  
 In Bosnia, however, I found much similarity between factors that influenced the 
onset and magnitude of violence. Specifically, polarized communities and regions that 
bordered Serbia—two predictors of magnitude—saw violence comparatively earlier. 
Organized actors were also clearly associated with the onset. Yet, it was not the Serb 
armies or Serb paramilitaries but the presence of the Yugoslav Army that had the 
strongest effect. This fits the historical narrative of the violence, as the Yugoslav Army 
was controlled by Serbia and worked closely with Serbian forces in Bosnia, particularly 
at the outset of the violence. 
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 Lastly, percent urban was associated with earlier onset,310 capturing the pattern 
that soldiers and paramilitaries started by taking over main government offices in key 
cities and then spreading outward within a region. This draws an interesting parallel with 
Rwanda, where cities also saw violence first. Other than this parallel, the factors that 
influenced the onset of violence differed in the two cases, with community-level onset in 
Rwanda influenced by other local, more contingent factors and community-level onset in 
Bosnia generally linked to the same factors that influenced magnitude, suggesting a top-
down strategy. This strategy was also present in Rwanda, but since the citizens largely 
implemented it, there was more room for variation in the factors that influenced the onset.  
 Overall, then, it is clear that who the perpetrators are and how they are organized 
matters tremendously for both magnitude and onset of violence at sub-national levels, 
with community characteristics informed by theories from criminology coming into play 
when there is mass public participation from the community, and larger strategic aims 
and factors that influence civil wars, informed by literature on political and ethnic 
violence, influencing violence when organized militias and armies commit the vast 
majority of the violence.311  
These patterns may be complicated by analyses of the magnitude of violence over 
time, as well as the magnitude of violence over time by region, which is largely a future 
goal. Yet, analysis of this form for Bosnia illustrated that the factors that influenced 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  310	  Unemployment—capturing rural regions’ high levels of farming—is associated with 
later onset in Bosnia. 	  
311 As noted previously, future projects could rely upon criminological literature on 
organizational-rule breaking to better understand the functioning of these armies and 
militias—not a goal here, but clearly a worthy area of study and a way in which 
criminological literature could further inform the study of genocide.  
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magnitude varied over time, suggesting the continued importance of incorporating a 
temporal element into meso-level studies of violence. 
Furthermore, while I did not analyze the aggregate magnitude of violence over 
time in great detail, there were interesting patterns in the ebbs and flows of violence in 
Bosnia and Darfur. Figure 6.3 reproduces figures depicting these patterns from Chapters 
4 and 5.  
Figure 6.3: Violence over Time in Bosnia and Darfur  
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For each, it is clear that the highest levels of violence took place relatively early within 
the episode of violence; here, momentum does not lead to increased violence over time. 
This is also supported in anecdotal reports from Rwanda, which suggest much more 
violence in April than in subsequent months. Yet, there were other spikes after the largest 
spike of violence, with larger spikes occurring near the end of each episode—again 
something worthy of future study.  
 Analyzing the violence over time also brings several other differences to light. As 
discussed, the violence in Rwanda lasted just over three months, violence in Bosnia 
lasted three years, and violence in Darfur has been going on for over ten years. A few 
thoughts can be offered on factors influencing duration. First, the size of the countries 
likely matters. Rwanda and Bosnia are each much smaller than Sudan, a vast country in 
comparison and a place where travel to commit or respond to violence is difficult. 
Second, the violence in Rwanda saw the mass participation of over one million 
perpetrators, which likely facilitated quicker violence. Victims often congregated in large 
groups, further facilitating killings. Only one group was fighting the government, and 
regime change brought the violence to a close. In Bosnia, by contrast, there were three 
sides to the violence, adding more complexity, and international intervention in the form 
of NATO airstrikes helped end the violence. Darfur has even more factions; the two 
original rebel groups continually splinter and disagree among themselves, rather than 
joining forces to fight the government. Violence continues today, though it is worth 
nothing that every refugee I interviewed suggested regime change and international 
intervention as pathways to end the violence.  
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 In sum, while analyses of the onset of genocidal violence are important, the 
disaggregation of violence over space and by time brings additional insights. Doing so for 
the cases of Rwanda, Bosnia, and Sudan illustrated that who the perpetrators are and how 
they are organized influences both the magnitude and the onset of violence, with 
community organization and the spread of ideology mattering when the violence was 
perpetrated more spontaneously312 by members of the community and strategic aims and 
broader spatial and temporal factors having a larger influence when the violence is 
perpetrated by formally organized groups.  
Integrating Insights  
Thus far, I have analyzed the factors that led to the violence, comparing insights from the 
quantitative analysis in Chapter 2 and the preconditions of genocide in each of the case 
studies. After reviewing how this informs the onset of genocide and linking it to general 
theories of genocide, I moved to sub-national levels, considering the factors that 
influenced the magnitude and onset of violence at meso levels. In this last section, I 
integrate insights, first discussing what influenced the onset and unfolding of the violence 
and then linking these factors to Hagan and Rymond-Richmond’s (2008, 2009) collective 
action theory of genocide, using them to expand and specify this theory.  
Considering what influenced the onset of genocide alongside what influenced the 
unfolding of violence yields several discoveries. At the societal level, an ideology that 
excludes and demonizes or dehumanizes segments of society was influential both as a 
factor in the onset of violence as well as at meso levels, with the spread of ideology 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  312	  As noted in Chapter 3, there were some previously recruited militias, such as the 
Interahamwe.Yet, the vast majority of perpetrators were civilians,	  though	  network ties 
and other affiliations likely also patterned participation in the violence (in other words, it 
was not completely spontaneous). 	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linked to meso-level violence in Rwanda. Yet, this was not the case in Bosnia or Darfur, 
where the violence was organized by the state and enacted by state actors.  
Though the ethnic heterogeneity of the population is not significantly associated 
with the odds of genocidal onset in Chapter 2, it was one of the strongest predictors of the 
magnitude (and, in Bosnia, onset) of violence at meso levels. Similarly, although the 
population of the country does not influence the onset of genocide directly, it does 
influence patterns in violence at sub-national levels.  
 Turning to state-level factors, I do not analyze whether and how some factors, 
such as the type of government or the GDP, influence the onset and magnitude of 
violence within a country’s regions. It is unlikely that these would influence variation in 
violence across regions, as they would not vary by region. Yet, they could influence the 
process of genocide in other ways, which remains to be studied. In close connection with 
this, while years at risk is associated with the onset of violence, it is less clear here how it 
is associated with the magnitude or onset at sub-national levels.313 
The situation in which the state is operating influenced violence at both levels, 
however. Civil war, for example, is a prominent factor that influences the onset and 
unfolding of genocide, as was seen by the significance of the frontline in Rwanda and in 
Bosnia. International interconnectedness may also matter broadly for both, with trade 
levels influencing onset and interventions having the potential to influence violence on 
the ground. While analyses thus far did not find significant effects of international 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  313	  Again, however, there are feasible pathways. For example, time at risk (in capturing 
regime durability) may be related with state capacity, which may, in turn, be related to its 
ability to implement genocide and fight resistance movements.	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interventions on the magnitude or onset of violence, it is clear from the case of Bosnia 
that such interventions have the potential to bring violence to a close.  
This begins to draw connections across these conceptual levels, yet it does not yet 
link levels. To do so, I rely upon Hagan and Rymond-Richmond’s (2008) Collective 
Action Theory of Genocide. This recent theory was devised to explain genocide in 
Darfur.314 While it is not typically integrated into most work of genocide scholars, it 
holds numerous insights and is particularly valuable for analyzing the process of 
genocide at multiple levels.  
Utilizing James Coleman’s (1986) macro-/micro-scheme (see Figure 6.4), Hagan 
and Rymond-Richmond begin at the macro level, noting resource competition within 
Darfur and the Sudanese Government’s ideologies directed against Black African tribes. 
This results in socially constructed identities and provides a vocabulary that reinforces an 
us/them theme. At the micro level, the us/them dichotomy and vocabulary influence 
individual racial intent. Collective action of individuals at the micro level transforms into 
collectivized racial intent, which aggregates to macro-level patterns of genocide and 
results in a genocidal state. 
This theory is well supported by the ADS data that Hagan and Rymond-
Richmond analyze, though it is not without criticisms. Particularly, the exclusive focus 
on race (rather than other potential motivations) is seen as problematic (Matsueda 2009; 
Shaw 2010; Mann 2011). However, this theory has yet to be extended to other cases and 
must be revised in order to be applied to other situations of genocide. Thus, I review how 
insights gleaned throughout this dissertation can inform, expand, and specify this theory. 
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  For additional levels and insights, see Saveslberg 2010.	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Figure 6.4: Hagan and Rymond-Richmond’s Collective Action Theory of Genocide  
 
State Factors 
Step one in Hagan and Rymond-Richmond’s collective action theory of genocide 
in Darfur is state-led Arabization, Arab supremacy, and related ideologies exacerbated by 
resource competition, resulting in dehumanization. This first step in the process 
highlights the conditions that influenced genocide in Sudan, suggesting it ultimately 
began at the state level because of several key factors. Yet, there have been many 
situations in which state-led ideologies privilege certain groups, dehumanization, and 
competition over resources, but genocide does not occur. Likewise, these factors do not 
explain the state-level onset of all genocides.  
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Instead, Chapter 2 paints a more general picture of conditions in which genocide 
occurs, pointing particularly to the state and the context in which it operates. In this 
regard, it falls in line with Hagan and Rymond-Richmond’s theory, suggesting that 
genocidal violence begins with active (or, at minimum, tacit) state involvement, as seen 
in each of the case studies.315  Yet, it also extends this theory by focusing on general 
preconditions.  
Specifically, comparatively young countries with exclusionary ideologies,316 
salient elite ethnicities, and autocratizing governments have the highest odds of genocide. 
Importantly, genocide is most likely to occur when these regimes face some form of 
threat or upheaval—such as a civil war, coup, or revolution. Thus, Hagan and Rymond-
Richmond’s general focus on ideology and land can be couched within this broader 
model, as seen in the figure below. And while this is the first step in the model, processes 
related to these factors may unfold over years before genocide actually begins.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  315	  As noted in Chapters 1 and 2, state involvement is not necessary for an event to be 
considered genocide. Nevertheless, the modern genocides analyzed throughout this 
project all began with some level of state involvement. 	  316	  Notably, the collective action theory of genocide also begins at the point in which an 
exclusionary ideology is already present. Chapter 2 can also inform this. Specifically, I 
analyzed the factors that influence whether such exclusionary ideologies exist within a 
country, finding that autocracies with colonial pasts, low levels of ethnolinguistic 
diversity, salient elite ethnicities, comparatively low trade relations, and upheaval have 
the highest odds of fostering an exclusionary ideology.  	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Figure 6.5: Collective Action Theory of Genocide: Revision 1 
 
Socially Constructed Identities   
Before and during genocide, the state influences the social construction of social 
identities (Link 1 in each figure). As Hagan and Rymond-Richmond suggest, the 
Sudanese State and its agents constructed the identities associated with both the victim 
and the perpetrator group. This resulted in the depiction of certain groups as “African” 
and others as “Arab,” with Africans seen as inferior.  
While the figure is particular to Sudan, Chapters 3 and 4 revealed similar 
processes in Rwanda and Bosnia. In Rwanda, government leaders had long labeled Tutsis 
enemies and invaders who were to blame for Hutu marginalization. In Bosnia, state 
leaders in both Bosnia and Serbia constructed Bosniaks as foreigners (“Turks”) who had 
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wrongly adopted Islam and lived on land that was rightfully Serb land (or, to a lesser 
degree, Croat). In each case, these processes were influenced by other actors, such as 
members of the Catholic Church or colonizers and the remnants of the institutions they 
created. While the state is key to the creation of these identities, other influences must 
also be considered in an analysis of locally organized and socially constructed 
identities.317 
Thus, the state and its agents, as well as other institutions, influence the social 
construction and essentialization of what will become perpetrator and victim groups, as 
well as the relationship between these groups. To be clear, the labels applied to these 
groups are often more fluid and complex than simple binary identities (again, even the 
labels of perpetrator and victim become complicated quickly, since someone might kill 
one neighbor, rescue another neighbor, and lose a family member during the same 
episode of violence [Fujii 2011]). Nevertheless, in the abstract, each genocide involves 
socially constructed victim and perpetrator groups; much of the construction of these 
groups is influenced by the state and other actors both before318 and during genocide.  
As the collective action theory of genocide is applied to Darfur, Figure 6.4 above 
includes three “Black African” tribes who were targeted in Darfur and specific groups of 
perpetrators, including the Janjaweed, Sudanese soldiers, and the Janjaweed and 
Sudanese soldiers acting in tandem. To apply this theory to other genocides, more general 
categories are needed to capture socially constructed victim and perpetrator identities, 
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  As discussed in Chapter 3, there are also often sub-identities within these groups that 
are too complex to include in a general theory. For example, in Rwanda, Northern Hutus 
and Southern Hutus were associated with two different identities.	  	  318	  Indeed, this construction can often take place over years and even decades, as was 
made clear by the case of Rwanda, where Tutsis were demonized in the 1950s. 	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shown in the figure below. As illustrated in Chapters 3-5, the victim group is often 
constructed as outsiders responsible for the marginalization of the perpetrator group. The 
perpetrator group is often constructed as marginalized (by fault of the victim) and acting 
in self-defense. These identities provide an organizing foundation for ethnically (or 
group)-based political parties and similar organizations. 
 
Figure 6.6: Collective Action Theory of Genocide: Revision 2 
 
Individual and Collectivized Genocidal Intent 
 The social construction of groups influences individuals who participate in 
genocide. As noted previously, genocide is an event that is comprised of millions of 
individual actions, in line with Coleman’s suggestion that macro phenomena result from 
 362	  
pathways that aggregate individual actions. Thus, at this next step, Hagan and Rymond-
Richmond explain that identities influence individual racial intent. In a masterful 
analysis, they draw upon Katz’s (1988) theory of righteous slaughter to argue that racial 
intent is signified by the racial epithets heard by victims in Darfur.  
 As my study does not analyze the individual level, I cannot inform this particular 
aspect of the model in great detail. Yet, I suggest three qualifications (gleaned from 
interviews and other aspects of this analysis) in the process of modifying the collective 
action theory of genocide to apply to other genocides. First, the form of the intent must be 
broadened. Racial intent is one form of genocidal intent; thus, the theory should be 
broadened to genocidal intent that targets any social group through the establishment of 
inferior and superior categories, as discussed in Chapter 1. Second, as discussed in 
Chapter 4, it must be qualified that it is not necessary that each person who participates in 
genocidal violence possess genocidal intent. Indeed, some of the perpetrators that Fujii 
(2011) and Straus (2006) interviewed in Rwanda highlighted how complex, interrelated 
motives—such as hope to acquire land or fear of personal harm—influenced participation 
in genocidal violence, falling in line with Brustein’s (1996) suggestion that many joined 
the Nazi party because of its benefits, not because of their hatred toward certain groups. 
This does not mean that genocide does not take place at a systemic level but that 
individual intent is more complex and multifaceted. Third, individual intent (and 
associated actions) can influence the social construction of the groups. In other words, 
individual intent and actions reinforce and even change socially constructed identities in a 
feedback loop. Again, this is not something analyzed in this study, so I suggest these 
modifications—particularly the last one—as modifications for future exploration.  
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 As Hagan and Rymond-Richmond explain, these individuals, who are motivated 
by genocidal intent as well as other factors, then commit genocidal acts; and the 
collection of actions aggregates to collective intent (Link 3a). Indeed, the greatest 
strength of Hagan and Rymond-Richmond’s model is in explaining explain how a 
genocidal system can emerge from the interdependent actions of individuals and how the 
yelling of racial epithets influences the production of collective intent in this case (for 
their particular analysis, see their 2008 and 2009 publications).319  
 Yet, to even bring individual actions into play, the theory needs one additional 
modification. To this point, nothing in the theory explains why individual intent would 
translate into individual action, which is implicitly assumed. But, there have likely been 
many countries that fit this description up to this point, but did not experience genocide. 
And there are often individuals who harbor notions of superiority and inferiority, but do 
not act on those ideas by attempting to kill or remove members of that group. Thus, a 
genocidal spark must be specified. As noted earlier in this chapter, a “spark,” a catalyst or 
turning point at the macro-level, influences the transition to genocide. All turning points 
are not sparks, but the spark is the most proximal turning point before systematic 
violence begins. All citizens or participants do not spontaneously pick up arms and begin 
engaging in genocidal action; a turning point, often both at the state level and at sub-
national levels, influences the beginning of violence.  
Once individual intent aggregates to collective intent and collective action, 
collective actions are organized in numerous ways. In their book, Hagan and Rymond-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  319	  Here I also included a feedback arrow, suggesting that the group organization and 
action reinforces individual actions. This is well in line with Hagan and Rymond-
Richmond’s argument, though a feedback arrow is not included in their figure. 	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Richmond discuss the actions of government leaders, leaders of the Janjaweed, and 
members of the Janjaweed and the Sudanese army. Again, however, this must be 
generalized for other episodes of genocide. In the case of Bosnia and Rwanda, several 
groups of actors perpetrated the genocides, including state actors and armies, 
paramilitaries, and local citizens who were not members of institutionalized groups, both 
“ordinary” citizens and citizens acting through their local positions as agents of the 
state.320   
Notably, these groups were mobilized in various ways (Link 1). Ordinary citizens 
in Rwanda were mobilized to participate in the violence through discriminatory, 
dehumanizing, and blaming messages. More proximal to the genocide, local citizens were 
mobilized through self-defense groups that stressed impending Tutsi threats, trained them 
to fight, and distributed weapons.  
In Rwanda, the army was also under the control of those who planned the 
genocide. The balance of collective action, as discussed above, tilts far toward local 
actors, however. In other words, while the army participated, the genocide in Rwanda 
saw mass collective action from citizens who were not previously formally organized. 
This was not the case in Bosnia. While local actors participated, much of the violence 
was organized and implemented by soldiers and paramilitaries—working hand in hand—
that moved throughout the country. These paramilitaries were also trained in local self-
defense committees, though their organization was less organic than in Rwanda. These 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  320	  While these are the three main types, there are certainly others. For example, there are 
often loosely organized perpetrator groups that may not quite rise to the organization of a 
paramilitary but are nevertheless organized actors exerting their will in tandem. 	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different organizations and forms of collective action taken by perpetrators are important, 
as they influence the last stage of the model—the patterns of genocidal violence.321   
 
Figure 6.7: Collective Action Theory of Genocide: Revision 3 
 
 
Genocidal State and Patterns of Victimization 
 In the last step of Hagan and Rymond-Richmond’s model, the patterns of 
collective action aggregate to produce a genocidal state and genocidal victimization. The 
model has little to say about these patterns, however. Yet, the process to this point 
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  Note also that the organization and actions of these groups likely influences individual 
intent, suggesting another feedback loop and area for future research. 	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directly influences the patterns, and I suggest that findings from my case studies can 
inform our understanding of these patterns.  
Namely, as I show in Chapters 3-5 and discussed above, who the perpetrators are 
and how they are organized directly influences the patterns of genocidal violence. The 
form of collective action is related to the variation in spatial and temporal patterns of 
genocidal violence. If state ideologies and actions target a broad participation base, 
community collective action—as in Rwanda—can result. However, if the state organizes 
paramilitaries and calls upon armies to perpetrate a larger share of the violence, the 
organization and actions of these armed actors plays a larger role in determining the 
patterns of genocidal violence that unfold.  
Broadly speaking, then, genocide is perpetrated through community collective 
action and/or formally organized collective action, though different episodes of genocide 
experience different degrees of each so that they could be plotted on a continuum 
(ranging from only one form to different balances of each). The degree to which the 
collective action is community/participatory based or formally organized may have 
several key influences that stand to be further examined. First, when the participation 
takes the form of community collective action, there may be wider variation in the 
violence. Recall that Rwanda saw between 700 and 50,000 people killed in one 
commune. The factors that influenced the magnitude did not match the factors that 
influenced the onset—suggesting there was not a particular strategy but that local 
conditions influenced the onset of violence. This is, in part, due to the community 
participation in the violence, as a lack of formally organized action meant that 
community action occurred based on a broader number of factors. In Bosnia, variation in 
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violence was much smaller—between 100 and 9,000 killed within one municipality—and 
the factors that influenced the magnitude and onset of the violence were similar.322 This 
does not mean that local conditions did not influence violence, as they surely did, but 
they are generally overshadowed in larger patterns in the Bosnian case,323 in part due to 
the formally organized nature of the violence—members of armies and paramilitaries 
carrying out strategic plans perpetrated much of the violence, minimizing variation.324  
 Thus, variation in violence and the patterns therein may be directly linked to the 
organization of the perpetrators who comprise the collective action. When “ordinary” 
citizens participate in the violence, the factors that help explain variation in the violence 
are directly linked to how community members learned ideologies and community 
organization. In Rwanda, for example, key factors that influenced the magnitude of the 
violence included spreading propaganda to citizens. In addition, measures of community 
organization—drawn from criminology’s social disorganization theory—influenced the 
commune-level magnitude of violence. As noted above, marriage rates and employment 
were associated with lower rates of violence in communes.  
 The Rwandan army also participated in genocidal violence, and their actions 
influenced the rate of violence, as seen in the significance of the frontline. Yet, other 	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  Patterns in the variation in rates, which account for the population, are similar.	  	  323	  This is less clear for the case of Sudan, which tends to fall in line with Bosnia but also 
shows that motivations to garner arable land may have also influenced patterns. Thus, 
more fine-grained multivariate analyses are needed before speaking about the relative 
balance of these influences.	  	  324	  I concede that variation could be large if the strategic plan that guides armies and 
paramilitaries dictates adaptation, but I propose that community collective action results 
in broader levels of variation in the violence. I also anticipate that the relative control of 
the state on these different factors matters. For example, in Bosnia, the state had 
relatively high control over paramilitaries, which worked in tandem with the armies. In 
Sudan, the state had less control over the Janjaweed, influencing greater variation in the 
violence. 	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genocides have been perpetrated through much more formally organized collective 
action. As noted, armies and paramilitaries (and, to a lesser degree, other citizens) were 
largely responsible for the violence in Bosnia and Darfur. Due to this, the factors that 
help explain the variation in violence are more closely linked to organized strategy, such 
as strategic importance to Serbia and polarization of the communities in Bosnia or the 
remoteness of villages in Darfur. This does not mean that other community 
characteristics were not at play but that institutionalized actors and their strategies are 
particularly important for understanding the patterns of genocidal victimization.   
 Of course, the perpetrators and how they are organized are not sufficient to 
explain patterns of genocidal victimization. For example, state-level factors may have 
also influenced patterns of violence. Indeed, Jepperson and Meyer (2011) have critiqued 
the Coleman model (the basis of Hagan and Rymond-Richmond’s model) for its 
overemphasis on individual-level causes, suggesting that a causal arrow may also run 
between macro conditions. While I do not analyze this specifically in this dissertation, it 
is plausible that state-level factors, such as the organization of the state, directly influence 
the patterns of genocidal victimization, an area for fruitful future research.  
 Furthermore, while I did not find significant effects related to specific 
interventions in each of the three cases, it is likely that international interventions 
sometimes influence patterns of genocidal victimization. There may have been other 
barriers to the violence as well, such as the actions of particular individuals. And still 
other factors come into play, such as the population of the perceived victim groups, as 
depicted in the figure below.  
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Figure 6.8: Collective Action Theory of Genocide: Revision 4 
 
 
 
Overall, these changes to the Hagan and Rymond-Richmond model must be tested on 
other episodes of genocide. However, my focus on both the macro-level factors and the 
meso-level factors at play complement and extend this model, ultimately informing both 
the conditions and the courses of genocide.  
Concluding Thoughts  
In this dissertation, I have examined the causes and processes of one of the worst crimes 
of humanity. Drawing upon quantitative techniques and novel datasets, historical 
analysis, fieldwork, and 113 interviews, I have analyzed the factors that influenced both 
the onset of genocide globally as well as regional and temporal variation within genocidal 
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violence in the genocides in Rwanda, Bosnia, and Sudan. In doing so, I have drawn upon 
sociological literatures and, particularly, literature from genocide studies, criminology, 
and the study of political and ethnic violence.  
 As reviewed in this chapter, I began by assessing the risk factors of genocides that 
have occurred over the past 50 years, finding that societal, state, and international factors 
influence the occurrence of genocide and that civil war is its strongest precondition. I also 
find that many of the factors proposed to explain genocide better predict the presence of 
an exclusionary ideology, an important area for future research.  
 Genocide is a process, and as such, I also assess meso-level variation in the 
magnitude and onset of violence. In general, I find that factors that influence the onset of 
genocide are not sufficient to explain meso-level violence during genocide. Accordingly, 
I turn to numerous other factors, finding that community organization helps explain 
patterns in genocidal violence in cases when the perpetrators are “ordinary” citizens and 
that factors associated with strategy and civil war violence help explain patterns in 
genocidal violence when the perpetrators are members of previously-organized militias 
and army units.  
This research makes strides for genocide studies and sociology, though much 
remains to be done. Although the crime of genocide was first formally defined in the 
wake of the Nazi Holocaust, it has been a social problem for centuries. Yet, sociologists 
have remained surprisingly quiet in discussions of why and how genocide occurs. While 
my foremost goal has been to better understand genocide, I have also attempted to show 
that genocide is a worthy topic of sociological inquiry. Indeed, while the sheer death, 
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destruction, and social harm that genocide causes globally should make it a worthy topic, 
the study of genocide also aligns with other common areas of sociological inquiry. 
 As noted in Chapter 1, genocide is a form of collective action, committed by 
formal organizations as well through organic community action. People committing 
genocide target groups, a core subject of sociological inquiry, and often define these 
groups by race, ethnicity, religion, nation, and numerous other categories that create and 
reflect us/them mentalities. Though I have not analyzed it in great detail here, genocide is 
also gendered.  
People who commit genocide attempt to radically remake their societies, drawing 
upon the sociological concept of utopias and exercising control and power over people, 
bodies, and cultures. As such, genocide is often a project of the state and of state building 
and can be informed by a wealth of knowledge on each, as well as sociological research 
on power and control.  
Genocide is also a crime, likely to be informed by numerous theories in 
criminology, ranging from work on hate crimes to research on white-collar and organized 
crimes. For example, I have shown that criminology’s social disorganization theory can 
inform genocide under certain situations, and this is just one application from a plethora 
of theories. Beyond this, genocide is a form of political and ethnic violence, alongside 
civil wars and human rights violations, and can be informed by and extend theories 
created to explain these social phenomena.  
Additionally, genocide is social change. As sociology’s founders were concerned 
with the impacts of social change, many of their theories—including those regarding the 
role of strain, relevant throughout this dissertation—can likely inform the study of 
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genocide. Genocide can also become a new norm within a society as it unfolds; the study 
of norms and rituals are likely fruitful avenues for future research.  
Sociological inquiry can also inform processes that occur after genocide. The 
memory of the violence can have many effects on a society, an important topic for 
sociologists of knowledge. And, those who are interested in transitional justice should 
find much to study by analyzing how a country rebuilds after violence and experiences 
the many lasting effects of the genocidal violence. Furthermore, sociologists of health 
and medicine could assess the effects of trauma, sexualized violence, and displacement 
(including violence in refugee camps).  
These are just a few of the many potential avenues through which sociological 
research can inform the study of genocide. Extending theories to explain these and other 
topics central to the study of genocide will provide tests of existing theories, further 
improving and extending the discipline of sociology. Sociology’s vast methodological 
toolkit, ranging from quantitative analysis of patterns to in-depth oral history interviews, 
will also bring much to this area of inquiry. If this is the “crime of crimes,” a thousand or 
a million individual crimes constituting a crime against humanity (both the collective of 
peoples and the very concept), it is well worth scholars using every skill at our disposal to 
analyze, ameliorate, and even prevent future instances of genocide.  
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Appendix A 
Genocides, 1955-2005 
Country Years 
Brief Description of First Genocidal Event since 1955 or 
Independence 
*Afghanistan 
 
1978(1980)- 
1992 
Widespread Mujahedeen rural insurgency provokes Soviet and 
Afghan government tactics of systematic terror, destruction of 
villages, and execution of prisoners. 
Algeria 1962 
In the wake of independence from France, Algerian militants 
attack Europeans and Muslim civilians who collaborated with 
French colonial authorities. 
Angola 
 1975- 
1994 
The National Union for the Independence of Angola rebels and 
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola led government 
forces in destructive campaigns and atrocities against civilians.  
Argentina 
 1976- 
1980 
Military stages coup and declares state of siege. Death squads 
target subversives for disappearances, kidnappings, torture, and 
murder. 
*Bosnia 
 1992- 
1995 
Muslim residents of Bosnia are subject to "ethnic cleansing" 
measures including destruction of property, forced resettlement, 
execution, and massacres by Serb and Croat forces seeking union 
with Serbia and Croatia. 
Myanmar 
(Burma) 1978 
To secure the border region, regular military units supported by 
militant Buddhist elements depopulate Arakanese Muslim 
communities in Western Burma by oppression, destruction, 
torture, and murder. 
*Burundi 
 
1965(1972)- 
1973 
Attempted coup by Hutu units in 1965 results in massacres of 
Tutsis. Ruling Tutsis respond by unleashing a Tutsi-dominated 
Army to destroy Hutu leaders.  
*Cambodia 
 1975- 
1979 
Khmer Rouge initiate restructuring of society with massive 
deaths by starvation, deprivation, executions, and massacres of 
supporters of the old regime, city dwellers, and ethnic and 
religious minorities. 
Chile 
 1973- 
1976 
In wake of military coup, supporters of former regime and other 
leftists are arrested, tortured, disappeared, exiled, and summarily 
executed. 
*China 1959 (1956) 
Army and security forces suppress counter-revolutionary 
elements of society, including Tibetan Buddhists, landowners, 
and supporters of former Chiang Kai-shek regime. 
Congo-
Kinshasa 
 1964- 
1965 
To consolidate control, rebels massacre counter-revolutionaries, 
including educated Congolese, missionaries, and other 
Europeans. 
Congo-
Kinshasa 1997 
Laurent Kabila’s movement systematically kills tens of 
thousands of Hutu refugees. 
El Salvador 
 1980- 
1989 
In the face of widespread insurgency, military, security units, and 
death squads kill, imprison, and harass suspected leftists among 
clergy, peasants, urban workers, and intellectuals. 
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Equatorial 
Guinea 
 1969- 
1979 
President Macias pressures Spanish residents to abandon control 
of the economy in February 1969. The ensuing crisis triggers an 
unsuccessful coup attempt, which triggers a violent and sustained 
crackdown on all political opposition. 
*Ethiopia 
 1976-1979 
 (1983) 
Army, internal security units, and civilian defense squads 
massacre political and military elites, workers, students, 
bureaucrats, and others thought to oppose the regime. 
*Guatemala 
 1978 
(1980)- 
1990 
Military-dominated governments initiate series of anti-guerrilla 
campaigns with use of death squads against suspected leftists and 
indigenous Mayans.  
*Indonesia 
 1965- 
1966 
After attempted Communist coup, Muslim vigilantes massacre 
Party members and ethnic Chinese. After government formally 
bans Party; military eliminates suspected Communists and 
sympathizers. 
*Iran 
 
1981(1979)- 
1992 
To consolidate Islamic revolution, government violently 
suppresses dissident Muslims (Mujahedeen) and rebel Kurds and 
selectively executes prominent Bahá'ís. 
*Iraq 
 1963-1975  
(1987) 
1963: To suppress repeated rebellions for independent Kurdistan 
in northern Iraq, government engages in large-scale massacres. 
1987: Military and security forces launch campaign of 
indiscriminate destruction across Iraqi Kurdistan to neutralize 
Kurdish guerrillas.  
Nigeria 1967-1969 
Government’s deliberate blocking of international aid results in 
the death of Ibos. 
*Pakistan 
(1949-1971) 1971 
General strikes by Bengali nationalists are met with martial law. 
Military uses tanks, airpower, and artillery and attacks civilians. 
Pakistan 
(1972-) 
 1973- 
1977 
Baluchi rebellion suppressed by military using violence against 
civilians. 
Philippines 
 1972- 
1976 
Moro resistance to government-sponsored Christian settlement 
and support of guerrillas fighting for autonomy results in military 
and paramilitary terror tactics; many Moros are killed in 
massacres and napalm bombings. 
*Rwanda 1963 (1962) 
Local Hutu officials orchestrate vengeance attacks against Tutsis 
following cross-border incursions by Tutsi rebels. 
Somalia 
 1988- 
1991 
Rebellion in the north by Somali National Movement leads to 
government anti-insurgency operations, causing many civilian 
deaths (particularly among Issaq clan).  
Sri Lanka 
 1989- 
1990 
Revolutionary campaign by Marxist Sinhalese JVP prompts 
government to unleash military and police death squads. Killings 
of JVP leaders, supporters, and poor Sinhalese youth in rural 
areas eliminate JVP. 
*Sudan 
1956-1972 
(2003) 
1956: Government uses indiscriminate violence to suppress 
mostly non-Muslim Africans who support a secessionist 
movement in the south. 2003: Government-supported Arab 
militias kill, rape, and burn the homes of members of the Fur, 
Masalit, and Zaghawa tribes.  
Syria 
 1981- 
1982 
Government military and security forces crush revolt by Muslim 
Brotherhood centered in cities of Hama and Aleppo. 
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*Uganda 
 1971- 
1979 
After General Amin seizes power, he systematically exterminates 
political opponents and personal enemies. Tribes closely 
associated with his predecessor also are targeted for destruction.  
South 
Vietnam1 
 1965- 
1975 
Government military and paramilitary forces engage in killings, 
reprisals, and bombardments against villagers supporting Viet 
Cong. 
*Yugoslavia 
 1998- 
1999 
Serb militias backed by Yugoslavian armed forces target ethnic-
Albanians to counter insurgency and cleanse Kosovo of 
Albanians.  
Zimbabwe 1983 State-sponsored massacre in Matabeleland.  
 
Note: The table is adapted from the Political Instability Task Force. Also, note that there were too many 
missing data for South Vietnam, so it is excluded. Stars indicate countries included in the restricted 
definition of genocide based on Fein’s (1993a) coding, and dates in parentheses are onset dates according 
to Fein. 
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Appendix B 
 
Exclusionary ideologies are operationally defined by the Political Instability Task 
Force to include the following: 
• Adherents of strict variants of Marxism–Leninism, such as the German 
Democratic Republic, are coded as exclusionary. Laos, Vietnam, the People’s 
Republic of China, and North Korea are coded as exclusionary up to 1998. 
Socialist regimes that tolerated some civil society organizations and/or allowed 
significant free enterprise (like Hungary after the 1960s) are not coded as 
exclusionary. 
•  Islamic states governed on the basis of Shari’a law, such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, 
and Sudan, are coded as exclusionary. Islamic states that permit some expression 
of other religions, like Bahrain and Oman, are not coded as exclusionary. 
• Advocates of anticommunist doctrines such as those advanced by military-
dominated elites in some time periods in Taiwan and South Korea are coded as 
exclusionary. Additionally, national security regimes in some Latin American 
countries during the 1960s and 1970s are coded as exclusionary.  
• Advocates of doctrines of ethnic and ethnonationalist superiority or exclusivity, 
including Iraq, South Africa during Apartheid, Serbia, and Bhutan, are also coded 
as exclusionary. Indonesia’s “Pancasila Democracy” is also coded as 
exclusionary. 
• Advocates of doctrines of strict secular nationalism that exclude political 
participation of religious movements, such as Turkey, Egypt, and Algeria, were 
coded as exclusionary (Harff 2003; PITF 2009; Marshall 2010.)   
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Notably, white supremacy is lacking from this coding scheme. While white 
supremacy has arguably been a driving factor in past genocides, it has not been noted as a 
factor in recent genocides. Furthermore, other racist and nationalist ideologies have been 
proposed as factors, though no variable exists to measure these to my knowledge.  
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Appendix C 
Figure 2.3: Hazard of Genocide by Risk Set Entrance 
	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 379	  
 
Appendix D 
Settlements in Darfur in 2004 
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